Full Judgment Text
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 11
PETITIONER:
MOHD. SHAUKAT HUSSAIN KHAN
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
DATE OF JUDGMENT02/05/1974
BENCH:
REDDY, P. JAGANMOHAN
BENCH:
REDDY, P. JAGANMOHAN
KHANNA, HANS RAJ
CITATION:
1974 AIR 1480 1975 SCR (1) 429
1974 SCC (2) 376
CITATOR INFO :
D 1986 SC 515 (105,106)
ACT:
Hyderabad Inams Abolition Act, 1955 and Amendment Act No. 10
of 1956--Repealed by Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area)
Abolition of Inams Act 9 of 1967 passed by the Andhra
Pradesh Legislature--Whether the Inam Act of 1955 revived on
striking down of Act No. 9 of 1967 by the High Court of
Andhra Pradesh--Whether Abkari rights subsisting on the Inam
lands were also abolished by the Inam Abolition Act of
1955--Whether compensation payable under section 12 of 1955
Act includes compensation for abolition of Abkari rights.
HEADNOTE:
The appellant was holder of the Inam lands with abkari
rights granted by the Nizam. By virtue of the said rights.
the appellant was entitled to the full income of the rental
licence fee for running liquor shops. tree tax and for tree
owners’ fee. The principal inam was abolished by the
Hyderabad Inams Abolition Act 1955 (and also by Act 10 of
1956). The Andhra Pradesh Legislature passed Act No. 9 of
1967 repealing the 1955 and 1956 Acts. Act 9 of 1967
provided for the vesting of the Inam lands in the State
without payment of compensation to the Inamdars. The Andhra
Pradesh High Court struck down Act No. 9 of 1967. Acting
under the provision of the 1955 Act the State denied the
enjoyment of Abkari right to the appellant. He therefore
filed a suit. Having lost before the trial court, and the
High Court, the appellant approached the Supreme Court with
the following contentions; (i) that the striking down of Act
9 of 1967 does not result in the revival of the Inam
Abolition Act, 1955; (ii) that the Abkari rights are not
included in the ’Inam’ and were, therefore, not abolished by
the Abolition Act; (iii) the Abolition Act does not provide
for compensation for abolition of Abkari rights and was
therefore hit by Art. 31 (2) of the Constitution.
Dismissing the appeal,
HELD : (i) The result of the striking down of Act 9 of 1967
was to revive the Abolition Act of 1955. The High Court was
right in holding that the Inam lands had already vested in
the State under the Abolition Act and. therefore, on the
date when Act No. 9 of 1967 was passed, there was neither
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 11
any estate which could be abolished nor was there any
necessity to effect any agrarian reform. [434G]
(ii) Under Sec. 2(2) of the inam Abolition Act, 1955, words
and expressions used in the Act but not defined shall have
the same meaning assigned to the said words in the Land
Revenue Act 1317 Fasli, Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural
Lands Act 1950 and Hyderabad Atiyat Enquiries Act 1952 and
the rules thereunder. S. 2(1-b) of the Andhra Pradesh
Revenue Act 8 of 1317 Fasli defines land as including all
kinds of benefit pertaining to lands or things attached to
the earth or permanently fastened to earth and also includes
shares in or charges on. the revenue or rent which are or
may be levied on villages, or-other defined areas. The
right to tap or derive benefit from trees standing on the
lands is a right appurtenant to the lands because a thing
attached to the land is itself a part of the land and is
immovable property. Haque Malakana which-is the right in
trees is therefore a right appurtenant to the land. When
any Inam land vests in the Govt., the right to tap trees
standing on the land also vests in the Govt. There cannot
be any separation of these rights when the tree is still a
part of the land. Right to receive rental or licence fee
(’Baithak’) for running sendhi shops at Inam lands
appertains to the ownership of the land. [436E; 437H; 438BC]
State of Bihar v. Rameshwar Pratap [1962] 2 S.C.R. 382.
[wherein it is held that the right of the proprietor of an
estate to hold a ’Mela’ on his own land is a right in
"estate being appurtenant to his ownership of the land"
relied upon.]
430
Under Sec. 3(1) of the Abolition Act, vesting of the Inams
in the Govt. is to take place notwithstanding any judgment
decree or order of a Civil, Revenue or Atiyat Court. Thus
Abkari rights being part of the Inam lands vest in the
Govt., with the Abolition of the Inams. [438C]
(iii) Abkari rights being part of the Inam and having
been vested in the State, the compensation that payable u/s.
