Full Judgment Text
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 9
PETITIONER:
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
M. V. NARASIMHAN
DATE OF JUDGMENT15/07/1975
BENCH:
FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA
BENCH:
FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA
UNTWALIA, N.L.
CITATION:
1975 AIR 1835 1976 SCR (1) 6
1975 SCC (2) 377
CITATOR INFO :
R 1982 SC 697 (15)
APL 1989 SC 222 (3,8)
APL 1989 SC 516 (50)
ACT:
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, Section 2-
Incorporation of provisions of s. 21 of Penal Code in the
definition of public servant-Amendment to s. 21 including
employee of Government company-Definition of public servant
in s. 2 of the Act, if unaffected.
HEADNOTE:
Section 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947,
provides that, for the purposes of this Act, "Public
servant" means a public servant as defined in s. 21 of the
Indian Penal Code. Before the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act,
1958 (Act No. 11 of 1958) was passed adding clause 12 to
this section, s. 21 of the Penal Code consisted only of
eleven clauses and an employee under the Corporation or a
Government Company did no. fall within the purview of any of
the clauses of s. 21 of the Penal Code. Clause 12 was
further amended by the Anti-Corruption Laws (Amendment) Act,
1964 (Act No. XL of 1964) enlarging the definition of
"public servant".
The respondent who was an employee in the Heavy
Electricals (India) Ltd. Bhopal, which is a Government
Company, was convected by the Special Judge Indore, under s.
420 I.P.C. and s. 5(2) read with s. 5(1)(d) of the Act and
was sentenced to one year rigorous imprisonment on each
count. The appeal filed by the respondent before the High
Court of Madhya Pradesh was allowed mainly on the ground
that as the respondent was not a public servant as
contemplated by the provisions of the Act, his trial under
the Act was without jurisdiction. The High Court took the
view that as the Act had incorporated the definition of the
Penal Code prior to its amendment, it became an integral and
independent part of the Act and would remain unaffected by
any repeal or change in the previous Act, namely, the Penal
Code. This appeal has been preferred on the basis of the
certificate granted by the High Court. .
Allowing the appeal,
^
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 9
HELD: (i) It is well-settled that, after the provision
of the previous Act is incorporated in the subsequent Act,
the off-spring, namely, the incorporated provisions,
survives even if the previous Act is repealed, amended,
declared a nullity or erased from the statute book. But the
Act being a social legislation its provisions must be
construed liberally so as to advance the object of the Act.
Though the Act and the Penal Code are not statutes in pari
materia there can be no doubt that the evidence Act and the
Prevention of Corruption Act form part of one system,
because the rules of Evidence Act, with minor exceptions,
apply to trials of offences created under the Act. The Act,
no doubt, contains a penal flavour but it is in effect a
piece of social legislation directed towards eradication of
the evil of corruption amongst the services alone. In other
words, the public servants alone fall within the mischief of
the Act and no one else. [11E; 12A-C]
Clarke v. Bradlaugh, [1881] 8 Q.B.D. 63,69, Ram Sarup
v. Munshi and other [1963] 3 S.C.R. 858, 868-869, In re
Wood’s Estate, Ex parte Her Majesty’s Commissioners of Works
and Buildings, [18861 31 Ch. D. 607, 615-616, Secretary of
State for India in Council v. Hindustan Co-operative
Insurance Society Ltd. L.R. 58 I.A. 259. 266-267. referred
to.
State of Madras v. Vaidyanath Aiyar, A.I.R. 1958 S.C.
61, relied on.
