Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
NIDAMARTI MAHESHKKUMAR
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATF OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT06/04/1986
BENCH:
BHAGWATI, P.N. (CJ)
BENCH:
BHAGWATI, P.N. (CJ)
MADON, D.P.
CITATION:
1986 AIR 1362 1986 SCR (2) 230
1986 SCC (2) 534 JT 1986 501
1986 SCALE (1)967
CITATOR INFO :
R 1989 SC 177 (8)
R 1989 SC 903 (28)
E&R 1989 SC1194 (7,8)
APL 1989 SC1513 (5)
ACT:
Constitution of India, Articles 15(1)(4) and 21
Admission to Medical Colleges - Reservation of Seats for
students from backward region of State - Validity of.
Professional Colleges - Admission to - Rule B(2) of
Rules for admission to M.B.B.S. Course - Student from
school/college within jurisdiction of one university
Ineligible for admission to medical college or colleges
situated in jurisdiction of another university - Validity of
Rule - Whether violative of Article 14 of the constitution.
HEADNOTE:
The qualification required for admission to the MBBS
course in the State of Maharashtra is the passing of 12th
standard examination held by the Mahsrashtra State Board of
Secondary and Higher Secondary Education. It comprises of
three Divisional Boards - one for Vidharbha region, another
for Marathwada region and the third for the rest of
Maharashtra - and though for the purpose of convenience each
of these three Divisional Boards conducts the 12th standard
examination for the area within its jurisdiction, the
examination which is held is one and the same throughout the
State of Maharashtra, based on the same syllabus, with the
same set of questions and the same standard of evaluation.
The results of the 12th standard examination are published
division wise and the merit list is also prepared on that
basis but the question papers being same and the standard of
evaluation also being uniform throughout the three regions,
it is easy to assess the comparative merits of the
candidates in the three regions by reference to the marks
obtained by them at the 12th standard examination.
The respondent-State, instead of selecting candidates
from all over the State for the academic year 1985 on the
basis of their performance in the 12th standard examination,
made region wise classification for admission to medical
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colleges by framing new Rules for admission to the M.B.B.S.
A course. Rule B(2) of the Rules provided that a student
from a school or college situated within the jurisdiction of
a particular university could seek admission only in the
medical college or colleges situate within the jurisdiction
of that University and he could not be eligible for
admission to medical college or colleges situate in the
jurisdiction of another university.
The appellant challenged the validity of Rule B(2) of
the Rules before the High Court on the ground that it
offends Article 14 of the Constitution. The High Court
dismissed the writ petition on the ground that since the
implementation of the order passed in Dr. Pradeep Jain &
Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. etc., [1984] 3 S.C.C. 654 that
30% of the open seats should be available for admission to
students on all India basis and that only 70% of the seats
could be reserved on the basis of residence or institutional
preference, had been deferred by the Supreme Court, the
State Government "had no other alternative but to fill in
the seats as if there were no directions from the Supreme
Court to fill in the seats on all-India basis" and Rule B(2)
of the Rules for admission to the M.B.B.S. course framed by
the State Government for the academic year 1985 was
therefore valid.
Allowing the appeal,
^
HELD: 1. The regionwise scheme adopted by the State
Government in Rule B(2) clearly results in denial of equal
opportunity violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
[245 D]
2.(i) The object of any valid scheme of admissions must
be to "select the best candidates for being admitted to
medical colleges" and that if any departure is to be made
"from the principle of selection on the basis of merit", it
must be justified on the touch-stone of Article 14. [238D-E]
Minor P. Rajendran v. State of Madras, [1968] 2 S.C.R.
786, A. Preeria-Kurappan v. State of Tamil Nadu, [1971] 2
S.C.R. 430 and Dr. Pradeep Jain & Ors. v. Union of India
Ors. etc., [1984] 3 S.C.C. 654, relied upon.
D.P. Joshi v. State of Madhya Bharat, [1955] 1 S.C.R.
232
1215 and Jagdish Saran v. Union of India, [1980] 2 S.C.R.
831, referred to.
