DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs. RAJAN SOOD

Case Type: Civil Appeal

Date of Judgment: 29-03-2022

Preview image for DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs. RAJAN SOOD

Full Judgment Text

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1927 OF 2022 Delhi Development Authority           ..Appellant (S) Versus Rajan Sood & Ors.                              ..Respondent (S) With  CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1928 OF 2022 J U D G M E N T  M. R. Shah, J. 1. Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned judgment and order dated 30.08.2016 passed by the High Court   of   Delhi   at   New   Delhi   in   Writ   Petition   (C)   No. 1034/2015, by which the High Court has allowed the said writ petition preferred by the private respondents herein – original   writ   petitioners   and   has   declared   that   the Signature Not Verified acquisition   proceedings   initiated   under   the   Land Digitally signed by R Natarajan Date: 2022.03.29 16:40:40 IST Reason: Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, 1 1894) in respect of the subject lands are deemed to have lapsed under sub­section (2) of section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation   and   Resettlement   Act,   2013   (hereinafter referred to as the Act, 2013), Delhi Development Authority (DDA) and Government of NCT of Delhi have preferred the present appeals.    2. Private   respondent   No.1   and   2   herein   ­   original   writ petitioners filed the writ petition before the High Court for a   declaration   that   the   acquisition   proceedings   initiated under the Act, 1894 in respect of the subject lands are deemed to have lapsed under sub­section (2) of section 24 of the Act, 2013. It was the case on behalf of the original writ   petitioners   before   the   High   Court   that   as   the possession of the land in question is with them and no compensation   has   been   paid,   the   land   acquisition proceedings   are   deemed   to   have   lapsed.   Heavy   reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation and Anr. Vs. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki and Ors, (2014) 3 SCC 183 .        2 2.1 The petition was opposed by the appellants herein and others. It was the specific case on behalf of the DDA that as   such   the   compensation   was   tendered   to   one   Shiv Kumar S/o Devi Chand. Relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of  Pune Municipal Corporation  (supra), the High Court, by the impugned judgment and order has allowed the said writ petition and has declared that the acquisition proceedings initiated under the Act, 1894 in respect of the subject lands are deemed to have lapsed under sub­section (2) of section 24 of the Act, 2013. 2.2 Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court, DDA and Government of NCT of Delhi have preferred the present appeals. 3. Learned   counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   DDA   has vehemently submitted that in the facts and circumstances of   the   case   the   High   Court   has   materially   erred   in declaring   that   the   acquisition   proceedings   have   lapsed under sub­section (2) of section 24 of the Act, 2013.  3 3.1 It is submitted on behalf of the DDA that in the present case as such the possession was already taken over by the Authority on 23.09.1986 after following the due procedure as   required   and   even   a   punchnama   was   also   drawn, which was the requirement while taking over possession.  3.2 It is urged that even the compensation was tendered to the   recorded   owner   ­   Shri   Shiv   Kumar   through   notice under section 12(2) of the Act, 1894 but recorded owner never came forward to accept the same. It is submitted that   therefore,   the   original   writ   petitioners   cannot   be permitted   to   take   the   benefit   under   sub­section   (2)   of section 24 of the Act, 2013. 3.3 It   is   further   submitted   that   even   the   amount   of compensation of Rs.2.00 crores was deposited by the DDA with   the   Land   and   Building   Department   towards compensation. Therefore, the original writ petitioners are not entitled to the benefit of deemed lapse. 3.4 It is further contended by learned counsel appearing on behalf of the DDA and the Government of NCT of Delhi 4 that as such the original writ petitioners were not having any   locus   to   file   the   writ   petition   as   their   title   to   the property   is   shrouded   with   fraud   and   investigation   is pending with the Anti­Corruption Branch. It is submitted that as the possession of the land in question was already taken   over   as   far   as   back   on   23.09.1986   and   even compensation of Rs.2.00 crores was deposited with the Land and Building Department, in view of the subsequent decision in the case of   Indore Development Authority Vs. Manoharlal and Ors., (2020) 8 SCC 129 , it cannot be said the acquisition proceedings have lapsed under sub­ section (2) of section 24 of the Act, 2013.  3.5 It is further submitted on behalf of the appellants that while passing the impugned judgment and order, the High Court has relied on the decision of this Court in the case of   Pune Municipal Corporation   (supra). That, the said decision   has   been   subsequently   overruled   by   the Constitution bench of this Court in the case of   Indore Development Authority  (supra).  