Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 10201-10202 OF 2010
M/S. MUTHOOT LEASING AND FINANCE
LIMITED AND ANOTHER
.....
APPELLANTS
VERSUS
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX ..... RESPONDENT
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10203 OF 2010
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10204 OF 2010
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 10205-10206 OF 2010
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10207 OF 2010
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4903 OF 2014
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4904 OF 2014
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4905 OF 2014
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4906 OF 2014
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4907 OF 2014
A N D
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2023
(ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 4441 OF 2011)
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
BABITA PANDEY
Date: 2023.01.03
16:58:24 IST
Reason:
Civil Appeal Nos.10201-10202 of 2010 & Ors. Page 1 of 21
J U D G M E N T
SANJIV KHANNA, J.
Leave granted in Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 4441 of
2011.
2. The common question which arises for consideration in this batch
of Civil Appeals is: whether the appellants – assessees are liable to
1
pay tax under the Interest-Tax Act, 1974 on the interest component
included in the hire-purchase instalments paid under the hire-
purchase agreement?
3. The facts, in brief, are that the appellants – assessees are non-
banking finance and leasing companies registered with the Reserve
Bank of India. Some of the appellants – assessees have been
reclassified as hire-purchase finance companies. It is not disputed
that the appellants – assessees are credit institutions within the
meaning of Section 2(5-A) of the Act, which reads as follows:
“(5-A) “credit institution” means,—
(i) a banking company to which the Banking Regulation
Act, 1949 (10 of 1949), applies (including any bank or
banking institution referred to in Section 51 of that Act);
(ii) a public financial institution as defined in Section 4-
A of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956);
1
For short, ‘the Act’.
Civil Appeal Nos.10201-10202 of 2010 & Ors. Page 2 of 21
(iii) a State financial corporation established under
Section 3 or Section 3-A or an institution notified under
Section 46 of the State Financial Corporations Act,
1951 (63 of 1951), and
(iv) any other financial company;”
It is also imperative to mention Section 2(5-B) of the Act,
which defines a “financial company” and includes within its ambit
hire-purchase finance companies:
“(5-B) “financial company” means a company, other
than a company referred to in sub-clause (i), (ii) or (iii)
of clause (5-A), being—
(i) a hire-purchase finance company, that is to say, a
company which carries on, as its principal business,
hire-purchase transactions or the financing of such
transactions;
xx xx xx"
4. The contention of the appellants – assessees is that under a hire-
purchase agreement, they hire out a vehicle to the customer and
receive hire-purchase instalments, and not interest on loans and
advances. As per the findings of fact recorded by the Income Tax
2
Appellate Tribunal , the hirer has acknowledged that the appellants
– assessees are the owners of the vehicle. As per the hire-purchase
agreements, the hirer must pay rent to the owner during the hiring
as per the sums mentioned in the agreement on the dates
mentioned therein. Further, the hirer has to take proper care of the
2
For short, ‘ITAT’.
Civil Appeal Nos.10201-10202 of 2010 & Ors. Page 3 of 21
vehicle and keep it in good condition. He has to also pay all rents,
rates, taxes and outgoings payable. The hirer must keep the vehicle
in his sole custody and possession at the address mentioned in the
agreement, or such other place as the owner has previously
consented to in writing. The owner or any person authorised by him
in writing is entitled to inspect the vehicle at all reasonable times
during the period of hire. The hirer may, at any time, determine the
hire-purchase agreement by delivering the vehicle at his own cost
to the owners. If the hirer fails to pay the hire instalments within the
stipulated time, becomes insolvent, pledges or sells, or attempts to
pledge or sell or otherwise alienate or transfer the vehicle, or does
or suffer any act or thing whereby, or in consequence of which, the
vehicle may be distrained, seized or taken into execution under
legal process, or breaks or fails to perform or observe any condition
as mentioned in the hire-purchase agreement, the owner is entitled
to forthwith determine the agreement and, thereupon, entitled to
enter the place where the vehicle is kept and seize, remove and
retake possession thereof. The owner is also entitled to sue for all
the instalments due, damages for breach of the agreement, and the
cost in retaking possession of the vehicle. The owners, if agreeable,
may permit the hirer to have the registration of the vehicle in his
own name, provided that the hirer shall transfer the registration in
Civil Appeal Nos.10201-10202 of 2010 & Ors. Page 4 of 21
the name of the owner whenever required to do so by the owner,
especially when the hirer commits breach of any of the conditions
of the agreement, due to which the owners are obliged to seize the
vehicle.
