Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 3064 of 2000
PETITIONER:
Prayag Upnivesh Awas Evam Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd.
RESPONDENT:
Allahabad Vikas Pradhikaran & Anr.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 16/04/2003
BENCH:
K.G. Balakrishnan & P. Venkatarama Reddi.
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, J.
An extent of 2 bigha, 5 biswa and 8 dhur of land falling in Village Civil
Station in the city of Allahabad was acquired under the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, "the Act"), for establishing a commercial
district centre at the instance of the Allahabad Development Authority (ADA).
Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was published on 13.1.1987 and
Declaration under Section 6(1) was made on 6.2.1987. Emergency provision
under Section 17 of the Act was invoked and the award was published on
25.5.1987. The land in question was government land which had been given
on lease to Shiv Narain Chaudhary, Laxman Narain Chaudhary and others.
The period of lease had expired in 1960 and it was not renewed. The award was
passed on 25.5.1987 and the compensation was fixed at Rs.9,80,565.06.
As both the Government and the lease holders claimed the compensation,
the Special Land Acquisition Officer (SLAO) referred this dispute to the Civil
Court on 12.10.1987 under Section 30 of the Act. The Reference was
registered as Reference Case No. 124 of 1987 and the matter was pending
before the 11th Addl. District Judge, Allahabad. While the matter was so
pending, the Addl. District Judge, Allahabad, sent a communication on
11.8.1992 to the SLAO stating that on perusal of the case file, an application
filed under Section 18 of the Act by the appellant herein, namely, Prayag
Upnivesh Awas Evam Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. (Appellant-Samiti), was
found to be on the file and that no mention had been made regarding that
application in the letter of Reference. A clarification, therefore, was sought by
the Addl. District Judge. Pursuant to this communication, the SLAO sent the
reply stating that such an application was also attached and due to an error, the
same was not mentioned in the letter dated 12.10.1987. After the receipt of
this letter, the 11th Addl. District Judge impleaded the appellant-Samiti and
proceeded in the matter as if there was a proper Reference under Section 18 of
the Act. It was held by the Addl. District Judge that for the land acquired by the
Government, the market value shall be Rs.1,400/- per square yard. Seventy
five per cent of the compensation was directed to be paid to the appellant-Samiti
and the balance twenty five per cent was directed to be paid to the State
Government.
The award passed by the Addl. District Judge was challenged by the
sponsoring authority, viz., Allahabad Development Authority (ADA) as well as
the State. ADA urged before the High Court that there was no proper
Reference under Section 18 of the Act for enhancement of the compensation and
that the Addl. District Judge had no jurisdiction to grant enhancement of
compensation. It was submitted that the appellant-Samiti did not participate in
the acquisition proceedings and therefore, they were not entitled to file Reference
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application under Section 18 of the Act. The High Court accepted the
contentions raised by the ADA and the State and held that there was no proper
reference under Section 18 of the Act and enhancement of compensation
ordered by the reference court was set aside. However, the finding on Issue
No. 2 that the Samiti will be entitled to get seventy five per cent of the
compensation amount and the balance twenty five per cent shall be given to the
State, was affirmed. The judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court is
challenged before us.
We heard the appellant’s counsel and counsel for the respondents.
The counsel for the appellant-Samiti submitted before us that the SLAO, by his
subsequent letter, clarified that an error had been committed in not mentioning
about the application submitted by the appellant-Samiti in the Reference letter,
although such application itself had been sent along with the Reference file by
the SLAO to the Additional District Judge. Learned counsel submitted that there
was proper Reference under Section 18 of the Act and, therefore, the award
passed by the Civil Court was proper and valid and was not liable to be
quashed by the High Court. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other
hand, submitted that there was no proper Reference under Section 18 and as
there was no such Reference, the Addl. District Judge lacked jurisdiction and,
therefore, the award passed by the learned Addl. District Judge is non est and
has rightly been set aside by the High Court.
