Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
L. MICHAEL & ANR.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
M/S. JOHNSTON PUMPS INDIA LTD.
DATE OF JUDGMENT10/02/1975
BENCH:
KRISHNAIYER, V.R.
BENCH:
KRISHNAIYER, V.R.
ALAGIRISWAMI, A.
SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH
CITATION:
1975 AIR 661 1975 SCR (3) 489
1975 SCC (1) 574
CITATOR INFO :
RF 1980 SC1896 (68)
F 1985 SC 251 (6)
RF 1991 SC 101 (15,170,190)
ACT:
Industrial Disputes Act (14 of 1947)--Dismissal of an
employee--Power of Tribunal to go behind an order of
termination--Employer must disclose the grounds of his
action when challenged as colourable or mala fide--When
Court should interfere with a finding of fact.
HEADNOTE:
The services of the appellant, who was an employee of the
respondents, were terminated by the latter by giving him a
month’s notice as per the standing orders without assigning
any reasons for the termination. The consequential
industrial dispute was referred to the Labour Court. The
management alleged that the dismissed employee misused his
position by passing on important and secret information
about the affairs of the company to certain outsiders, that
even after he was transferred to another section he made
attempts to elicit information from the section with a view
to pass it on to outsiders, and that, therefore, the
management lost confidence in the employee and terminated
his services by a bona fide order. The Labour Court
confirmed the order of termination. In appeal to this
Court, it was contended that, even where a management had
the Power to terminate the services of its employees without
reasons but with notice pay the colourable exercise of that
power invalidated the order and the Court court probe,
beheath the surface to check upon the bona fides behind the
exercise-of the power,
Allowing the appeal to this Court.
HELD: 1(a) Ile Labour Court has misled itself on the law and
its order should be set aside. The word will be
reinstated with back wages. [498 G]
(b) The manner of dressing up an order does not matter.
The Court will lift the veil to view the reality or
substance of the order. [495 F]
(2) (a) ’The Tribunal has the power and. indeed, the duty
to X-ray the order and discover its true nature, if the
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object and effect, if the attendant circumstances and the
ulterior purpose be to dismiss the employee because he is an
evil to be eliminated. But if the management, to cover up
the inability to establish by an inquiry, illegitimately but
ingeniously passes an innocent looking order of termination
simpliciter, such action is bad and is liable to be set
aside. Loss of confidence is no new Armour for the
management; otherwise security of tenure, ensured by the new
industrial jurisprudence and authenticated by a catena of
cases of this Court can be subverted by this neo formula
Loss of confidence in the law will be the consequence of the
Loss of Confidence doctrine. [497 C-D]
(b) An employer who believe or suspects that _his employee,
particularly one holding a position of confidence, has
betrayed that confidence, can, if the conditions and terms
of the employment permit, terminate his employment and
discharge him without any stigma attaching to the discharge.
But such belief or suspicion of the employer should not be a
mere whim or fancy. it should be bona fide and reasonable.
It must rest on some tangible basis and the Power has to be
exercised by the employer objectively, in good faith, which
means honestly and with due care and prudence. If the
exercise of such power is challenged on the ground of being
colourable or mala fide or an act of victimisation or unfair
labour practice. the employer must disclose to the Court the
grounds of his impugned action so that the same may be
tested judicially. [498 B-C]
In the instant case this has not been done. There is only
the ipse dixit of the employer that he was suspecting since
1968 that the appellant was divulging secrets relating to
his business. The employer has not disclosed the grounds on
which this suspicion arose in 1968. Further after 1968, the
appellant was given
490
two extra increments in addition to his normal increments in
appreciation of his hard work. This circumstance completely
demolishes even the whimsical and tenuous stand taken by the
employer. It was manifest that the impugned action was not
bona fide. [498 D]
The Chartered Bank v. The Chartered Bank Employees’ Union
[1960] 3 S.C.R. 441; Murgan Mills Ltd. v. Industrial
Tribunal, Madras [1965] 2 S.C.R. 148 and Workmen of Sudder
Office, Cinnamare v. Management, [MO] II L.L.J. 620.
followed.
Air India Corporation Bombay v, V. A. Rebellow & Anr. [1972]
3 S.C.R. 606 distinguished.
Delhi Transport Undertaking v. Goel [1970] II LIJ, 20,
referred to.