2.(ii) There are two considerations which may
legitimately weigh with the Court in justifying departure
from the principle of selection based on merit. One is what
may be called State interest and the other is what may be
described as a region’s claim of backwardness. The claim of
State interest in providing adequate medical services to the
people of the State by imparting medical education to
students who by reason of their residence in the State would
be likely to settle down and serve the people of the State
as Doctors, is a legitimate ground for departing from the
strict principle of selection based on merit. [240 D-G]
2.(iii) Where the region from which the students of a
university are largely drawn is backward either from the
point of view of opportunities for medical education or
availability of competent and adequate medical services, it
would be constitutionally permissible, without violating the
mandate of the equality clause, to provide a high percentage
of reservation or preference for students coming from that
region, because without reservation or preference students
from such backward region will hardly be able to compete
with those from advanced regions since they would have no
adequate opportunity for development so as to be in a
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position to compete with others. By reason of their socially
or economically disadvantaged position they would not have
been able to secure education in good schools and they would
consequently be at a disadvantage compared to students
belonging to the affluent or well-to-do families who have
had best of school education. There can, therefore,
legitimately be reservation or preference in their favour so
far as admissions are concerned in case of a medical college
which is set up or intended to cater to the needs of a
region which is backward or whose alumni are largely drawn
from such backward region. It may however, be noted that the
reservation or preference in such a case may even be of a
high percentage of seats but it cannot be total. [242 F-H;
243 A-C]
2.(iv) It would not be unconstitutional for the State
Government to provide for reservation or preference in
respect of a certain percentage of seats in the medical
college or
233
colleges in each region in favour of those who have studied
in schools or colleges within that region and even if the
percentage stipulated by the State Government is on the
higher side, it would not fall foul of the constitutional
mandate of equality. There are two reasons why such
reservation or preference would be constitutionally
permissible. In the first place it would cause a
considerable amount of hardship and inconvenience if
students residing in the region of a particular university
are compelled to move to the region of another university
for medical education which they might have to do if
selection for admission to the medical colleges in the
entire State were to be based on merit without any
reservation or preference regionwise. It must be remembered
that there would be a large number of students who, if they
do not get admission in the medical college near their
residence and are assigned admission in a college in another
region on the basis of relative merit, may not be able to go
to such other medical college on account of lack of
resources and facilities and in the result, they would be
effectively deprived of a real opportunity for pursuing the
medical course even though on paper they would have got
admission in the medical college. The opportunity for
medical education provided to them would be illusory and not
real because they would not be able to avail of it. Moreover
some difficulty would also arise in case of girls because if
they are not able to get admission in the medical college
near the place where they reside they might find it
difficult to pursue medical education in a medical college
situated in another region where hostel facilities may not
be available and even if hostel facilities are available,
the parents may hesitate to send them to the hostels.
Therefore, the reservation or preference in respect of a
certain percentage of seats may legitimately be made in
favour of those who have studied in schools or colleges
within the region of a particular university, in order to
equalise opportunities for medical admission on a broader
basis and to bring about real and not formal, actual and not
merely legal, equality. [247 F-H; 248 A-E]
2(v) Not more than 70 per cent of the total number of
open seats in the medical college or colleges situate within
the area of jurisdiction of a particular university, after
taking into account other kinds of reservations validly
made, shall be reserved for students who have studied in
schools or
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colleges situate within that region and at least 30 per cent
of the open seats shall be available for admission to
students who have studied in schools or colleges in other
regions within the States [248 G-H; 249 A-B]
Dr. Pradeep Jain & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. etc.
[1984] 3 S.C.C. 654, Minor P. Rajendran v. State of Madras,
[1968] 2 S.C.R. 786, and v. Peeria-Kurappan v. State of
Tamil Nadu [1971] 2 S.C.R. 761, relied upon.
D.P. Joshi v. State of Madhya Bharat, [1955] 1 S.C.R.
1215 and Jagdish Saran v. Union of India, [1980] 2 S.C.R.
831 referred to.
D.N. Chanchala v. State of Mysore, [1971] Suppl. S.C.R.
608 distinguished.
