Full Judgment Text
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.7472/2011
RAJASTHAN STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORP.
MANAGING DIRECTOR & ANR. Appellant(s)
VERSUS
RAMESH KUMAR SHARMA Respondent(s)
WITH
C.A. No. 7475/2011 (XV)
C.A. No. 7474/2011 (XV)
C.A. No. 7473/2011 (XV)
C.A. No. 7476/2011 (XV)
O R D E R
Civil Appeal No.7472/2011
1. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant.
2. None has appeared for the respondent(s).
3. The civil suit was filed by the workmen for declaration and
permanent injunction assailing a fine imposed on them by the
appellant management. It is, inter alia , the plea of the
respondents that what has been done is in violation of Regulation
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
ASHA SUNDRIYAL
Date: 2020.01.21
16:40:58 IST
Reason:
35 of the standing order (which is non-statutory) in effect thus,
the contractual obligation inter se the parties is alleged to have
been breached.
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4. The appellant endeavoured to stall the suit by raising a plea
under order VII Rule 11 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 claiming
that the plaint is liable to be rejected and the respondents to be
relegated to the remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
The plea did not find favour with the learned Civil Judge, Jaipur
City who dismissed that application by order dated 16.5.2006. The
revision petition preferred against the same was dismissed by the
High Court on 27.02.2008. Twelve years hence we are determining
whether this exercise of the two forums below was valid or not!
5. We may note that only notice was issued in the matter and no
interim order was granted. Logically speaking, the suit would have
been tried and decided in the meantime, if not the appeal also
considering the time period which has lapsed. We are, however,
informed that the suit has not even been proceeded with on the
basis that matter is pending before this Court. The facts pain us
that the recourse to justice can be delayed for such an ad
infinitum period of time.
6. On examination, we find that the principles set out in The
Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke of Bombay &
Ors.- 1976(1) SCC 496 would govern i.e. as set out in para 9 below:
“9. It would thus be seen that through the intervention of
the appropriate government, of course not directly, a very
extensive machinery has been provided for settlement and
adjudication of industrial disputes. But since an
individual aggrieved cannot approach the Tribunal or the
Labour Court directly for the redress of his grievance
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without the intervention of the government, it is
legitimate to take the view that the remedy provided under
the Act is not such as to completely oust the jurisdiction
of the civil court for trial of industrial disputes. If the
dispute is not an industrial dispute within the meaning of
Section 2(k) or within the meaning of Section 2A of the
Act, it is obvious that there is no provision for
adjudication of such disputes under the Act. Civil courts
will be the proper forum. But where the industrial dispute
is for the purpose of enforcing any right, obligation or
liability under the general law or the common law and not a
right, obligation or liability created under the Act, then
alternative forums are there giving an election to the
suitor to choose his remedy of either moving the machinery
under the Act or to approach the civil court. It is plain
that he can’t have both. He has to choose the one or the
other. But we shall presently show that the civil court
will have no jurisdiction to try and adjudicate upon an
industrial dispute if it concerned enforcement of certain
right or liability created only under the Act. In that
event civil court will have no jurisdiction even to grant a
decree of injunction to prevent the threatened injury on
account of the alleged breach of contract if the contract
is one which is recognized by and enforceable under the Act
alone.”
7. Learned counsel does not dispute that the view taken in the
aforesaid judgment has not been overruled but seeks to submit that
the legal position has been elucidated in the case of the appellant
in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and Anr. v. Krishna
Kant and Ors.-( 1995) 5 SCC 75 as under:
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“35. We may now summarise the principles flowing from the
above discussion:
(1) Where the dispute arises from general law of contract,
i.e., where reliefs are claimed on the basis of the general
law of contract, a suit filed in civil court cannot be said
to be not maintainable, even though such a dispute may also
constitute an "industrial dispute" within the meaning of
Section 2(k) or Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947.
(2) Where, however, the dispute involves recognition,
observance or enforcement of any of the rights or
obligations created by the Industrial Disputes Act, the
only remedy is to approach the forums created by the said
Act.
(3) Similarly, where the dispute involves the recognition,
observance or enforcement of rights and obligations created
by enactments like Industrial Employment (Standing Orders)
Act,1946 - which can be called 'sister enactments' to
Industrial Disputes Act- and which do not provide a forum
for resolution of such disputes, the only remedy shall be
to approach the forums created by the Industrial Disputes
Act provided they constitute industrial disputes within the
meaning of Section 2(k) and Section 2-A of Industrial
Disputes Act or where such enactment says that such dispute
shall be either treated as an industrial dispute or says
that it shall be adjudicated by any of the forums created
by the Industrial Disputes Act. Otherwise, recourse to
Civil Court is open.
(4) It is not correct to say that the remedies provided by
the Industrial Disputes Act are not equally effective for
the reason that access to the forum depends upon a
reference being made by the appropriate government. The
power to make a reference conferred upon the government is
to be exercised to effectuate the object of the enactment
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and hence not unguided. The rule is to make a reference
unless, of course, the dispute raised is a totally
frivolous one ex-facie. The power conferred is the power to
refer and not the power to decide, though it may be that
the government is entitled to examine whether the dispute
is ex-facie frivolous, not meriting an adjudication.
