Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
RAJASTHAN ADULT EDUCATION ASSOCIATION & ANR.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
KUMARI ASHOKA BHATACHARYA & ANR
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/12/1997
BENCH:
SUJATA V. MANOHAR, D.P. WADHWA
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
THE 1ST DAY OF DECEMBER, 1997
Present:
Hon’ble Mrs. Justice Sujata V.Manohar
Hon’ble Mr Justice D.P.Wadhwa
D.A.Dave, Sr. Adv., Ramesh Singh, Ms. Nandini Gore,
Ms.M.Karanjawala, Advs. with him for the appellants
J U D G M E N T
The following Judgment of the Court was delivered:
D.P. Wadhwa, J.
Appellant is aggrieved by the judgment dated August 4,
19095 of the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court
dismissing its appeal filed against the judgment dated March
10, 1992 of the learned single Judge allowing the writ
petition of the respondent. The respondent in her writ
petition had challenged the order dated May 1, 1989 of the
appellant terminating her services after giving her one
month’s notice.
The appellant is a society registered under the
Societies Registration Act. It was established with the main
object of creating atmosphere for adult education which
includes imparting education for women in rural parts of the
State of Rajasthan. The respondent was appointed temporarily
as Programme Assistant in district IDARAS (Information
Development And Resource Agency) by letter dated November 9,
1987. Her appointment was for a period of three months on a
consolidated salary of Rs. 1200/- per month. Her appointment
was extended for a further period of six months from March
1, 1988. By letter dated March 11, 1989 the respondent was
informed that her services were not upto the mark and
deficiencies in her service were pointed out after
evaluation of her work. The respondent was told the need for
her for putting serious efforts and to learn the sponsored
subject. She was given one more opportunity to show
improvement in her work and period of her services was again
extended from January 30 to April 30, 1989. By letter dated
May 1, 1989 the respondent was told that her services were
not required and these were terminated. She was given one
moths’ notice. Her employment thus ceased on May 31, 1989.
Respondent in her writ petition filed against the order
terminating her services as temporary programme Assistant
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was challenged principally on the ground that the order was
passed without complying with the provision of Section 25F
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Notice being issued to
the appellant to show cause as to why the writ petition he
not admitted and disposed of it was submitted by the
appellant that writ petition was not maintainable as the
appellant was not a ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12
of the Constitution and that it was also not an ‘industry’
coming within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act.
Learned single Judge who allowed the writ petition held that
the appellant was a State and that in any case before
terminating her services the respondent should have been
given an opportunity to explain her conduct. He observed
that "even if Article 311 is not applicable, services of the
petitioner could not have been terminated or dispensed with,
without giving a reasonable opportunity as is required by
the fundamental principles of natural justice. An employee
cannot be condemned unheard, without giving an opportunity
to show cause and that was not done in the present case".
The Division Bench in appeal against the judgment of
the learned single Judge did not consider the merit of the
case of its own and by the impugned judgment merely observed
that there was no reason to interfere with the judgment of
the learned single Judge allowing the writ petition and
setting aside the order of termination of services of the
respondent.
We do not think High Court has examined the issue
involved in the case in its proper perspective. The
respondent was not holding any regular appointment with the
appellant. She was employed for a particular project. At the
most she was on probation during the period of her
appointment. she was told to show improvement in her work.
Not only that she was told so in writing by letter dated
March 11, 1989 but the matter was discussed with her on
other occasions as well. When the appellant found that the
work of the respondent was not upto the mark and she was not
showing any improvement during her probation period, her
services were dispensed with. Her employment was purely
temporary. Letter terminating her services does not cast any
stigma on the respondent. Termination of her services was
not by way of any punishment. It was a termination
simpliciter. The appellant was within its right to terminate
the temporary employment of the respondent.
We accordingly set aside the impugned judgment of the
Division Bench dated August 4, 1995 as well as that of the
learned single Judge dated March 10, 1992. In this view of
the matter, it is not necessary for us to go into the wider
question if the appellant is a State amenable to writ
jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution.
The appeal is allowed but without costs.