12 of the Abolition Act is inclusive of the Abkari rights.
As the Hyderabad Inams Abolition Act 1955 is a legislation
intended to give effect to agrarian reforms by making the
land available to the landless, compensation provided u/s.
12 cannot be challenged. [439B]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1637 of
1967.
Appeal by certificate from the judgment and decree dated the
19th December 1966 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in
C.C.C. Appeal No. 57 of 1961.
M. N. Phadke, A. G. Menezes, J. B. Dadachanji, O. C.
Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellants.
P. Ram Reddy and A. V. V. Nair for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
JAGANMOHAN REDDY, J. The appellant had filed a suit against
the respondent, State of Andhra Pradesh, for a declaration
that the abkari rights of the appellant in the suit inam
lands were not abolished when the inams, which included the
inams granted to, him were abolished under the Hyderabad
Inams Abolition Act, 1955, and, therefore, he was entitled
to the full income namely ’Baithak’ of Sendhi shops (rental
or licence fee or right of sale), tree tax, Haque Malikana
(tree owners’ fee) and for recovery of the said abkari
income from the respondent. This suit was dismissed against
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 11
which an appeal was filed in the High Court of Andhra
Pradesh which was dismissed. Against that judgment this
appeal is by certificate.
The appellant is the maktedar of the suit inam lands situate
in Sardarnagar and Kurvaguda in Hyderabad District. The
grant by the Nizam of the Makta in favour of his
predecessors-in-interest in respect of Sardarnagar inam
lands was by muntakab (decree) Ex. P-1 dated August 15,
1944. This grant was in perpetuity with specific term ’Ba
Hama-Abwab’ (with all sources of income) and ’Bila-Quiyame-
Haqe-Sirkar’ (without any deduction as Government share). A
similar muntakab Ex. P-2 was granted by the Atiyat Court in
respect of the ’Arazi Maktha’ (minor inam) of inam lands of
Kurva guda village. The appellant enjoyed all the rights
granted to him under the respective muntakabs which included
the right of selling Sendhi shops, collection of tree tax
and other similar rights. Earlier the erstwhile Hyderabad
Government by its order dated 22nd Isfendar 1355 F.
corresponding to 24th January 1946 acquired the right of the
appellant in respect of selling opium, ganja and the right
of distilling liquor by payment of compensation but it did
not acquire the right of selling Sendhi or tree tax,Haque
Malikana and licence fee in respect of which Government was
making annual payments till July 19, 1955 when on the
abolition of the inams under the Hyderabad Inams Abolition
Act 8 of 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the ’Abolition
Act’) the inams granted to
431
the appellant became vested in the Government. Thereafter
the Government discontinued payment of Baithak of Sendhi
shops and tree tax under the wrong impression that Hyderabad
Abolition Act prohibited any such payment. On April 20,
1956 the Abolition Act was amended by Act 10 of 1956 whereby
the provisions relating to payment of compensation were
superseded while those relating to vesting continued in
force. The Government therefore issued a circular to the
effect that all amounts collected as land revenue from the
erstwhile inam lands including the inam lands of the
appellant were to be kept in a suspense account. From
December 5, 1957 the Sendhi rights in Sardarnagar lands i.e.
Haque Malikana, licence fee were recognised by the
Government of Andhra Pradesh in G.0. 2254. It may be men-
tioned that the provisions of the Act relating to
compensation were to come into force on and from a notified
date so much so that even after more than three years of the
Abolition Act no notification as provided under subsection
3(b) of section 1 was published to bring into effect the
provisions relating to compensation.
Thus it was contended that no principles of payment of
compensation under the Abolition Act for only land revenue
was taken into consideration but no rights of the appellant
as referred to in s. 3 (2) (a) were taken into
consideration. It was further stated that as s. 3 (2) (b)
was not taken into account and as ss. 12 to 14 of the Act do
not contain any provisions for adequate and fair
compensation in respect of the right, the provisions ire
invalid and ultra vires of the Constitution.
The respondent, the State of Andhra Pradesh, contended that
by virtue of the Abolition Act all inams vested in the
Government and hence all rights of the appellant had also
vested in the Government. No compensation is therefore
payable to the appellant separately for each item of right
but as a whole for the inam which was abolished and vested
in the Government. Nothing was therefore due or payable to
the appellant. The trial Judge however found that under s.