5 3.6 In the alternative, it is submitted by the learned counsel appearing   on   behalf   of   the   respective   appellants   that assuming, without admitting that the possession of the land in question remain with the original writ petitioners, in that case also, as there was an order of stay granted by the High Court in the year 2011, in the writ petition filed by the original writ petitioners and the High Court granted the interim order of taking no coercive action/order qua the land, therefore, in view of the decision of this Court in the case of   Indore Development Authority   (supra), the period   under   which   the   stay   was   operative   is   to   be excluded. Reliance is placed on para 366.8 of the decision of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Indore   Development Authority  (supra).  3.7 Making   the   above   submission   and   relying   upon   the aforesaid   decision,   it   is   prayed   to   allow   the   present appeals.         4. Both these appeals are vehemently opposed by Ms. Pinky Anand, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of 6 the original writ petitioners. Counter affidavits have been filed on behalf of private respondent No.1 and 2 – original writ petitioners opposing the present appeals. 4.1 It is vehemently submitted by Ms. Anand, learned Senior Advocate   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   original   writ petitioners   that   as   such   there   are   specific   findings recorded   by   the   High   Court   that   the   original   writ petitioners   continue   to   be   in   physical   possession   and therefore,   as   neither   the   actual   possession   of   land   in question was taken over nor any compensation was paid and/or even tendered to the original writ petitioners. It is rightly held that acquisition proceedings have lapsed. 4.2 It is urged that in fact in the earlier order passed by the High Court on 09.11.2011 in writ petition No.7714/2011, the   Division   Bench   directed   the   authority   to   consider their application under section 48 of the Act, 1894 and to decide it on merits. That as per section 48 of the Act, 1894 only in a case where possession of the land is not taken   over   by   the   acquiring   authority,   then   only,   the application under section 48 of the Act, 1894 would be 7 maintainable. It is submitted therefore, when the Division Bench directed the authority to consider the application of the petitioners under section 48 of the Act, 1894 on merits,   it   is   to   be   presumed   that   only   original   writ petitioners continue to remain possession. It is contended that the authority might have taken ex­parte possession on paper as alleged on 23.09.1986, however, the original writ   petitioners   remained   in   possession   actually.   It   is further submitted by learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the original writ petitioners that there is also a specific finding recorded by the High Court that the authorities   have   failed   to   prove   that   any   amount   of compensation was paid and/or tendered to the original writ petitioners or even deposited with the treasury. It is submitted that when the original writ petitioners remain in   possession   and   neither   the   compensation   was tendered nor it was paid, the twin conditions to declare the acquisition proceedings as having lapsed under sub­ section   (2)   of   section   24   of   the   Act,   2013   have   been satisfied. It is therefore submitted that the High Court has   not   committed   any   error   in   declaring   that   the 8 acquisition proceedings in respect of the subject lands are   deemed   to   have   lapsed   under   sub­section   (2)   of section 24 of the Act, 2013   5. We have heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respective parties at length.   6. By the impugned judgment and order the High Court has held and declared that the land acquisition proceedings in respect of the land in question are deemed to have lapsed under sub­section (2) of section 24 of the Act, 2013. While holding and declaring so the High Court has relied upon decision   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Pune   Municipal   (supra). However, the said decision of this Corporation Court has been subsequently overruled by the decision of this Court in the case of  Indore Development Authority (supra). In paragraph 365 to 366, this Court in the case of Indore Development Authority  (supra) has observed and held as under: ­  “365.  Resultantly,   the   decision   rendered   in  Pune Municipal   Corpn.  [ Pune   Municipal Corpn.  v.  Harakchand Misirimal Solanki , (2014) 3 SCC 183 : (2014) 2 SCC (Civ) 274] is hereby overruled and all   other   decisions   in   which  Pune   Municipal 9 Corpn.  [ Pune Municipal Corpn.  v.  Harakchand Misirimal Solanki , (2014) 3 SCC 183 : (2014) 2 SCC (Civ) 274] has   been   followed,   are   also   overruled.  The   decision in  Sree   Balaji   Nagar   Residential   Assn.  [ Sree   Balaji Nagar Residential Assn.  v.  State of T.N. , (2015) 3 SCC 353 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 298] cannot be said to be laying down good law, is overruled and other decisions following   the   same   are   also   overruled.   In  Indore  v.   [ Development   Authority Shailendra Indore Development Authority  v.  Shailendra , (2018) 3 SCC 412 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 426] , the aspect with respect to the proviso to Section 24(2) and whether “or” has to be read   as   “nor”   or   as   “and”   was   not   placed   for consideration.   