5. On these facts, the ITAT accepted the plea of the appellants –
assessees that they are not liable to pay interest tax on the interest
component imbedded in the hire-purchase instalment. The ITAT
th
referred to Circular No. 760 dated 13 January 1998 issued by the
3
Central Board of Direct Taxes and observed that the hire-purchase
agreement is a composite transaction, and has elements of
bailment and sale. Relying on the terms and conditions of the hire-
purchase agreement noted above, the ITAT held that hire-purchase
agreements are distinguishable from loans and advances. The hire
instalments are something different and more, and not the interest
on loans and advances that is chargeable to interest tax.
6. The ITAT had also relied on the provisions of The Hire-Purchase
Act, 1972, which, in our opinion, is palpably wrong as the said
enactment was never enforced and was subsequently repealed
vide the Hire-Purchase (Repeal) Act, 2005.
3
For short, ‘CBDT’.
Civil Appeal Nos.10201-10202 of 2010 & Ors. Page 5 of 21
7. The High Court of Kerala in the case of The Commissioner of
Income Tax, Cochin v. M/s. Muthoot Leasing & Finance
4 th
Limited by the impugned judgment dated 10 March 2008 set
aside and reversed the finding of the ITAT, observing that the hire-
purchase instalment includes “finance charges”, which is nothing
but interest, and therefore, interest tax is leviable on the interest
component. The transaction, though styled as a hire-purchase
agreement, the High Court held, is in fact a finance agreement for
purchase of a vehicle. The hirer, as a borrower, had been charged
a flat rate of interest. The hirer, on payment of instalments, had the
option to purchase the vehicle for one rupee, which was an empty
formality, because the vehicle was already registered in his name.
5
As per Section 51 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 , the registering
authority is required to enter the details of the hire-purchase
agreement in the certificate of registration. The respondent –
assessee therein had the license to repossess the vehicle on
default, but to get ownership they had to apply for change in name
under the provisions of the MV Act. Reliance placed by the
th
appellant – assessee on Circular No. 760 dated 13 January 1998
issued by the CBDT was rejected, observing that the CBDT had
4
ITA No. 269 of 2002.
5
For short, the ‘MV Act’.
Civil Appeal Nos.10201-10202 of 2010 & Ors. Page 6 of 21
th
earlier issued Circular No. 738 dated 25 March 1996 clarifying that
the interest recovered under the hire-purchase agreement falls
under Section 2(7) of the Act. For arriving at the conclusion,
reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in Sundaram
6
Finance Limited v. State of Kerala and Another , a decision
which we will subsequently examine.
8. The High Court of Delhi in Commissioner of Interest Tax v. M/s
7 st
G.E. Capital Transportation , decided on 1 September 2006,
has taken a different view, observing that the assessees therein
having not earned any interest on loan or advance, no component
of the hire-purchase instalment paid by the customer/hirer towards
the hire is chargeable to interest tax under the Act. At this stage, it
may be relevant to state that the special leave petition preferred by
the Commissioner of Income Tax, New Delhi against the decision
of the Delhi High Court in a connected matter, in the case of
Commissioner of income Tax, New Delhi v. M/s G.E. Capital
8 th
Services India , was dismissed by this Court on 16 May 2008.
The dismissal being in limine and at the admission stage, would not
constitute a binding precedent under Article 141 of the Constitution
of India.
6
AIR 1966 SC 1178.
7
ITA No. 1275 of 2006.
8
SLP(C) No. 14202 of 2008.