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 11
3 (24) of the Abolition Act, Abkari rights are also included
so the term inam would include these rights also and that
ss. 17 to 20 show the mode for determining total
compensation payable in respect of inams: so it cannot be
said that the aspect of compensation for the Abkari right is
not covered by the Act. It accordingly dismissed the suit.
In appeal against that judgment the High Court also held
that Abkari rights are not granted independently splitting
them from the inams and since all rights, title and interest
in the inam lands have been abolished by the Abolition Act
which on an interpretation of s. 3(2) (b) of the Act read
with the definition of land in Land Revenue Act 1317 F.
would also vest the Abkari rights of the inamdar in the Gov-
ernment. As the appellant’s rights have been extinguished
his suit was held to be rightly dismissed and consequently
the appeal also was dismissed.
The simple question in this case, therefore, is whether the
inams granted under Exs. P-1 and P-2 vested in the
Government along with the Abkari rights as contended by the
respondent or is it only the lands
432
that have vested in the Government on the abolition of the
inams without the Abkari rights which still vest in the
appellant as contended by the appellant. In the
alternative, it was prayed that if the effect of the
Abolition Act is that the Abkari rights also vest in the
Government, then the law itself is invalid inasmuch as the
Abkari rights which are property have been taken away
contrary to the provisions of Art. 31(2) of the Constitution
without payment of compensation’ It was further submitted
that as the Abolition Act is not an agrarian reform, it did
not get the protection of Art. 31A of the Constitution. In
any case, the original Abolition Act, namely, The Hyderabad
Abolition of Inams Act 8 of 1955 was enacted prior to the
Seventh Amendment of the Constitution which came into force
on November 1, 1956. Accordingly on a construction of the
relevant entries in List II and List III the Hyderabad
Legislature lacked legislative competence to enact the
statute. All these submissions, as has been noticed
already, were rejected by both the Courts. It may however
be mentioned that when the appeal against the judgment of
the High Court of Andhra Pradesh was pending in this Court,
the Andhra Pradesh Legislature passed The Andhra Pradesh
(Telangana Area) Abolition of Inams Act 9 of 1967 repealing
the earlier Abolition Act 8 of 1955 as amended by Act 10 of
1956 and vesting all the inams in the Government from July
20, 1955. A writ petition (W.P. No. 78 of 1969) was filed
in this Court challenging the validity of Act 9 of 1967.
During the pendency of these proceedings in this Court,
several writ petitions were also filed in the High Court of
Andhra Pradesh challenging the validity of Act 9 of 1967.
That Court by its judgment dated March 31, 1970 held all the
provisions of Act 9 of 1967 to be invalid and accordingly
struck down the entire Act. The State however did not
appeal against the said judgment. It may also be mentioned
that the State of Andhra Pradesh published a notification on
October 20, 1973 under S. 1(3)(b) of the Abolition Act by
which all the provisions of that Act and in particular the
sections relating to compensation, namely, ss. 12, 13, 14
and 16 were enforced from November 1, 1973. It is stated
before us that in view of-this position, the appellant
withdrew his writ petition No. 78 of 1969 which was
dismissed as infructuous so that the present appeal is the
only one that has now to be considered.
The learned advocate for the appellant has urged that the
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 11
effect of striking down Act 9 of 1967 by the High Court of
Andhra Pradesh was not to revive Act 8 of 1955 as amended by
Act 10 of 1956 which being dead could not be revived.
Accordingly the vesting of the inams in the Government under
the repealed Acts 8 of 1955 and 10 of 1956 has no legal
validity. Secondly, it is contended that even assuming that
Act 8 of 1955 and Act 10 of 1956 are revived, these Acts are
constitutionally invalid on two grounds urged before the
High Court, namely (i) for want of legislative competence;
and (ii) as the law takes- away property without
compensation it conflicts with the provisions of Art. 31(2)
of the Constitution and is therefore invalid. Thirdly, on a
proper construction of S. 12 of the Abolition Act it would
appear that there is no provision made for payment of
compensation for taking away the Abkari rights of the
appellant inasmuch as the compensation that has been
provided for under the Act is in respect of the lands and
not the Abkari rights. The law also does not got the
protection of Art.
