M/S Andhra Pradesh Power Generation Corporation Limited (Apgenco) vs. M/S Tecpro Systems Limited

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
2025 INSC 1447
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 8998 OF 2023

M/S ANDHRA PRADESH POWER GENERATION
CORPORATION LIMITED (APGENCO) ...APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

M/S TECPRO SYSTEMS LIMITED & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 13200 OF 2023

J U D G M E N T
I. Introduction:
1. Leave granted.
2. These two civil appeals arise from an order passed by the High
1
Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad under Section 11(6) of the
2
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 constituting an Arbitral Tribunal
(AT) for resolution of dispute as per the arbitration clause 22.2 in General
Conditions of Contract (GCC). The contest by the two appellants is on the

Page 1 of 21



ground that first respondent, being one of the members of the Consortium,
could not have invoked arbitration in its individual capacity. This is based
on the simple plea that the arbitration agreement is only between the
appellant APGENCO, the purchaser and the “Consortium”. While
considering an application under Section 11, we are of the opinion that
the High Court was justified in constituting the AT on the basis of a prima
facie test of arbitrability. We have further held that it is for the AT to
examine the preliminary issue in detail by considering the contractual
provisions and the surrounding evidence. We have thus upheld the order
passed by the High Court constituting the AT.
II. Facts:
3. Facts that are necessary for disposal of these appeals are that the
appellant APGENCO, floated a tender inviting bids from a Consortium of
companies for an EPC contract pertaining to works for their Rayalseema
Thermal Power Plant. The tender specifications incorporated the
Instructions to Bidders (IB) and the General Conditions of Contract (GCC),
comprising of dispute resolution through arbitration under Clause 22.2.
4. A Consortium comprising respondent nos. 1, 2 and 3 namely M/s
Tecpro Systems Ltd., M/s VA Tech Wabag Ltd., and M/s Gammon India
Ltd. was constituted on 17.08.2010 for exclusively participating in the
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tender process, with Tecpro Systems Ltd., the first respondent designated
as the Leader of the Consortium. The Consortium emerged successful,
and a Letter of Intent (LOI) dated 30.10.2010 was issued to the
Consortium through the first respondent, being the lead member.
Thereafter, three Purchase Orders, dated 15.12.2010 were issued in
favour of the Consortium and execution commenced, each member
undertaking its respective scope of work.
5. During execution, first respondent encountered severe financial
distress, resulting in project delays. Consequently, VA Tech, being jointly
and severally liable as a consortium member, undertook first respondent’s
scope of work and was subsequently recognised as the Lead Member
vide correspondence dated 04.04.2014, resulting in amendment of the
Consortium Agreement. Billing continued to be raised in the name of first
respondent for administrative purposes, while payments flowed directly to
each member in agreed proportions. Later, the first respondent was
admitted into Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) on
07.08.2017, followed thereafter by an order initiating liquidation.
6. After the first respondent ceased to be the lead member, the
appellant, APGENCO issued a letter dated 04.10.2017 to first respondent
that it was responsible for substantial delays in execution of the project.
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In reply, first respondent denied the allegations and asserted that the
appellant had committed various breaches, because of which the
company suffered losses, amounting to approximately Rs. 1951.59
crores. By letter dated 11.12.2017 the first respondent demanded
payment of the said amount and also indicated that, if the claim is
disputed, the letter should be treated as a notice invoking the arbitration
clause under the GCC. In its response, the appellant APGENCO, rejected
these allegations and asserted counter claims predicated on losses
alleged to have been suffered due to first respondent’s non-performance.
Gammon India Ltd. (respondent no. 3) also protested first respondent’s
unilateral communication, asserting that it lacked authority to act without
