RAVINDER KAUR GREWAL vs. MANJIT KAUR

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7764 OF 2014 Ravinder Kaur Grewal & Ors. ...Appellant(s) Versus Manjit Kaur & Ors.       ...Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T A.M. Khanwilkar, J. 1. This appeal emanates from the judgment and decree dated 27.11.2007 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at 1 Chandigarh  in R.S.A. No. 946/2004, whereby the second appeal filed   by   the   respondent   Nos.   1   to   3   (heirs   and   legal representatives of Mohan Singh ­ original defendant No. 1) came to   be   allowed   by   answering   the   substantial   question   of   law formulated as under: ­ “Whether the document Ex.P­6 required registration as by way of said document the interest in immovable property worth more than Rs.100/­ was transferred in favour of the plaintiff?” Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by DEEPAK SINGH Date: 2020.07.31 12:53:25 IST Reason: 1 For short, “the High Court” 2 2. Briefly stated, the suit was filed by the predecessor of the appellants   herein   ­   Harbans   Singh,   son   of   Niranjan   Singh, resident   of   Sangrur,   Punjab   against   his   real   brothers   Mohan Singh   (original   defendant   No.   1)   and   Sohan   Singh   (original defendant   No.   2)   for   a   declaration   that   he   was   the   exclusive owner   in   respect   of   land   admeasuring   11   kanals   17   marlas comprising khasra Nos. 935/1 and 935/2 situated at Mohalla Road   and   other   properties   referred   to   in   the   Schedule.     He asserted that there was a family settlement with the intervention of   respectable   persons   and   family   members,   whereunder   his ownership and possession in respect of the suit land including the constructions thereon (16 shops, a samadhi of his wife – Gurcharan Kaur and one service station with boundary wall) was accepted and acknowledged.  Structures were erected by him in his capacity as owner of the suit land.   It is stated that in the year 1970 after the purchase of suit land, some dispute arose between the brothers regarding the suit land and in a family settlement arrived at then, it was clearly understood that the plaintiff – Harbans Singh would be the owner of the suit property including constructions thereon and that the name of Mohan Singh   (original   defendant   No.   1)   and   Sohan   Singh   (original 3 defendant   No.   2)   respectively   would   continue   to   exist   in   the revenue record as owners to the extent of half share and the plaintiff   would   have   no   objection   in   that   regard   due   to   close relationship between the parties.  However, the defendants raised dispute claiming half share in respect of which Harbans Singh (plaintiff) was  accepted  and  acknowledged to  be  the   exclusive owner   and   as   a  result   of   which   it  was   decided   to   prepare   a memorandum   of   family   settlement   incorporating   the   terms already settled between the parties, as referred to above.   The stated memorandum was executed by all parties on 10.3.1988. However,   after   execution   of   the   memorandum   of   family settlement dated 10.3.1988, the defendants once again raised new issues to resile from the family arrangement.   As a result, Harbans Singh (plaintiff) decided to file suit for declaration on 9.5.1988,   praying   for   a   decree   that   he   was   the   owner   in possession   of   the   land   admeasuring   11   kanals   17   marlas comprising of khasra Nos. 935/1 and 935/2 situated at Mohalla Road.  An alternative plea was also taken that since plaintiff was in possession of the whole suit property to the knowledge of the defendants openly and adversely for more than twelve years, he had acquired ownership rights by way of adverse possession.   4 3. The suit was resisted by the defendants by filing written statement.   Harbans Singh (plaintiff) filed replications.   On the basis of rival pleadings, the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Sangrur in Suit No. 187/1988 B.T. No. 185 of 18­1­95 (18­1­95) framed following issues: ­ “1. Whether the plaintiff is owner in possession of suit   land? OPP 2. Whether there was any family settlement between the parties on 10.3.1988 and memo of family settlement was executed by parties on that day? OPP 3. Whether   the   plaintiff   constructed   shops,   a   service station   and   boundary   wall   around   the   disputed property? OPP 4. Whether the plaintiff has become owner of suit land by adverse possession? OPP 5. Whether the property in dispute was purchased out by the   income   of   Joint   Hindu   Family   coparcenary property and construction on the suit land was also purchased   by   Joint   Hindu   Family   coparcenary property? OPD 6. Whether   Sohan   Singh,   Mohan   Singh   and   Harbans Singh constitute a Joint Hindu Family? OPD 7. Whether the defendants are estopped from denying the execution of memo of family settlement by their act and conduct? OPP 8. Relief.” During the pendency of the suit, Harbans Singh (plaintiff) expired and,   therefore,   the   appellants   herein   were   brought   on   record being his legal heirs.  The trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 19.1.2000, partly decreed the suit in the following terms: ­ “RELIEF  5 30. In   view   of   my   discussion   on   various   issues above, the suit of the plaintiff partly succeeds and partly fails.   