433
31A of the Constitution as the abolition of Abkari rights is
not in furtherance of agrarian reforms. Alternatively, it
was contendedthat upon a proper construction of the
provisions of Act 8 of 1955,the Abkari rights of the
appellant were not affected inasmuch as bythe definition
of the term ’Inam’ what was vested was the land or the
rights arising from the land and not the rights which are
acquiredand granted decors of any rights in land.
A few of the contentions which are not res integra may be
disposed of. For instance, the contention that Act 8 of 1955
and Act 10 of 1956, even if they are revived, are
constitutionally invalid as they have been enacted by a
Legislature not competent to enact the same, and’ secondly
the Abolition Act 8 of 1955 is not in furtherance of
agrarian reforms. On the first contention it may be
observed that this Court in B. Shankara Rao Badani & Ors. v.
State of Mysore Anr.(1) pointed out that where the
petitioner’s village were vested in the State of Mysore
under s.1(4) of the Mysore (Personal and Miscellaneous)
Inams Abolition Act, 1954, and it was contended that the,
compensation provided by the Mysore Act was not the market
value of the property at the time of acquisition there was a
violation of-Art. 31(2) and secondly the Mysore Act was
beyond the legislative competence of the Mysore Legislature
under Entry 36 of List II and’ Entry 42 of List III to the
Seventh Schedule as the Entries stood be-fore the Seventh
Amendment of the Constitution, because (i) the, existence of
public purpose and the obligation to pay compensationare
necessary concomitants of compulsory acquisition of
property, and so, the term acquisition must be construed as
importing by necessary implication the two conditions of
public purpose and payment of adequate compensation, and
(ii) the words ’subject to the provisions of Entry 42, List
III’ in Entry 36 of List II reinforce the argument that a
law with respect to acquisition of property made under Entry
36, should be exercised subject to the twofold restriction
as to public purpose and payment of compensation both of
which are referred to in, Entry 42, List III. It was held
by this Court that the legislation was undertaken as a part
of agrarian reform which the Mysore State Legislature
proposed to bring about in the State. Therefore, the
impugned’ Mysore Act was a law providing for the acquisition
by the State of any estate or of any rights therein or for
the extinguishment or modificationof such rights as
contemplated by Art. 3 1 A and hence, the impugned Act was
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 11
protected from attack in any Court on the ground that it
contravened Art. 31(2). Secondly, it was also held that the
entries in the Lists of the Seventh Schedule were designed
to define and delimit therespective areas of legislative
competence of the Union and State Legislature and the
principle of the maximum expressum facit cassare tacitum
makes it inappropriate to treat the obligation to pay
compensation as implicit in Entry 33 of List I or Entry 36
of List II when it is separately and expressly provided for
in Art.31(2). Thirdly, the words ’subject to the provisions
of Entry 42 List III’ mean no more than that any law made
under Entry 36 by a State Legislature can be displaced or
overridden by the Union Legislature making a law:
(1) [1969] 3 S.C.R. 1.
434
under Entry 42 of List III. If the restrictive condition as
to public pur-pose and payment of compensation are to be
derived from these words, their absence in Entry 33 of List
I leads to the unreasonable inference that Parliament can
make law authorising acquisition of property with,out a
public purpose and without a provision for compensation.
The ’true inference is that the power to make a law,
belonging both to Parliament and State Legislatures, can be
exercised subject to the two restrictions not by reason of
anything contained in the legislative entries but by reason
of the positive provisions in Art. 31(2). But as legisla-
tion failing within Art. 31A cannot be called in question in
a court for non-compliance with those provisions in Art.
31(2) such legislation cannot be struck down as
unconstitutional and void, In view of this decision, the
question of lack of legislative competence was not pressed.
The entire case of the appellant, therefore, rests on two
short submissions, namely, (1) that the striking down of Act
9 of 1967 by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh against which
there has been no appeal to this Court and the withdrawal of
writ petition No. 78 of 1969 filed in this Court would not
revive the Abolition Act, and if they are revived, the
abkari rights which are not a part of the inam rights, they
are not touched by the provisions of the Act.
Alternatively, even if the provisions of the revived Acts
deal with such rights, though these rights are separate
rights, compensation ought to have been provided for
separately and since this has not been done the law is
violative of Art. 31 (2) of the Constitution.