(5) Consistent with the policy of law aforesaid, we commend
to the Parliament and the State Legislatures to make a
provision enabling a workman to approach the Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal directly - i.e., without the
requirement of a reference by the government - in case of
industrial disputes covered by Section 2-A of the
Industrial Disputes Act. This would go a long way in
removing the misgivings with respect to the effectiveness
of the remedies provided by the Industrial Disputes Act.
(6) The certified Standing Orders framed under and in
accordance with the Industrial employment (Standing Order)
Act, 1946 are statutorily imposed conditions of service and
are binding both upon the employers and employees, though
they do not amount to "statutory provisions". Any violation
of these Standing Orders entitles an employee to
appropriate relief either before the forums created by the
Industrial Disputes Act or the Civil Court where recourse
to Civil Court is open according to the principles
indicated herein.
(7) The policy of law emerging from Industrial Disputes Act
and its sister enactments is to provide an alternative
dispute resolution mechanism to the workmen, a mechanism
which is speedy, inexpensive, informal and un-encumbered by
the plethora of procedural laws and appeals upon appeals
and revisions applicable to civil courts. Indeed, the
powers of the Courts and Tribunals under the Industrial
Disputes Act are far more extensive in the sense that they
can grant such relief as they think appropriate in the
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circumstances for putting an end to an industrial dispute.”
8. We must keep in mind that the Industrial Dispute Act is an
alternative dispute resolution mechanism for the benefit of the
workmen to provide “speedy, inexpensive, informal and unencumbered
by the plethora of procedural laws. The object is thus, to protect
the workmen.
9. It has also been observed that dispute arises from general law
of contract, i.e., where reliefs are claimed on the basis of the
general law of contract, a suit filed in civil court cannot be said
to be not maintainable, even though such a dispute may also
constitute an "industrial dispute" within the meaning of Section
2(k) or Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It is
only when the dispute involves recognition, observance or
inforcement of or obligations created by the Industrial Disputes
Act, the only remedy would be exclusively under the provisions of
the Industrial Disputes Act Act. The facts of this case involved
the termination of service of workmen and thus the remedy was inter
alia under the Industrial Disputes Act.
10. The present case involves recovery of certain fine amount
which cannot be said to be covered by Section 2-A of the Industrial
Disputes Act. The workmen in their wisdom (or possibly, lack of
it) approached the civil Court and have been left high and dry for
the last fifteen years without any adjudication on merits of their
claims. We may also note that the impugned orders are also, in a
sense interlocutory in character.
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11. We are thus, of the view that there is no ground made out to
interfere with the impugned order and the appeal is consequently
dismissed.
12. In view of the lapse of time, we direct the Civil Judge to
forthwith proceed to try the Civil Suit No.774/2005 and endeavour
to complete the trial and pronounce the judgment, if not already
pronounced in the maximum period of six months from the date of
receipt of the order.
13. The appeal is dismissed in terms aforesaid.
C.A. No. 7475/2011, C.A. No. 7474/2011, C.A. No.7473/2011 & C.A.
No. 7476/2011
The appeals are dismissed in view of the order passed above in
Civil Appeal No.7472/2011.
………………………………………..J.
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL]
…………………………………....J.
[K.M. JOSEPH]
NEW DELHI;
JANUARY 16, 2020.
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ITEM NO.104 COURT NO.12 SECTION XV
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Civil Appeal No.7472/2011
RAJASTHAN STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORP.
MANAGING DIRECTOR & ANR. Appellant(s)
VERSUS
RAMESH KUMAR SHARMA Respondent(s)
WITH
C.A. No. 7475/2011 (XV)
C.A. No. 7474/2011 (XV)
C.A. No. 7473/2011 (XV)
C.A. No. 7476/2011 (XV)
Date : 16-01-2020 These appeals were called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KISHAN KAUL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K.M. JOSEPH
For Appellant(s) Mr. S. K. Bhattacharya, AOR
Mr. L.K. Paonam, Adv.
Ms. Seema Sharma, Adv.
Mr. Niraj Bobby Paonam, Adv.
Mrs. Tomthinnganbi Koijam, Adv.
For Respondent(s) Mr. Bankey Bihari Sharma, AOR [N.P.]
Mr. Yash Pal Dhingra, AOR [N.P.]
Mr. Parmanand Gaur, AOR [N.P.]
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
Civil Appeal No.7472/2011
The appeal is dismissed in terms of the signed order
reportable order.
Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.
C.A. No. 7475/2011, C.A. No. 7474/2011, C.A. No.7473/2011 & C.A.
No. 7476/2011
The appeals are dismissed in terms of the signed order
reportable order.
Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.
(ASHA SUNDRIYAL) (ANITA RANI AHUJA)
COURT MASTER COURT MASTER
[Signed reportable order is placed on the file]