Therefore, his suit is decreed partly to the extent that he is declared to be owner in possession of khasra no. 935/1/1/2 (5­18) and to the extent of ½ share in khasra   no.   935/1/1/1   (5­19)   with   construction   there upon.     Keeping   in   view   the   relationship   between   the parties and the circumstances of the case, no order as to cost.     Decree   sheet   be   prepared   accordingly.     File   be consigned to the record room.” 4. Aggrieved   by   this   decision,   the   appellants/plaintiffs   filed first appeal before the District Judge, Sangrur being Civil Appeal No. 45 of 5­2­2000 B.T. No. 60 of 11­6­2001.  The first appellate Court, after reappreciating the pleadings and evidence on record, was pleased to allow the appeal and modify the judgment and decree   passed   by   the   trial   Court.     The   first   appellate   Court declared the original plaintiff as owner of the suit land alongwith constructions including 16 shops, a service station and boundary wall with samadhi in the land.  The operative order passed by the first appellate Court, dated 29.11.2003, reads thus: ­ “18. In the light of the above discussion, the appeal is allowed   and  the   judgment   passed   by   the   learned   trial court is modified and the suit of the plaintiff is decreed. The plaintiff is declared owner of the land measuring 11 kanals 17 marlas comprised in rectangle and killa no. 935/1/1/1 (5­19), 935/1/1/2 (5­18) situated in Mehlan Road,   Sangrur   along   with   construction   including   16 shops, a service station and boundary wall with samadh in the land.  In view of the peculiar circumstances of the case the parties are left to bear their own costs.  Decree sheet be prepared and copy of the judgment be placed on the   file   of   the   learned   trial   court   and   the   same   be returned   immediately   to   the   successor   court   of   Smt. 6 Harreet Kaur PCS, the then Civil Judge (Junior Division), Sangrur.     This   court   file   be   consigned   to   the   record room.” 5. The respondent Nos. 1 to 3 being legal representatives of Mohan Singh (original defendant No. 1) preferred second appeal before the High Court being R.S.A. No. 946/2004.  The learned single   Judge   answered   the   substantial   question   of   law reproduced   in   paragraph   1   above   in   favour   of   the   said respondents.     The   High   Court   was   pleased   to   set   aside   the conclusion recorded by the first appellate Court and opined that the document which, for the first time, creates a right in favour of plaintiff   in   an   immovable   property   in   which   he   has   no   pre­ existing right would require registration, being the mandate of law.  Accordingly, the second appeal came to be allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court was set aside, thereby restoring the decree passed by the trial Court, vide impugned judgment dated 27.11.2007. 6. The appellants have questioned the correctness of the view taken   by   the   High   Court   and   in   particular,   reversing   the conclusion   reached   by   the   first   appellate   Court.     When   the present appeal was taken up for hearing, the Court referred the matter to a larger Bench of three­Judges to answer the question 7 as to whether the acquisition of title by adverse possession can be taken by plaintiff under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and is there any bar under the Limitation Act to sue on aforesaid basis in case of infringement of any rights of a plaintiff.   The appeal   accordingly   proceeded   before   the   three­Judge   Bench, which in turn answered the said question vide judgment dated 2 7.8.2019  in favour of the plaintiff.  As a result, the matter has been placed before us for consideration of the appeal on its own merits.   7. The appellants would contend that the High Court disposed of the second appeal in a casual manner and more so, without dealing with the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate Court in favour of the plaintiff.  It is urged that the first appellate Court, after noticing the admitted factual position, proceeded to first   examine   the   question   whether   the   document   dated 10.3.1988 (Exhibit P­6) was executed by the parties or not.  That fact has been answered in favour of the plaintiff (appellants) after analysing  the  evidence on record.   It has  been held  that  the stated document was indisputably executed by the parties.  The next question considered by the first appellate Court was whether 2 Reported as (2019) 8 SCC 729 8 the stated document required registration or not, which has been justly   answered   in   favour   of   the   plaintiff   (appellants)   on   the finding that it was merely a memorandum of family settlement and not a document containing terms and recitals of the family settlement made thereunder.  For that, the first appellate Court noted that the plaintiff had constructed 16 shops and a samadhi including boundary wall on the suit land on his own, which fact was indisputable and established from the evidence on record. Further, the plaintiff was in possession of the suit land.   Even this finding is supported by the evidence on record and is well­ established.   