the consent of other consortium members.
7. As the appellant did not release the claimed amount, first
respondent issued another letter dated 03.04.2018, stating that disputes
had clearly arisen between the parties. Through this communication, first
respondent formally invoked the arbitration clause and nominated a
former Judge of this Court as its nominee arbitrator, and called upon the
appellant to appoint its arbitrator. Appellant neither responded to said
notice nor has taken steps to constitute the AT. Aggrieved by this inaction,
first respondent instituted proceedings under Section 11(6) before the
High Court, and the appellant promptly objected to maintainability on the
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ground that the first respondent as an individual member, cannot
unilaterally invoke arbitration.
8. The High Court, however, allowed the Section 11(6) application and
referred the disputes to arbitration. The said judgment is assailed in the
present appeals.
III. Submissions:
9. In view of our conclusion that the grounds raised by the appellant
and the respondent can and should be considered by the AT, it is
necessary to note in detail each and every submissions made by appellant
and the respondent. This is necessary to determine whether a submission
is beyond the remit of the AT, or that, the question must be considered at
the referral stage itself.
A. Submissions on behalf of the Appellants:
10. We have heard Mr. N. Venkataraman, learned A.S.G. appearing on
behalf of appellant, APGENCO and Mr. Guru Krishnakumar, Senior
Advocate on behalf of M/s. VA Tech Wabag Ltd., appellant in the
connected civil appeal. The cumulative submissions on behalf of the
appellants are as follows:
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10.1 At the referral stage, Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 11
of the Act, 1996 is obliged to prima facie satisfy itself as to the existence
of an arbitration agreement between the parties. Prima facie satisfaction
necessarily includes an examination of the arbitration agreement and the
parties to such arbitration agreement. Upon such examination, it would be
evident that no arbitration agreement exists between APGENCO and first
respondent.
10.2 The arbitration agreement contained in Clause 22.2 of GCC is
enforceable against APGENCO by the “Contractor”, that is, the
Consortium, and not by any individual member. The term “Parties” in
Clause 1.1.63 of the GCC is defined to mean the “Purchaser” or the
“Contractor”, and “Purchaser” is defined in Clause 2.1, as APGENCO and
that “Contractor” is defined as “ the person whose tender has been
accepted by the Purchaser and the legal successors in title to such
person ”. It is therefore argued that the expression “person” expressly
includes the Consortium, and therefore it is only the Consortium, which is
a party to the arbitration agreement. The definitions of “contractor”,
“bidder”, “person” and “party”, read conjointly, demonstrate that the
contracting counterparty was the “Consortium” and not any individual
constituent entity. Hence, first respondent, in its individual capacity, could
not have approached the High Court for appointment of an arbitrator.
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10.3 No arbitration agreement exists between the first respondent in its
individual capacity, and APGENCO. The reliance placed by first
respondent upon the arbitration clause contained in the GCC is
misplaced. The GCC is a pre bid document. Upon acceptance of the bid
by a consortium, the contractual relationship culminates into Purchase
Orders. In fact, the three Purchase Orders contain identical jurisdictional
clauses conferring exclusive jurisdiction upon civil courts at Hyderabad or
Secunderabad, with no provision for arbitration as a dispute resolution
mechanism. The Purchase Orders constitute the principal contracts
governing the relationship between the purchaser on one hand and the
Consortium, as a collective entity, on the other.
10.4 Relying on the judgments of the Delhi High Court in Consulting
3
Engineers Group Ltd. v. National Highway Authority of India (NHAI) and
the Bombay High Court in MSEDCL v. Godrej and Boyce Manufacturing
4
Company Ltd. , it is urged that an individual consortium member lacks the
competence to invoke arbitration in the absence of authority from the other
members of the consortium.