(ii) The object of the Act is to eradicate corruption
from various levels either in Government services or in
service under the Corporation or Government Companies. The
Penal Code no doubt creates offences like those mentioned in
ss. 161 and 165 of the Code but they were not found
sufficient to cope with the present situation and the
expending needs of the nation. In these circumstances,
7
it was considered necessary to evolve a quick, expeditious
and effective machinery to destroy the evil of corruption
existing in any form. If, therefore, the Penal Code with the
same object enlarged the definition of s. 21 by adding the
twelfth clause by virtue, of the Criminal law (Amendment)
Act, 1958 and the Anti-corruption Laws (Amendment) Act,
1964, there is no reason why the extended meaning to the
provision of s. 2 of the Act ns borrowed from s. 21 of the
Penal Code be not given lo that section. Otherwise the Act
would become wholly unworkable. [12D-F]
Secretary of State for India in Council v. Hindustan
Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd. L.R. 58 I.A. 259, 266-
267. S. Gangoli v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, [1960] 1 S.
C. R. 290 and M. Narayanan Nambiar v. State of Kerala, [1963
Supp. 2 S.C.R. 724. referred to.
(iii) Even if s. 2 of the Act had not applied the
provisions of the Penal Code and had not defined public
servant, then the provisions of the Penal Code would have
come into operation by implied reference because the Act was
a supplemental Act to the Penal Code. It was only by way of
abundant caution that s. 2 of the Act incorporated the
definition of "public servant" as mentioned in s. 21 of the
Penal Code and in that sense alone the Act can be treated as
being pari meteria with the Penal Code. [15A-B]
JUDGMENT:
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
284 of 1974.
From the judgment and order dated the 12th April, 1973
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 9
of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 43
of 1971.
F. S. Nariman, Addl. Solicitor General of India, P. P.
Rao and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant.
The respondent appeared in person.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
FAZAL ALI, J. This is an appeal by State of M.P. by
certificate granted by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh
under Art. 134(1)(c) of the Constitution against its
judgment and order dated April 12, 1973 by which the
respondent who was convicted by the Special Judge, Indore,
under s. 220 I.P.C. and s.5(2) read with s. 5(1)(d) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and sentenced to one year
rigorous imprisonment on each count, was acquitted by the
High Court. Briefly put, the prosecution case against the
respondent was that he was an employee in the Heavy
Electricals (India) Ltd, Bhopal which is a Government
company and was working at the relevant time as Personal
Assistant to Shri C. Rae, Manager, Purchasing & Main Stores
of the Company. Mr. Rae was allotted a new Fiat Car at
Bombay on priority basis and the respondent and Mr. Rae had
arrived at Bombay to take delivery of the car on March 14,
1965 and they stayed there till March 13. 1965. Mr. Rae,
however, left on the morning of March 13, 1965 directing the
respondent to obtain delivery of the Fiat Car on March 14,
1965 and then proceed to Indore. Ultimately the car was
brought to Bhopal on March 16, 1965 at about 2-30 P.M. On
March 23, 1965 the respondent submitted his T.A. bill Ext.
P-21 showing his departure from Bombay on March 16, 1965 by
car at 2-00 P.M.
8
and arrival at Bhopal on March 17, 1965 at 6-30 P.M. and
claimed daily allowance at the rate of Rs. 12/- per day for
halt at Bombay. The respondent accordingly received the full
amount of the T.A. Bill on April 3, 1965. The allegation
against the respondent was that he had prepared a false T.A.
Bill and had cheated the Government Company and was guilty
of serious criminal misconduct as envisaged by the
Prevention of Corruption Act. The learned Special Judge,
Indore, accepted the prosecution case and convicted the
respondent as indicated above. The respondent then filed an
appeal before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh which allowed
appeal, mainly on the ground that as the respondent was not
a public servant as contemplated by the provisions of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, his trial under the said Act
was without jurisdiction. The High Court, however, left it
open to the Government to prosecute the respondent under the
relevant law, if necessary. It is against this order of the
High Court that the State of M.P. has filed this appeal
before us after obtaining certificate of fitness from the
High Court.