On the main question whether the impugned Acts were revived
by reason of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh striking down
Act 9 of 1967. a perusal of that judgment would show that
the Division ’Bench considered the question and held that as
the inam had already vested in the Government on July 20,
1955, there was no need to abolish inams which already stood
abolished long before the date when the impugned Act,
namely, Act 9 of 1967, was enacted. The right to patta
having been acquired, the only purpose behind the impugned
Act 9 of 1967 was to deprive the inamdars of their compen-
sation, and to deny the payment of compensation to the
inamdars and others who were entitled to the same under the
repealed Act. After stating thus, the Division Bench
further observed:
"The result of the above said analysis is that
on the date when the impugned Act was made,
there was neither any estate which could be
abolished nor there was any necessity ,to
effect any agrarian reform in so far as inams
were concerned had already been done under the
Act repealed. If ’the Government did not
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 11
choose to implement the Act for nine months
and then preferred to postpone the payment of
compensation or grant of patta, that would
hardly alter the position. The effect of the
impugned Act in pith and substance is really
not agrarian reform but to destroy the rights
,of the inamdars and others who were assured
compensation under the repealed Act. Thus the
Act although pretends to enact a law relating
to agrarian reform in spirit’ and in
435
effect it is a device to deprive the inamdars
and other persons of their acquired rights
under the repealed Act."
The striking down of Act 9 of 1967 must be construed in the
light of the reasoning given by the learned Judges of the
Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court that the
Abolition Act 8 of 1955 and the Amendment Act 10 of 1956 had
already achieved the result which Act 9 of 1967 was intended
to achieve, and once the inams had already vested in the
Government, compensation had to be paid in accordance with
the terms of those laws and cannot again be reopened by
vesting the inams which had already vested as if they had
not already vested in the Government. This postulates the
existence, of the Acts impugned before us as a ground for
striking down Act 9 of 1967, so that when the High Court
says that. the latter Act 9 of 1967 is void it could not
have intended to say that even the Acts, now impugned before
us did not revive. What the Court implied by declaring Act
9 of 1967 void is that it was nonest and that no such law
could be passed in respect of a subject-matter which has
already vested in the Government : see Deep Chand v. The
State of Uttar Pradesh and Others(1). If so Act 8 of 1955
as amended by Act 10 of 1956 have been held to be in force
and that compensation was to be paid in accordance
therewith.
The decision cited by the learned Advocate for the appellant
in B. N. Tiwari v. Union of India & Others(2)--is
inapplicable. In that case the Ministry of Home Affairs by
a resolution in 1950 had declared reservation in favour of
scheduled castes and tribes and had. made a rule in 1952 for
carry forward, whereby the unfilled reserved vacancies of a
particular year would be carried forward for one year only.
In 1955 the above rule was substituted by another rule
providing that the unfilled reserved vacancies of a
particular year would be carried forward for two years. The
court held that when the 1952 carry forward rule was
substituted by another rule in 1955, the former rule ceased
to exist when 1955 rule was declared unconstitutional in T.
Devadasan v. Union of India(3), as such there was no carry
forward rule in existence in 1960. In these circumstances
the question that was considered was whether the carry
forward rule of 1952 could still be said to exist. This
Court took the view that the carry forward rule of 1952
having been substituted by the carry forward rule of 1955,
the former rule clearly ceased to exist because its place
was taken by the carry forward rule of 1955. Thus by pro-
mulgating the new carry forward rule of 1955, the Government
of India itself cancelled the carry forward rule of 1952.
Therefore, when this Court struck down the carry forward
rule as modified in 1955 that did not mean that the carry
forward rule of 1952 which had already ceased to exist
because the Government of India its if can celled it and had
substituted a modified rule in 1955 in its place, could
revive. In the case before us it had attempted to do
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 11
something which the Legislature could not do namely to
abolish inams which did not exist and which had already
vested in the Government and
(1) [1959] Supp.(2) S.C.R. 8. (2) [1965] 2 S.C.R. 421.
(3) A.I.R. [1964] S.C. 179.
436
which the Legislature could not abolish again. In these
circumstances, the repeal of an enactment, which had already
been given effect was a device for depriving the inamdars
whose rights had been abolished, of their right of
compensation, and was accordingly struck down as still-born,
null and void, as such unconstitutional from its inception
and cannot have the effect as if it had repealed the
previous Acts. On this analysis the provisions of Acts 8 of
1955 as amended by Act 10, of 1956 could not be held to have
been repealed it all, and therefore they are in existence.
