Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPEALATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1042 OF 2002
Kathi Bharat Vajsur & Anr. ...Appellants
Versus
State of Gujarat ...Respondent
J U D G M E N T
H.L. DATTU, J.
1)
This appeal is directed against the judgment and order
passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of
Gujarat in Criminal Appeal No. 744/1985 dated
15.07.2002. By the impugned judgment and order, the High
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Court has reversed the order of acquittal passed by the
Additional Sessions Judge, Amreli in Sessions Case No.
22/84 and convicted the two appellants for the offence
punishable under section 302 read with section 34 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 [“the IPC” for short],
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sentencing them to imprisonment for life and a fine of
1000/- each, in default of which they are directed to
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further undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months.
2) At the outset, we note that initially there were three
accused before the Trial Court, and they were all
acquitted for the offences alleged against them. During
the pendency of the appeal before the High Court, A1
(Kathi Fakira Vajsur) expired, and the appeal stood
abated as against him. The other two accused, namely A2
(Kathi Bharat Vajsur) and A3 (Kathi Ramku Vajsur) are
prosecuting this appeal. During the pendency of this
appeal, this Court had enlarged the appellants on bail
vide order dated 03.12.2002.
3) The factual scenario giving rise to the present appeal
is as follows:
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The case of the prosecution is that, a part of the
adjoining land of the primary school in village Gigasan
was leased out to A1, where he had constructed a storage
tank for storage of kerosene. It was resolved by the
Gigasan Panchayat to give the road between the school and
the tank to the school for their use. Therefore,
Panchayat had proposed to construct a wall on the land so
granted. Prior to the date of the incident, when one
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Amra Pitha and other labourers had commenced the work on
the said plot, A1 protested to it and did not permit them
to carry out the proposed work, due to which Amra Pitha
had to complain to the Sarpanch Jagu Dada and the
Secretary of the Panchayat Shri. Kanubhai about the
interference caused by A1. On the morning of the
th
incident, i.e. 30 March 1984, when Jagu Dada (PW6), Mulu
Dada (deceased) and Dhoha Vasta (Informant) informed the
President of the Taluka Development Officer about the
attitude of A1 towards Amra Pitha and other labourers, he
directed Mulu Dada to ignore the threat and complete the
construction as resolved by the Panchayat.
4)
On the same day, at about 3.30 pm, PW6, the deceased
and two labourers, namely Jetha (PW8) and Natha (PW7)
went to the plot and began the construction work as
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directed and they were assisted by Manjibhai and Patel
who were teachers working in the Primary School. When
they began digging for laying the foundation, A1 along
with his brothers A2 and A3 came near the plot and asked
them not to dig the pit. After verbal exchange, A1 took
out a double bore tamancha from his pocket and pointed
at PW6, and threatened him to leave. On his refusal to
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leave, A1 opened fire which caused injury on his right
hand and thereafter, again fired on the chest of PW6.
Meantime, A2 also fired from tamancha on the person of
Mulu Dada due to which Mulu Dada fell down, after which
A3 caused injury on the head with an axe which he was
carrying with him. Thereafter they fled from the place
of incident. Due to the injuries caused, Mulu Dada died
on the spot. Immediately, PW5 reported the incident to
the Police Station, Dhari and on the basis of the
written report the Station Officer took-up the
investigation and on completion thereof charge-sheet was
filed against the accused persons for the offences
punishable under Sections 302, 307 read with Section 34
of the Indian Penal Code (for short ‘the IPC’).
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5) To substantiate its accusation, prosecution examined
several witnesses to prove its case before the Trial
Court. The Trial Court, after considering the entire
evidence on record, acquitted the accused persons, on
the ground that the prosecution failed to prove its case
beyond reasonable doubt.
6) Aggrieved by the same, the State preferred an appeal
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before the Gujarat High Court. The Court, after
examining the entire evidence on record, has set aside
the judgment and order passed by the Trial Court, and
convicted A2 and A3 under Section 302 read with Section
34 of the IPC, sentencing them to life imprisonment and
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a fine of 1000/- each. However, as far as A1 was
concerned, the appeal had abated due to his death.
Aggrieved by the conviction and sentence passed by the
High Court, the accused -appellants are before us in
this appeal.