3
2022 SCC OnLine Del 3253.
4
2019 SCC OnLine Bom 3920.
Page 7 of 21



10.5 The Group of Companies doctrine is wholly inapplicable as per the
⁵
judgment of this Court in Cox and Kings Ltd. v. SAP India Pvt. Ltd . , which
clarifies that mutual intention is indispensable and cannot be implied so
as to override an express contractual structure, which envisages action
only through the Consortium and excludes unilateral action by individual
members.
10.6 First respondent lost Consortium leadership in 2014 due to non-
performance; VA Tech Wabag took over and completed the work. First
respondent later entered CIRP in 2017 but still issued a unilateral
arbitration notice, contrary to the stand of the other Consortium members,
who oppose arbitration against APGENCO. Claims relating to the
Consortium cannot be raised unilaterally by a defaulting and insolvent
member.
10.7 High Court failed to appreciate the distinction, as affirmed in ASF
6
Buildtech P. Ltd. v. Shapoorji Pallonji & Co. P. Ltd. , between the
“existence” of an arbitration agreement and the “capacity to invoke” such
agreement. While an arbitration agreement undoubtedly exists, only the

5
(2024) 4 SCC 1.
6
(2025) 9 SCC 76.
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Consortium, and not an individual member, has the contractual capacity
to invoke it.
10.8 Claim of first respondent to be a “legal successor” of the
Consortium, and therefore falling within the definition of Contractor as per
the GCC is entirely misconceived. The term successors in title envisages
one to whom ownership/title is transferred, and would not be applicable to
a Consortium such as the present one.
10.9 The attempt of first respondent to invoke arbitration independently,
despite default, insolvency and cessation of leadership, constitutes a
misuse of the arbitral process and is contrary to the contractual framework
and commercial common sense. Reliance is also specifically placed upon
the order dated 07.11.2023 passed by Hon’ble Justice M. B. Lokur in
arbitration proceedings relating to Telangana State Power Generation
Corporation Limited (TSPGCL), wherein identical claims raised by first
respondent were rejected on the ground that it could not act independently
of the consortium.
B. Submissions on behalf of first respondent:
11. Mr. Anirudh Krishnan, Advocate on behalf of the first respondent, on
the other hand submits the following:
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11.1 Objections raised by appellants are fundamentally misconceived
because the contractual framework, properly construed, recognises that
first respondent had both the right and the authority to invoke arbitration.
The tender floated by APGENCO envisaged participation by single
bidders as well as consortiums, and that the Consortium of respondent
nos. 1 to 3 was duly constituted in accordance with the tender terms. The
Purchase Orders issued pursuant to the Letter of Intent explicitly
incorporated the Tender Specification, which in turn incorporated the GCC
including Clause 22.2 which contains the operative arbitration agreement.
11.2 In view of the principles laid down in M.R. Engineers and
7
Contractors Pvt. Ltd. v. Som Datt Builders Ltd . , Inox Wind Ltd. v.
8
Thermocables Ltd . , and NBCC (India) Ltd. v. Zillion Infraprojects Pvt.
9
Ltd. , the arbitration clause stands validly incorporated by reference into
the Purchase Orders. The jurisdiction clause contained in the Purchase
Orders, which confers jurisdiction on courts at Hyderabad, is not
inconsistent with the GCC, thereby indicating that Hyderabad was
intended to be the juridical seat of arbitration.