The question that now remains is whether Act 8 of 1955 as
amended by Act 10 of 1956 abolishes the Abkari rights also,
and if so, whether the compensation provided in the
aforesaid Acts includes those rights also. On the first
question S. 2(1) (c) of the Abolition Act defines ’inam’ as
meaning land held under a gift or a grant made by the Nizam
or by any Jagirdar, holder of a Samathan or other competent
granter and continued or confirmed by virtue of a muntakhab
or other title deed, with or without the condition of
service and coupled with the remission of the whole or part
of the land revenue thereon and entered as such in village
records and includes-(i) aresi makhta, arazi agrahar and
seri inam; and (ii) lands held as inam by virtue of long
possession and entered as inam in the village records.
"Inamdar" under S. 2(1)(d) of the Abolition means a person
holding an inam or a share therein, either for his own
benefit or in trust and includes the successor in interest
of an inamdar etc. Under sub-s. (2) of s. 2 words and
expressions used in this Act (Abolition Act 8 of 1955) but
not defined therein shall have the meaning assigned to them
in the Land Revenue Act, 1317, Fasli. the Hyderabad Tenancy
and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950, and the Hyderabad Atiyat
Enquiries Act, 1952 and the rules thereunder. The
provisions whereunder the inam has been abolished, in so far
as they are relevant in this case, are sub-s. (1) of s. 3
which provides that notwithstanding anything to the contrary
contained in any usage, settlement, contract, grant, sanad,
order or other instrument, Act, regulation, rules or order
having the force of law and notwithstanding any judgment,
decree or order of a Civil, Revenue or Atiyat Court, and
with effect from the date of vesting, all inams to which
this Act is made applicable under sub-section (2) of section
1 of this Act shall be deemed to have been abolished and
shall vest in the State. Clauses (a), (b), (c)-and (d) of
sub-s. (2) of S. 3of the Abolition Act which are also
material are as follows :
"S. 3(2) Save as expressly provided by or
under the provisions of this Act and with
effect from the date of vesting, the following
consequences shall ensure, namely :
(a)the provisions of Land Revenue Act,
Fasli relating to inams, and the provisions of
the Hyderabad Atiyat Enquiries Act, 1952, and
other enactments, rules, regulations land
circulars in force in respect of Atiyat grants
shall, to the extent, they are repugnant, to
the provisions of this Act, not apply and the
provisions of the Land Revenue Act, 1317
Fasli, relating to unalienated lands for
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 11
purposes of land revenue, shall apply to the
said inams;
437
(b)all rights, title and interest vesting
in the inamdar kabiz-e-kadim, permanent tenant
protected tenant and non-protected tenant in
respect of the inam land, other than the
interests expressly saved by or under
provisions of this Act and including those in
all communal lands, cultivated and
uncultivated lands (whether assessed or not),
waste lands, pasture lands, forests, mines and
minerals, quarries, rivers and streams, tanks
and irrigation works, fisheries and ferries,
shall cease and be vested absolutely in the
State free from all encumbrances;
(c)all such inam lands shall be liable to
payment of land revenue;
(d)all rents and land revenue including
cesses and royalties, accruing in respect of
such inam lands, on or after the date of
vesting, shall be payable to the State and not
to the inamdar, and any payment made in
contravention of this clause shall not be
valid."
Under s. 4 of the Abolition Act every inamdar
shall, with effect from the date of vesting,
be entitled to be registered as an occupant of
all inam lands other than those specified in
clauses (a), (b) and (c) of that section.
Similarly under S. 5 every kabiz-e-kadim
shall, with effect from the date of vesting,
be entitled to be registered as an occupant in
respect of such inam lands in his possession
which were under his personal cultivation and
which, together with any lands he separately
owns and cultivates personally, are equal to
four and a half times the ’family holding’.
Under sub-s. (2) of S. 4 the: kabiz-e-kadim
shall be entitled to compensation from the
Government as provided for under the Abolition
Act in respect of Inam lands, in his
possession in excess of the limit specified in
sub-s. (1) whether cultivated or not. Section
12 of the Abolition Act provides for
determination of compensation payable to the
inamdar and provides thus :
"The compensation payable to the inamdar for
the inams abolished under section 3 shall be
the aggregate of the sums specified below :-
(i)in respect of inam lands registered in
the name of the inamdar and kabiz-e-kadim
under sections 4 and 5, a sum equal to twenty
times the difference between land revenue and
judi or quit-rent;
(ii)in respect of income accruing to the
inamdar from the lands registered in the names
of his permanent tenant, protected tenant and
non-protected tenant a sum equal to sixty per
cent of the premium charged as the case may
be, under sections 6, 7 and 8."