The short question that arises for consideration is whether the SLAO
had made a reference under Section 18 of the Act? Admittedly, the original
reference was only under Section 30 of the Act, for apportionment as there
was a dispute as to who should get the compensation.
In the Reference letter sent by the SLAO on 12.10.1987, nothing has been
stated regarding the claim for enhancement of compensation put in by any of
the parties. It is also pertinent to note that in the reference letter, the
appellant-Samiti is not shown as a party. The first claimant is one, Shiv
Narain Lal Chaudhary and there are six other claimants. The Reference letter of
the SLAO clearly shows that the appellant-Samiti was not a party to such
Reference. It is surprising as to how the learned Addl. District Judge could seek
a clarification on the basis of an application which was found on the file and if
such an application was made by any party, naturally there would have been a
Reference under Section 18 of the Act and it would have been specifically
mentioned in the Reference letter. It is equally surprising that even though the
appellant was not a party to the reference case and was allegedly not having
knowledge of the proceedings, how and at whose instance the clarification was
sought by the Addl. District Judge. It is also pertinent to note that the
clarification issued by the SLAO subsequent to the letter from the Addl. District
Judge, cannot be construed as Reference under Section 18 of the Act. The
letter from SLAO reads as follows :
"This is with reference to your letter dated 11.8.1992 whereby you
have enquired as to whether in the reference forwarded on
12.10.1987 entitled as State Government vs. Shiv Narayan
Chaudhary and Ors., the reference of Prayag Upnivesh Sahkari
Samiti, under Section 30/18 was also made? In this connection it is
submitted that in the file of the office, the reference of Prayag
Upnivesh Sahkari Samiti Ltd., is also attached. Probably, due to
error in the previous reference letter dated 12.10.1987 the same
was not mentioned."
The letter quoted above by itself is not sufficient to make it as a Reference
purported to have been made under Section 18 of the Act. The learned Addl.
District Judge clearly erred in assuming that there was a Reference under
Section 18 of the Act. The subsequent impleadment of the Samiti as a party to
the Reference, which was pending under Section 30 of the Act, and the
conversion of the same also as a Reference under Section 18, were illegal and
has rightly been quashed by the High Court.
It is well established that the reference court gets jurisdiction only if the
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matter is referred to it under Section 18 or 30 of the Act by the Land
Acquisition Officer and that civil court has got the jurisdiction and authority only
to decide the objections referred to it. The reference court cannot widen the
scope of its jurisdiction or decide matters which are not referred to it. This
question was considered by various judicial authorities and one of the earliest
decisions reported on this point is Pramatha Nath Mullick Bahadur vs.
Secy of State AIR 1930 PC 64. This was a case where the claimant sought
a Reference under Section 18 of the Act. In the application filed by the
claimant, he raised objection only regarding the valuation of the land. The
claimant did not dispute the measurements of the land given in the award.
Before the reference court, the claimant raised objection regarding the
measurements of the land and sought for fresh measurements. This was
refused and the claimant applied to the High Court for revision of this order, but
without success. Again, in the appeal, the claimant raised the same objection
regarding measurements and the High Court rejected it. The Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council held thus :
"Their Lordships have no doubt that the jurisdiction of the Courts
under this Act is a special one and is strictly limited by the terms of
these sections. It only arises when a specific objection has been
taken to the Collector’s award, and it is confined to a consideration
of that objection. Once therefore it is ascertained that the only
objection taken is to the amount of compensation, that alone is the
"matter" referred, and the Court has no power to determine or
consider anything beyond it."