It is also established from record that as per the family settlement, the plot in Prem Basti belonging to Harbans Singh (plaintiff) was given to Sohan Singh (original defendant No. 2), which was in possession of Mohan Singh (original defendant No. 1) and that another plot purchased by plaintiff in the name of his   son   Vikramjit   Singh   was   given   to   Mohan   Singh   (original defendant No. 1) and his wife.   Notably, the Defendant Witness No. 1 (DW­1) admitted that the said property was sold thereafter to   one   Surjit   Kaur.     In   substance,   it   is   established   that   the parties   had   acted   upon   the   family   settlement,   which   was recorded   in   the   form   of   document   ­   Exhibit   P­6   being   a 9 memorandum   of   family   settlement.     In   other   words,   the concerned parties had acted upon the family arrangement as per the   settlement   terms   decided   in   1970   and   reinforced   by   the document Exhibit P­6 (memorandum of family settlement).  Being a memorandum of family settlement, it was not required to be registered and, in any case, the parties having acted upon the terms of the said settlement to the prejudice of the other party, it was not open to them to resile from the said arrangement.  Thus, they   are   estopped   from   disowning   the   arrangement   already reached, acted upon and so recorded in the memorandum of family settlement.   Thus understood, the plaintiff was accepted and acknowledged to be the owner of the suit property by all the family   members   who   were   also   party   to   the   memorandum   of family   settlement   (Exhibit   P­6).     The   appellants   have   placed reliance on the decision of this Court in  Kale & Ors. vs. Deputy 3   They pray for restoration of Director of Consolidation & Ors. the decree passed by the first appellate Court and setting aside the impugned judgment. 8. On   the   other   hand,   the   respondent   Nos.   1   to   3   would contend that the High Court has rightly considered the document 3 (1976) 3 SCC 119 10 Exhibit P­6 as containing terms and recitals of family settlement and for which reason it was essential to get the same registered. It is urged that there was no pre­existing title in favour of the plaintiff   in   respect   of   the   suit   property,   as   the   same   was purchased   in   the   name   of   concerned   defendant   by   way   of   a registered sale deed.  The parties were not in possession of Joint Hindu Family property as such and therefore, the question of partition of that property does not arise.  The plea that there was no Joint Hindu Family property was taken by the plaintiff in the replication filed before the trial Court.  This plea was taken in the context of the assertion made by the defendants in the written statement that the suit property was jointly owned by Mohan Singh   (original   defendant   No.   1)   and   Sohan   Singh   (original defendant No. 2).  The contesting respondents have reiterated the stand that there was no family settlement in 1970, as stated by the   plaintiff   and   that   the   signature   of   the   defendant   No.   2 appearing   in   document   Exhibit   P­6   is   forged   and   fabricated. Further, the High Court has justly non­suited the plaintiff and preferred to restore the partial decree passed by the trial Court on the conclusion that the document Exhibit P­6 is inadmissible in evidence, as it has not been registered despite the transfer of 11 title in immovable property worth more than Rs.100/­.  In other words, the High Court answered the substantial question of law against the plaintiff and as a result of which it rightly allowed the second appeal filed by the defendants (respondent Nos. 1 to 3). The view so taken by the High Court is unexceptionable. 9. We have heard Mr. Manoj Swarup, learned senior counsel for   the   appellants   and   Mr.   Parveen   Kumar   Aggarwal,   learned counsel for the respondents. 10. The   core   issue   involved   in   this   appeal   is:   whether   the document Exhibit P­6 was required to be registered as interest in immovable property worth more than Rs.100/­ was transferred in favour of the plaintiff?   11. It   is   not   in   dispute   that   the   parties   are   closely   related. Mohan   Singh   (original   defendant   No.   1)   and   Sohan   Singh (original defendant No. 2) were real brothers of Harbans Singh (original plaintiff).  Original defendant No. 4 – Harjinder Kaur is the wife of Sohan Singh (original defendant No. 2).  The father of the plaintiff and defendant Nos. 1 and 2 died during minority of defendant Nos. 1 and 2.  The defendants had proved the copy of sale deed   dated   16.4.1970   (Exhibit   DW­3/A),   whereby   Mohan 12 Singh   (original   defendant   No.   1)   and   Sohan   Singh   (original defendant   No.   2)   purchased   land   admeasuring   5   kanals   19 marlas comprised in khasra No. 935/1.  Harbans Singh (plaintiff) had appeared on behalf of the purchaser at the time of execution of   the   sale   deed.     Jamabandi   for   the   year   1984­1985   of   the property   in   dispute   (Exhibit   D­1)   reveals   that   khasra   No. 935/1/1/1   (5­19)   shows   the   name   of   Mohan   Singh   (original defendant No. 1) and Sohan Singh (original defendant No. 2) as owners, whereas the name of Harbans Singh (plaintiff) is shown against khasra No. 935/1/1/2 (5­18) as owner.   Mohan Singh (original defendant No. 1) had stated that the land standing in the name of Harbans Singh (original plaintiff) was purchased by him from the funds of joint family, but that fact has not been proved   or   established   by   the   contesting   defendants.     