Section 2(1-b) of the Andhra Pradesh Land Revenue Act 8 of
1317 Fasli defines ’land’ as including all kinds of benefits
pertaining to land, or things attached to the earth, or
permanently fastened to
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 11
438
things attached to the, earth and also includes shares in,
or charges on, the revenue or rent which are or may be
levied on villages, or other defined areas.
A combined reading of the provisions of the Abolition Act
with the Andhra Pradesh Land Revenue Act shows that the
Legislature had by abolishing inams intended to abolish all
rights vested in the inam lands which had been granted to
the inamdar. The right to tap or derive benefit from trees
standing on the lands is a right appurtenant to the lands
because a thing attached to the land is itself a part of the
land and is immovable property. Haque Malakana which is the
right in trees is therefore a right appurtenant to the land
so that when any inam land vests in the Government, the
right to tap trees standing on the land also vests in the
Government. There cannot be any separation of these rights
when the tree is still part of the land. There can be no
doubt that on publication of the notification under sub-s.
(1) of s. 3 of the Abolition Act all inams were abolished
and vested in the State. The inams which were so abolished
and vested in the State include in it all rights, title and
interests in the inams by virtue of clause (b) of sub-s. (2)
of s. 3 of the Abolition Act. Such rights as are intended
to be saved are those that are saved by the express
provisions contained in the Abolition Act. It is,
therefore, clear that all rights, title and interest vesting
in the Inamdar would include the Abkari rights in the
trees., This conclusion of ours is supported by the
definition of ’land’ in s. 2(1-b) of the Andhra Pradesh Land
Revenue Act which has to be imported into the definition of
’inam land’ and’ which includes any rights in or over such
property of benefits accruing from the land or things
attached to the land and will also include shares in the
charges on the revenue or rent.
This Court had in State of Bihar v. Rameshwar Pratap Narain
Singh(1) while dealing with the validity of the Bihar Land
Reform. Amendment Act of 1959 considered the question
whether the right of a proprietor of an estate to hold a
’mela’ on his own land was a right in the estate, and held
that "the right to hold a ’Mela’ has always been considered
in this country to be an interest in land, an interest which
the owner of the land can transfer to another along with the
land or without the land. There can be no doubt therefore
that the right of the proprietor of any estate to hold a
’Mela’ on his own land is a" right in the estate being
appurtenant to his ownership of the land. Under sub-s. (1)
of s. 3 of the Abolition Act vesting of the inams is
notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of a Civil,
Revenue or Atiyat Court. In other words, notwithstanding
anything in the Muntakhab all the inams to which the
Abolition Act is made applicable shall be deemed to have
been abolished and shall vest in the State with effect from
the date of vesting.
We have noticed already that the inam granted to the
appellant under the Muntakhab is with "all sources of
income" i.e. ’Ba-Hama-Abwab’ which rights are not granted
independently of the Maktha or
(1) [1962] 2 S.C.R. 382.
439
inam land but are granted as part of the inam land so that
when inam land vests, the rights which the inamdar had in
the land including ’Hama Abwab’ i.e. Abkari rights also vest
in the State. On this conclusion it is clear that the
Abkari rights being part of the inam and having vested in
the State, the compensation that is payable under s. 12 of
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 11 of 11
the Abolition Act is inclusive of the Abkari rights. As the
abolition of inams is a legislation intended to give effect
to agrarian reforms by making the land available to persons
who have no lands, compensation provided for under s. 12
cannot be challenged. The scheme of compensation under the
Abolition Act is that four and a half times the family
holding is to be retained by the inamdar and in respect of
the rest of it a patta is given to the tenants which even
with respect to them, along with any lands they own and
cultivate personally, be equal to four and a half times the
family holding. If after providing for these two items
there remains any balance left the Government is required to
pay compensation whether to the inamdar or to the tenants
who have excess of land in their possession.
In any view of the matter we think that the judgment of the
High Court of Andhra Pradesh cannot be assailed. We
accordingly dismiss the appeal with costs.
S.B.W.
Appeal dismissed.
10-L 177SupCI/75
440