In the instant case, there is no material to show that
the entire region within the jurisdiction of the university
in Vidharbha is backward or that the entire region within
the jurisdiction of Pune University is advanced. It is also
not possible to categories the regions within the
jurisdiction of the various universities as backward or
advanced as if they were exclusive categories. As a result
of the regionwise classification a student from one region
who has secured lesser marks than another from a different
region may be selected for admission to the medical college
or colleges within his region. And moreover, a student from
one region would have no opportunity for securing admission
in the medical college or colleges in another region, though
he may have done much better than the student in that other
region. Therefore, it would plainly be violative of the
mandate of the equality clause to compartmentalize the State
into different regions and provide that a student from one
region should not be allowed to migrate to another region
for medical education and thus be denied equal opportunity
with others in the State for medical education. [243 G-H;
244 C-E]
The Court observed (a) that the number of seats
required to be made available for admission to students on
All-India basis must first be taken out and then to the
remaining number of open seats after taking into account
other kinds of reservations validly made, the percentages of
70 and 30 must be
235
applied for determining the extent to which regional
reservation or preference can legitimately be made; (b) that
the admissions made on the basis of Rule B(2) shall not be
disturbed, nor will any claim for admission be founded for
the academic year 1985 on the basis of Rule B(2). If the
State Government wants to make regionwise reservation or
preference after setting apart the seats required to be made
available for admission to students on All-India basis, the
State Government may follow the guidelines laid down by the
Supreme Court so AS to avoid clash with Article 14 of the
Constitution. [249 C-D: E-G]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 4395 of
1985.
From the Judgment and Order dated 1st August, 1985 of
the Bombay High Court in W.P. No. 2670 of 1985.
V.N. Ganpule for the Appellant.
V.S. Desai, A.S. Bhasme and A.M. Khanwilkar for the
Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
BHAGWATI, CJ. This appeal by special leave arises from
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a writ petition filed by the appellant in the High Court of
Bombay challenging the validity of Rule B(2) of the Rules
framed by the State Government on 21st December 1984 for
admission to the M.B.B.S. course. The validity of this Rule
has been assailed on the ground that it offends Article 14
of the Constitution. The challenge has been negatived by the
High Court but the appellant contends in this appeal that
the decision of the High Court is erroneous and Rule B(2)
must be struck down as unconstitutional and void.
The qualification required for admission to the MBBS
course in the State of Maharashtra is the passing of 12th
standard examination held by the Maharashtra State Board of
Secondary and Higher Secondary Education. The teaching in
the first ten standards is carried on in schools while in
the 11th and 12th standards the teaching is done at some
places in schools and at others in colleges. The schools and
colleges where education is imparted in the 11th and 12th
standards are H
236
not in any way connected with the Universities within whose
jurisdiction they are situate nor have the Universities
anything to do with the 12th standard examination. There is
one Board for the whole of Maharashtra called "Maharashtra
State Board of Secondary and Higher secondary Education" and
it comprises of three Divisional Boards - one for Vidharbha
region, another for Marathwada region and the third for the
rest of Maharashtra - and though for the purpose of conve-
nience each of these three Divisional Boards conducts the
12th standard examination for the area within its
jurisdiction, the examination which is held is one and the
same throughout the State of Maharashtra, based on the same
syllabus, with the same set of questions and the same
standard of evaluation. The results of the 12th standard
examination are published divisionwise and the merit list is
also prepared on that basis but the quest{on papers being
the same and the standard of evaluation also being uniform
throughout the three regions, it is easy to assess the
comparative merits of the candidates in the three regions by
reference to the marks obtained by them at the 12th standard
examination. The admissions to the medical colleges within
the State of Maharashtra could, there fore, arguably be
determined on the basis of merit and the best candidates
could be selected from all over the State on the basis of
their performance in the 12th standard examination. But for
the academic year 1985, the State Government departed from
this principle of selection based on merit across the hoard
and made regionwise classification for admission to medical
colleges by framing new Rules for admission to the M.B.B.S.
Course on 21st December, 1984. Rule R(2) of these Rules
provided inter alia as under :
"Students who have passed H.S.C. (10+2) 12th
standard examination of the Maharashtra State
Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education
from schools/Colleges situated within the
jurisdiction of one university are not eligible
for admission to medical college or colleges
situated in the jurisdiction of another
university. The seats at the Government Medical
Colleges in Maharashtra State except those
earmarked for nominees of the Government of India
and nominees of Miraj Medical Centre and those
mentioned in Rule D(4) below are reserved for the
students of the respective university area."