7
(2009) 7 SCC 696.
8
(2018) 2 SCC 519.
9
2024 SCC OnLine SC 323.
Page 10 of 21



11.3 Identical issues were examined in proceedings arising out of the
same project with TSPGCL, the successor of the appellant in Telangana
after bifurcation of the State, where this Court appointed a former judge
of this Court as arbitrator after rejecting identical objections to first
respondent’s capacity to invoke arbitration. The objections now raised are
substantially the same and do not warrant reconsideration at the
Section 11 stage; the AT alone is competent to address them.
11.4 The appellant’s assumption that “Contractor” refers only to the
Consortium acting jointly misconstrues the definition. Clause 2.1 of
Invitation to Bid defines ‘Contractor’ in two facets. First, the ‘Person’
whose Tender has been accepted. Second the legal successors in title of
such person. The latter applies when the Consortium ceases to exist. The
Consortium Agreement dated 17.08.2010 at Clause 16(d) states that it
ceases to operate on a party becoming insolvent. This provision is carried
through in the Supplementary Agreements. Therefore, the expiry of the
Consortium Agreement will result in each party being represented by
themselves or their legal successors.
11.5 Even if the Consortium were to be treated as continuing, it has no
independent legal personality under Indian law unless expressly
constituted as such. Reliance is placed on New Horizons Ltd. v. Union of
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10
India , Dulichand Laxminarayan Firm v. Commissioner of Income Tax,
11 12
Nagpur , and Ramanlal Bhailal Patel v. State of Gujarat , which affirm
that a consortium or joint venture, unless incorporated, is neither a juristic
person nor a separate legal entity distinct from its members. Clause 4 of
the Consortium Agreement expressly states that the Consortium is not a
separate legal entity. Hence, the appellant cannot assert that only the
Consortium, as an independent juridical unit, could invoke arbitration.
11.6 The Consortium was a bidding arrangement; members retained
separate scopes of work, distinct performance obligations, and
independent payment streams. Payments were made directly to each
member. The division of work under the Consortium Agreement and the
amended Purchase Orders demonstrates that each member held an
identifiable, severable, and independently enforceable contractual
interest.
11.7 The existence of counterclaims or potential liabilities against first
respondent is irrelevant for the purpose of determining its right to invoke
arbitration. Counterclaims may be raised in the arbitration and adjudicated
together. Appellant, VA Tech has no locus to oppose first respondent’s

10
(1995) 1 SCC 478.
11
(1956) 1 SCC 269.
12
(2008) 5 SCC 449.
Page 12 of 21



independent invocation when its claims arise from its allocated scope of
work and relate to moneys allegedly due to it.
11.8 The appellant’s objections concern the entitlement to invoke
arbitration, not the existence of the arbitration agreement. Such issues fall
squarely within the AT’s jurisdiction under Section 16.
IV. Analysis and Reasoning:
12. The reason for referring to the submissions of the appellants as well
as the respondent in detail is only to flag and highlight certain preliminary
and jurisdictional questions that will fall for consideration before the AT in
the event we hold that the referral court need not examine these questions
in view of Sections 11(6-A) and 16 of the Act, 1996.
13. We must, at the outset, address an important submission advanced
on behalf of the appellants, namely, that in the present case there exists
no arbitration agreement insofar as the individual constituent of a
consortium is concerned. This submission is founded upon certain
13 14
decisions of the Delhi High Court and the Bombay High Court which
have taken the view that a member of a consortium, in its individual
capacity, cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the Court under Section 11 of

13
2022 SCC OnLine Del 3253, Consulting Engineers Group Ltd. v. National Highway Authority of India
(NHAI).
14
2019 SCC OnLine Bom 3920, MSEDCL v. Godrej and Boyce Manufacturing Company Ltd.
Page 13 of 21