Civil Appeal Nos.10201-10202 of 2010 & Ors. Page 7 of 21
st
9. Section 2(7) of the Act, post amendment with effect from 1 October
1991, reads as under:
“(7) “interest” means interest on loans and advances
made in India and includes—
(a) commitment charges on unutilised portion of any
credit sanctioned for being availed of in India; and
(b) discount on promissory notes and bills of exchange
drawn or made in India,
but does not include—
(i) interest referred to in sub-section (1-B) of Section 42
of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 (2 of 1934);
(ii) discount on treasury bills;”
10. There are two direct decisions of this Court interpreting Section 2(7)
of the Act vide Commissioner of Income Tax, Kanpur v. Sahara
9
India Savings and Investment Corporation Limited ; and State
Bank of Patiala Through General Manager v. Commissioner of
10
Income Tax, Patiala , which are relevant, and thus, we would
refer to them in some detail.
11. In Sahara India Savings and Investment Corporation Limited
st
(supra), this Court noticed that prior to 1 October 1991, the word
“interest” in Section 2(7) was defined so as to include any amount
9
(2009) 17 SCC 43.
10
(2015) 15 SCC 483.
Civil Appeal Nos.10201-10202 of 2010 & Ors. Page 8 of 21
chargeable to income tax under the head “Interest on Securities”.
Post the amendment, the words “amount chargeable to income tax
… under the head ‘Interest on Securities’” stood deleted. The Act,
this Court held, had been enacted with twofold purposes, namely,
as an anti-inflationary measure and for revenue collection. With this
objective in mind, the court proceeded to examine and interpret
Section 2(7) of the Act to hold that the expression “interest” must
be given a restrictive meaning as interest on “loans and advances,
including commitment charges, discount on promissory notes and
bills of exchange, but not to include interest referred to in Section
42(1-B) of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 as well as discount
on treasury bills”. Section 2(7) defines taxable interest in the first
part and confines the interest only to loans and advances, and in
the second part includes, by specific mandate, commitment
charges and discounts on promissory notes and bills of exchange.
Interpreting the provision in this manner, it was held that the
legislature, in its wisdom, had extended the meaning of the word
“interest” in the second part to two items, namely, commitment
charges and discounts on promissory notes and bills of exchange.
In the said case, the respondent – assessee had made investments
in bonds and debentures. It was held that interest on these bonds
and debentures bought by the respondent – assessee therein, as
Civil Appeal Nos.10201-10202 of 2010 & Ors. Page 9 of 21
and by way of “investment”, is not taxable as interest under Section
2(7) of the Act as they do not qualify and could not be treated as
“interest on loans and advances”.
12. In State Bank of Patiala Through General Manager (supra), this
Court had examined the cleavage of opinion between different High
Courts on whether the fixed percentage charge leviable on default
in payment of discounted bills of exchange should be treated as
interest within the meaning of Section 2(7) of the Act. The amount
credited on this account had been booked by the appellant Bank
therein in its interest account. Agreeing with the assessee therein,
this Court observed that the definition of ‘interest’ in the Act is a
narrow one, and is exhaustive as it is a “means and includes”
definition. The reasoning of the Karnataka High Court in State
Bank of Mysore v. Commissioner of I.T., Karnataka-I,
11
Bangalore that discounting of a bill is a form of advance or loan
and hence, compensation paid on delayed payment of money due
thereon is interest on loans and advances, was overruled as
overlooking the limited coverage in Section 2(7) of the Act. There is
a distinction between loans and advances, and discounted bills of
exchange drawn or made in India. If discounted bills of exchange
11
(1989) 175 ITR 607.
Civil Appeal Nos.10201-10202 of 2010 & Ors. Page 10 of 21
were also to be treated as loans and advances made in India, there
would be no need to extend the definition of “interest” to include
discount on bills of exchange. This Court, accordingly, agreed with
the views expressed by some other High Courts, including Madras
High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Cholamandalam
12
Investment and Finance Co. Ltd. , that the character of an
overdue bill is not synonymous with the loans and advances and,
therefore, it will not fall within the ambit and scope of interest under
part one of Section 2(7) of the Act. It was observed that the right to
charge for overdue interest by the assessee Banks therein did not
arise on account of any delay in repayment of any loan or advance,
but arose on account of default in the payment of amounts due
under a discounted bill of exchange. A subject can be brought to
tax only by a clear statutory provision in that behalf. Interest is
chargeable to tax under the Act only if it arises “directly” from a loan
or advance and not otherwise. Accordingly, interest payable “on” a
discounted bill of exchange cannot be equated with interest payable
“on” a loan or advance.