Therefore,   that   decision   too   cannot prevail, in the light of the discussion in the present judgment. 366.  In view of the aforesaid discussion, we answer the questions as under: 366.1.  Under the provisions of Section 24(1)( a ) in case the award is not made as on 1­1­2014, the date of commencement of the 2013 Act, there is no lapse of proceedings.   Compensation   has   to   be   determined under the provisions of the 2013 Act. 366.2.  In case the award has been passed within the window   period   of   five   years   excluding   the   period covered   by   an   interim   order   of   the   court,   then proceedings shall continue as provided under Section 24(1)( b ) of the 2013 Act under the 1894 Act as if it has not been repealed. 366.3.  The word “or” used in Section 24(2) between possession and compensation has to be read as “nor” or   as   “and”.   The   deemed   lapse   of   land   acquisition proceedings under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act takes place where due to inaction of authorities for five years or more prior to commencement of the said Act, the possession   of   land   has   not   been   taken   nor compensation has been paid. In other words, in case possession   has   been   taken,   compensation   has   not been   paid   then   there   is   no   lapse.   Similarly,   if compensation has been paid, possession has not been taken then there is no lapse. 10 366.4.  The   expression   “paid”   in   the   main   part   of Section   24(2)   of   the   2013   Act   does   not   include   a deposit of compensation in court. The consequence of non­deposit is provided in the proviso to Section 24(2) in   case   it   has   not   been   deposited   with   respect   to majority   of   landholdings   then   all   beneficiaries (landowners) as on the date of notification for  land acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act shall be entitled   to   compensation   in   accordance   with   the provisions   of   the   2013   Act.   In   case   the   obligation under Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has not been fulfilled, interest under Section 34 of the said Act can be granted. Non­deposit of compensation (in   court)   does   not   result   in   the   lapse   of   land acquisition proceedings. In case of non­deposit with respect to the majority of holdings for five years or more, compensation under the 2013 Act has to be paid to the “landowners” as on the date of notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act.  In   case   a   person   has   been   tendered   the 366.5. compensation as provided under Section 31(1) of the 1894   Act,   it   is   not   open   to   him   to   claim   that acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2) due to non­ payment or non­deposit of compensation in court. The obligation to pay is complete by tendering the amount under Section 31(1). The landowners who had refused to accept compensation or who sought reference for higher   compensation,   cannot   claim   that   the acquisition   proceedings   had   lapsed   under   Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.  The proviso to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act is 366.6. to   be   treated   as   part   of   Section   24(2),   not   part   of Section 24(1)( b ). 366.7.  The mode of taking possession under the 1894 Act and as contemplated under  Section 24(2) is by drawing of inquest report/memorandum. Once award has been passed on taking possession under Section 16 of the 1894 Act, the land vests in State there is no divesting provided under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, as once possession has been taken there is no lapse under Section 24(2). 366.8.  The provisions of Section 24(2) providing for a deemed   lapse   of   proceedings   are   applicable   in  case 11 authorities have failed due to their inaction to take possession   and   pay   compensation   for   five   years   or more   before   the   2013   Act   came   into   force,   in   a proceeding   for   land   acquisition   pending   with   the authority   concerned   as   on   1­1­2014.   The   period   of subsistence of interim orders passed by court has to be excluded in the computation of five years. 366.9.  Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not give rise to   new   cause   of   action   to   question   the   legality   of concluded proceedings of land acquisition. Section 24 applies   to   a   proceeding   pending   on   the   date   of enforcement of the 2013 Act i.e. 1­1­2014. It does not revive   stale   and   time­barred   claims   and   does   not reopen concluded proceedings nor allow landowners to question the legality of mode of taking possession to reopen   proceedings   or   mode   of   deposit   of compensation   in   the   treasury   instead   of   court   to invalidate acquisition.” 7. The   High   Court  while   passing   the   impugned   judgment and order has observed that the possession of the land in question continued with the original writ petitioners and that the compensation was neither paid nor even tendered to the original writ petitioners. However, by holding that the original writ petitioners have continued to remain in possession, the High Court has relied upon the earlier order   dated   09.11.2011   passed   in   writ   petition No.7714/2011,   by   which   the   High   Court   directed   the authority to consider their application under section 48 of the Act, 1894 on merits. However, it was the specific case 12 on behalf of the authority before the learned Single Judge that the possession of the land in question was already taken   over   on   23.09.1986   and   even   the   compensation amount of Rs.2.00 crores was deposited with the land and building department. 