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The admissions to medical colleges were thus made subject to
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regionwise classification inasmuch as a student from a
school or college situated within the jurisdiction of a
particular university could seek admission only in the
medical college or colleges situate within the jurisdiction
of that University and he could not be eligible for
admission to medical college or colleges situate in the
jurisdiction of another university. This regionwise
classification made by the State Government for the purpose
of admissions to medical colleges was assailed by the
appellant by filing a writ petition in the High Court of
Bombay on the ground that it was violative of Article 14 of
the Constitution. The writ petition was heard by a Division
Bench of the High Court and by a judgment dated 1st August,
1985 the High Court dismissed the writ petition. The
principal ground on which the High Court rejected the writ
petition was that the implementation of the Order passed by
this Court in Dr. Pradeep Jain & Ors. v. Union of India &
ors. etc., [1984] 3 S.C.C. 654, that 30% of the open seats
should be available for admission to students on all-India
basis and that only 70% of the seats could be reserved on
the basis of residence or institutional preference, had been
deferred by this Court by its Order dated 8th July 1985 to
the academic year 1986 and it was not to be given effect to
in the academic year 1985. The High Court took the view that
since the implementation of this Order had been deferred by
this Court, the State Government "had no other alternative
but to fill in the seats as if there were no directions from
the Supreme Court to fill in the seats on all-India basis"
and Rule B(2) of the Rules for admission to the M.B.B.S.
Course framed by the State Government for the academic year
1985 was therefore valid. This view taken by the High Court
is impugned in the present appeal preferred by the appellant
with special leave obtained from this Court. F
The question as to what principles for selection of
students for admission to the medical colleges would be
permissible under Article 14 of the Constitution came up for
consideration before this Court in the leading case of Dr.
Pradeep Jain (supra). The judgment in this case reviewed all
the previous decisions given by this Court starting from
D.P. Joshi v. State of Madhya Bharat, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1215
and ending with Jagdish Saran v. Union of India, [1980] 2
S.C.R. 831 and after analysing these decisions the Court
laid-down the principles which should govern selection of
students for
238
admission to the medical colleges consistently with the
requirement of Article 14. The Court pointed out that the
primary consideration in selection of candidates for
admission to the medical colleges must be merit and the
object of any rules which may be made for regulating
admissions to the medical colleges must be to secure the
best and most meritorious students. This was in fact the
consideration which weighed with the Court in Minor P.
Rajendran v. State of Madras, [1968] 2 S.C.R. 786 in
striking down a Rule made by the State of Madras allocating
seats in medical colleges on district wise basis and so also
in A. Peeria-Kurappan v. State of Tamil Nadu, [1971] 2
S.C.R. 430 the same consideration prevailed with the court
in striking-down a unitwise scheme of selection of
candidates for appointment to medical colleges in the State
of Tamil Nadu, which provided for constituting the medical
colleges in the city of Madras as one unit and each of the
other medical colleges in the mofussil as a separate unit
and selection being made unitwise. The court in both these
cases clearly and categorically proceeded on the bas{s of
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the principle that the object of any valid scheme of
admissions must be to "select the best candidates for being
admitted to medical colleges" and that if any departure is
to be made "from the principle of selection on the basis of
merit", it must be justified on the touch-stone of Article
14. This principle was affirmed by the court in Dr. Pradeep
Jain’s case (supra).
This Court then proceeded to consider in Dr. Pradeep
Jain’s case (supra) as to what are the circumstances in
which departure may justifiably be made from the principle
of selection based on merit. The Court enunciated in clear
and emphatic terms the philosophy behind the concept of
equality under the Constitution and observed :
"Now the concept of equality under the
Constitution is a dynamic concept. It takes within
its sweep every process of equalisation and
protective discrimination. equality must not
remain mere idle incantation but it must become a
living reality for the large masses of people. In
a hierarchical society with an indelible feudal
stamp and incurable actual inequality, it is
absurd to suggest that progressive measures to
eliminate
239
group disabilities and promote collective equality
are antagonistic to equality on the ground that
every individual is entitled to equality of
opportunity based purely on merit judged by the
marks obtained by him. We cannot countenance such
a suggestion, for to do so would make the equality
clause sterile and perpetuate existing
inequalities. Equality of opportunity is not
simply a matter of legal equality. Its existence
depends not merely on the absence of disabilities
but on the presence of abilities. Where,
therefore, there is inequality, in fact, legal
equality always tends to accentuate it. What the
famous poet William Blake said graphically is very
true, namely, "One law for the Lion and the Ox is
oppression". Those who are unequal, in fact,
cannot be treated by identical standards; that may
be equality in law but it would certainly not be
real equality. It is, therefore, necessary to take
into account de facto inequalities which exit in
the society and to take affirmative action by way
of giving preference to the socially and
economically disadvantaged persons or inflicting
handicaps on those more advantageously placed, in
order to bring about real equality. Such
affirmative action though apparently
discriminatory is calculated to produce equality
on a broader basis by eliminating de facto
inequalities and placing the weaker sections of
the community on a footing of equality with the
stronger and more powerful sections so that each
member of the community, whatever is his birth,
occupation or social position may enjoy equal
opportunity of using to the full his natural
endowments of physique, of character and of
intelligence......... We cannot, therefore, have
arid equality which does not take into account the
social and economic disabilities and inequalities
from which large masses of people suffer in the
country. Equality in law must produce real
equality, de jure equality must ultimately find
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its raison d’etre in de facto equality. The State
must, therefore, resort to compensatory State
action for the purpose of making people who are
factually
240
unequal in their wealth, education or social
environment, equal in specified areas. The State
must, to use again the words of Krishna Iyer, J.