(3) It is true that this Court, in appeal, as a rule of
practice, is loath to interfere with a finding of fact
recorded by the trial court. But if such a finding is based
on no evidence or is the result of a misreading of the
material evidence or is so unreasonable or grossly unjust
that no reasonable Person would judicially arrive at that
conclusion. it is the duty of this Court to interfere and
set matters right. [498 E-F]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1605 of 1972.
Appeal by Special leave from the Award dated November 24,
1971 of the Labour Court, Delhi in L.C.I.C. No. 31 of 1971.
M. K. Ramamurthi and J. Ramamurthi, for the appellant.
V. M. Tarkunde, O. C. Mathur, D. N. Mishra, and Sudhir K.
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Khanna, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KRISHNA IYER, J.-Industrial law in India has many twilight
patches, illustrated by the present appeal which projects
the problem of an employee whose services have been
terminated similiciter by the Management, a pump
manufacturing enterprise, issuing a notice ending the
,employment and offering one month’s pay as authorized by
the relevant Standing orders. The thorny legal issue is
whether the ipse dixit of the employer that he has lost
confidence in the employee is sufficient justification
jettison the latter without levelling and proving the objec-
tionable conduct which has undermined his confidence so that
the tribunal may be satisfied about the bona fides of the
’firing’ as contrasted with the colourable exercise of power
hiding a not-so-innocuous purpose.
The backdrop
The facts and circumstances become decisive of the fate of
the, ,case even where the law is simplistic or fair in its
face. Here, what are the events and environments of
employment leading to the worker being given the boot ? Is
the order an innocent and, therefore, legal quit notice
sanctioned by the Standing Orders which does not stigmatize
the worker but merely bids him good-bye ? Oris it a sinister
intent to punish as a guileless order based on ’loss of
confidence’, an alibi which, on a certain reading of this
Court’s rulings, is also a protective armour against
judicial probe and setting aside ?
491
Michael, a permanent employee of proved efficiency and six
years standing, was appreciatively given two ’merit’
increments. But a letter of September 2, 1970 told him off
service, giving him one month’s ’notice-pay’ discharging him
without damning, as distinguished from dismissing him for
misconduct.
The rival versions illumine the factual confrontation, the
resolution of which is no easy legal essay. The worker,
Michael, through his Union, protested against the ’sack’
order as victimisation of a Trade Union activist but the
Management was heedless, conciliation was fruitless and the
dispute between the Union and the Management was eventually
referred by the Delhi Administration to the Labour Court for
adjudication. The reference ran thus
"Whether the termination of services of Shri
L. Michael is illegal and/or unjustified and,
if so, to what relief is he entitled and what
directions are necessary in this respect ?"
Both sides stated their cases in their pleadings and the
true nature of the conflict emerges from them.
The story set out by the employee in his statement before
the Labour Court was that although he was efficient,
appreciated and awarded merit increments, the Management was
antagonized by his active part in the formation of an
Employees’ Union, especially because oral warnings by the
Regional Manager against his Unionist proclivity was
ignored. Michael became the treasurer of the Union. This
Union chapter claimed its price, for the Management quietly
terminated his services by a simple letter which reads:
"We are sorry to advise that your services are
no longer required by the Company. As such,
this letter may be treated as a notice for the
termination of your services with immediate
effect. As for the terms of your employment
letter, on termination of services you will be
paid one month’s salary extra. You may please
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call on the undersigned and have your accounts
settled."
This act, claims the worker, was ’in flagrant violation of
elementary principles of natural justice without assigning
any reason and without giving him an opportunity to defend
himself. This, in his statement he challenged the
termination as ’wrongful, mala fide, illegal, and an act of
victimisation’. The counter case of the management get up
in its statement, as is apparent from the discharge order,
is that no dismissal is involved, no enquiry necessary and
no illegality invalidates.
The management claimed that the alleged annoyance with the,
workman for union activity was a concoction in self-defence,
as the Management had not even knowledge of the formation of
the Union. This fatter limb of the plea is a little too
naive. The warning by the Regional Manager was denied and
the reference to trade union activities by the worker was
more ’to create a ground for the workman’s claim and has
been leveled as a matter of habit and routine. The basic
plea of the management was that the action being a simple
492
termination without a sting, the process and consequence of
a disciplinary action were not attracted.