7) Shri. Dholakia, learned senior counsel, submitted that
the Trial Court was justified in acquitting the accused
persons, as the Trial Court had recorded that there are
material contradictions in the statements of PW5 and PW6
recorded by the police under section 161 of the Code of
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Criminal Procedure, 1973 [hereinafter referred to as
“the Code”] and the evidence that was tendered in the
Court during the trial. He further submits that the
tamancha allegedly used, was a single barrel gun, which
needs to be reloaded after firing a single shot and that
there was no evidence of such reloading. By referring to
the testimony of the ballistic expert (PW 18), the
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learned senior counsel would state that the answer given
by him was not conclusive whether such a fire arm could
have been used. He would submit that since the
conviction and sentence is imposed under Section 302 r/w
Section 34, it was required for the prosecution to prove
which injury was caused by which accused and which
injury was fatal to the life of the accused. He would
emphasize that there must be a live link between all the
alleged events, in order to prove the guilt of the
appellants beyond reasonable doubt, which he would
submit, is missing in this case.
8) The four main contradictions/discrepancies that Shri.
Dholakia points out in the prosecution story are: (a)
The eye witnesses (PW5 and PW6), when they were shown
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the arms recovered, emphatically denied that those were
not the arms used on the date of the incident; (b) the
sequence of the shooting by A1 and A2, and who shot whom
was not clear from the testimony of PW5 and PW6 when
read along with their statements recorded under section
161 of the Code; (c) that the clothes of PW5, which were
seized and who is said to have carried the body of the
deceased, had absolutely no blood stains on his clothes;
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and (d) the conduct of the injured witness (PW6), in
running away from the scene of the incident to a room
and locking himself, and then running back to the scene
of the incident, was suspicious and abnormal. Shri.
Dholakia would then submit that if two views are
possible, then the one that was in favour of the accused
requires to be adopted. In conclusion, it is submitted
that the Trial Court, which had observed the demeanour
of the witnesses and considered all the facts and
circumstances, had rightly acquitted the appellants of
all charges. It is also contended that in the absence of
any perversity or omission to consider material evidence
or apparent error in law, the judgment of the Trial
Court was not open to interference in an appeal against
acquittal.
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9) Smt. Madhavi Divan, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent-State would fairly submit that some
contradictions or discrepancies could be found in the
evidence recorded, but would contend that if the
evidence is read as a whole, there would not be even an
iota of doubt left as to the guilt of the appellants.
She would further submit that even if portions of the
evidence of the hostile witnesses are eschewed from
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consideration, still it is possible to arrive at the
same conclusion as has been done by the High Court. The
learned counsel would rely on the testimony of PW6, who
is an injured witness to establish the presence of all
the three accused at the time of the incident. PW6 has
further described the kind of injuries that he had
sustained, which, she would submit would corroborate
with the medical evidence as well as the testimony of
the doctor who had treated the injured witness. The
learned counsel would submit that though, PW6 may be
confused about the sequence of the gun shots, there is
absolutely no dispute as to who fired the shots at the
deceased person. Smt. Divan would further refer to the
evidence of PW12 (Manjibhai), a teacher in the Primary
School, who has also testified that the three accused
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were present at the scene of occurrence and they were
carrying tamanchas and one of them an axe, and that
there was an heated altercation between the accused
persons and the deceased (PW5 and PW6), when he (PW12)
left the scene. She would also state that he had heard
the gun shots, and when he came out, saw the corpse of
the deceased in pool of blood. The learned counsel would
then refers to the evidence of PW7 and PW8, the
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labourers who were present at the place of the incident,
who have also testified that the accused had come to the
place with tamanchas and axe, and that there was
altercation between the accused and the deceased, PW5
and PW6. They also testified that they had heard the gun
shots. She would then refer to the evidence of PW16
(Lakha), who had also heard the gun shots fired, and was
told about the incident by PW5.
10) Smt. Divan would fairly submit that though PW7,
PW8 and PW12 are all declared hostile, yet, she would
state that by reading their evidence with the evidence
of PW5, PW6 and PW16, it is clear that the deceased, PW5
and PW6 were present at the place of the incident, and
so were the accused appellants armed with tamanchas and
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axe. She would further submit that the factum of an
altercation between the two parties was also established
from the evidence on record, and that of the gun shots
fired. With this evidence, Smt. Divan would submit, it
is clear beyond any doubt that the death of the deceased
was caused by the accused appellants, and strongly
refuted the contention of Shri. Dholakia that two views
were possible, stating that on this evidence no other
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view was possible, apart from the view taken by the High
Court.