The short point taken by the respondent before the High
Court was that as the word "public servant" has not been
expressive defined in the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1947, it has borrowed the definition from s. 21 of the
Indian Penal Code, such a definition amounts to legislation
by incorporation, and therefore any subsequent amendment,
addition or alteration in the Indian Penal Code would not at
all affect the incorporated provision in the Prevention of
Corruption Act. The High Court seems to have readily
accepted this contention and has accordingly held that as
the various amendments to s. 21 of the Indian Penal Code
cannot apply to the provisions of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, and therefore the respondent being only an
employee of the Government Company does not fall within the
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 9
ambit of public servant as defined in s. 21 of the Indian
Penal Code prior to the amendment. In order of appreciate
this point, it may be necessary to set out the scheme of the
Prevention of Corruption Act-hereinafter referred to as ’the
Act’-with particular reference to s. 21 of the Indian Penal
Code-hereinafter referred to as ’the Penal Code’-which has
been incorporated in the Act. To begin with, the preamble
to the Act clearly shows that the Act has been passed for
more effective prevention of bribery and corruption, bribery
being a form of corruption. Section 2 of the Act runs thus:
"For the purpose of this Act, "Public servant"
means a public servant as defined in section 21 of the
Indian Penal Code."
It would be seen that s. 2 of the Act completely
incorporates the provision of s. 21 of the Penal Code in
order to define a "public servant". The Legislature in its
wisdom did not think it necessary to give a separate
definition of "public servant" in the Act, but in order to
achieve brevity in legislation incorporated the provision of
s. 21 of the Penal Code into it. before the Criminal Law
(Amendment) Act, 1958 (Act No. 11 of 1958) was passed s. 21
of the Penal Code consisted only of eleven clauses and an
employee under the
9
Corporation or a Government Company did not fall within the
purview of any of the clauses of s. 21 of the Penal Code.
Thus when the Legislature incorporated the provisions of s.
21 of the Penal Code in the Act in the year 1947, cl. 12 was
not there at all on the statute book of the Penal Code. The
High Court took the view that as the Act had incorporated
the definition of the Penal Code prior to its amendment,
therefore, it became an integral and independent part of the
Act and would remain unaffected by any repeal or change in
the previous Act, namely the Penal Code. It appears,
however, that by virtue of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act,
1958, twelfth clause was inserted in s. 21 of the Penal
Code, which runs as follows:
"Twelfth.-Every officer in the service or pay of a
local authority or of a corporation engaged in any
trade or industry which is established by a Central,
Provincial or State Act or of a Government company as
define in section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956."
This Act also amended certain provisions of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 in enlarging the concept
of criminal misconduct but it did not at all amend any
portion of s. 2 of the Act, perhaps the reason being that in
view of the enlargement of the definition of "public
servant" in s. 21 of the Penal Code express amendment of s.
2 of the Act was not necessary.
By virtue of the Anti-Corruption Laws (Amendment) Act,
1964 (Act No. XL of 1964), clause 12 of s 21 of the Penal
Code was substituted as follows:
"Twelfth.-Every person-
(a) in the service or pay of the Government or
remunerated by fees or commission for the performance
of any public duty by the Government;
(b) in the service or pay of a local authority, a
corporation established by or under a Central,
Provincial or State Act or a Government company as
defined in section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956,"
It would thus appear that by virtue of these two
amendments the Parliament sought to enlarge the definition
of "public servant" so as to include even an employee of a
Government company or a corporation with the avowed object
of stamping out corruption at various levels prevailing in
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 9
the country.
The question that arises for consideration is whether
the sub sequent amendments to s. 21 of the Penal Code after
its incorporation in the Act would have to be read into the
Act or not. It is true that if the doctrine of legislation
by incorporation is strictly applied in this
10
case, then the definition of s. 21 of the Penal Code prior
to its amendment by Act 11 of 1958 and Act XL of 1964 would
alone stand and, if this is so, the respondent would not be
a public servant within the meaning of s. 21 of the Penal
Code. It is well settled that where the subsequent Act
incorporates a provision of the previous Act, the position
is that the borrowed provision is bodily lifted from the
previous Act and placed in the subsequent Act and becomes an
integral and independent part of it so as to remain
unaffected by any repeal, change or amendment in the
previous Act. In Clarke v. Bradlaugh,(1) Brett, L.J.,
observed as follows:
"..... but there is a rule of construction that,
where a statute is incorporated by reference into a
second statute the repeal of the first statute by a
third does not affect the second."
