THE ORIENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED vs. KAHLON @ JASMAIL SINGH KAHLON (DECEASED) THROUGH HIS LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE NARINDER KAHLON GOSAKAN

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.  4800  OF 2021 (arising out of SLP(C)No.2873 of 2021) 

JUDGMENT NAVIN SINHA, J. Leave granted. 2. A claim arising out of injuries caused in a motor accident that has reached its fruition more than 20 years later before this Court, which we find extremely distressing.  The original claimant and his wife, both did not survive the ordeal to see the fruits of the litigation which is now being pursued by their daughter.  Signature Not Verified  3. The facts of the case in a nutshell are that the original Digitally signed by Rajni Mukhi Date: 2021.08.16 16:32:21 IST Reason: claimant was severely injured in a motor accident on 02.05.1999. 1 He filed a claim for compensation under Section 166(1)(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). The Motor  Accidents   Claims  Tribunal  on  02.11.2006  awarded him a sum of Rs.1,00,000/­ only with 9% interest.  Dissatisfied, the original claimant preferred an appeal before the High Court. Unfortunately,   he   was   deceased   on   06.11.2015   during   the pendency of the appeal, not attributed to the injuries suffered in the   accident.       The   daughter   of   the   claimant,   who   was   an unmarried girl aged 21 years at the time of the accident, was substituted   in   the   appeal.     The   High   Court   substantially enhanced the compensation.  4. Shri H. Chandra Sekhar, learned counsel on behalf of the appellant, submits that the cause of action being personal to the injured abates on his death, which was not caused due to the accident.   The legal heir is entitled only to such compensation which forms part of the estate of the deceased.  Loss of salary, future prospects, pain and suffering along with attendant charges do not form part of the estate of the deceased.  The compensation could not have been fixed by application of multiplier as it was not   a   case   of   death   caused   or   occasioned   by   or   due   to   the 2 accident.     The amount awarded by the Tribunal would alone form part of the estate of the deceased.   Reliance in support of the submissions has been placed on two Full Bench decisions of the Karnataka High Court in   Kanamma vs. Deputy General Manager , ILR 1990 Karnataka 4300,  Uttam Kumar vs. Madhav ,   ILR 2002 Karnataka 1864,   and Another Umedchand Golcha vs. Dayaram and Others ,  2002(1) MPLJ 249,  Pravabati Gosh   2009(4) GLR 64. and another vs. Gautam Das and others , The respondent being a married daughter is not entitled to any claim for any other loss of estate of the deceased as she was not dependent on the deceased.  It is lastly submitted that the High rd Court   has   erred   in   not   deducting   1/3   of   the   compensation amount towards personal expenses by the deceased.  5. Shri   Nikhil   Goel,   learned   counsel   on   behalf   of   the respondent no.1, submits that no deduction towards personal expenses   can   be   made   as   the   deceased   actually   incurred expenses   during   his   lifetime.     The   deduction   is   to   be   made hypothetically only in a case where death has occurred, relying on  Raj Kumar vs. Ajay Kumar and another ,   2011(1) SCC 343. 3 The submission of Shri Goel is that it is only a claim for personal injuries that will abate with the death of the deceased.     The claims such as loss of income, medical expenses etc. will survive as part of the loss to the estate.   He relies upon  Surpal Singh Ladhubha   Gohil   vs.   Raliyatbahen   Mohanbhai   Savlia   and ,  2009(2) GLH 217 ,  Ors. Munni Devi and Others vs. New India Assurance   Co.   Ltd. ,   103(2003)   DLT   464,   Venkatesan   vs.  2014 ACJ 1621 and  Kasthuri , Maimuna Begum and others vs. Taju and   Others , 1989 MhLJ 352.  Shri Goel next submits that the   High   Court   has   committed   no   error   in   awarding   loss   of income along with future prospects with a multiplier of 11 relying on   Parmindar Singh vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. & Ors ., (2019) 7 SCC 217 and  Kajal vs. Jagdish Chand & Ors., (2020)   4   SCC   413.     The   injured   had   suffered   100   per   cent physical disability.   He was unable to pursue his life and career and had to leave his job and shift to his home town Punjab. Despite being a law graduate and professionally qualified with a Diploma   in   Labour   Laws,   he   was   unable   to   pursue   any independent   career   thereafter   because   of   complete   physical disability.  