7.1 It is the case on behalf of the original writ petitioners that a   purported   letter   dated   23.09.1986   allegedly   taking symbolic possession was never disclosed by appellants in the proceedings conducted before the High Court on two separate occasions and the same has been filed for the first time in the present proceedings. The aforesaid is not correct. Even in the impugned order itself in paragraph 2, the High Court has noted the submissions on behalf of the appellants to the effect that the possession was taken over on 23.09.1986. Therefore, it cannot be said such a plea is taken for the first time before this Court. It is the case   on   behalf   of   the   original   writ   petitioners,   relying upon the earlier order passed by the High Court dated 09.11.2011   in   writ   petition   No.7714/2011   that,   the original writ petitioners continue to be in possession and 13 the   actual   possession   has   never   been   taken   over. However, it is required to be noted that even in the order dated 09.11.2011, there was no specific finding given by the High Court that the original writ petitioners are in possession of the land in question. On the contrary, it is observed that the authority to consider the application under   section   48   of   the   Act,   1894   on   merits   on   the assumption of the possession being with the original writ petitioners.   Therefore,   while   passing   the   order   dated 09.11.2011 also, the High Court assumed the original writ   petitioners   are   in   possession   hence   as   such   no specific finding was given to the effect that the original writ petitioners are in possession.  7.2 It   is   next   contented   on   behalf   of   the   original   writ petitioners that the alleged possession on 23.09.1986 is illegal   and   it   was   a   paper   possession.   However,   it   is submitted on behalf of the appellants that possession of land   in   question   was   taken   over   by   drawing   the punchnama   which   can   be   said   to   be   sufficient compliance of the requirement while taking possession. 14 The High Court has also doubted the compensation being tendered as contended on behalf of the appellant.  7.3 Be that as it may. Assuming for the sake of argument that   the   original   writ   petitioners   are   found   to   be   in possession and the compensation was not tendered, in that case also as can be seen from the order passed by the   High   Court   on   09.11.2011   in   writ   petition No.7714/2011, the authority was restrained from taking any coercive action in respect of the land in question. Therefore,   in   view   of   the   subsequent   decision   of   this Court   in   the   case   of   Indore   Development   Authority (supra ­ paragraph 366.8), the period, during which the interim order is/was operative, has to be excluded in the computation   of   five   years’   period.   In   the   present   case even, it is the contention on behalf of the original writ petitioners   that   the   order   of   no   coercive   action   was directed to be continued till the application under section 48 of the Act, 1894 was decided. It is the specific case on behalf of the original writ petitioners before this Court and even so stated in the written submissions that till 15 date no decision is taken on the application under section 48 of the Act, 1894. Meaning thereby the direction/stay granted by the High Court while passing the order dated 09.11.2011   in   writ   petition   No.7714/2011   continued when the Act, 2013 came into force. 7.4 In that view of the matter and considering the decision of this   Court  in   case   of   Indore   Development   Authority (supra),   it   cannot   be   said   that   the   land   acquisition proceedings are deemed to have lapsed under sub­section (2) of section 24 of the Act, 2013.  8. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the case of   (supra),   more Indore   Development   Authority particularly, paragraph 366, it cannot be said that the land acquisition proceedings are deemed to have lapsed. 9. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above and on the aforesaid ground alone that at the time when the Act, 2013 came into force there was a stay granted by the High Court vide order dated 09.11.2011 in writ petition No.7714/2011   restraining   the   authority   taking   any 16 coercive action in respect of the land in question, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court declaring   that   the   land   acquisition   proceedings   are deemed to have lapsed under sub­section (2) of section 24 of the Act, 2013, is unsustainable.    10. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the present appeals are allowed. The impugned judgment and order   passed   by   the   High   Court   in   Writ   Petition   (C) No.1043/2015   declaring   that   the   land   acquisition proceedings under the Act, 1894 with respect to the land in question are deemed to have lapsed under sub­section (2) of section 24 of the Act, 2013, is hereby quashed and set   aside.   The   present   appeals   are   allowed   to   the aforesaid extent, accordingly. There shall be no order as to costs.     …………………………………J.                   (M. R. SHAH) …………………………………J.  (B.V. NAGARATHNA) New Delhi,  March 29, 2022. 17