These observations were noticed and approved by this
Court in Ram Sarup v. Munshi and others(1), where this Court
made the following observations:
"Where the provision of an Act are incorporated by
reference in a later Act the repeal of the earlier Act
has, in general, no effect upon the construction or
effect of the Act in which its provisions have been
incorporated. The effect of incorporation is stated by
Brett, L.J., in Clarke v. Bradiaugh:
"Where a statute is incorporated, by reference
into a Second statute the repeal of the first statute
by a third does not affect the second."
In the circumstances, therefore, the repeal of the
Punjab Alienation of Land Act of 1900 has no effect on the
continued operation of the Pre-emption Act and the
expression ’agricultural land’ in the later Act has to be
read as if the definition in the Alienation of Land Act had
been bodily transposed into it." F
The doctrine of incorporation by reference to earlier
legislation has been very aptly described by Lord Esher, M.
R., in In re Wood’s Estate, Ex parte Her Majesty’s
Commissioners of Works and Building(3) where he observed as
follows:
"If a subsequent Act brings into itself by
reference some of the clauses of a former Act, the
legal effect of that, as has often been held, is to
write those sections into the new Act just as if they
had been actually written in it with the pen, or
printed in it, and, the moment you have those clauses
in the later Act, you have no occasion to refer to the
former Act at all For all practical purposes,
therefore, those sections of the Act of 1840 are to be
dealt with as if they were actually in the Act of
1855."
11
Craies on Statute Law, (7th Edition), while referring
to the observations of Brett, L.J., observed at p. 361 as
follows
"There is a rule of construction that where a
statute is incorporated by reference into a second
statute, the repeal of the first statute by a third
does not affect the second, as the incorporated
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 9
provisions have become part of the second statute."
The Privy Council in Secretary of State for India in
Council v. Hindustan Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd.
(1), while amplifying this doctrine, observed as follows:
"Their Lordship regard the local Act as doing
nothing more than incorporating certain provisions from
an existing Act, and for convenience of drafting doing
so by reference to that Act, instead of setting out for
itself at length the provisions which it was desired to
adopt.. The independent existence of the two Acts is
therefore recognized; despite the death of the parent
Act, its offspring survives in the incorporating Act.
Though no such saving clause appears in the General
Clauses Act, their Lordships think that the principle
involved is as applicable in India as it is in this
country."
Thus, the position is that after the provision of the
previous Act is incorporated in the subsequent Act, the off-
spring, namely the incorporated provisions, survives even if
the previous Act is repealed, amended, declared a nullity or
erased from the statute book. The High Court appears to have
relied on all these decisions in order to come to its
conclusion that as the Act has incorporated the provisions
of s. 21 of the Penal Code in s. 2 thereof, any amendment in
the previous Act, namely the Penal Code, will not affect the
subsequent Act, namely the Prevention of Corruption Act.
It was argued before the High Court as also before us
that the Act and the Penal Code are statutes in pari materia
and form part of one system and they should, therefore, be
interpreted as enforcing each other. Thus any change in the
definition of s. 21 of the Penal Code would have to be
implicitly read into s.2 of the Act. The Additional
Solicitor General Mr. Nariman appearing for the State,
however, conceded later on, and in our opinion rightly. that
it may not be possible to hold that the Act and the Penal
Code were statutes in pari materia. It would appear that the
Act is a completely self contained statute with its own
provisions and has created a specific offence of criminal
misconduct which is quite different from the offence of
bribery as defined in the Penal Code.
Both these statutes have different objects and create
offences with separate ingredients. No authority has been
cited before us in support of the proposition that the Act,
namely, the Prevention of Corruption Act, and the Penal Code
are statutes in pari materia so as to form one system.
