Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
2024 INSC 1019
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2024
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.2122 of 2020)
DIGAMBAR AND ANOTHER …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
AND ANOTHER …RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
B.R. GAVAI, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The present appeal challenges the final judgment and
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order dated 23 January 2020 passed in Criminal Application
859 of 2019, vide which the learned Division Bench of the High
Court of Judicature at Bombay at Aurangabad dismissed the
application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
1
Procedure, 1973 for quashing and setting aside the First
2 th
Information Report No. 339 of 2018 dated 6 November 2018
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
DEEPAK SINGH
Date: 2024.12.20
15:04:15 IST
Reason:
1
“CrPC” hereinafter
2
“FIR” hereinafter
1
registered with Shivaji Nagar Police Station, Latur for offences
punishable under Sections 498-A, 312, 313 and 34 of the
3
Indian Penal Code, 1860 filed against the husband of the
complainant-Madhav Suryawanshi and the present
appellants-Digambar Suryawanshi (Appellant No. 1) and
Kashibai Suryawanshi (Appellant No. 2) (Parents-in-law of the
complainant)
3. Shorn of details, the facts leading up to the present
appeal are as under:
3.1. As per the FIR, the complainant and Madhav
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Suryawanshi (Son of the appellants) were married on 26
March 2006. Two daughters were born out of the wedlock.
After the birth of the second daughter in 2011, the
complainant’s husband and the appellants demanded a son
from her. They berated her and insulted her and inflicted
physical and mental cruelty, stating that she was giving birth
to only daughters. Due to the ill-treatment, she began residing
separately from the month of February 2018. It was further
alleged that the appellants used to instigate their son
(Husband of the complainant) against the complainant. He
3
“IPC” hereinafter
2
would beat her citing the reason that she was not giving birth
to a male child.
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3.2. It is further alleged in the FIR that, on 28 November
2016, the appellants along with the complainant’s husband
visited her in Latur. The appellants asked the complainant to
eat a meal prepared by them, which she refused to consume
initially. However, they coerced her to eat it despite her
protests. On the next day, she had stomach pain in the
morning, and she started bleeding. This led to her baby being
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aborted in her womb. On 5 December 2016, she visited the
doctor along with her sisters and it was discovered that a piece
of the foetus is still in her womb, and she was treated for the
same. Based on these facts, alleging about the forced abortion
and physical and mental cruelty, the complaint was made.
3.3. The appellants along with their son filed a criminal
application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. praying for
quashing and setting aside of the FIR No. 339 of 2018 before
the High Court.
3.4. During its pendency, the Family Court at Latur vide order
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dated 20 May 2019 granted a decree of Divorce by mutual
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consent and dissolved the marriage between the complainant
and the son of the appellants.
3.5. The High Court, vide impugned judgment and final order
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dated 23 January 2020 dismissed the application filed under
Section 482 of Cr.P.C. for quashing of the FIR No. 339 of 2018.
3.6. Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeal was filed.
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Notice was issued by this Court vide order dated 2 June
2020. During the pendency of the matter, the chargesheet
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came to be filed on 8 February 2021.
4. We have heard Shri Shirish K. Deshpande, learned
counsel for the appellants, Shri Samrat Krishnarao Shinde,
learned counsel for Respondent No.1-State of Maharashtra
and Smt. Prachiti Deshpande for Respondent No. 2-
Complainant.
5. Shri Deshpande submits that the appellants before this
Court have no active role to play. They have merely been roped
into the complaint as they are the parents-in-law of the
complainant.
6. It was further submitted that, if such a serious offence
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was committed by the appellants on 28 November 2016, it
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should have been mentioned in the notice of Divorce sent by
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the complainant on 15 May 2018 as it is alleged in the FIR,
that the son of the appellants had also allegedly played a role
in that incident. There is not even a whisper of this incident in
this notice. The complaint was filed after the notice of Divorce,
and it was merely filed to mount the pressure on the
appellants and their son. This clearly shows that the
complaint is concocted, and it was filed as an afterthought
only with an intent to take revenge on the appellants.
7. Shri Deshpande further submitted that even if it is
believed that the complainant allegedly found a piece of foetus
in her womb after she was examined by the doctor, it does not
automatically mean that some poisonous substance was given
by the appellants to her as there is not an iota of evidence to
that effect.