11)
Smt. Madhavi Divan, learned counsel, would submit that
this Court must not give undue importance to the non-
recognition of the weapons by PW5 and PW6 during the
trial. According to the learned counsel, the panch
witnesses have identified the weapons recovered at the
instance of the accused during the trial. She would, for
this purpose, refers to the evidence of PW10
(Vallabhbhai), who not only narrated the place and
manner in which the axe and the other weapons were
recovered at the instance of A2, but also identified the
same when shown the same in Court. She would further
state that it is reasonable for the eyewitnesses, one of
whom was injured in the incident, not to have seen the
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weapons in the commotion of the incident properly. To
sum up, the learned counsel submits that the High
Court, after re-appreciating the entire evidence on
record, has come to the conclusion that the Trial Court
has fallen in error in magnifying the minor
contradictions to arrive at a conclusion that the
prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused
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beyond all reasonable doubt.
12)
The circumstances in which an appellate court will
interfere with the finding of the Trial Court are now
well settled by catena of decisions of this Court. In
Dwarka Dass v. State of Haryana, (2003) 1 SCC 204, the
dicta of all these decisions has been crystallized thus:
“2. While there cannot be any denial of the factum
that the power and authority to apprise the
evidence in an appeal, either against acquittal or
conviction stands out to be very comprehensive and
wide, but if two views are reasonably possible, on
the state of evidence: one supporting the
acquittal and the other indicating conviction,
then and in that event the High Court would not be
justified in interfering with an order of
acquittal, merely because it feels that it,
sitting as a trial court, would have taken the
other view. While re-appreciating the evidence,
the rules of prudence requires that the High Court
should give proper weight and consideration to the
views of the trial Judge...”
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13) In the case of Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab
2000 Crl. LJ 3462 (SC), this Court has held that the
High Court is entitled to re-appreciate the evidence if
it is found that the view taken by the acquitting Court
was not a possible view or that it was a perverse or
infirm or palpably erroneous view or the Trial Court
taken into consideration inconsequential circumstances
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or has acted with material irregularity or has rejected
the evidence of eye-witnesses on wrong assumptions.
14)
It is also now well settled that in a criminal trial
the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt, in order to convict him. This court in
the case of State of U.P. v. Krishna Gopal, (1988) 4 SCC
302, held:
“25. A person has, no doubt, a profound right not
to be convicted of an offence which is not
established by the evidential standard of proof
beyond reasonable doubt. Though this standard is a
higher standard, there is, however, no absolute
standard. What degree of probability amounts to
“proof” is an exercise particular to each case.
Referring to the interdependence of evidence and
the confirmation of one piece of evidence by
another a learned Author says:
“The simple multiplication rule does not apply
if the separate pieces of evidence are
dependent. Two events are dependent when they
tend to occur together, and the evidence of
such events may also be said to be dependent.
In a criminal case, different pieces of
evidence directed to establishing that the
defendant did the prohibited act with the
specified state of mind are generally
dependent. A juror may feel doubt whether to
credit an alleged confession, and doubt
whether to infer guilt from the fact that the
defendant fled from justice. But since it is
generally guilty rather than innocent people
who make confessions, and guilty rather than
innocent people who run away, the two doubts
are not to be multiplied together. The one
piece of evidence may confirm the other.”
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Doubts would be called reasonable if they are free
from a zest for abstract speculation. Law cannot
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afford any favourite other than truth. To
constitute reasonable doubt, it must be free from
an over-emotional response. Doubts must be actual
and substantial doubts as to the guilt of the
accused person arising from the evidence, or from
the lack of it, as opposed to mere vague
apprehensions. A reasonable doubt is not an
imaginary, trivial or a merely possible doubt; but
a fair doubt based upon reason and common sense.
It must grow out of the evidence in the case.
26. The concepts of probability, and the degrees
of it, cannot obviously be expressed in terms of
units to be mathematically enumerated as to how
many of such units constitute proof beyond
reasonable doubt. There is an unmistakable
subjective element in the evaluation of the
degrees of probability and the quantum of proof.
Forensic probability must, in the last analysis,
rest on a robust common sense and, ultimately, on
the trained intuitions of the Judge. While the
protection given by the criminal process to the
accused persons is not to be eroded, at the same
time, uninformed legitimisation of trivialities
would make a mockery of administration of criminal
justice.”
