Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Miscellaneous Petition(crl.) 862 of 2001
Special Leave Petition (crl.) 223 of 2000
PETITIONER:
BIPIN SHANTILAL PANCHAL
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF GUJARAT AND ANR.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 22/02/2001
BENCH:
K.T. Thomas, R.P. Sethi & B.N. Agarwal.
JUDGMENT:
L...I...T.......T.......T.......T.......T.......T.......T..JJ U D G M E N T
THOMAS, J.
This is yet another opportunity to inform the trial
courts that despite the procedural trammels and vocational
constraints we have reached a stage when no effort shall be
spared to speed up trials in the criminal courts. It causes
anguish to us that in spite of the exhortations made by this
Court and a few High Courts, time and again, some of the
trial courts exhibit stark insensitivity to the need for
swift action, even in cases where the accused are
languishing in prisons for long years as under-trials only
on account of the slackness, if not inertia, in accelerating
the process during trial stage.
We shall narrate, in a brief manner, as to what happened
thus far in the present case though this seems to be one of
the rare cases in which an under-trial prisoner has been
facing a record time for reaching culmination of the trial
proceedings.
The genesis of the proceedings is interception of a
consignment at the Air Warehouse, Mumbai, which was meant
for export to Nairobi. The consignment, when opened, was
found containing a very huge quantity of Mandrex tablets
(Methaqualone). Respondent (Dr. Bipin S. Panchal) was
arrested on 8.11.1993 in connection with the aforesaid
seizure of narcotic or psychotropic substance. It led to
the unearthing of a further huge quantity of Mandrex tablets
which, added with the earlier interception, is quantified at
about 2000 Kgs. The Directorate of Revenue Intelligence,
Ahmedabad filed a complaint against certain persons
including respondent Bipin S. Panchal, for various offences
under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS)
Act. The said case is being tried before the court of
Additional City Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad.
Respondent was detained in prison as he was not bailed
out during the trial proceedings despite repeated motions
made by him. Once in 1994, when respondent approached for
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bail, this Court directed the trial court to expedite the
trial. Though the evidence taking started on 4.9.96, the
case is still lingering on as the trial persisted thereafter
for years. This is in spite of the permission accorded to
the trial court for holding proceedings inside the jail
where some of the accused are being interned, as per Section
268 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
For so many reasons the trial court could not proceed
fast, for which the respondent has also contributed
substantially. From the records available with us we have
perceived that the respondent moved the High Court of
Gujarat for bail on the ground that the court is not closing
the trial despite the direction for speeding up the steps.
However, the High Court dismissed the application for bail
as per a detailed order passed on 29.10.1999. That order
was challenged by the respondent before this Court by
seeking special leave to appeal.
The said special leave petition was disposed of on
31.3.2000 with the following order: As the Special Judge
who is trying the case has reported to us that he reasonably
expects to close the trial within six months, we dispose of
this special leave petition permitting the petitioner to
move for bail again in case the trial is not closed within
six months.
Even the aforesaid period of six months is over by now,
but the culmination of trial is still a far cry. It was in
the above background that the present application is made by
the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence praying for
modification of the order dated 31.3.2000 by extending the
period for closing of the trial for a further period of six
months.
We notice that the immediate impact of the order dated
31.3.2000 was a positive response as five witnesses were
examined on 3.4.2000 itself. But as the Additional Sessions
Judge (Shri A.R. Bhatt) expected his retirement two months
hence, he chose to remain in limbo in regard to this case
and hence no progress was made until 10.7.2000 when his
successor (Shri B.N. Jain) took up the matter. The
successor Judge appears to have determined to close the
trial within the time frame. He, therefore, decided to
follow the legislative mandate contained in Section 309 of
the Code and ordered day-to-day trial for which he made a
schedule also.
But the initial alacrity shown by the trial judge did
not last long as the swiftness of the trial was bridled on
account of trumpery reasons. The defence counsel questioned
the admissibility of certain documents and raised objections
with regard to the same. Though the trial court disallowed
the objections as per an order passed on 24.7.2000
(presumably after hearing both sides at length) the trial
judge adopted a very unwholesome procedure by stopping the
trial for a lengthy period, just to enable the defence to
take up that order before the High Court. Even though the
prosecution brought witnesses to be examined on 8.8.2000,
the trial judge hesitated to examine them, and extended the
stay granted by himself and did not choose to take the
evidence of those witnesses on the said date. However, the
defence failed to challenge the said order and hence the
trial proceedings were resuscitated on 16.8.2000.