In   that sense, it may appear from the revenue record that the concerned parties were owners in respect of separate properties and not as joint   owners.     The   fact  remains   that   Harbans   Singh   (original plaintiff),   Mohan   Singh   (original   defendant   No.   1)   and   Sohan Singh (original defendant No. 2) are closely related being real brothers.   Further, although the ownership of the suit property recorded in Jamabandi is of concerned defendant, Harbans Singh 13 (plaintiff)   had   constructed   16   shops,   samadhi   of   his   wife   – Gurcharan Kaur and a boundary wall on the property and was in possession thereof.   Pertinently, the trial Court had opined in paragraph   24   of   its   judgment   that   all   the   three   brothers   – Harbans Singh (plaintiff), Mohan Singh (original defendant No. 1) and Sohan Singh (original defendant No. 2), as noted in Exhibit P­6, owned various properties, on which possession of Harbans Singh (plaintiff) being the eldest brother is admitted.  However, it was a permissive possession.  The first appellate Court has also opined  in   paragraph  16  of  the   judgment  that  Harbans   Singh (plaintiff)   came   in   possession   of   the   suit   property   with   the consent of the defendants.  Notably, this finding of fact has not been disturbed by the High Court.  That apart, it is established from the record that plot at Prem Basti belonged to Harbans Singh   (plaintiff),   which   was   given   to   Sohan   Singh   (original defendant   No.   2)   after   taking   possession   thereof   from   Mohan Singh (original defendant No. 1).   Further, plot purchased by Harbans Singh (plaintiff) in the name of his son was given to Mohan Singh (original defendant No. 1) and his wife.  It has been admitted by DW­1 that later on the said plot was sold to one Surjit Kaur.  These facts clearly establish that there was not only 14 univocal family arrangement between the parties, but it was even acted upon by them without any exception.  This factual position has not been doubted by the High Court.   12. As a matter of fact, the High Court has not bothered to even advert  to   this   aspect,   whilst   analysing   the   correctness   of   the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate Court, which was the final fact­finding Court.  From the impugned judgment, it is noticed  that  after   giving   the   basic   facts,   the   High  Court  first extracted the relevant portion from the trial Court’s judgment (paragraphs 17­21 thereof) and thereafter adverted to the finding and conclusion recorded by the trial Court on other issues.  The High Court then went on to extract paragraph 16 of the judgment of the first appellate Court in its entirety, running into about 8 pages and then formulated the substantial question of law.  For answering the said substantial question of law, the High Court first adverted to the decision of this Court in  Bhoop Singh vs. 4 Ram Singh Major & Ors.  and reproduced paragraphs 12, 13, 16 and 18 thereof.  After that, the relevant portion of the decision of the same High Court in the case of   Hans Raj & Ors. vs. 4 (1995) 5 SCC 709 15 5 Mukhtiar Singh  has been extracted.  After doing so, the High Court then referred to the contention of the appellants herein and extracted   paragraphs   44   and   54   of   the   judgment   in   Hari 6 Shankar Singhania & Ors. vs. Gaur Hari Singhania & Ors. The High Court then adverted to a decision of the same High 7 Court   in     and Jagdish   &   Ors.   vs.   Ram   Karan   &   Ors. reproduced paragraph 14 thereof.   Only after reproducing the aforesaid extracts   in   extenso , learned single Judge of the High Court adverted to the factual aspects of the present case in the following words, to allow the appeal: ­ “On a consideration of the matter, I find that a document which,   for   the   first   time,   creates   a   right   in   favour   of plaintiff in an immovable property in which he has no pre­existing   right,   then   registration   is   required.     The presumption of pre­existing right can only be inferred if a consent decree is passed where such claim is admitted by the other party, but a document which is not disputed by the   party   and   there   is   no   admission   regarding   the acceptance   of   a   right   and   suit   is   based   on   such   a document   under   which   the   right   is   transferred   to   the plaintiff in a property in which he has no pre­existing right, then it would not require registration as is the ratio of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Som Dev and others (supra).  In view of this proposition of law if the matter is considered, the question of law, as framed, has to be answered in favour of the appellants. In   the   present   case,   it   may   be   noticed   that   the property in dispute was purchased by way of two sale deeds and the ownership of the parties was duly reflected in the revenue record.  The plaintiff claimed right to the 5 (1996) 3 RCR (Civil) 740 (paragraphs 7 to 9) 6 (2006) 4 SCC 658 7 PLR (2003) 133 P&H 182 16 property under the deed of family settlement Exhibit P­6. Thus he claimed that the defendants had relinquished their right in the immovable property in his favour under the memorandum of family settlement which was alleged to have been executed much earlier.  