15) In the case of Gurbachan Singh v. Satpal Singh,
(1990) 1 SCC 445, it is observed:
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“4……. The standard adopted must be the standard
adopted by a prudent man which, of course, may
vary from case to case, circumstances to
circumstances. Exaggeration devotion to the rule
of benefit of doubt must not nurture fanciful
doubts or lingering suspicions and thereby destroy
social defence. Justice cannot be made sterile on
the plea that it is better to let hundred guilty
escape than punish an innocent. Letting guilty
escape is not doing justice, according to law.
5. The conscience of the court can never be bound
by any rule but that is coming itself dictates the
consciousness and prudent exercise of the
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judgment. Reasonable doubt is simply that degree
of doubt which would permit a reasonable and just
man to come to a conclusion. Reasonableness of the
doubt must be commensurate with the nature of the
offence to be investigated.”
16)
Now coming back to the facts of the case, it is not in
dispute that in the incident, said to have taken place
th
on 30 March, one person is killed and the other person
is seriously injured. In the trial, the injured has
fully supported the case of the prosecution. His
evidence finds support from the evidence of PW6 and the
evidence of Doctor, PW 16. While hearing the learned
counsel appearing for the parties, we have also perused
the entire evidence on record, we are of the view that
Trial Court had erred in holding that the prosecution
had not been able to prove the case beyond reasonable
doubt. We are inclined to agree with the submission of
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Smt. Madhavi Divan, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent, that by relying on the evidence of PW5, PW6,
PW7, PW8, PW12 and PW 16, there can be no doubt that the
A1, A2 and A3 were present at the place of the incident
and were carrying tamanchas and axe, and that, there was
an altercation between the accused persons and PW5, PW6
and the deceased, and that gun shots were fired and the
deceased died because of the gun shot injuries and the
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blow on the head with the axe by A3. Perhaps the Trial
Court took a hyper-technical view by primarily
concentrating on minor contradictions to hold that the
prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. We are not in agreement with
the findings and conclusions reached by the Trial Court.
17) The argument canvassed by Shri. S.K. Dholakia, learned
senior counsel, appearing for the appellants, that there
was material discrepancies in the evidence adduced by
the eyewitnesses PW5 and PW6, with regard to the
sequence of shots fired and who shot whom. This, the
learned senior counsel would submit, is enough to punch
a hole in the prosecution story. He would further state
that the High Court has brushed aside these
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contradictions merely terming them as minor
contradictions. Per contra, Smt. Divan, learned counsel
appearing for the respondent, while not denying that
there were some discrepancies in the evidence given by
PW5 and PW6, would state that on a complete reading of
the evidence, there is no doubt about the guilt of the
accused. We are inclined to agree with the learned
counsel for the respondent.
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18) In the case of Leela Ram v. State of Haryana, (1999) 9
SCC 525, this Court held:
“12. It is indeed necessary to note that one
hardly comes across a witness whose evidence does
not contain some exaggeration or embellishment —
sometimes there could even be a deliberate attempt
to offer embellishment and sometimes in their
overanxiety they may give a slightly exaggerated
account. The court can sift the chaff from the
grain and find out the truth from the testimony of
the witnesses. Total repulsion of the evidence is
unnecessary. The evidence is to be considered from
the point of view of trustworthiness. If this
element is satisfied, it ought to inspire
confidence in the mind of the court to accept the
stated evidence though not however in the absence
of the same.”
19) This Court, in the case of Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal
Gupta (Dr.) v. State of Maharashtra, (2010) 13 SCC 657,
summarized the law on material contradictions in
evidence thus:
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“Material contradictions
30. While appreciating the evidence, the court has
to take into consideration whether the
contradictions/omissions had been of such
magnitude that they may materially affect the
trial. Minor contradictions, inconsistencies,
embellishments or improvements on trivial matters
without effecting the core of the prosecution case
should not be made a ground to reject the evidence
in its entirety. The trial court, after going
through the entire evidence, must form an opinion
about the credibility of the witnesses and the
appellate court in normal course would not be
justified in reviewing the same again without
justifiable reasons. (Vide State v. Saravanan.)