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On that day the defence raised another objection
regarding admissibility of another document. The trial
judge heard elaborate arguments thereon and upheld the
objection and consequently refused to admit that particular
document. What the prosecution did at that stage was to
proceed to the High Court against the said order and in the
wake of that proceeding respondent filed an application on
9.11.2000, for enlarging him on bail on the strength of the
order passed by this Court on 31.3.2000 (extracted above).
We are compelled to say that the trial judge should have
shown more sensitivity by adopting all measures to
accelerate the trial procedure in order to reach its finish
within the time frame indicated by this Court in the order
dated 31.3.2000 since he knew very well that under his
orders an accused is continuing in jail as an under-trial
for a record period of more than seven years. Now, we feel
that the Additional Judge, whether the present incumbent or
his predecessor, was not serious in complying with the
directions issued by this Court, though the parties in the
case have also contributed their share in bypassing the said
direction.
As pointed out earlier, on different occasions the trial
judge has chosen to decide questions of admissibility of
documents or other items of evidence, as and when objections
thereto were raised and then detailed orders were passed
either upholding or overruling such objections. The worse
part is that after passing the orders the trial court waited
for days and weeks for the concerned parties to go before
the higher courts for the purpose of challenging such
interlocutory orders.
It is an archaic practice that during the evidence
collecting stage, whenever any objection is raised regarding
admissibility of any material in evidence the court does not
proceed further without passing order on such objection.
But the fall out of the above practice is this: Suppose the
trial court, in a case, upholds a particular objection and
excludes the material from being admitted in evidence and
then proceeds with the trial and disposes of the case
finally. If the appellate or revisional court, when the
same question is re-canvassed, could take a different view
on the admissibility of that material in such cases the
appellate court would be deprived of the benefit of that
evidence, because that was not put on record by the trial
court. In such a situation the higher court may have to
send the case back to the trial court for recording that
evidence and then to dispose of the case afresh. Why should
the trial prolong like that unnecessarily on account of
practices created by ourselves. Such practices, when
realised through the course of long period to be hindrances
which impede steady and swift progress of trial proceedings,
must be recast or re-moulded to give way for better
substitutes which would help acceleration of trial
proceedings.
When so recast, the practice which can be a better
substitute is this: Whenever an objection is raised during
evidence taking stage regarding the admissibility of any
material or item of oral evidence the trial court can make a
note of such objection and mark the objected document
tentatively as an exhibit in the case (or record the
objected part of the oral evidence) subject to such
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objections to be decided at the last stage in the final
judgment. If the court finds at the final stage that the
objection so raised is sustainable the judge or magistrate
can keep such evidence excluded from consideration. In our
view there is no illegality in adopting such a course.
(However, we make it clear that if the objection relates to
deficiency of stamp duty of a document the court has to
decide the objection before proceeding further. For all
other objections the procedure suggested above can be
followed.)
The above procedure, if followed, will have two
advantages. First is that the time in the trial court,
during evidence taking stage, would not be wasted on account
of raising such objections and the court can continue to
examine the witnesses. The witnesses need not wait for long
hours, if not days. Second is that the superior court, when
the same objection is re-canvassed and reconsidered in
appeal or revision against the final judgment of the trial
court, can determine the correctness of the view taken by
the trial court regarding that objection, without bothering
to remit the case to the trial court again for fresh
disposal. We may also point out that this measure would not
cause any prejudice to the parties to the litigation and
would not add to their misery or expenses.
We, therefore, make the above as a procedure to be
followed by the trial courts whenever an objection is raised
regarding the admissibility of any material or any item of
oral evidence.
Now, for disposal of the present application we may
state that there is no point in our granting further time to
the trial court to complete the trial. It is for the trial
court to complete it as early as possible. But we would not
do anything to deprive the accused in custody of his right
to move for bail on account of the delay thus far
occasioned. The bail application would be disposed of by
the court concerned on its own merits. With the above
observations we dispose of this application.
[ K.T. Thomas ]
[ R.P.Sethi ]
[ B.N. Agarwal ]
February 22, 2001.