The Management, however, took the Court into confidence to
explain why the employee was discharged. He was employed as
a Receipt and Dispatch Clerk in the office upto 10-3-1970.
As an insider with a to office correspondence the
employee misused his position by passing on ’very important
and secret information about the affairs of the company to
certain outsiders. He was consequentially shifted to the
post of clerk handling posting of bins and collection of
payments but the workman, although denied direct access to
correspondence in the Receipt and Dispatch section, made
attempt ’to elicit information from the section with a view
to pass it on to outsiders’. The upshot of these activities
of which the management was alerted was a loss of confidence
in the employee. This unreliability was visited with non-
injurious termination of service by a bona fide order.
Therefore, the action was claimed to be legal and immune to
judicial interference.
Two socially vital factors must inform the understanding and
application of Industrial jurisprudence. The first is the
constitutional mandate of Part IV obligating the State to
make ’provision for securing just and humane conditions of
work’. Security of employment is the first requisite of a
worker’s life. The second equally axiomatic consideration
is that a worker who willfully or anti-socially holds up the
wheels of production or undermines the success of the
business is a high risk and deserves, in industrial
interest, to be removed-without tears. Legislation and
judicial interpretation have woven the legal fabric. We
have to see whether on the facts of the present case what
the relevant law is, whether it has been applied by the
Labour Court rightly and whether the appellant has merit on
his side, judged by the social conscience and judicial
construction of the law in this branch of discharge
simpliciter versus disguised’ dismissal.
A few salient facts need emphasis before the principles of
law are applied. The workman in his statement stressed the
case of malaus antinus due to his union activities, although
he did vaguely refer to the termination of service as
wrongful and malafide. From this it cannot be argued, as
the Management sought to make out, that his denial of
leaking out office secrets was an after-thought pleaded only
in the rejoinder and therefore liable to be discredited.
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How could the worker have a hunch about the management’s
undisclosed ground for dismissal ? When the latter stated
the reason which prompted this action for the first time
before the Labour Court, the workman in his reply refuted
this case. It is noteworthy that there is no speck of
record or any hint of written material in support of the
story that the management had credible information of the
appellant betraying sensitive secrets of business. The
letters sent by the Union and the worker requesting for
reinstatement were being ignored. The management could well
have disclosed their suspicion in reply and told the Union
and the workman that they resorted to an innocuous discharge
to avoid punitive trauma. The management could have
divulged in writing to
493
the Conciliation Officer their legitimate fears about the
worker’s integrity and their considerate action of simple
termination. This too they failed to do. In their written
statement in Court the Management asserted for the first
time that the employee was an intractable smuggler of inside
information. The statement winds up with the legalistic
plea : ’the management had, in the meanwhile, lost confi-
dence in the workman’. This culminating collapse of trust
is alleged to be the primary cause for the discharge from
employment.
At the time of the evidence, M.W.1, a former Regional
Manager, swore that the workman joined as a pump operator in
1963, was promoted as clerk in 1967, that the suspicion of
disloyal communication arose ’for the first time in 1968’
and yet ’thereafter he was given two increments extra in
addition to normal increments. He was a hard working man
and has a very good memory but the suspicion was there’.
These are the facts and the evidence in the case and it has
been fairly conceded before the Labour Court by the
Management’s representative that were the action regarded as
punitive it was bad, there having been no enquiry whatever
with liberty to the employee to meet the charge. But the
single slender strand on which the discharge was suspended
was ’loss of confidence of the management in the employee.
The Labour Court argued:
"According to the management, as there was no
proof with it for this suspicion it could not
proceed against him departmentally and, in the
circumstances, it was considered desirable to
terminate his services by passing an order of
discharge without any stigma attached to it."
While on all hands it was agreed that the employee was
efficient, the court took the view that the motivation for
the termination was the suspicion Which lurked in the mind
of the Regional Manager that information regarding tenders
was being passed on by the workman’. We, have to find out
whether the holding in the award that, on the materials
above placed, the action could be called colourable or saved
as bona fide, could be castigated as achieving an
illegitimate end or supported as a premature but straight-
forward and harmless farewell. In short, was loss of
confidence a legal label affixed by the management to eject
the workman, there being no other legal method of accompli-
shing their wish to remove him for misconduct ?