The compensation as enhanced by the High Court is, 4 therefore, not on account of personal injuries, but as loss of the estate of the deceased, and therefore, calls for no interference. 6. We have considered submissions on behalf of the parties. The original claimant was travelling with his wife and unmarried daughter when their vehicle was hit by a lorry driven rashly and negligently   on   02.05.1999.     The   claimant   was   taken   to   the Government Hospital, Trivandrum but the severity of the injuries required him to be shifted to the Apollo Hospital, Chennai the next day for professionalized management where he remained under treatment till 24.11.1999.  He suffered spinal shock, with cervical cord injury and quadriplegia with respiratory failure.  He was resuscitated and put on ventilator support for skull traction. His right ankle needed surgery.   He required further treatment for anterior decompression, disc excision and bone grafting.  His physical activity was by way of wheel chair mobilisation.   The disability   certificate   dated   16.06.2000   issued   to   him   by   the Government   Headquarter   Hospital,   Cuddalore   opined   100   per cent permanent motor system disability with operative scar on the   right­side   neck,   right   ankle,   healed   scar   on   the   left   side forehead   frontal   region   and   parietal   region   and   that   he   was 5 unable to lift all four limbs which were vested with sensory loss present in certain places classified as quadriplegic orthopedically. 7. The   claimant   was   a   law   graduate   with   a   Diploma   in Personal   Management and   Labour   Welfare from   the   Punjab University.   Because  of the  injuries, he  found  it difficult and inconvenient to continue with his job as Deputy General Manager and resigned pre­maturely on 30.09.2001 at the age of 53 years before his scheduled superannuation on 30.04.2006.  Unable to pursue his   life   and  career   with   the   burden  of  treatment  and family expenses in the changed circumstances in Cuddalore, he moved this Court in T.P.(C) No. 1043 of 2003 for transfer of the claim case filed by him in Cuddalore in the year 2000 which was allowed   on   25.02.2004.     The   proceedings   were   shifted   to Gurdaspur in Punjab. 8. The Tribunal in a very cursory and cryptic manner awarded a compensation of Rs.1,00,000/­ along with 9% interest.   The claimant then moved the High Court which has enhanced the compensation   to   Rs.37,81,234/­   by   taking   into   account   his 6 annual salary with future prospect applying the multiplier of 11 including pain and suffering, attendant’s charges.  9. The Act is a beneficial and welfare legislation. Section 166(1) (a) of the Act provides for a statutory claim for compensation arising out of an accident by the person who has sustained the injury.  Under Clause (b), compensation is payable to the owner of the property.  In case of death, the legal representatives of the deceased can pursue the claim.   Property, under the Act, will have a much wider connotation than the conventional definition. If the legal heirs can pursue claims in case of death, we see no reason why the legal representatives cannot pursue claims for loss of property akin to estate of the injured if he is deceased subsequently for reasons other than attributable to the accident or injuries under Clause 1(c) of Section 166.  Such a claim would be completely distinct from personal injuries to the claimant and which may not be the cause of death.  Such claims of personal injuries would undoubtedly abate with the death of the injured. What would the loss of estate mean and what items would be covered by it are issues which has to engage our attention.  The appellant   has   a   statutory   obligation   to   pay   compensation   in 7 motor accident claim cases.     This obligation cannot be evaded behind the defence that it was available only for personal injuries and abates on his death irrespective of the loss caused to the estate of the deceased because of the injuries.  10. In     (supra),   giving   a   broad   liberal Umed   Chand interpretation   to   the   provisions   of   the   Act   so   that   legal representatives do not suffer injustice, it was observed that the claim for personal injuries will not survive on death of the injured unrelated   to   the   accident   but   the   legal   representatives   could pursue the claim for enhancement of the claim for loss of the estate which  would  include  expenditure  on  medical  expenses, travelling, attendant, diet, doctor’s fee and reasonable monthly annual accretion to the estate for a certain period.  