in Jagdish Saran case ’weave those special
facilities into the web of equality which, in an
equitable setting, provide for the weak and
promote their levelling up so that, in the long
run, the community at large may enjoy a general
measure of real equal opportunity....equality is
not negated or neglected where special provisions
are geared to the larger goal of the disabled
getting over their disablement consistently with
the general good and individual merit". The scheme
of admission to medical colleges may, therefore,
depart from the principle of selection based on
merit, where it is necessary to do so for the
purpose of bringing about real equality of
opportunity between those who are unequals".
It was pointed out by the Court that there are two
considerations which may legitimately weigh with the Court
in justifying departure from the principle of selection
based on merit. One is what may be called State interest and
the other is what may be described as a region’s claim of
backwardness. The legitimacy of claim of State interest was
recognised explicitly in D.P. Joshi’s case (supra) and Minor
P. Rajendran’s case (supra). These two cases show that the
claim of State interest in providing adequate medical
services to the people of the State by imparting medical
education to students who by reason of their residence in
the State would be likely to settle down and serve the
people of the state as Doctors, was regarded by the court as
a legitimate ground for departing from the strict principle
of selection based on merit. The decision of this Court in
D.N. Chanchala v. State of Mysore, [1971] Suppl. S.C.R. 608
also upheld university wise distribution of seats, though it
WAS not in conformity with the principle of selection based
on merit and marked a departure from it, and the
justification for taking this view was that institutional
preference was not constitutionally impermissible "firstly,
because it would be quite legitimate for students who are
attached to a university to entertain 8 desire to have
training in specialised subjects, like medicine, satisfied
through colleges affiliated to their own
241
university since that would promote institutional continuity
which has its own value and secondly, because any student
from any part of the country can pass the qualifying
examination of that university, irrespective of the place of
his birth of residence."
The second consideration which can legitimately weigh
with the court in diluting the principle of selection based
on merit is the claim of backwardness made on behalf of any
particular region. We may, in this connection, usefully
quote the following passage from the judgment of this Court
in Dr. Pradeep Jain’s case (supra):
"There have been cases where students residing a
backward region have been given preferential
treatement in admissions to medical colleges and
such preferential treatment has been upheld on the
ground that though apparently discriminatory
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against other it is intended to correct the
imbalance or handicap from which the students from
the backward region are suffering and thus bring
about real equality in the larger sense. Such
preferential treatment for those residing in the
backward region is designed to produce equal
opportunity on a broader basis by providing to
neglect geographical or human areas an opportunity
to rise which they would not have if not
preferential treatment is given to them and they
are treated on the same basis as others for
admissions to medical colleges, because then they
would never be able to compete with others more
advantageously placed. If creatively and
imaginatively applied, preferential treatment
based on residence in a backward region can play a
significant role in reducing uneven levels of
development and such preferential treatment would
presumably satisfy the test of Article 14, because
it would be calculated to redress the existing
imbalance between different regions in the State.
There may be a case where a region is educational-
ly backward or woefully deficient in medical
services and in such a case there would be serious
educational and health service disparity for that
242
backward region which must be redressed by an
equality and service minded welfare state. The
purpose of such a policy would be to remove the
existing inequality and to promote welfare based
equality for the residents of the backward region.
If the State in such a case seeks to remove the
absence of opportunity for medical education and
to provide competent and adequate medical services
in such backward region by starting a medical
college in the heart of such backward region and
reserves a high percentage of seats there to
students from that region, it may not be possible
to castigate such reservation or preferential
treatment as discriminatory. What is directly
intended to abolish existing disparity cannot be
accused of discrimination."
Krishna Iyer, J. said to the same effect when he observed in
Jagdish Saran’r case (supra) at page 856 of the Report :
We have no doubt that where the human region from
which the alumni of an institution are largely
drawn is backward, either from the angle of oppor-
tunities for technical education or availability
of medical services for the people, the provision
of a high ratio of reservation hardly militates
against the equality mandate viewed in the
perspective of social justice.