8. It was further submitted that since the appellants and
their son did not succumb to the pressure applied through the
complaint and did not favourably respond to the notice of
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Divorce, another FIR was registered on 25 February 2019
against the son of the appellants for offences punishable
under Sections 307, 336 and 427 of the IPC alleging that the
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son of the appellants had tried to kill her on the road in broad
daylight.
9. It was further submitted that these pressure tactics
compelled the son of the appellants to cooperate with the
complainant and the Divorce for mutual consent was granted
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on 20 May 2019 by the Family Court at Latur. It was further
submitted by Shri Deshpande, that after a bare reading of the
allegations levelled in the FIR, they seem to be absurd and are
inherently improbable. There is no circumstance where a
conclusion can be reached that there is sufficient material to
proceed against the appellants.
10. Lastly, it was submitted that the contents of the
chargesheet clearly reveal that the appellants herein had no
role to play in the miscarriage suffered by the complainant.
The Doctor’s statement reproduced in the chargesheet clearly
states that the complainant had visited the hospital due to
severe abdominal pain and bleeding. The doctor clearly stated
that it was possible that the foetus became inanimate due to
the abortion pills in the woman’s diet and that seems to be the
reason for the excessive bleeding. No opinion was given as to
when the pills were ingested and in what form were they
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ingested, and hence, no role of the appellants herein could be
established.
11. Per contra, Shri Samrat Krishnarao Shinde, learned
counsel for Respondent No.1-State of Maharashtra submitted
that the allegations levelled in the FIR prima facie disclose the
commission of offences under Section 498-A, 312, 313 and 34
of the IPC. The complainant was consistently harassed after
the birth of the second daughter as the appellants and their
son wanted a male child and therefore mental and physical
cruelty was inflicted upon the complainant.
12. It was further submitted by Shri Shinde that the
appellants herein instigated their son against the complainant
and played a major role in the harassment and the cruelty
inflicted against the complainant. The appellants herein also
played a role in the miscarriage suffered by the complainant.
13. Shri Shinde further submitted that the reliability and the
truthfulness of the allegations cannot be examined at this
stage. He submits that the High Court has rightly held that, it
cannot be presumed that the complainant must have made
false allegations to obtain divorce from the appellants’ son. All
of these points must be examined by the competent Trial Court
7
when the trial is being conducted. He therefore submits, that
no grounds for interference with the impugned order passed
by the High Court are made out.
14.
Smt. Prachiti Deshpande, learned counsel for
Respondent No.2-Complainant has supported the contentions
raised by the learned counsel for Respondent No.1.
15. At the outset, it is relevant to mention that the son of the
appellants, i.e. the former husband of the complainant was
also a petitioner in the proceedings before the High Court,
which were filed for quashing. He had also filed a separate
Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 3298 of 2020 against the same
which had been tagged with the present appeal. However, the
son of the appellants herein expired and therefore his appeal
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was disposed of as abated vide order dated 10 December
2024.
16. In the present case, the allegations raised by the
complainant in the FIR will have to be examined to find out
whether the allegations, when taken at their face value, would
constitute any offence or make out a case against the
appellants under Sections 498-A, 312, 313 and 34 of the IPC.
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17. Firstly, the allegations under Section 498-A of the IPC
must be examined. The said provision reads as under:
“498A. Husband or relative of husband of a
woman subjecting her to cruelty.- Whoever, being
the husband or the relative of the husband of a
woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be
punished with imprisonment for a term which may
extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation .—For the purposes of this section,
"cruelty” means—
(a) any willful conduct which is of such a nature as
is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to
cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health
(whether mental or physical) of the woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman where such
harassment is with a view to coercing her or any
person related to her to meet any unlawful demand
for any property or valuable security or is on account
of failure by her or any person related to her to meet
such demand.”
18. The ingredients for an offence to be made out under
Section 498-A of IPC require that there has to be cruelty
inflicted against the victim which either drives her to commit
suicide or cause grave injury to herself or lead to such conduct
that would cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health.
The second part of this Section refers to harassment with a
view to satisfy an unlawful demand for any property or
valuable security raised by the husband or his relatives. In the
9
present case, no allegations which would fulfil the requirement
of the second part are found.