It is trite that the income which a person derives compositely forms part of the expenditure   on  himself,  his   family  and  the   savings  go  to  the estate.  The unforeseen expenses as aforesaid naturally have to be met from the estate causing pecuniary loss to the estate. 8 11. In  Maimuna Begum  (supra) the defence under Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 on the old English Common Law maxim “ ” was rejected actio personalis moritur cum persona opining that it would be unjust to non­suit the heirs on that ground. 12. In     (supra), the injured claimant preferred an Venkatesan appeal dissatisfied, but was deceased during the pendency of the appeal.  Compensation came to be awarded under the Act for loss of   estate   keeping   in   mind   the   nature   of   the   injuries,   the treatment, the expenditure incurred and loss of income. 13. In   (supra), Justice K.S. Radhakrishnan, C.J. Surpal Singh (as he then was),  observed  that the   Act  was  a  social  welfare legislation providing for compensation by award to people who sustain bodily injuries or get killed.  The grant of compensation had to be expeditious as procedural technicalities could not be allowed to defeat the just purpose of the act.   The Courts in construing social welfare legislations had to adopt a beneficial rule   of   construction   which   fulfils   the   policy   of   the   legislation favorable to those in whose interest the Act has been passed. 9 Judicial   discipline   demanded   that   the   words   of   a   remedial statutes be construed so far as they reasonably admit so as to secure that relief contemplated by the statute and it shall not be denied to the class intended to be relieved.  Rejecting the maxim of “ actio personalis moritur cum persona ” on the premise that it was an injury done to the person and the claim abated with his demise it was observed: “11. The question as to whether injury was personal or otherwise is of no significance so far as the wrong doer is concerned and he is obliged to make good the loss sustained by the injured.  Legal heirs and legal   representatives   would   have   also   suffered considerable   mental   pain   and   agony   due   to   the accident caused to their kith and kin.  Possibly they might have looked after their dear ones in different circumstances,   which   cannot   be   measurable   in monetary terms.  We are therefore in full agreement with the view expressed by the learned Single Judge of   this   Court   in   Gujarat   State   Road   Transport Corporation’s case (supra) that even after death of the injured, the claim petition does not abate and right   to   sue   survives   to   his   heirs   and   legal representatives.” 14. This   view   has   subsequently   been   followed   in   a   decision authored by brother Justice M.R. Shah J., (as he then was) in Madhuben Maheshbhai Patel vs. Joseph Francis Mewan and Others , 2015 (2) GLH 499,  holding as follows: 10 “12….Considering   the   aforesaid   decision   of   the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Surpal Singh   Ladhubha   Gohil   (supra);   decisions   of   the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Jenabai Widow of Abdul Karim Musa (supra) and in the   case   of   Amrishkumar   Vinodbhai   (supra);   and aforesaid two decisions of the learned Single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court, we are of the opinion that maxim “actio personalis moritur cum persona” on which Section 306 of the Indian Evidence Act ( sic Indian   Succession   Act)   is   based   cannot   have   an applicability   in   all   actions   even   in   an   case   of personal   injuries   where   damages   flows   from   the head   or   under   the   head   of   loss   to   the   estate. Therefore,   even   after   the   death   of   the   injured claimant, claim petition does not abate and right to sue survive to his heirs and legal representatives in so   far   as   loss   to   the   estate   is   concerned,   which would  include  personal expenses  incurred  on the treatment   and   other   claim   related   to   loss   to   the estate.  Under the circumstances, the issue referred to   the   Division   Bench   is   answered   accordingly. Consequently,   it   is   held   that   no   error   has   been committed by the learned Tribunal in permitting the heirs to be brought on record of the claim petition and permitting the heirs of the injured claimant who died subsequently to proceed further with the claim petition.     