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31. Where the omission(s) amount to a
contradiction, creating a serious doubt about the
truthfulness of a witness and the other witness
also makes material improvements before the court
in order to make the evidence acceptable, it
cannot be safe to rely upon such evidence. (Vide
State of Rajasthan v. Rajendra Singh.)
32. The discrepancies in the evidence of
eyewitnesses, if found to be not minor in nature,
may be a ground for disbelieving and discrediting
their evidence. In such circumstances, witnesses
may not inspire confidence and if their evidence
is found to be in conflict and contradiction with
other evidence or with the statement already
recorded, in such a case it cannot be held that
the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable
doubt. (Vide Mahendra Pratap Singh v. State of
U.P.)
33. In case, the complainant in the FIR or the
witness in his statement under Section 161 CrPC,
has not disclosed certain facts but meets the
prosecution case first time before the court, such
version lacks credence and is liable to be
discarded. (Vide State v. Sait.)
34. In State of Rajasthan v. Kalki, while dealing
with this issue, this Court observed as under:
(SCC p. 754, para 8)
“8. … In the depositions of witnesses there
are always normal discrepancies however honest
and truthful they may be. These discrepancies
are due to normal errors of observation,
normal errors of memory due to lapse of time,
due to mental disposition such as shock and
horror at the time of the occurrence, and the
like. Material discrepancies are those which
are not normal, and not expected of a normal
person.”
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35. The courts have to label the category to which
a discrepancy belongs. While normal discrepancies
do not corrode the credibility of a party's case,
material discrepancies do so. (See Syed Ibrahim v.
6
State of A.P. and Arumugam v. State.)
36. In Bihari Nath Goswami v. Shiv Kumar Singh
this Court examined the issue and held: (SCC p.
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192, para 9)
“9. Exaggerations per se do not render the
evidence brittle. But it can be one of the
factors to test the credibility of the
prosecution version, when the entire evidence
is put in a crucible for being tested on the
touchstone of credibility.”
37. While deciding such a case, the court has to
apply the aforesaid tests. Mere marginal
variations in the statements cannot be dubbed as
improvements as the same may be elaborations of
the statement made by the witness earlier. The
omissions which amount to contradictions in
material particulars i.e. go to the root of the
case/materially affect the trial or core of the
prosecution case, render the testimony of the
witness liable to be discredited.”
20) Moreover, by reading the evidence of the PW1
(Kamlesh), PW2 (Dr. Savjibhai) and PW3 (Dr.
Shobhanaben), the injuries on PW6 and the deceased have
come to light. These injuries are consistent with the
testimony of the evidence tendered by the eyewitnesses,
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namely PW5 and PW6. This Court, in the case of Rakesh v.
State of M.P.,(2011) 9 SCC 698, held:
“13. It is a settled legal proposition that the
ocular evidence would have primacy unless it is
established that oral evidence is totally
irreconcilable with the medical evidence. More so,
the ocular testimony of a witness has a greater
evidentiary value vis-à-vis medical evidence; when
medical evidence makes the ocular testimony
improbable, that becomes a relevant factor in the
process of the evaluation of evidence. However,
where the medical evidence goes so far that it
completely rules out all possibility of the ocular
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evidence if proved, the ocular evidence may be
disbelieved. (Vide State of U.P. v. Hari Chand,
Abdul Sayeed v. State of M.P. and Bhajan Singh v.
State of Haryana.)”
21)
When the medical evidence is in consonance with the
principal part of the oral/ocular evidence thereby
supporting the prosecution story, there is no question
of ruling out the ocular evidence merely on the ground
that there are some inconsistencies or contradictions in
the oral evidence. We are not inclined to agree with
Shri. Dholakia on this count.
22)
Shri. Dholakia would lay emphasis on the unusual
conduct of PW6 after the occurrence of the incident and
therefore submits that the learned trial judge was
justified in disbelieving the evidence of PW6. We
cannot agree. This Court, in the case of Appabhai v.