Two questions, therefore, fall for decision. Can a person,
reasonably instructed in the law and scrutinising with
critical faculties the facts on record, conic to the
conclusion that the snapping of the tic of master and
servant in the present case was innocuous andbona-fide
or oblique circumvention of the processual protection the
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law provides before a workman is dismissed for mis-conduct ?
We can discern harmony and consistency in case lawfrom
Chartered Bank(1) and Murugan(2) through Sudder Office(3)
and
(1) [1960] 3 S. C. R. 441. (2) [1965] 2 S. C. R. 149.
(3) [1970] II L. L. J. 620.
-423SCI/75
494
Air India Corporation(1). The social justice ice
perspective and particular facts are important, though. The
plethora if precedents need not, be covered in extenso as
the law laid-down is the same except that judicial response
to each case situation leads to emphasis on different facets
of the principle. Even so some milestone decisions, if we
may say so, may be considered.
In Murugan Mills Case (supra) Wanchoo J (as he then was),
speaking for the Court made the following observations :
"The right of the employer to terminate the
services of his workman under a standing order
like cl.17(a) in the present case, which
amounts to a claim ’to hire and fire’ an
employee as the employer pleases and thus
completely negatives security of service which
has been secured to industrial employees
through industrial adjudication, came up for
consideration before the Labour Appellate
Tribunal in Buckingham & Carnatic Co. Ltd v.
Workers of the Company (1952 L.A.C. 490). The
matter then came up before this Court also in
Chartered Bank v. Chartered Bank Employees
Union (1960 3 SCR 441 and the Management of U.
B. Dutt & Co. v. Workmen of U. B. Dutt & Co.
(1962 Supp. 2 SCR 822) wherein the view taken
by the Labour Appellate Tribunal was approved
and it was held that even in a case like the
present the requirement of bona fides was
essential and if the termination of service
was a colourable exercise of the power or as a
result of victimisation or unfair labour
practice the industrial tribunal would have
the jurisdiction to intervene and set aside
such termination. The form of the
order in
such a case is not conclusive and the tribunal
can go behind the order to find the reasons
which led to the order and then consider for
itself whether the termination was a
colourable exercise of unfair labour practice.
If it came to the conclusion that the
termination was a colourable exercise of the
power or was a result of victimisation or
unfair labour practice, it would have the
jurisdiction to intervene and set aside such
termination."
In that case the form of the order had no foul trace, but
before the Tribunal dereliction of duty and go-slow tactics
were disclosed as the inarticulate reasons. This Court
ruled :
"This clearly amounted to punishment for
misconduct and therefore to pass an order
under cl.17(a) of the Standing Orders in such
circumstances was clearly a colourable
exercise of the power to terminate the
services of a workman under the provisions of
the Standing Orders."
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Shri M. K. Ramamurthy, counsel for the appellants, contended
for the proposition that even where a management had the
power to terminate the services of its employee without
reasons but with notice pay only, the colourable exercise of
that power invalidated it, and the
(1)[1972] 3 S. C. R. 606.
495
Court could probe, beneath the surface to check upon the
bonafides behind the exercise of the power. If the reasons
including the termination were victimisation, unfair labour
practice or misconduct, it was foul play to avoid a fair
enquiry and fall back upon the power to terminate
simpliciter There are myriad situations where an employer
may in good faith, have to reduce his staff, even though he
may have only a good word for his employees. Simple
termination is a weapon usable on such occasions and not
when the master is willing to strike but afraid to wound.
We have been referred to the Bihar State Road Transport
Corporation case(1). The power of the Court to go behind
the language of the order is reaffirmed there. In Suddek
Office (supra) the Court apparently laid stress on the
Management’s right to terminate the services simpliciter
under the terms of contract, where there was no lack of bona
fides, unfair labour practice or victimisation. It is
significant that this Court used language and laid down law
very much like in the earlier cases and did refer to the
precedents on the point. For instance, Vaidialingam J.,
’there observed :
" It is needless to point out that it has been
held by this Court in The Chartered Bank,
Bombay v. The Chartered Bank Employees’ Union
(1960 11 LLJ 222) that if the termination of
service is a colourable exercise of the power
vested in the management or as a result of
victimisation or unfair labour practice, the
Industrial Tribunal would have jurisdiction to
intervene and set aside such termination. In
order to find out whether the order of
termination is one of termination simpliciter
under the provisions of contract or of
standing orders, the Tribunal has ample
jurisdiction to go into all the circumstances
which led to the termination simpliciter."