12
In the State of Madras v. Vaidyanath Aiyar, (1) this
Court while construing the meaning of the phrase ’it shall
be presumed’ appearing in s. 4 of the Act utilised the
construction placed on the phrase shall presume’ in the
Evidence Act by holding that the Evidence Act was a statute
in pari materia with the Prevention of Corruption Act. There
can be no doubt that the Evidence Act and the Prevention of
Corruption Act form part of one system, because the rules of
the Evidence Act, with minor exceptions, apply to trials of
offences created under the Act. This principle, however,
cannot apply to the present case, where, as we have already
stated the areas of the two statutes, namely the Act and the
Penal Code are entirely different. Secondly, while the
Indian Penal Code is essentially a penal statute of a much
wider scope than the Act, the Act no doubt contains a penal
flavour but it is in effect a piece of social legislation
directed towards eradication of the evil of corruption
amongst the services alone In other words, public servants
alone fall within the mischief of the Act i.e.. the
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 9
Prevention of Corruption Act, and no one else.
Mr. Nariman then argued that having regard to the
preamble and the object of the Act and the Penal Code there
can be no doubt that the Act was undoubtedly a statute
supplemental to the Penal Code and that being the position
any amendment in the definition of s. 21 of the Penal Code
would have to be read into s. 2 of the Act, because once the
definition of s.21 of the Penal Code was incorporated in the
Act it had to be imported into the other Act and considered
pari passu the Penal Code. In our opinion, this argument is
well founded and must prevail. We have already indicated
that the object of the Act was to eradicate corruption from
various levels either in Government services or in services
under the Corporations or Government companies. The Penal
Code no doubt creates offences like those mentioned in ss.
161 and 165 of the Code but they were not found sufficient
to cope with the present situation and the expanding needs
of the nation. In these circumstances, it was considered
necessary to evolve a quick, expeditious and effective
machinery to destroy the evil of corruption existing in any
from. If, therefore, the Penal Code with the same object
enlarged the definition of s.21 by adding the twelfth clause
by virtue of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1958 and the
Anti-corruption Laws (Amendment) Act, 1964, there is no
reason why the extended meaning to the provision of s.2 of
the Act as borrowed from s. 21 of the Penal Code be not
given to that section.
This Court in S. Gangoli v. The State of Uttar
Pradesh(2) while interpreting s. 2 of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, that the accused were public servants within
the meaning of the Act, being employees of the East Indian
Railway, which was managed and owned by the Government of
India, observed as follows:
"The East Indian Railway which has employed the
appellants was at the material time owned by the
Government of India and managed and run by it, and so
if the status of the appellants had to be judged at the
material date solely
13
by reference to s.21 of the Code there would be no
difficulty in holding that they are public servants as
defined by the said section."
Even while discussing the exact ambit and scope of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, this Court observed in M.
Narayanan Nambiar v. Slate of Kerala(1) as follows:
"The preamble indicates that the Act was passed as
it was expedient to make more effective provision for
the prevention of bribery and corruption. The long
title as well as the preamble indicate that the Act was
passed to put down the said social evil i.e. bribery
and corruption by public servant....... It also aims to
protect honest public servants from harassment by
prescribing that the investigation against them could
be made only by police officials of particular status
and by making the sanction of the Government or other
appropriate officer a pre-condition for their
prosecution. As it is a socially useful measure
conceived in public interest, it should be liberally
construed so as to bring about the desired object, i.e.
to prevent corruption among public servants and to
prevent harassment of the honest among them."
These observations regarding the object of the Act
obviously were based on the footing that the Act must be
read as supplemental to the Penal Code, and therefore the
definition borrowed from the Penal Code must be read into s.
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 9
2 of the Act not only at the time when it was borrowed but
even at the material date when the offence is committed.
This being the position it is manifest that by virtue of the
amendments referred to above in the Penal Code which
inserted twelfth clause to s.21 of the Penal Code the
respondent clearly comes within the meaning of "public
servant" and the High Court was in error in taking a view to
the contrary. Further the Prevention of Corruption Act being
a social legislation its provisions must be liberally
construed so as to advance the object of the Act. This can
only be done if we give extended meaning to the term "public
servant" as referred to in s. 2 of the Act by applying the
enlarged definition contained in clause 12 inserted in the
Penal Code by the two amendments referred to above.