13. The decision in State Bank of Patiala Through General Manager
(supra) also draws distinction between the broad definition of the
expression “interest” in the Income Tax Act, 1961 vide Section
12
(2008) 296 ITR 601.
Civil Appeal Nos.10201-10202 of 2010 & Ors. Page 11 of 21
2(28-A), to observe that the expression used under the Act, that is
the Interest-Tax Act, 1974, is much narrower and restricted. Under
the Income Tax Act, 1961, interest can be payable in any manner
whatsoever. Secondly, the expression “in respect of” includes
interest arising even indirectly out of a money transaction, unlike
the word “on” contained in Section 2(7) of the Act, which connotes
a direct arising of payment of interest out of a loan or advance.
Thirdly, “any moneys borrowed” must be contrasted with “loan or
advances”. The former expression would include moneys borrowed
by means other than by way of loans or advances. Thus, the Act,
unlike the Income Tax Act, 1961, is focused on a very narrow
taxable event which does not include within its ken interest payable
on default in payment of amounts due under a discounted bill of
exchange.
14. A hire-purchase agreement has two elements – an element of
bailment and an element of sale. The element of sale fructifies
when the option to purchase is exercised by the intending
purchaser after fulfilling the terms of the agreement. Till then, the
goods are given on hire. One can argue that in a hire-purchase, an
element of interest is inbuilt, but what is payable is the hire amount
and not interest per se . The hirer has an option to return the vehicle
or the goods taken on hire. It is not a simple transaction of giving a
Civil Appeal Nos.10201-10202 of 2010 & Ors. Page 12 of 21
loan or advance on which interest is payable. The transaction(s) in
commercial and legal sense are far more complex with
corresponding rights of the parties. Even if the hirer is recorded as
the owner of the vehicle under Section 51 of the MV Act, the name
of the appellant – assessee is also recorded in the registration
book, which is in recognition of the hire-purchase agreement. The
registered owner under the MV Act may be liable in case of
accidents/traffic challans, etc. But this, in no way, dilutes the right
of the appellants – assessees in respect of the title of the property,
that is, the vehicle. Any transfer or sale made by the hirer or any
violation of the hire-purchase agreement can lead to civil as well as
criminal consequences. Given the dictum and ratio in Sahara India
Savings and Investment Corporation Limited (supra) and State
Bank of Patiala Through General Manager (supra), the view
taken by the High Court of Delhi in M/s G.E. Capital
13
Transportation (supra), as followed by the High Court of Delhi in
Commissioner of Interest Tax v. M/S G.E. Capital
14
Transportation , is correct and the view taken by the High court
of Kerala in the impugned judgment is not in consonance with the
above decisions of this court.
13
ITA 1275 of 2006.
14
ITA 1280 of 2006.
Civil Appeal Nos.10201-10202 of 2010 & Ors. Page 13 of 21
15. However, the learned counsel for the Revenue has relied on
Sundaram Finance Limited (supra), which decision had also been
relied upon by the High Court of Kerala in the impugned judgment.
The submission is that there is a conflict in the ratios. Before we
consider the ratio of the judgment in Sundaram Finance Limited
(supra), we would refer to the decision of the Constitution Bench of
this Court in K.L. Johar and Co. (In Both Appeals) v. Deputy
15
Commercial Tax Officer, Coimbatore III (In Both Appeals) . In
the decision, this Court had referred to the concept of hire-purchase
in the context of sales tax liability under the Madras General Sales
Tax Act, 1939, to observe that the hirer can exercise the option of
purchase only when he fulfils the terms of the agreement, and till
then there is no sale at all. The argument, which was accepted by
the High Court of Madras, that because in most cases such option
is exercised by the hirer, the tax was leviable immediately, was
flawed, as the taxable event had not taken place. In the said case
also, one of the contentions raised was that only one rupee had to
be paid as the price for the transfer of the vehicle since the entire
amount was paid as hire. This contention was not accepted, for it
overlooked the essence of the hire-purchase agreement, which was
that the hire includes not only what would be payable really as hire
15
AIR 1965 SC 1082.