the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The appellants contend that in
the absence of a direct arbitration agreement between the employer and
the individual consortium member, the very assumption of jurisdiction by
the referral court would be impermissible.
14. In our considered view, these objections must be answered in the
broader perspective of the nature and scope of the jurisdiction exercised
by a referral court under Section 11 of the Act. With the introduction of the
statutory restraint under Section 11(6A), the Legislature has consciously
confined the domain of judicial scrutiny to the mere “existence of an
arbitration agreement”. This legislative design is further reinforced by the
express empowerment of the AT under Section 16 to rule on; (i) its own
jurisdiction, (ii) objections with respect to the very existence of the
arbitration agreement, and also, (iii) objections relating to the validity of
such an agreement. The statutory scheme thus envisages a clear
demarcation between the limited threshold scrutiny at the referral stage
on the one hand and the substantive jurisdictional adjudication to be
undertaken by the AT on the other.
15. The legislative policy under the Act 1996 strongly favours minimal
judicial intervention at the pre arbitral stage. A long line of precedents,
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15
such as Duro Felguera SA v Gangavaram Port Ltd , the Constitution
Bench decision in Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under
16
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and Stamp Act, 1899, In Re , and
17
SBI General Insurance Co Ltd v Krish Spinning Mills Pvt Ltd have
authoritatively settled that the enquiry under Section 11 is confined to a
prima facie determination of the existence of an arbitration agreement and
no further. The referral court is required to undertake only a prima facie
18
determination of the existence of an arbitration agreement , and refrain
from entering into contentious factual or legal issues related to authority,
capacity, arbitrability, maintainability, or merits of claims.
16. It is certainly a matter of institutional discipline for the referral courts
to enable “parties” to identify and exercise alternative remedies,
particularly that of arbitration, with clarity and consistency. The question
whether a member of a consortium can itself invoke Section 11 of the Act,
1996 is not one that admits of a monolithic or a uniform answer. Answer
to that question will necessarily depend on enquiry into the terms of the
principal contract, as well as the Consortium Agreement. The specific
terms of the Consortium Agreement, parties to that agreement, and the

15
(2017) 9 SCC 729.
16
(2024) 6 SCC 1.
17
(2024) 12 SCC 1.
18
Goqii Technologies (P) Ltd. v. Sokrati Technologies (P) Ltd., (2025) 2 SCC 192.
Page 15 of 21



nature of the rights and mutual obligations that the agreement creates will
have to be examined in detail. Reference court will, however, confine its
enquiry only to a prima facie satisfaction as to whether a member of a
consortium qualifies as a “party” to the arbitration agreement. This prima
facie satisfaction is sufficient for the referral court to constitute and refer
the dispute to the AT. Thereafter, it is for the AT to undertake the detailed
enquiry as to whether a member of the consortium is in fact a veritable
party to the arbitration agreement or not. This is exactly the limited enquiry
permitted and prescribed in Cox & Kings (supra) , the relevant portion of
which is as under:
“ 126. Evaluating the involvement of the non-signatory party in the
negotiation, performance, or termination of a contract is an important
factor for a number of reasons. First, by being actively involved in the
performance of a contract, a non-signatory may create an appearance
that it is a veritable party to the contract containing the arbitration
agreement; second, the conduct of the non-signatory may be in
harmony with the conduct of the other members of the group, leading
the other party to legitimately believe that the non-signatory was a
veritable party to the contract; and third, the other party has legitimate
reasons to rely on the appearance created by the non-signatory party
so as to bind it to the arbitration agreement.
169. In case of joinder of non-signatory parties to an arbitration
agreement, the following two scenarios will prominently emerge : first,
where a signatory party to an arbitration agreement seeks joinder of a
non-signatory party to the arbitration agreement; and second, where
a non-signatory party itself seeks invocation of an arbitration
agreement. In both the scenarios, the referral court will be required to
prima facie rule on the existence of the arbitration agreement and
whether the non-signatory is a veritable party to the arbitration
agreement. In view of the complexity of such a determination, the
referral court should leave it for the Arbitral Tribunal to decide whether
the non-signatory party is indeed a party to the arbitration agreement
on the basis of the factual evidence and application of legal doctrine.
The Tribunal can delve into the factual, circumstantial, and legal
Page 16 of 21