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State of Gujarat, 1988 Supp SCC 241, held:
“11.… Experience reminds us that civilized people
are generally insensitive when a crime is
committed even in their presence. They withdraw
both from the victim and the vigilante. They keep
themselves away from the court unless it is
inevitable. They think that crime like civil
dispute is between two individuals or parties and
they should not involve themselves. This kind of
apathy of the general public is indeed
unfortunate, but it is there everywhere whether in
village life, towns or cities. One cannot ignore
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this handicap with which the investigating agency
has to discharge its duties. The court, therefore,
instead of doubting the prosecution case for want
of independent witness must consider the broad
spectrum of the prosecution version and then
search for the nugget of truth with due regard to
probability if any, suggested by the accused. The
court, however, must bear in mind that witnesses
to a serious crime may not react in a normal
manner. Nor do they react uniformly. The horror
stricken witnesses at a dastardly crime or an act
of egregious nature may react differently. Their
course of conduct may not be of ordinary type in
the normal circumstances. The court, therefore,
cannot reject their evidence merely because they
have behaved or reacted in an unusual manner. In
Rana Pratap v. State of Haryana Chinnappa Reddy,
J., speaking for this Court succinctly set out
what might be the behaviour of different persons
witnessing the same incident. The learned Judge
observed: [SCC p. 330, SCC (Cri) p. 604, para 6]
“Every person who witnesses a murder reacts in
his own way. Some are stunned, become
speechless and stand rooted to the spot. Some
become hysteric and start wailing. Some start
shouting for help. Others run away to keep
themselves as far removed from the spot as
possible. Yet others rush to the rescue of the
victim, even going to the extent of counter-
attacking the assailants. Every one reacts in
his own special way. There is no set rule of
natural reaction. To discard the evidence of a
witness on the ground that he did not react in
any particular manner is to appreciate
evidence in a wholly unrealistic and
unimaginative way.””
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23) We are in agreement with the above observations. When
an eyewitness behaves in a manner that perhaps would be
unusual, it is not for the prosecution or the Court to
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go into the question as to why he reacted in such a
manner. As has been rightly observed by his lordship
O. Chinnappa Reddy, J., in Rana Pratap’s case (supra.)
there is no fixed pattern of reaction of an eyewitness
to a crime. When faced with what is termed as ‘an
unusual reaction’ of an eyewitness, the Court must only
examine whether the prosecution story is in anyway
affected by such reaction. If the answer is in the
negative, then such reaction is irrelevant. We are
afraid that the unusual behaviour of the injured
eyewitness, PW6, will not, in anyway, aid the appellants
to punch a hole on to the prosecution story.
24) Shri. Dholakia, learned senior counsel, would
emphasis on the fact that when the eyewitnesses PW5 and
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PW6 were shown the weapons recovered, they explicitly
stated that these were not the weapons used for by the
accused. He would state that this was a major
discrepancy in the case of the prosecution. In support
of this, he would rely on the case of Mahendra Pratap
Singh v. State of UP, (2009) 11 SCC 334. In reply, Smt.
Divan, learned counsel, would submit that it would be
more reliable to rely on the evidence of the Panch
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witness (PW10) and the PSI (PW20) than on the
eyewitnesses for the purpose of identifying the weapons,
especially when the weapons were recovered at the
instance of the accused persons. She would further state
that in the commotion of the incident, it is possible
that the eyewitnesses might not have clearly seen the
weapons. We find that the argument of the learned
counsel for the respondent is reasonable and therefore,
we accept the same.
25) When the entire evidence on record is considered,
the fact that the eyewitnesses did not recognize the
weapons used, makes no difference to the prosecution
story.
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26) We are afraid the decision of this Court in the
case of Mahendra Pratap Singh (supra.) cited by Shri.
Dholakia would not help the appellants, as in the case
not only were the weapons used identified, but also the
evidence on record did not inspire confidence in the
story of the prosecution. In that case, this Court came
to conclude that two views were possible, and therefore
gave the benefit of the same to the accused. In the
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instant case, cumulative reading of the entire evidence
makes the prosecution story believable, thereby proving
the guilt of the accused appellants beyond any doubt.
The High Court in the impugned judgment has correctly
appreciated the evidence on record, and we do not find
any infirmity in the same, therefore we uphold the
conviction of guilt and sentence imposed by the High
Court.
27)
In the light of the above discussion, we see no merit
in the appeal and accordingly, the same is dismissed.
The appellants have been enlarged on bail during the
pendency of this appeal before this Court. Therefore,
the Jurisdictional Jail Superintendent is directed that
the appellants herein be taken into custody forthwith to
serve out the sentence of life imprisonment.
JUDGMENT
..........................J.
(H.L.DATTU)
..........................J.
(ANIL R. DAVE)
NEW DELHI,
May 08, 2012.
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JUDGMENT
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