Civil Appeal Nos.10201-10202 of 2010 & Ors. Page 14 of 21
but also that a part of it was towards the price. These observations
are relevant in the context of the present case as they refer to and
explain the true nature of hire in hire-purchase agreements, albeit
in the context of the sales tax enactment. However, this court also
observed that even in the absence of legislative guidance, the sales
tax authorities may split the hire into two parts. This decision was
followed in the case of Sundaram Finance Limited (supra) with
the majority judgment authored by J.C. Shah, J. observing that the
decision of the Constitution Bench in K.L. Johar and Co. (supra)
dealt with the agreements where the financier has paid the balance
amount to the erstwhile owner of the goods and thereupon obtained
the hire-purchase agreement from the customer, under which the
customer becomes the owner of the goods on payment of all the
instalments of the stipulated hire and exercising his option to
purchase the goods on payment of a nominal price. In another form
of hire-purchase transactions, goods are purchased by the
customer who, in consideration of executing a hire-purchase
agreement and allied documents, remains in possession of the
goods, subject to the liability to pay the amount paid by the financier
on behalf of the customer to the owner or the dealer. The financier
obtains the hire-purchase agreement which gives him a license to
seize the goods in the event of failure by the customer to abide by
Civil Appeal Nos.10201-10202 of 2010 & Ors. Page 15 of 21
the conditions of the hire-purchase agreement. The true effect of a
transaction may be determined from the terms of the agreement
considered in light of the surrounding circumstances. In some
cases, the real bargain would be a loan on the security of the goods.
If there is a bona fide and completed sale of goods, evidenced by
documents, anterior to and independent of a subsequent and
distinct hiring to the vendor, the transaction may not be regarded
as a loan transaction, even though the reason why it was entered
into was to raise money. Recording the aforesaid, the appeal of the
assessee in Sundaram Finance Limited (supra) was allowed by
the majority observing that they were carrying on business of
financiers and not dealing with motor vehicles. The motor vehicle
purchased by the customer was registered in his name and
remained, at all material times, so registered in his name. The sale
letter was a formal document which was not made effective by
registering the vehicle in the name of the assessee and even the
insurance of the motor vehicle had to be effected as if the customer
was the owner.
16. Before we examine the reasoning and context in which the
elucidation was made, we would like to refer to two circulars issued
th
by the CBDT. The CBDT had, vide Circular No. 738 dated 25
March 1996, opined that hire-purchase transactions are generally
Civil Appeal Nos.10201-10202 of 2010 & Ors. Page 16 of 21
in the nature of finance transactions entered into by the companies
engaged in the business of financing, and finance charges accruing
or arising to hire-purchase finance companies are in the nature of
interest as defined in Section 2(7) of the Act and hence, chargeable
to interest tax. However, in the subsequent Circular No. 760 dated
th
13 January 1998, the CBDT observed that they considered the
issue and were advised that in case of transactions which are, in
substance, in the nature of hire-purchase, the receipts of hire
charges would not be in the nature of interest. In transactions which
are, in substance, in the nature of financing transactions, the hire
charges should be treated as interest, subject to interest tax. To
determine the distinction between the two transactions, the
assessing officers were required to consider the issue on merits
taking, inter alia , into account – (i) the terms of the agreement; (ii)
the nature of the arrangement between the supplier of the asset,
the hire-purchase company and the end user of the asset; and (iii)
the intention of the parties which manifests itself in the fixation of
the initial payment, the method of determination of hire-purchase
price etc. However, when the hire-purchase company pays the
price or a substantial part thereof on behalf of such hirer who is the
real purchaser but does not pay the full price, then such agreement
is in the nature of a security for re-payment of the loan and is
Civil Appeal Nos.10201-10202 of 2010 & Ors. Page 17 of 21
essentially a loan transaction. Reference was made to the judgment
in the case of Sundaram Finance Limited (supra).