aspects of the matter to decide whether its jurisdiction extends to the
non-signatory party. In the process, the Tribunal should comply with
the requirements of principles of natural justice such as giving
opportunity to the non-signatory to raise objections with regard to the
jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal. This interpretation also gives true
effect to the doctrine of competence-competence by leaving the issue
of determination of true parties to an arbitration agreement to be
decided by the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 16.
At the referral stage, the referral court should leave it for the
170.12.
Arbitral Tribunal to decide whether the non-signatory is bound by the
arbitration agreement. ”
(emphasis supplied)
17. Beyond the prima facie enquiry, it should be the discipline of the
referral court to refrain from undertaking a detailed enquiry on basis of
evidence to arrive at a finding of fact in the nature of a ‘proof’. The scope
of such an enquiry, by virtue of Section 11(6-A) is very well articulated in
the decision of this Court in Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements
19
under Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and Stamp Act, 1899, In Re
wherein this Court observed:
“ 165. The legislature confined the scope of reference under Section
11(6-A) to the examination of the existence of an arbitration
agreement. The use of the term “examination” in itself connotes that
the scope of the power is limited to a prima facie determination. Since
the Arbitration Act is a self-contained code, the requirement of
“existence” of an arbitration agreement draws effect from Section 7 of
the Arbitration Act. In Duro Felguera [Duro Felguera, S.A. v.
Gangavaram Port Ltd., (2017) 9 SCC 729 : (2017) 4 SCC (Civ) 764],
this Court held that the Referral Courts only need to consider one
aspect to determine the existence of an arbitration agreement —
whether the underlying contract contains an arbitration agreement
which provides for arbitration pertaining to the disputes which have
arisen between the parties to the agreement. Therefore, the scope of
examination under Section 11(6-A) should be confined to the
existence of an arbitration agreement on the basis of Section 7.
Similarly, the validity of an arbitration agreement, in view of Section 7,

19
(2024) 6 SCC 1.
Page 17 of 21



should be restricted to the requirement of formal validity such as the
requirement that the agreement be in writing. This interpretation also
gives true effect to the doctrine of competence-competence by leaving
the issue of substantive existence and validity of an arbitration
agreement to be decided by Arbitral Tribunal under Section 16. We
accordingly clarify the position of law laid down in Vidya Drolia [Vidya
Drolia v. Durga Trading Corpn., (2021) 2 SCC 1 : (2021) 1 SCC (Civ)
549] in the context of Section 8 and Section 11 of the Arbitration Act.
The burden of proving the existence of arbitration agreement
166.
generally lies on the party seeking to rely on such agreement. In
jurisdictions such as India, which accept the doctrine of competence-
competence, only prima facie proof of the existence of an arbitration
agreement must be adduced before the Referral Court. The Referral
Court is not the appropriate forum to conduct a mini-trial by allowing
the parties to adduce the evidence in regard to the existence or validity
of an arbitration agreement. The determination of the existence and
validity of an arbitration agreement on the basis of evidence ought to
be left to the Arbitral Tribunal. This position of law can also be gauged
from the plain language of the statute.
167. Section 11(6-A) uses the expression “examination of the
existence of an arbitration agreement”. The purport of using the word
“examination” connotes that the legislature intends that the Referral
Court has to inspect or scrutinise the dealings between the parties for
the existence of an arbitration agreement. Moreover, the expression
“examination” does not connote or imply a laborious or contested
inquiry. [P. Ramanatha Aiyar, The Law Lexicon (2nd Edn., 1997) 666.]
On the other hand, Section 16 provides that the Arbitral Tribunal can
“rule” on its jurisdiction, including the existence and validity of an
arbitration agreement. A “ruling” connotes adjudication of disputes
after admitting evidence from the parties. Therefore, it is evident that
the Referral Court is only required to examine the existence of
arbitration agreements, whereas the Arbitral Tribunal ought to rule on
its jurisdiction, including the issues pertaining to the existence and
validity of an arbitration agreement. A similar view was adopted by this
Court in Shin-Etsu Chemical Co. Ltd. v. Aksh Optifibre Ltd. (2005) 7
SCC 234. ”
18. Following this Court’s mandate in the above decision, this Court in
Managing Director Bihar State Food and Civil Supply Corporation Limited
Page 18 of 21



20
v. Sanjay Kumar explaining the contemporary legal position of the
referral court emphasised that:
“ The curtains have fallen. Courts exercising jurisdictions under
27.
Section 11(6) and Section 8 must follow the mandate of sub-section
(6A), as interpreted and mandated by the decisions of this Court and
their scrutiny must be “confine(d) to the examination of the existence
of the arbitration agreement”.”