In any case, it has to   be   held   that   the   document   transferring   title   in   an immovable property worth more than Rs.100/­ rupees, even   if   it   was   by   way   of   relinquishment,   the   same required registration.  Thus, the learned trial Court was right in holding that no title passed on to the plaintiff under   Exhibit   P­6   i.e.   family   settlement   entered   into between the parties.  This view of mine finds support from the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Hari   Chand   (dead)   through   LRs   vs.   Dharampal   Singh Baba, 2007 (4) Herald (SC) 3028, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to lay down that the family settlement could only be if one has lawful right over the property and then alone family settlement could be executed.  When there is no lawful rights of the parties over the property, there was no occasion to file the suit on the basis of family settlement. In view of what has been stated and discussed above, this   appeal   is   allowed   and   the   judgment   and   decree passed by the learned lower Appellate Court is set aside and that of the learned trial Court is restored, but with no order as to costs.”  13. As   against   this,   the   first   appellate   Court   thoroughly examined   the   pleadings   and   the   evidence,   oral   as   well   as documentary, placed on record by the concerned parties.  In the first   place,   it   examined   the   question   whether   the   document Exhibit P­6 was executed by the parties or not.  After adverting to the relevant evidence, the first appellate Court opined that the trial Court was right in concluding that Exhibit P­6 was executed by the parties referred to therein.  That being concurrent finding of   fact,   needs   no   further   scrutiny.     The   High   Court   has   not 17 reversed this finding of fact, as is noticed from the extracts of its judgment reproduced above.  The first appellate Court then went on to examine whether the document required registration.  The High Court has reproduced paragraph 16 of the judgment of the first appellate Court in its entirety.  What is relevant to notice is that the first appellate Court adverted to the pleadings and oral and documentary evidence produced by the respective parties and found that the plaintiff had proved the compromise (Exhibit CX) dated 15.5.1992 between the plaintiff and defendant Nos. 2 and 3, namely, Sohan Singh and Harjinder Kaur.  Harjinder Kaur had stepped into witness box and admitted the said fact.   She also admitted the fact of execution of a family settlement.  Thus, the   dispute   was   between   the   successors   of   Harbans   Singh (plaintiff) and successors of Mohan Singh (original defendant No. 1).   The first  appellate  Court thus  accepted  the  stand of  the plaintiff that in the year 1970, after purchase of land, dispute arose between the parties regarding the suit land and in that family   settlement,   plaintiff   was   held   to   be   owner   of   the   suit property including its constructions.  The first appellate Court in that context observed thus: ­ 18 “16. …     The   specific   case   of   the   plaintiff   that   he constructed with his personal money 16 shops on the suit land,  one service  station  with boundary   wall and  also samadh of Smt. Gurcharan Kaur.   It is admitted that samadh of Gurcharan Kaur is in the suit property.  If the plaintiff   was   not   acknowledged   the   owner   of   the   suit property then there was no question of construction of samadh of Gurcharan Kaur his wife by the plaintiff on the suit property.   So the version of the defendant that no dispute arose in the year 1970 and no family settlement took place can not be accepted…” The first appellate Court then analysed the evidence of defendant witnesses and held that the same were not reliable or trustworthy as they did not know any fact regarding the suit property.  The first appellate Court then adverted to another crucial fact and noted that Mohan Singh (original defendant No. 1) and Sohan Singh (original defendant No. 2) were residing in house situated at Prem Basti prior to 1988, which belonged to Harbans Singh (plaintiff).     As   noted   earlier,   this   property   as   per   the   family arrangement was given to Sohan Singh and has been so recorded in the memorandum of family settlement (Exhibit P­6).  The first appellate Court found that the defendants had failed to prove that they were in possession of the suit property or remained in possession thereof.   On the other hand, the evidence on record clearly established that the plaintiff was in possession of the suit property.   The first appellate Court then interpreted document 19 Exhibit P­6 and found that it was not with regard to khasra No. 935 (11­17), but it referred to other properties.  After analysing the relevant evidence, the first appellate Court held that Exhibit P­6 cannot be construed as a document containing terms and recitals  of   a  family   arrangement,   but  only  a  memorandum  of family arrangement.  It went on to observe as follows: ­ 16. …     Document   Ex.P­6   is   not   with   regard   to khasra   no.   395   (11­17)   but   other   property   is   also included in the said document.  A plot situated in Prem Basti   which   was   in   the   name   of   Harbans   Singh   and Gurcharan   Kaur   was   already   got   vacated   from   Mohan Singh   and   was   given   to   Sohan   Singh   and   Harjinder Singh.  