19. A perusal of the FIR shows that the allegations made by
the complainant are that in the year 2015, the appellants
inflicted mental and physical cruelty upon her as she could
not give birth to a male child. Such allegations made by the
complainant appear to be vague as no specific instances of
harassment are mentioned. No specific role or allegation is
levelled on either of the appellants and no specific incident of
physical or mental cruelty has been mentioned. A mere
omnibus statement has been made that the physical and
mental cruelty was afflicted because the complainant could
not provide a male child. Furthermore, it is merely mentioned
that the appellants would instigate the husband to harass the
complainant, but again, no specific or precise instances are
mentioned as to how the appellants instigated their son and
what acts were committed by him as a direct result of such
instigation.
20. It would be appropriate to refer to a recent decision of
this Court in Criminal Appeal 5199 of 2024 titled as Dara
Lakshmi Narayana and Others vs. State of Telangana
10
4
and Another . This court dealt with the ingredients of Section
498-A and whether the same are attracted through vague
allegations raised by the complainant (wife). It was observed
that:
“ 17. The issue for consideration is whether, given the
facts and circumstances of the case and after
examining the FIR, the High Court was correct in
refusing to quash the ongoing criminal proceedings
against the appellants arising out of FIR No. 82 of
2022 dated 01.02.2022 under Section 498A of the
IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Act.
18. A bare perusal of the FIR shows that the
allegations made by respondent No.2 are vague and
omnibus. Other than claiming that appellant No.1
harassed her and that appellant Nos.2 to 6 instigated
him to do so, respondent No.2 has not provided any
specific details or described any particular instance
of harassment. She has also not mentioned the time,
date, place, or manner in which the alleged
harassment occurred. Therefore, the FIR lacks
concrete and precise allegations.
19. Further, the record reveals that respondent No.2
on 03.10.2021 left the matrimonial house leading
appellant No.1 to file a police complaint on
05.10.2021. When the police officials traced her,
respondent No.2 addressed a letter dated 11.11.2021
to the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Thirupathur
Sub Division requesting to close the complaint made
by appellant No.1. In the said letter, respondent No.2
admitted that she left her matrimonial house after
quarrelling with appellant No.1 as she was talking to
a person by name Govindan over the phone for the
past ten days continuously. She further admitted
that appellant No.1 was taking good care of her. She
also stated that she will not engage in such actions
in future. Despite that, in 2021 itself, respondent
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2024 SCC OnLine SC 3682 : 2024 INSC 953
11
No.2 once again left the matrimonial house leaving
appellant No.1 and also her minor children.
20. Losing hope in the marriage, appellant No.1
issued a legal notice to respondent No.1 seeking
divorce by mutual consent on 13.12.2021. Instead of
responding to the said legal notice issued by
appellant No.1, respondent No.2 lodged the present
FIR 82 of 2022 on 01.02.2022 registered with
Neredmet Police Station, Rachakonda under Section
498A of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry
Act.
21. Given the facts of this case and in view of the
timing and context of the FIR, we find that
respondent No.2 left the matrimonial house on
03.10.2021 after quarrelling with appellant No.1 with
respect to her interactions with a third person in
their marriage. Later she came back to her
matrimonial house assuring to have a cordial
relationship with appellant No.1. However, she again
left the matrimonial house. When appellant No.1
issued a legal notice seeking divorce on 13.12.2021,
the present FIR came to be lodged on 01.02.2022 by
respondent No.2. Therefore, we are of the opinion
that the FIR filed by respondent No. 2 is not a
genuine complaint rather it is a retaliatory measure
intended to settle scores with appellant No. 1 and his
family members.
22. Learned counsel for respondent No.1 State
contended that a prima facie case was made out
against the appellants for harassing respondent No.2
and demanding dowry from her. However, we observe
that the allegations made by respondent No.2 in the
FIR seem to be motivated by a desire for retribution
rather than a legitimate grievance. Further, the
allegations attributed against the appellants herein
are vague and omnibus.
23. Respondent No.2 has not contested the present
case either before the High Court or this Court.
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that respondent No. 2
has not only deserted appellant No. 1 but has also
abandoned her two children as well, who are now in
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the care and custody of appellant No.1. The counsel
for the appellants has specifically submitted that
respondent No.2 has shown no inclination to re-
establish any relationship with her children.
…….
25. A mere reference to the names of family members
in a criminal case arising out of a matrimonial
dispute, without specific allegations indicating their
active involvement should be nipped in the bud. It is
a well-recognised fact, borne out of judicial
experience, that there is often a tendency to implicate
all the members of the husband’s family when
domestic disputes arise out of a matrimonial discord.