The manner of dressing up an order does not matter. The
Court will lift the veil to view the reality or substance of
the order. The Court, in that case, examined the
circumstances in detail to see whether a dismissal for
misconduct was being masked as a simple send off with a
month’s pay, and held ultimately :
"We are satisfied that the management has
passed the order of termination simpliciter
and the order does not amount to one of
dismissal as and by way of punishment."
of course, loss of confidence in the workman was alleged by
the management and the Court found that it was not a
camouflage. It may be noticed that in that case the workman
was being entrusted with stores worth several lakhs of
rupees, some goods were lost from the stores and the Union
was informed by the management that it had lost confidence
in the workman. In the written statement before the Labour
Court the management alleged that the workman was the head
godown-clerk who was the custodian of the company’s
property, the post being one of trust and confidence. It is
noteworthy that in the High Court the workman did not even
file a counter-affidavit and the counsel for the Union and
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the workman agreed that the order of termination was not a
camouflage to cover up what really was an order
(1) [1970] S.C.R. 708.
496
of dismissal. He merely urged that the termination of the
services was really by way of dismissal. In this conspectus
of circumstances, this Court found that the Head Clerk in
charge of the engineering godown and responsible for the
maintenance of considerable stores, held a sensitive
position. This Court observed :
"The entire basis of the Labour Court’s award
for holding that the order is one of dismissal
is its view that the management has invoked
cl. 9 to camouflage its action. When that
approach has been given up on behalf of the
workman before the High Court the reasoning of
the Labour Court falls to the ground and the
High Court has acted within the jurisdiction
under Art. 226 when it set aside the order of
the Labour Court especially when there has
been no finding of victimisation, unfair
labour practices or mala fides recorded,
against the management. To conclude we are
satisfied that the High Court was justified in
setting aside the order of the Labour Court."
We have gone into this decision at length to disabuse the
impression that a new defence mechanism to protect
termination of service simpliciter, viz., loss of
confidence, had been propounded in this ruling. We do not
agree, that any such innovation has been made. The Air,
India Corporation Case (supra) may seem to support the ’no
confidence’ doctrine but a closer study contradicts any such
view. of course, Shri Tarkunde, counsel for the management,
placed great reliance on this ruling. Needless to say, this
Court recognised the power of the Tribunal to go behind the
form of the order, look at the substance and set aside what
may masquerade as termination simpliciter, if in reality it
cloaked a dismissal for misconduct ’as a colourable exercise
of power by the management. The Court repeated that an
Industrial employer cannot ’hire and fire’ his workmen on
the basis of an unfettered right under the contract of
employment. On the facts of the Air-India Case (supra) the
Court concluded that it-was ’not possible to hold this order
to be based on any conceivable misconduct’. Special
reference was made to the grave suspicion regarding the
complainant’s private conduct with air-hostesses. Where no
misconduct spurs the action and a delicate unsuitability for
the job vis a vis the young women in employment in the same
firm is strongly suspected, resort to termination
simpliciter cannot be criticized as a malafide machination.
In that background, the action was held to be bonafide and
the overall unsuitability led-to a loss of confidence in the
employee. Not that the loss of. confidence was exalted as a
ground but the special circumstances of the case exonerated
bad faith in discharge simpliciter.
Before concluding the discussion, we may refer to the case
of Delhi Transport Undertaking v. Goel(1) adverted to by the
Labour Court. Indeed that decision turned on Regulations
framed under the Delhi Road Transport Authority Act, 1950
and not on pure Industrial Law or construction of the
Standing Orders. Moreover, the Court, in that
(1) [1970] II LLJ 20.
497
case, appears to have discussed rulings under Art. 311 also.
However, on the facts of that case, the Court was satisfied
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that order of termination was not a disguise or cloak for
dismissing the employee and the ground given that he was a
cantankerous person undesirable to be retained-was good.
We do not read the Delhi Transport case (supra) to depart
from Murugan Mills Case (supra). Indeed, the latter did
not, and maybe could not, over-rule the former.