In another case, namely, Mohammed Hasnuddin vs. State of
Maharashtra (1979) 2 SCC 572, this Court observed :
"Every tribunal of limited jurisdiction is not only entitled but
bound to determine whether the matter in which it is asked to
exercise its jurisdiction comes within the limits of its special
jurisdiction and whether the jurisdiction of such tribunal is
dependent on the existence of certain facts or circumstances. Its
obvious duty is to see that these facts and circumstances exist to
invest it with jurisdiction, and where a tribunal derives its
jurisdiction from the statute that creates it and that statute also
defines the conditions under which the tribunal can function, it goes
without saying that before that tribunal assumes jurisdiction in a
matter, it must be satisfied that the conditions requisite for its
acquiring seisin of that matter have in fact arisen. As observed by
the Privy Council in Nusserwanjee Pestonjee v. Meer
Mynoodeen Khan wherever jurisdiction is given to a court by an
Act of Parliament and such jurisdiction is only given upon certain
specified terms contained in that Act, it is a universal principle that
these terms must be complied with, in order to create and raise the
jurisdiction for if they be not complied with the jurisdiction does not
arise."
In K. Kankarathanamma & Ors. vs. State of Andhra Pradesh &
Ors. (1964) 6 SCR 294, the Land Acquisition Officer made a reference under
Section 30 for the apportionment of the compensation amount amongst the
various claimants. Six of the appellants did not accept the award of the Land
Acquisition Officer and made application to him for referring the matter for
determination by the court, but no reference was made by him pursuant to this
application. When the matter came up before the court, it proceeded on the
footing that the reference made to it was not merely limited to the
apportionment of compensation but also with respect to the amount of
compensation. No objection, however, was raised by the State before the
reference court regarding the absence of reference. When the matter came up
before the High Court, the Govt. Pleader raised this objection. Though the High
Court allowed the plea to be raised before it, but ultimately it negatived the plea.
The appellants contended before the High Court that pursuant to the failure of
the State to raise the plea before the Subordinate Judge as to the absence of a
reference, the State must be deemed to have waived the point. Rejecting this
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contention, this Court held :
"..the matter goes to the court only upon a reference made by
the Collector. It is only after such a reference is made that the
court is empowered to determine the objections made by a claimant
to the award. Section 21 restricts the scope of the proceedings
before the court to consideration of the contentions of the persons
affected by the objection. These provisions thus leave no doubt
that the jurisdiction of the court arises solely on the basis of a
reference made to it. No doubt, the Land Acquisition Officer has
made a reference under s. 30 of the Land Acquisition Act but that
reference was only in regard to the apportionment of the
compensation amongst the various claimants. Such a reference
would certainly not invest the court with the jurisdiction to consider
a matter not directly connected with it. This is really not a mere
technicality for as pointed out by the Privy Council in
Nusserwanjee Pestonjee & Ors. V. Meer Mynoodeen Khan
Wullud Meer Sudroodeen Khan Bahadoor wherever jurisdiction
is given by a statute and such jurisdiction is only given upon certain
specified terms contained therein it is a universal principle that
those terms should be complied with, in order to create and raise
the jurisdiction, and if they are not complied with, the jurisdiction
does not arise. This was, therefore, a case of lack of inherent
jurisdiction and the failure of the State to object to the proceedings
before the court on the ground of an absence of reference in so far
as the determination of compensation was concerned cannot
amount to waiver or acquiescence. Indeed, when there is an
absence of inherent jurisdiction, the defect cannot be waived nor
can be cured by acquiescence."
In a recent decision of this Court in Ajjam Linganna vs. Land
Acquisition Officer (2002) 9 SCC 426, it was held that the Reference court
has no power to convert the Reference under Section 30 into one under
Section 18 of the Act at the instance of those who did not apply for reference
earlier.
In the instant case, there was no Reference by the SLAO under Section
18 of the Act and the appellant-Samiti was not before the SLAO. Even the
application allegedly filed on 12.10.1987 has rightly been characterized as
suspicious as no mention has been made by the SLAO in the Reference letter
dated 12.10.1987. In the absence of a proper Reference, the Additional District
Judge had no jurisdiction to decide the question of enhancement of
compensation. When such an objection was not referred to the court, there was
complete lack of jurisdiction. In our view, the decision of the High Court is
correct and requires no interference. The appeal is without merits and is
accordingly dismissed with costs.