A plot measuring 17 marlas which was purchased by Vikaramjit Singh was given to Manjit Kaur and Mohan Singh and Manjit Kaur DW­1 has admitted that she had already   sold   that   plot   to   Surjit   Kaur.     So   it   can   be concluded that said document was acted upon.  Although few sentences of the said documents are in the present tense but the court is to see from the material on record whether   the   said   document   created   right   in   the immovable property or rights were already created but the document was written by way of memorandum.  The said document does not pertain to khasra no. 935/1/1/1 (5­ 19) but entire khasra no. 935/1 (11­17).   Had the said document created right in khasra no. 935/1/1/1 (5­19) then   there   was   no   question   of   throwing   khasra   no. 935/1/1/2 in common pool and other property of the parties.  There is specific recital that on the basis of sale deeds Harbans Singh was owner in possession of the suit property   and   was   coming   in   possession   of   the   same. Harbans   Singh   has   constructed   16   shops   and   service station there.    In other words, it proves that Harbans Singh was being considered as owner in possession of the   suit   property.     Prior   to   execution   of   the   said document on that day they compromised not to raise any   dispute   regarding   his   ownership.     So   this document was a writing with regard to fact which was already being considered and admitted by the parties. So   it   cannot   be   said   that   this   document,   copy   of 20 which is Ex.P­6 created right for the first time in the . …..” immovable property   (emphasis supplied) And again, as follows: ­ “16. …..   Since the parties were closely related to each other and document was executed with regard to the fact­which they were already admitting so I am of the   view   that   document   dated   10.3.1988   copy   of which is Ex.P­6 did not require registration .   In case Hans Raj cited supra the matter was got compromised and document itself created right in the property.  In case Hari Singh vs. Shish Ram & others cited supra it was held that document between the parties was partitioned and consideration was passed from one party to other.  In Shishpal vs. Vikram cited supra it was held that during life time of Gyani Ram the plaintiff filed suit so there could   not   be   any   family   settlement.     In   case   Smt. Karamjit Kaur and another versus Smt. Sukhjinder Kaur and others cited supra vide compromise the plaintiff and defendant no. 1 to 4 had agreed to take 30 bighas of land out of 90 bighas left by Mohinder Singh so it was held that   said   compromise   has   created   right   in   favour   of defendants  no.  5  and  6  to the  property   of  more than Rs.100/­   So   require   registration.     All   the   above   said authorities   cited   by   counsel   for   defendants   are distinguishable   on   facts   and   ratio   of   said   authorities cannot be applied to the facts of the present case.  Since plaintiff is proved to be in existence in possession of the suit   property.     So   construction   of   shops   land   service station on the said property was done by the plaintiff himself and not from funds of joint family.   This fact is further corroborated by writing dated 10.3.1988 copy of which is Ex. P­6.   Since said document did not require registration so plaintiff is proved to be owner of the suit property.     The   defendants   estopped   from   denying   the execution   of   the   family   settlement.     Defendants   have failed to prove that Harbans Singh, Mohan Singh and Sohan   Singh   constituted   Joint   Hindu   Family   Property and construction of the suit property was raised from the Joint Hindu Family Funds.  Thus, finding recorded by the learned Trial Court on issues No. 3, 5 and 7 are set aside and it is held that the plaintiff constructed shops and service station and boundary wall on the suit property with his own funds.   The defendant has failed to prove 21 that property in dispute was purchased by the income of the Joint Hindu coparcenary property and Sohan Singh, Mohan   Singh   and   Harbans   Singh   constituted   Joint family.     So   these   issues   are   decided   in   favour   of   the plaintiff.     Parties   executed   document   Ex.P­6   dated 10.3.1988   by   way   of   memorandum   of   family settlement and it did not require registration.   The defendants are estopped from denying the execution of  the  said  document and  plaintiff is proved  to be owner in possession of the suit land .  Issues No. 1 and 2 and 7 are also decided in favour of the plaintiff.  Since the plaintiff came in possession of the suit property with the consent of the defendants and his possession never become   adverse   to   the   interest   of   the   defendants   so finding   of   the   learned   trial   Court   on   issue   no.   4   is affirmed.” (emphasis supplied) 14. As noticed from the extracted portion of the judgment of the High Court in paragraph 12 above, it is amply clear that the High Court has not dealt with the factual aspects adverted to by the first appellate Court to conclude that the document Exhibit P­6 was   only   a   memorandum   of   family   settlement   and   not   a document   containing   the   terms   and   recitals   of   a   family settlement.  Being the former, no registration was necessary.  