The above study of the. chain of rulings brings out the
futility of the contention that subsequent to Murugan Mill’s
Case (supra) colourable exercise of power has lost validity
and loss of confidence has gained ground. The law is.
simply this : The Tribunal has the power land, indeed, the
duty to X-ray the order and discover its true nature, if
,,he object and effect, if the attendant circumstances and
the ulterior purpose be to dismiss the employee because he
is an evil to be eliminated. But if the management, to
cover up the inability to establish by an enquiry,
illegitimately but ingeniously passes an innocent-looking
order of termination simpliciter, such action is bad and is
liable to be set aside. Loss of confidence is no new Armour
for the management; otherwise security of tenure, ensured by
the new industrial Jurisprudence and authenticated by a
catena of cases of this Court, can be subverted by this neo-
formula. Loss of confidence in the Law will be the conse-
quence of the Loss of Confidence doctrine.
In the light of what we have indicated, it is clear that
loss of confidence is often a subjective feeling or
individual reaction to an objective set facts and
motivations. The Court is concerned with the latter and not
with the former, although circumstances may exist which
justify a genuine exercise of the power of simple
termination. In a reasonable case of a confidential or
responsible post being misused or a sensitive or strategic
position being abused, it may be a high risk to keep the
employee, once suspicion has started and a disciplinary en-
quiry cannot be forced on the master. There, a termination
simpliciter may be bow fide, not colourable, and loss of
confidence may be evidentiary of good faith of the employer.
In the present case, the catalogue of circumstances set out
in the earlier part of the judgment strikes a contrary note.
The worker was not told when he wrote; the Union was not
disclosed when they demanded; the Labour Court was treated
to verbal statements like; very reliable sources’ and other
credulous phrases without a modicum of evidence to prove
bonafides. Some testimony of unseemly attempts by the
workman to get at secrets outside his orbit, some indication
of the source of suspicion, some proof of the sensitive or
strategic role of the employee, should and would have been
forthcoming had the case been bona fide. How contradictory,
that even when a strong suspicion of leaking out sensitive
secrets was being entertained about the employee he was
being given special merit increments over and above the
normal increments’ A case of res ipsa loauitur. Circums-
tances militate against the ’I say so’ of M.W.1 that the
management had suffered an ineffable loss of confidence. To
hit below the belt by trading legal pharses is not
Industrial Law. We are constrained to express ourselves
unmistakably lest industrial unrest induced by
498
wrongful terminations based on convenient loss of confidence
should be generated.
Before we conclude we would like to add that an employer who
believes or suspects that his employee, particularly one
holding a position of confidence, has betrayed that
confidence, can, if the conditions and terms of the
employment permit, terminate his employment and discharge
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him without any stigma attaching to the discharge. But such
belief or suspicion of the employer should not be a mere
whim or fancy. It should be bona fide and reasonable. It
must rest on some tangible basis and the power has to be
exercised by the employer objectively, in good faith, which
means honestly with due care and’ prudence. If the exercise
of such power is challenged on the ground of being
colourable or mala fide or an act of victimisation or unfair
labour practice, the employer must disclose to the Court the
grounds of his impugned action so that the same may be
tested judicially. In the instant case this has not been
done. There is only the ipse dixit of the employer that he
was suspecting since 1968 that the appellant was divulging
secrets relating to his business. The employer has not dis-
closed the grounds oil which this suspicion arose in 1968.
Further after 1968, the appellant was given two extra
increments, in addition to his normal increments, as stated
already, in appreciation of his hard work. This
circumstance completely demolishes even the whimsical and
tenuous stand taken by the employer. It was manifest
therefore that the impugned action was not bona fide.
It was urged by Mr. Tarkunde, learned counsel for the
employer that the question whether or not the employer had
lost confidence in the employee, was essentially one of fact
aad this Court should not disturb the finding of fact
recorded by the trial court on this point. It is true that
this Court, in appeal, as a rule of practice, is loath to
interfere with a finding of fact recorded by the trial
Court. But if such a finding is based on no evidence, or is
the result of a misreading of the material evidence, or is
so unreasonable or grossly unjust that no reasonable person
would judicially arrive at that conclusion, it is the duty
of this Court to interfere and set matters fight. The case
before us is one such instance-, where we are called upon to
do so.
The Labour Court has misled itself on the law land we set
aside its order. The workmans will be reinstated with back
wages. However the management will be free, if it has
sufficient material and if so advised, to proceed against
the workman for misconducts or on other ,grounds valid in
law.
The appeal is, accordingly, allowed with costs.
P.B.R. Appeal allowed.
499