19. Once the High Court was satisfied that an arbitration agreement
prima facie existed, an aspect neither seriously disputed nor refutable at
this stage, its decision to constitute the AT cannot be faulted. In the earlier
part of our judgment, we have reproduced the detailed arguments of the
appellants and respondents on the issue of maintainability only to draw a
distinction between a prima facie consideration of such contentions for the
purpose of Section 11 on the one hand and for a detailed examination by
the AT. While we hold that there is certainly a prima facie case for referring
the dispute to arbitration under Section 11, a detailed scrutiny on the basis
of evidence must be left to AT. Whether first respondent has validly
invoked arbitration individually, whether the Consortium continues to
exist, whether consent of other Consortium partners was necessary, and
whether claims are maintainable after commencement of liquidation, are
all matters which may legitimately be raised, contested and determined
before the AT under Section 16. Entertaining these questions here would

20
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1604: 2025 INSC 933.
Page 19 of 21



amount to conducting a mini trial at the Section 11 stage, contrary to the
settled principles of minimal judicial intervention and kompetenz-
kompetenz.
20. Returning to facts of the present case, it is significant to note that
with respect to the very same underlying contractual framework that was
bifurcated after the formation of the States of Andhra Pradesh and
21
Telangana, this Court by its order dated 29.11.2021 constituted the AT
and referred the dispute for detailed consideration, of all issues to an AT.
The relevant portion of the reference order is as under;
“ Without going into the question whether the reasoning which weighed
with the High Court was correct or not, in our view, the ends of justice
would be met if there be comprehensive arbitral proceedings before a
sole Arbitrator which would encompass claims arising out of the
agreement amongst members of Consortium consisting of (a) M/s
Tecpro Systems Limited, (b) M/s Gammon India Ltd and (c) M/s VA
Tech Wabag Ltd. and the claims arising pursuant to letter of Intent
dated 13.10.2010.
It is therefore directed that:
(a) A sole arbitrator shall consider all the claims arising out of both the
agreements.
(b) Mr. Justice M. B. Lokur, former Judge of this court shall be the sole
arbitrator.
(c) M/s Telangana State Power Generation Corporation Limited, M/s
Tecpro Systems Limited, M/s VA Tech Wabag Ltd and M/s Gammon
Engineers & Contractors Pvt. Ltd. shall be parties to the arbitration.
(d) Let a claim statement be filed by M/s Tecpro Systems Ltd. within
15 days from today before the learned Arbitrator.

21
In Civil Appeal Nos.7119 of 2021 and 7120 of 2021.
Page 20 of 21



(e) M/s Telangana State Power Generation Corporation Ltd. and other
members of the Consortium shall be entitled to put in their counter
statement/response and/or raise fresh claim/counter claims, if any.
(f) The parties shall appear before the learned Arbitrator on such date
as the learned Arbitrator may choose. A communication in that behalf
shall be sent to the learned Arbitrator by the Registry of this Court
immediately alongwith a copy of this order.
The afore-stated directions are in substitution of the directions issued
by the High Court.
All the appeals are disposed of accordingly. No costs. ”
It is also an admitted fact that the AT thereafter examined the issue as to
whether the applicant is a veritable party or not.
V. Conclusion:
21. Having considered the matter in detail, we are of the opinion that the
High Court has not committed any error in constituting the AT in exercise
of its powers under Sections 11(6) and 11(6-A) of the Act, 1996. The AT
will consider all questions including preliminary objections relating to
maintainability of the arbitration on their own merit.
22. Civil Appeals, arising out of order dated 17.02.2023 passed by the
High Court are accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.
………………………………....J.
[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA]

………………………………....J.
[ATUL S. CHANDURKAR]
NEW DELHI;
DECEMBER 17, 2025
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