For which reason, relief claimed by the plaintiff founded on the family settlement between the real brothers arrived at in 1970, acted upon   without   any   exception   and   documented   on   10.3.1988, ought to follow.   22 15. The first appellate Court has also justly opined that the parties had acted upon the stated family settlement and if we may say so, to the prejudice of the other party.   In that, the property   in   the   name   of   plaintiff   at   Prem   Basti  was   given   to Sohan Singh (original defendant No. 2), which was otherwise in possession of Mohan Singh (original defendant No. 1).  Further, the plot purchased by the plaintiff in the name of his son was given to Mohan Singh (original defendant No. 1) and his wife, but that plot was admittedly sold by them to one Surjit Kaur.  Being a   case   of   a   family   settlement   between   the   real   brothers   and having been acted upon by them, it was not open to resile from the same.  They were estopped from contending to the contrary. This crucial aspect has been glossed over by the High Court and if we may say so, the second appeal has been disposed of in a most casual manner.   Inasmuch as, the impugned judgment of the High Court merely contains extraction of the judgment of the trial   Court   and   first   appellate   Court   and   of   the   relied   upon judgments (precedents).  The only consideration is found in two concluding   paragraphs,   which   are   extracted   above   (paragraph 12).   Even on liberal reading of the same, it is not possible to conclude   that   the   High   Court   in   exercise   of   its   appellate 23 jurisdiction (second appeal) had undertaken proper analysis and scrutiny   of   the   judgment  of   the   first  appellate   Court  in   right perspective,   much   less   keeping   in   mind   the   limited   scope   of jurisdiction to entertain second appeal under Section 100 of the Code   of   Civil   Procedure,   1908.     The   impugned   judgment   is bordering on a casual approach by the High Court in overturning the   well­considered   decision   of   the   first   appellate   Court. Although   the   impugned   judgment   runs   into   36   pages,   the manner   in   which   it   proceeds   leaves   us   to   observe   that   it   is cryptic.     We   say   no   more.     On   this   count   alone,   impugned judgment does not stand the test of judicial scrutiny. 16. Be that as it may, the High Court has clearly misapplied the dictum in the relied upon decisions.  The settled legal position is that   when   by   virtue   of   a   family   settlement   or   arrangement, members of a family descending from a common ancestor or a near relation seek to sink their differences and disputes, settle and resolve their conflicting claims or disputed titles once and for all   in   order   to   buy   peace   of   mind   and   bring   about   complete harmony and goodwill in the family, such arrangement ought to be governed by a special equity peculiar to them and would be enforced if honestly made.  The object of such arrangement is to 24 protect the family from long drawn litigation or perpetual strives which   mar   the   unity   and   solidarity   of   the   family   and   create hatred and bad blood between the various members of the family, as observed in   (supra).   In the said reported decision, a Kale   three­Judge Bench of this Court had observed thus: ­

(emphasis supplied) In paragraph 10 of the said decision, the Court has delineated the contours of essentials of a family settlement as follows: ­ “10.  In other words to put the binding effect and the essentials of a family settlement in a concretised form, 25

26 Again,   in   paragraph   24,   this   Court   restated   that   a   family arrangement being binding on the parties, clearly operates as an estoppel, so as to preclude any of the parties who have taken advantage under the agreement from revoking or challenging the same.  In paragraph 35, the Court noted as follows: ­

And again, in paragraph 36, the Court noted as follows: ­

While rejecting the argument regarding inapplicability of principle of estoppel, the Court observed as follows: ­

27

(emphasis supplied) And in paragraph 42, the Court observed as follows: ­

(emphasis supplied) The   view   so   taken   is   backed   by   the   consistent   exposition   in 8 previous decisions  referred to and duly analysed in the reported judgment.   The question formulated by the High Court, in our opinion, stands answered in favour of the appellants (plaintiff), in 8 Lala Khunni Lal vs. Kunwar Gobind Krishna Narain, ILR 33 All 356 Mt. Hiran Bibi vs. Mst. Sohan Bibi, AIR 1914 PC 44 Sahu Madho Das vs. Pandit Mukand Ram, AIR 1955 SC 481 Ram Charan Das vs. Girjanandini Devi, AIR 1966 SC 323 Tek Bahadur Bhujil vs. Debi Singh Bhujil, AIR 1966 SC 292 Maturi Pullaiah vs. Maturi Narasimham, AIR 1966 SC 1836 Krishna Biharilal vs. Gulabchand, (1971) 1 SCC 837 S. Shanmugam Pillai vs. K. Shanmugam Pillai, (1973) 2 SCC 312 Ramgopal vs. Tulshi Ram, AIR 1928 All 641 Sitala Baksh Singh vs. Jang Bahadur Singh, AIR 1933 Oudh 347 Mst. Kalawati vs. Sri Krishna Prasad, AIR 1944 Oudh 49 Bakhtawar vs. Sunder Lal, AIR 1926 All 173 Awadh Narain Singh vs. Narain Mishra, AIR 1962 Pat 400 Ramgouda Annagouda vs. Bhausaheb, AIR 1927 PC 227 Brahmanath Singh vs. Chandrakali Kuer, AIR 1961 Pat 79 Mst. Bibi Aziman vs. Mst. Saleha, AIR 1963 Pat 62 Kanhai Lal vs. Brij Lal, AIR 1918 PC 70 Dhiyan Singh vs. Jugal Kishore, AIR 1952 SC 145 T.V.R. Subbu Chetty’s Family Charities vs. M. Gaghava Mudaliar, AIR 1961 SC 797 Rachbha vs. Mt. Mendha, AIR 1947 All 177 Chief Controlling Revenue Authority vs. Smt. Satyawati Sood, AIR 1972 Delhi 171 (FB) Shyam Sunder vs. Siya Ram, AIR 1973 All 382 28 light of exposition of this Court in  Kale  (supra).  