17. As noticed above, this judgment in Sundaram Finance Limited
(supra) relates to the true nature of hire in hire-purchase
agreements as in the context of the sales tax enactment. In the
present case, however, we are dealing with and interpreting Section
2(7) of the Act, which has been interpreted in two decisions, that is,
in the case of Sahara India Savings and Investment Corporation
Limited (supra) and State Bank of Patiala Through General
Manager (supra), which have given a very limited and restricted
meaning to Section 2(7) of the Act as interest directly arising “on”
loans and advances, and not any other interest, be it interest
earned on investment or interest payable on delayed payment of
the discounted bill of exchange.
18. Taxation depends upon the language of the charging section and
what is brought to tax within the four corners of the charging section.
Therefore, one should be careful and cautious when applying the
ratio of judgments relating to one tax enactment as a precedent in
a case relating to another tax enactment. This rule of caution is
important and should not be overlooked, more so when the
language of the enactment and the object and purpose of the
Civil Appeal Nos.10201-10202 of 2010 & Ors. Page 18 of 21
enactment are different. This ratio is somewhat expressed by this
Court in Association of Leasing and Financial Service
16
Companies v. Union of India and Others , wherein in the context
of levy of service tax by Section 65(105)(zm) read with section
65(12) of the Finance Act, 1994, as amended, banking and financial
services were brought to tax. In the context of the said enactment,
this Court deemed it appropriate to distinguish between financial
lease and operating lease and held that the services rendered in
the former case would be taxable, whereas the latter would fall out
of the tax net. In this context, it was observed that non-banking
financial companies are essentially loan companies, but they could,
in addition thereto, be in the business of equipment leasing, hire-
purchase finance and investment. In case of bailment termed as
“hire”, the bailee receives both possession of the chattel and the
right to use it in return for remuneration. On the other hand,
equipment leasing is long-term financing which helps the borrower
to raise funds without outright payment in the first instance. Here,
the “interest” element cannot be compared to consideration for
lease/hire, which is in the nature of remuneration (consideration) for
hire.
16
(2011) 2 SCC 352.
Civil Appeal Nos.10201-10202 of 2010 & Ors. Page 19 of 21
19. Findings of fact generally recorded by the ITAT are treated as
conclusive. The High Court can interfere with the findings of fact
while deciding a substantial question of law when the findings are
not supported by the material on record, so as to be treated as
17
perverse. For this, however, the High Court must frame a
separate substantial question of law and only then interfere with the
findings of fact by the ITAT, while applying the strict parameters. In
the present case, the High Court did not frame a specific substantial
question of law and thus, the interference with the findings of fact is
unwarranted. This is not to say that the tax authorities are not
entitled to examine the surrounding facts and circumstances to
ascertain the true character and nature of the transaction,
regardless of the nomenclature given by the parties.
20. Given the aforesaid legal position, we may have even remanded
the matter to the assessing officer for fresh adjudication and to re-
examine all the transactions in light of the aforesaid ratio and
reasoning, keeping in mind the dictum laid in Sahara India Savings
and Investment Corporation Limited (supra) and State Bank of
Patiala Through General Manager (supra) to rule out cases where
camouflage or subterfuge has been adopted to avoid payment of
17
See Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Anjuman-E-Ismail Madris-Un-Niswan , (1999) 6 SCC 343; and C.
Doddanarayana Reddy (Dead) By Legal Representatives and Others v. C. Jayarama Reddy (Dead)
By Legal Representatives and Others , (2020) 4 SCC 659.
Civil Appeal Nos.10201-10202 of 2010 & Ors. Page 20 of 21
interest tax. This would have entailed not only looking at the
documents but also several other factors, which would have meant
getting information and ascertainment of facts in detail from the
assessee and the hirer. However, at this distinct point of time, we
do not think that it would be appropriate to pass an order of remand.
It is to be also noted that the Act has ceased to operate with effect
st
from 31 March 2000.
21. Recording the aforesaid, we allow the present appeals and set
aside the impugned judgments. The additions made by the
assessing officer are set aside and the orders passed by the ITAT
deleting the additions in the case of the appellant – M/s. Muthoot
Leasing and Finance Limited and other cases are upheld. In the
facts of the present case, there would be no order as to costs.
......................................J.
(SANJIV KHANNA)
......................................J.
(M.M. SUNDRESH)
NEW DELHI;
JANUARY 03, 2023.
Civil Appeal Nos.10201-10202 of 2010 & Ors. Page 21 of 21