This was precisely the ground on which, in the State of
Uttar Pradesh v. Pradip Tandon, [1975] 2 S.C.R. 761 this
Court allowed reservation in medical admissions for people
of the hill and Uttarakhand areas of the State of U.P. On
the ground that those areas were socially and educationally
backward. Similarly, and for the same reason, the Andhra
Pradesh High Court in A. Peeria Kurappan’a case (supra) held
that preferential treatment of Telengana students in medical
admissions was justified. It is, therefore, clear that where
the region from which the students of a university are
largely drawn is backward either from the point of view of
opportunities for medical education or availability of
competent and adequate medical services, it would be
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constitutionally permissible, without violating the mandate
of the equality clause, to provide a high percentage of
reservation or preference for students coming from that
region, because without reservation or preference students
from such backward region will hardly be able to compete
with those from advanced regions since they would have no
adequate
243
opportunity for development so as to be in a position to
compete with others. By reason of their socially or
economically disadvantaged position they would not have been
able to secure education in good schools and they would
consequently be at a disadvantage compared to students
belonging to the affluent or well-to-do families who have
had best of school education. There can, therefore,
legitimately be reservation or preference in their favour so
far as admissions are concerned in case of a medical college
which is set up or intended to cater to the needs of a
region which is backward or whose alumni are largely drawn
from such backward region. It may, however, be noted that
the reservation or preference in such a case may even be of
a high percentage of seats but it cannot be total.
Here, in the present case, regionwise classification
for admission to medical colleges was sought to be depended
on the ground that Vidharbha and Marathwada regions are
backward as compared to Pune and Bombay regions which are
far more advanced and it was contended on behalf of the
State Government that, in the circumstances, the provision
in Rule B(2) that a student from a school or college situate
within the jurisdiction of a particular university would not
be eligible for admission to medical college or colleges
situate in the jurisdiction of another university but would
be confined only to medical college or colleges within the
jurisdiction of the same university, was intended to give
protection to students in Vidharbha, Marathwada and other
predominently rural areas the population of which is
socially, economically and educationally backward for
otherwise they would have no opportunity for medical
education since they would not be able to compete with
students from Pune and Bombay regions and consequently the
classification made by this provision was constitutionally
permissible. We are afraid this contention is not well-
founded and must be rejected. In the first place there is no
material to show that the entire region within the
jurisdiction of the university in Vidharbha is backward or
that the entire region within the jurisdiction of Pune
University is advanced. There are quite possibly even in the
region within the jurisdiction of Pune University
predominently rural areas which are backward and equally
there may be in the region within the jurisdiction of the
university in Vidharbha, areas which are not backward. We do
not think it is Possible to categorise the regions within
the jurisdiction of
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the various universities as backward or advanced as if they
were exclusive categories and in any event there is no
material placed before us which would persuade us to reach
that conclusion. But even if the regions within the
jurisdiction of the universities in Vidharbha and Marathwada
can be said to be backward and regions within the
Jurisdiction of the universities in Bombay and Pune can be
said to be advanced, we do not think that regionwise
classification for admission to medical colleges can he
sustained. There is no reason why a brilliant student from a
region which is within the jurisdiction of a university in
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Vidharbha or Marathwada area should be denied the
opportunity of medical education in Bombay or Pune. Why
should he remain confined to the so-called backward region
from which he comes? Should an equal opportunity for medical
education not be made available to him as is available to
students from regions within the jurisdiction of Bombay and
Pune Universities? Why should mobility for educational
advancement be impeded by geographical limitations within
the State? Would this clearly not be a denial of equal
opportunity violative of Article 14 of the Constitution? The
answer must clearly be in the affirmative. It would plainly
be violative of the mandate of the equality clause to
compartmentalize the State into different regions and
provide that a student from one region should not he allowed
to migrate to another region for medical education and thus
be denied equal opportunity with others in the state for
medical education. This is precisely the reason why this
Court struck-down unitwise scheme for admission to medical
colleges in the state of Tamil Nadu in A. Peeria Karuppan’s
case (supra). The unit-wise scheme which was held to be
constitutionally invalid in that case was a scheme under
which the medical colleges in the city of Madras were
constituted as one unit and each of the other medical
colleges in the mofussil was constituted as a unit and a
separate Selection Committee was set up for each of these
units. The intending applicants were asked to apply to any
one of the committees but were advised to apply to the
Committee nearest to their place of residence and if they
applied to more than one committee, their applications were
to be forwarded by the government to only one of the
committees. The petitioners challenged the validity of this
unit wise scheme and contended that the unit-wise scheme was
violative of Article 14 of the constitution inter alia
because the applicants of some of the units were in a better
position than
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those who applied in other units, since the ratio between