A priori, we have no hesitation in affirming the conclusion reached by the first appellate Court that the document Exhibit P­6 was nothing but a memorandum of a family settlement.  The established facts and circumstances   clearly   establish   that   a   family   settlement   was arrived at in 1970 and also acted upon by the concerned parties. That finding of fact recorded by the first appellate Court being unexceptionable, it must follow that the document Exhibit P­6 was merely a memorandum of a family settlement so arrived at. Resultantly, it was not required to be registered and in any case, keeping   in   mind   the   settled   legal   position,   the   contesting defendants   were   estopped   from   resiling   from   the   stated arrangement in the subject memorandum, which had recorded the settlement terms arrived at in the past and even acted upon relating to all the existing or future disputes   qua   the subject property   amongst   the   (signatories)   family   members   despite absence of antecedent title to the concerned property. 17. As regards the decision in  Bhoop Singh   (supra) and   Som 9 , the same dealt with the Dev & Ors. vs. Rati Ram & Anr. question of necessity to register any decree or order of a Court 9 (2006) 10 SCC 788 29 governed by clause (vi) of Section 17(2) of the Registration Act, 10 1908 .  In the present case, however, clause (v) of sub­Section 2 of   Section   17   of   the   1908   Act   is   attracted.     Section   17   as applicable when the cause of action arose (prior to amendment of 2001) reads thus: ­ “Part III OF REGISTRABLE DOCUMENTS 17. Documents of which registration is compulsory.­ (1)   xxx xxx xxx (2) Nothing in clauses (b) and (c) of sub­section (1) applies to –  (i) xxx xxx xxx (ii) xxx xxx xxx (iii) xxx xxx xxx (iv) xxx xxx xxx (v) any   document   not   itself   creating, declaring,   assigning,   limiting   or   extinguishing any right, title or interest of the value of one hundred   rupees   and   upwards   to   or   in immovable property, but merely creating a right to  obtain  another   document   which  will,  when executed,   create,   declare,   assign,   limit   or extinguish any such right, title or interest; or …..” 18. In our considered view, reliance placed by the High Court on the decisions of this Court will be of no avail to alter or impact the   conclusion   recorded   by   the   first   appellate   Court.     As aforementioned, in   Bhoop Singh   (supra) and   Som Dev   (supra), the Court was dealing with the issue of compulsory registration 10 For short, “the 1908 Act” 30 of a decree or order of Court.   In the context of the applicable clause (vi) in sub­Section (2) of Section 17, the Court in  Bhoop  (supra) went on to hold as follows: ­ Singh

In the present case, as noted earlier clause (v) of Section 17(2) is attracted, which pertains to execution of any document creating or extinguishing right, title or interest in an immovable property 31 amongst the family members.  Thus, the dictum in  Kale  (supra) is attracted in the fact situation of this case. 19. Considering the above, we have no hesitation in concluding that the High Court committed manifest error in interfering with and in particular reversing the well­considered decision of the first appellate Court, which had justly concluded that document dated   10.3.1988   executed   between   the   parties   was   merely   a memorandum of settlement, and it did not require registration.  It must follow that the relief claimed by the plaintiff in the suit, as granted   by   the   first   appellate   Court   ought   not   to   have   been interfered   with   by   the   High   Court   and   more   so,   in   a   casual manner, as adverted to earlier.   20. Having   said   that,   it   is   unnecessary   to   examine   the alternative plea taken by the plaintiff to grant decree as prayed on the ground of having become owner by adverse possession. For the completion of record, we may mention that in fact, the trial Court had found that the possession of the plaintiff was only permissive possession and that finding has not been disturbed by the first appellate Court.  In such a case, it is doubtful that the 32 plaintiff can be heard to pursue relief, as prayed on the basis of his alternative plea of adverse possession.   21. Be that as it may, we deem it appropriate to set aside the impugned judgment and restore the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court in favour of the plaintiffs (appellants herein). 22. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed.   Impugned judgment and decree of the High Court is set aside.   The judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court is restored in favour of the plaintiff (appellants herein).  Decree be drawn up accordingly. There   shall   be   no   order   as   to   costs.     Pending   interlocutory applications, if any, shall stand disposed of. ..................................J.   (A.M. Khanwilkar) ..................................J.            (Dinesh Maheshwari) New Delhi; July 31, 2020.