There is yet another aspect of the matter which is
spelt out from the decision of the Privy Council in the
Hindustan Co-operative Insurance Society’s case (supra)
which has been relied upon by the High Court itself. While
reiterating the principle that after certain provisions from
an existing Act have been incorporated into a subsequent
Act, no addition to the former Act can be made, their
Lordships of the Privy Council made it clear that this
principle would not apply where the subsequent Act is
rendered unworkable or is not able to function effectually.
In this connection their Lordships observed. as follows:
14
"It seems to be no less logical to hold that where
certain provisions from an existing Act have been
incorporated into a subsequent Act, no addition to the
former Act, which is not expressly made applicable to
the subsequent Act, can be deemed to be incorporated in
it, at all events if it is possible for the subsequent
Act to function effectually without the addition "
On a consideration of these authorities, therefore, it
seems that the following proposition emerges:
Where a subsequent Act incorporates provisions of
a previous Act then the borrowed provisions become an
integral and independent part of the subsequent Act and
are to tally unaffected by any repeal or amendment in
the previous Act. This principle, however, will not
apply in the following cases:
(a) where the subsequent Act and the previous Act are
supplemental to each other;
(b) where the two Acts are in pari materia;
(c) where the amendment in the previous Act, if not
imported into the subsequent Act also, would
render the subsequent Act wholly unworkable and
ineffectual; and
(d) where the amendment of the previous Act, either
expressly or by necessary intendment, applies the
said provisions to the subsequent Act.
The Additional Solicitor General vehemently contended
that if the enlarged definition by the insertion of clause
12 in s. 21 of the Penal Code is not imported into s. 21 of
the Act, then the Act would become wholly unworkable. For
instance, if two persons are serving under a Government
company and have committed an offence of accepting illegal
gratification, and if one is prosecuted under s. 161 of the
Penal Code and the other under the Act, it is obvious that
the prosecution against the employee under the Penal Code
would succeed on proof of facts, whereas the employee of the
same company who is prosecuted under the Act will fail
because such an employee will not be a public servant,
according to the extended meaning given by the amendments to
s. 21 of the Penal Code. This will, therefore, defeat and
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 9
frustrate not only the object of the Act but will render it
absolutely unworkable. In view of these circumstances,
therefore, we are inclined to hold that in the facts and
circumstances of the present case and having regard to the
nature and scope or the Prevention of Corruption Act, the
extended definition of s.21 of the Penal Code would have to
be imported into s. 2 of the Act. That being the position
there can be no doubt that the respondent was a public
servant within the meaning of s. 2 of the Act and his
conviction by the learned Special Judge, Indore, did not
suffer from any legal infirmity.
There is yet another aspect of the matter. lt seems to
us that even if s. 2 of the Act had not applied the
provisions of the Penal Code and had not defined public
servant, then the provisions of the
15
Penal Code would have come into operation by implied
reference because the. Act was a supplemental Act to the
Penal Code. It was only by way of abundant caution that s. 2
of the Act incorporated the definition of public servant" as
mentioned in s. 21 of the Penal Code and in that sense alone
the Act can be treated as being pari materia with the Penal
Code. For these reasons therefore for are clearly of the
opinion that the judgment of the High Court holding that the
respondent was not a public servant is legally erroneous and
cannot be allowed to stand.
The other point is regarding the question of sentence.
The High Court has itself pointed out that the respondent
had been forced under duress exercised by his superior
officer in drawing the inflated travelling allowance. The
High Court has also expressed the view that having regard to
the fact that as the accused had to face a trial for a
numher of years, the Government will consider the
desirability of not prosecuting him again. In view of these
circumstances, therefore, we feel the respondent has
committed only a technical offence and a token sentence is
called for
We, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the judgment
of the High Court dated April 12, 1973, acquitting the
respondent. We convict the respondent under s. 420 I.P.C.
and s. 5(2) read with s. 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act but reduce his sentence to the imprisonment
already served.
V.M.K. Appeal allowed.
16