the applicants and the number of seats in each unit varied
and several applicants who secured lesser marks than the
petitioner were selected merely because their applications
came to be considered in other units. This contention was
upheld by the Court holding that the scheme in question was
invalid as it was discriminatory against some of the
applicants. The ratio of this decision applies fully and
completely to the present case. Here also as a result of the
regionwise classification a student from one region who has
secured lesser marks than another from a different region
may be selected for admission to the medical college or
colleges within his region while the student who has secured
higher marks may not succeed in getting selected for
admission to the medical college or colleges within his
region. And moreover, a student from one region would have
no opportunity for securing admission in the medical college
or colleges in another region, though he may have done much
better than the student in that other region. The regionwise
scheme adopted by the State Government in Rule B(2) clearly
results in denial of equal opportunity violative of Article
14 of the Constitution. We may at this stage refer to the
decision of this Court in D. N. Chanchala’s case (supra) on
which considerable reliance was placed on behalf of the
State Government. The reservation impugned in this case was
university-wise reservation under which preference for
admission to a medical college run by a university was given
to students who had passed the PUC examination of that
university and only 20 per cent of the seats were available
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to those passing the PUC examination of other universities.
The petitioner who had passed PUC examination held by the
Bangalore University applied for admission to any one of the
medical colleges affiliated to the Karnataka University. She
did not come within the merit list on the basis of 20 per
cent open seats which were filled up and since she had not
passed the PUC examination held by the Karnataka University,
her application for admission was rejected. She therefore
filed writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution
contending inter alia that the university-wise distribution
of seats was discriminatory and hence violative of Article
14 of the Constitution. This contention was rejected by the
Court. Shelat, J. speaking on behalf of the Court gave the
following reasons in support of its conclusion :
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"In our view, there is nothing undesirable in
ensuring that those attached to such universities
have their ambitions to have training in
specialised subjects, like medicine, satisfied
through colleges affiliated to their own
universities. Such a basis for selection has not
the disadvantage of districtwise or unitwise
selection as any student from any part of the
State can pass the qualifying examination in any
of the three universities irrespective of the
place of his birth or residence. Further, the
rules confer a discretion on the selection
committee to admit outsiders upto 20 per cent of
the total available seats in any one of these
colleges, i.e., those who have passed the
equivalent examination held by any other
university not only in the State but also
elsewhere in India. It is, therefore, impossible
to say that the basis of selection adopted in
these rules would defeat the object of the rules
as was said in Rajendran case or make possible
less meritorious students obtaining admission at
the cost of the better candidates. The fact that a
candidate having lesser marks might obtain
admission at the cost of another having higher
marks from another university does not necessarily
mean that a less meritorious candidate gets
advantage over a more meritorious one. As is well
known, different universities have different
standards in the examinations held by them."
It will be obvious on a little scrutiny of these reasons
that they cannot possibly have any application to the
regionwise classification adopted in the present case. There
are two basic differences between the regionwise
classification In the present case and the university-wise
reservation in D.N. Chanchala’s case (supra). Firstly, there
was no common examination or uniform standard of evaluation
in the different universities in D.N. Chanchala’s case
(supra) so that it could not be said that a candidate
obtaining lesser marks in the PUC examination held by one
university was necessarily less meritorious than another
student getting more marks in the PUC examination held by
another university. But here in the present case there is
only one common examination for the 12th
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Standard held in the entire state with the same syllabus and
the same set of questions and uniform standard of evaluation
with the result that it can be safely predicated that a
student who gets less marks in the 12th Standard examination
may ordinarily be regarded as less meritorious than another
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student getting higher marks. If there were different
examinations held by the three Division Boards with
different sets of questions and different standards of
evaluation the ratio of the decision in D.N. Chanchala’s
case would have inevitably and irresistibly applied. But the
standard of comparison between students throughout the State
being clear and well-defined on account of a common 12th
Standard examination with same set of questions and uniform
standard of evaluation the decision in D.N. Chanchala’s case
can have no application. Moreover in D.N. Chanchala’s case
(supra) the reservation in favour of students passing PUC
examination of a particular university was not total but 20
per cent of the seats were made available to those passing
the PUC examination of other universities. Here in the
present case, however, the reservation in favour of students
who have studied in schools or colleges situate in the
region within the jurisdiction of a particular university is
100 per cent and no student who has studied in a school or
college within the region of another university can possibly
get admission in the medical college or colleges situate
within the region of that the first mentioned university. We
must therefore hold that the ratio of the decision in D.N.
