Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 1005 of 2006
PETITIONER:
Kastha Niwarak Grahnirman Sahakari Sanstha Maryadit, Indore
RESPONDENT:
President, Indore Development Authority
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/02/2006
BENCH:
ARIJIT PASAYAT & S.H. KAPADIA
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 6390/2002)
ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
Leave granted.
Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment rendered by a
Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in a Letters
Patent Appeal upholding the view of the learned Single Judge
that appellant is not entitled to benefits flowing from
Resolution No.9 dated 31.1.1986 of the respondent.
The factual background in a nutshell is as follows:
The Indore Development Authority (hereinafter referred to
as the ’Authority’) adopted certain guidelines allowing the
Housing Co-operative Societies to utilize the land owned by
them by making plots for construction of houses for the
benefit of their members. The relevant guidelines contained in
the Circular dated 31.1.1986 are as follows:
"(1) Only those societies shall be taken into
consideration which have got themselves
registered as per the law by purchasing the
land prior to the publication of the Declaration
of Section 50(2) of the Authority in respect of
the scheme.
(2) Those societies will also be taken into
consideration which have got themselves
registered after the publication of the
Declaration of Section 50(2) but the
application was moved by them before the
Competent Authority for obtaining rebate
under the Urban Land Ceiling Act prior to the
above law.
(3) This will be mandatory for availing the
benefit of these facilities that while entering
into an advance agreement with the Authority,
the Society should hand over the vacant and
peaceful possession of the concerned land
itself to the Authority. And it will be at liberty
to move for revision etc. for enhancing the
compensation. With regard to the handing over
of the possession if there arises any court case
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or any other dispute then this facility would
not be available. If any tenant or sub tenant or
any other person holds the possession of the
land then it will be the responsibility of the
Society that it should make available the
vacant possession to the Authority by
removing them from the land. In the event of
being not so, this scheme of allotment of land
shall not be implemented."
The appellant was denied the benefit of the Circular on
the ground that it did not fulfill the requisite conditions. Writ
Petition (W.P. No.755 of 1994) was filed by the appellant
praying for appropriate directions to the Authority to grant it
the benefit of the Circular dated 31.1.1986. A learned Single
Judge dismissed the Writ Application noticing that the
appellant did not fulfill the requisite conditions. It was noted
that the appellant claiming to be one of the interested societies
applied to the Authority on 9.11.1987 and 28.12.1987. The
Authority called upon the appellant to furnish certain details.
By order of the Authority dated 1.10.1993 the benefit was
declined. It was also noted by the High Court that the Circular
in question dated 31.1.1986 was withdrawn by resolution
No.93 dated 14.5.1993. Though a stand was taken by the
appellant that certain other societies similarly situated were
granted the benefit, the High Court noted that they stood on a
different footing. Learned Single Judge noted that the
appellant was not the owner of the land and it only claimed to
be the potential purchaser having purportedly entered into
certain agreements. That being so, it was held that the
appellant had not acquired any legal right to get the benefit in
terms of the Circular dated 31.1.1986. A Letters Patent
Appeal was filed before the High Court which by the impugned
order upheld the view of the learned Single Judge. It was
specifically noted by the Division Bench that as the appellant-
Society was not the owner of the land, it was not entitled to
the benefit.
In support of the appeal, Mr. Mahabir Singh, learned
senior counsel submitted that the real import of the
Resolution is that the society should have got a tangible
interest in the property. Appellant had entered into
agreements for purchase of the land on 18.1.1982 and,
therefore clearly fulfilled the conditions. In fact possession was
taken on 5.5.1992. It was also pointed out that in the case of
some others who had similarly situated the benefit had been
extended. According to him, denial of appellant in such
circumstances would amount to violation of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the ’Constitution’).
In response, learned counsel for the respondent-
Authority submitted that both learned Single Judge and the
Division Bench have rightly noticed that the appellant did not
fulfill the requisite conditions and, therefore, was not entitled
to any relief.
First Clause, as quoted above, requires that only those
societies were to be considered which had got themselves
registered as per law by purchasing land prior to the
publication of the Declaration of Section 50(2) of the Madhya
Pradesh Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam, 1973 (in short
the ’Adhiniyam’). Stand of the learned counsel for the
appellant that what was mandatory was the registration and
not the ownership of the land is clearly untenable. The
conditions are cumulative i.e. (a) the society has to be
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registered; and (b) it must purchase the land prior to the
publication of Declaration of Section 50(2) of the Authority in
respect of the scheme. The second condition was admittedly
not fulfilled. Clause 3 is also relevant. It provides that it will be
mandatory for the society for availing the benefit of the scheme
to hand over a vacant and peaceful possession of the
concerned land to the Authority while entering into an
advance agreement with the Authority. In other words, the
advance agreement could be entered into but at that point of
time the vacant and peaceful possession of the concerned land
was to be handed over to the Authority. The appellants could
not have done so because it was neither the owner nor in
possession of the concerned land. It is to be noted that there is
scope for advance agreement. It has been in that context
specifically noted in Clause (3) that so far as handing over
possession is concerned if there are court cases or any other
dispute then the facility regarding handing over possession
would not be availed. Therefore, the view expressed by the
High Court is clearly in order.
So far as the allotment to non-eligible societies is
concerned even if it is accepted, though specifically denied by
the Authority, to be true that does not confer any right on the
appellants. Two wrongs do not make one right. A party cannot
claim that since something wrong has been done in another
case direction should be given for doing another wrong. It
would not be setting a wrong right, but would be perpetuating
another wrong. In such matters, there is no discrimination
involved. The concept of equal treatment on the logic of Article
14 of the Constitution cannot be pressed into service in such
cases. What the concept of equal treatment presupposes is
existence of similar legal foothold. It does not countenance
repetition of a wrong action to bring both wrongs on a par.
Even if hypothetically it is accepted that a wrong has been
committed in some other cases by introducing a concept of
negative equality the appellant cannot strengthen its case. It
has to establish strength of its case on some other basis and
not by claiming negative equality. (See Union of India v.
International Trading Co. (2003(5) SCC 437).
Looked at from any angle, the appeal deserves to be
dismissed which we direct. No costs.