However,   the   claim   petition   and   even appeal   for   enhancement   would   be   confine   to   the claim   for   the   loss   to   the   estate   as   observed hereinabove.” 15.  Similar view has been taken by the Punjab & Haryana High Court in   AIR 1985 P&H 2 and the Joti Ram vs. Chamanlal,   Madras High Court in   Thailammai vs. A.V. Mallayya Pillai, 1991 ACJ 185 (Mad). 11 16.  The view taken in   ( supra) and   Kanamma   Uttam Kumar (supra)   that   the   claim   would   abate   is   based   on   a   narrow interpretation of the Act which does not commend to us.   The reasoning of the Gujarat High Court is more in consonance with aim, purpose and spirit of the Act and furthers its real intent and purpose which we therefore approve. 17. The   injuries   suffered   by   the   deceased   in   the   accident required prolonged hospitalization for six months. The extent of disability suffered was assessed on 16.06.2000 as 100%.   The extent of disability, pursuant to physiotherapy was reassessed as 75% on 08.08.2002.  In the interregnum, the injured resigned his job on 30.09.2001 at the age of 53 years as he found movement difficult and inconvenient without an attendant as distinct from complete immobility.   The injured was possessing professional qualifications in labour laws and Industrial relations along with a Diploma in Personnel Management.  He may have had to suffer some handicap in also practicing before the labour court, but cannot be held to have suffered 100% physical disability as his capacity   for   rendering   advisory   and   other   work   coupled   with 12 movement on a wheel chair with the aid of an attendant could still facilitate a reduced earning capacity.  It cannot be held that the injured was completely left with no source of livelihood except to deplete his estate. In assessing, what has been described as a ‘Just   Compensation’   under   the   Act,   all   factors   including possibilities have to be kept in mind. 18.   The Tribunal, on technicalities rejected his claim for salary, medical   expenses   and   percentage   of   disability   and   granted   a measly compensation of Rupees one lakh only by a cryptic order. We are, therefore, of the opinion that while the claim for personal injuries may not have survived after the death of the injured unrelated to the accident or injuries, during the pendency of the appeal, but the claims for loss of estate caused was available to and could be pursued by the legal representatives of the deceased in the appeal. 19.  In  (supra) compensation on the basis of Parminder Singh     complete   loss   of   income,   the   percentage   of   disability,   future prospects were granted applying the relevant multiplier.  Again, in   Kajal   (supra)   the   injured   was   assessed   as   100   per   cent 13 disabled, considering all of which compensation was awarded on the notional future prospects along with relevant multiplier.  The loss of income to the injured in the facts of the present case has to be assessed at 75%.  In view of    (supra) there shall Raj Kumar be no deduction towards personal expenses.   20. We see no reason to deviate from the consistent judicial view taken by more than one High Court that loss of estate would include   expenditure   on   medicines,   treatment,   diet,   attendant, Doctor’s fee, etc. including income and future prospects which would have caused reasonable accretion to the estate but for the sudden expenditure which had to be met from and depleted the estate of the injured, subsequently deceased.  21. However,   the   compensation   under   the   head   pain   and suffering being personal injuries is held to be unsustainable and is disallowed.  The High Court has not awarded anything towards medical expenses despite hospitalisation for six months being an admitted   fact.       We   therefore   award   a   sum   of   Rs.1,00,000/­ towards   medical   expenses.   Hence,   the   reassessed   total compensation would be Rs.28,42,175/­, calculated hereunder:

14

22. The appellant is therefore directed to pay to respondent no.1 within a period of four weeks Rs.28,42,175/­ along with interest @ 9% p.a. from the date of filing of the claim petition, till its realisation.   23. The appeal is partly allowed to the extent indicated above. …………...................J. [NAVIN SINHA] …………...................J. [R. SUBHASH REDDY] NEW DELHI AUGUST 16, 2021. 15