Chanchala’s case does not compel us to take a view different
from the one we are inclined to take on first principle.
But we would like to make it clear that it would not be
unconstitutional for the State Government to provide for
reservation or preference in respect of a certain percentage
of seats in the medical college or colleges in each region
in favour of those who have studied in schools or colleges
within that region and even if the percentage stipulated by
the State Government is on the higher side, it would not
fall foul of the constitutional mandate of equality. There
are two reasons why such reservation or preference would be
constitutionally permissible. In the first place it would
cause a considerable amount of hardship and inconvenience if
students residing in the region of a particular university
are compelled to move to the region of another university
for medical education which
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they might have to do if selection for admission to the
medical colleges in the entire State were to be based on
merit without any reservation or preference regionwise. It
must be remembered that there would be a large number of
students who, if they do not get admission in the medical
college near their residence and are assigned admission in a
college in another region on the basis of relative merit,
may not be able to go to such other medical college on
account of lack of resources and facilities and in the
result, they would be effectively deprived of a real
opportunity for pursuing the medical course even though on
paper they would have got admission in the medical college.
The opportunity for medical education provided to them would
be illusory and not real because they would not be able to
avail of it. Moreover some difficulty would also arise in
case of girls because if they are not able to get admission
in the medical college near the place where they reside they
might find it difficult to pursue medical education in a
medical college situated in another region where hostel
facilities may not be available and even if hostel
facilities are available, the parents may hesitate to send
them to the hostels. We are therefore of the view that
reservation or preference in respect of a certain percentage
of seats may legitimately be made in favour of those who
have studied in schools or colleges within the region of a
particular university, in order to equalise opportunities
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for medical admission on a broader basis and to bring about
real and not formal, actual and not merely legal, equality.
The only question is as to what should be the extent of such
reservation or preference. But on this question we derive
considerable light from the decision in Dr. Pradeep Jain’a
case (supra) where we held that reservation based on
residence requirement or institutional preference should not
exceed the outer limit of 70 per cent of the total number of
open seats after taking into account other kinds of
reservations validly made and that the remaining 30 per cent
of the open seats at the least should be made available for
admission to students on All-India basis irrespective of the
state or the university from which they come. We would adopt
the same principle in case of regionwise reservation or
preference and hold that not more than 70 per cent of the
total number of open seats in the medical college or
colleges situate within the area of jurisdiction of a
particular university, after taking into account other kinds
of reservations validly made, shall be
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reserved for students who have studied in schools or
colleges situate within that region and at least 30 per cent
of the open seats shall be available for admission to
students who have studied in schools or colleges in other
regions within the State.
There is however one matter in respect of which it is
necessary to make some clarification. The first is that when
we talk of total number of open seats after taking into
account other kinds of reservations validly made to which
the percentages of 70 and 30 are to be applied as aforesaid,
we mean the total number of open seats after deducting such
number of open seats as are required to be made available
for admission of students on All-India basis in accordance
with the principles laid down in the decision in Dr. Pradeep
Jain’s case (supra) as modified from time to time by various
subsequent judgments delivered by this Court. The number of
seats required to be made available for admission to
students on All-India basis must first be taken out and then
to the remaining number of open seats after taking into
account other kinds of reservations validly made, the
percentages of 70 and 30 must be applied for determining the
extent to which regional reservation or preference can
legitimately be made.
We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the judgment
of the High Court and declare Rule B(2) unconstitutional and
void. We may however make it clear that admissions made on
the basis of Rule B(2) shall not be disturbed, nor will as
claim for admission be founded for the academic year 1985 on
the basis of Rule B(2). If the State Government wants to
make regionwise reservation or preference after setting
apart the seats required to be made available for admission
to students on All-India basis, we have laid down the
guidelines which the State Government may follow so as to
avoid clash with Article 14 of the Constitution.
There will be no order as to costs of the appeal.
M.L.A. Appeal allowed.
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