Such generalised and sweeping accusations
unsupported by concrete evidence or particularised
allegations cannot form the basis for criminal
prosecution. Courts must exercise caution in such
cases to prevent misuse of legal provisions and the
legal process and avoid unnecessary harassment of
innocent family members. In the present case,
appellant Nos.2 to 6, who are the members of the
family of appellant No.1 have been living in different
cities and have not resided in the matrimonial house
of appellant No.1 and respondent No.2 herein.
Hence, they cannot be dragged into criminal
prosecution and the same would be an abuse of the
process of the law in the absence of specific
allegations made against each of them.”
21. The facts in the said case are of similar nature when
compared to the present case. It was held by this Court that
vague allegations of cruelty were levelled by the complainant
therein (wife) and the relatives of the husband (including the
parents-in-law) were dragged into the crime without any
reason. In paragraphs 18 and 21, it was held that the contents
13
of the FIR were vague and omnibus, that the FIR lacked
precise allegations, and it was lodged after the legal notice for
Divorce was sent by the complainant therein. It was therefore
concluded that the FIR came to be lodged as a retaliatory
measure intended to settle score with the husband and his
relatives.
22. In another recent judgment of this Court titled
Jayedeepsinh Pravinsinh Chavda and Others v. State of
5
Gujarat , the guilt of the appellant therein under Section 498-
A of IPC was maintained, however, the ingredients of 498-A of
IPC were discussed. It was observed thus:
“ 11. From the above understanding of the provision,
it is evident that, ‘cruelty’ simpliciter is not enough to
constitute the offence, rather it must be done either
with the intention to cause grave injury or to drive
her to commit suicide or with intention to coercing
her or her relatives to meet unlawful demands.”
23. Hence, it was clear that ‘cruelty’ is not enough to
constitute the offence. It must be done with the intention to
cause grave injury or drive the victim to commit suicide or
inflict grave injury to herself. In the present case, the
allegations levelled in the FIR do not reveal the existence of
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2024 SCC OnLine SC 3679 : 2024 INSC 960
14
any such allegations. The only allegation that referred to an
injury being inflicted against the complainant is a vague
statement that the son of the appellants herein used to beat
her, but there is no specific allegation of any such injury being
caused by the appellants herein.
24. In the present case, in the latter half of the FIR, it is
alleged that the complainant was given poisonous food by the
appellants herein and was coerced into consuming the same.
This led to the miscarriage and therefore the offences under
Sections 312 and 313 of IPC were attracted. Sections 312 and
313 of the IPC read as under:
“ 312. Causing miscarriage.- Whoever voluntarily
causes a woman with child to miscarry, shall, if such
miscarriage be not caused in good faith for the
purpose of saving the life of the woman, be punished
with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with
both; and, if the woman be quick with child, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for
a term which may extend to seven years, and shall
also be liable to fine.
Explanation .—A woman who causes herself to
miscarry, is within the meaning of this section.”
313. Causing miscarriage without woman's
consent.- Whoever commits the offence defined in
the last preceding section without the consent of the
woman, whether the woman is quick with child or
not, shall be punished with 349[imprisonment for
life], or with imprisonment of either description for a
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term which may extend to ten years, and shall also
be liable to fine.”
25. From a perusal of the provisions, it is clear that the
ingredients necessary for the offence under Section 312 of the
IPC is that the miscarriage must be voluntarily caused and
must not be caused in good faith for the purpose of saving the
life of the woman. Section 313 of the IPC states that the offence
is attracted if the offence under Section 312 of the IPC is done
without the consent of the woman.
26. The presence of the ingredients of the offences under
Sections 312 and 313 of the IPC may be further examined
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through the perusal of the chargesheet dated 8 February
2021. The statement given by the Doctor who treated the
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complainant after the alleged incident on 28 November 2016
is found in the chargesheet. Same is reproduced hereinbelow:
“ The complainant in this case, Pushpa Madhav
Suryavanshi, was came to our hospital on 05-12-
2016 at 02.30 pm in the OPD for treatment of a
complaint of abdominal pain and bleeding. I would
have questioned the woman after enrolling in the
OPD; she told me that, she was diagnosed with
pregnancy when her urine was tested 7 days before
coming to the hospital. But she told me that the next
day after I was examined by kit, she told me that the
abortion pills must have been in my stomach. Having
told me that, I examined her and did sonography.
While doing this sonography, I noticed that she had
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a seven-week-old lifeless fetus in her womb and was
bleeding. Also, the blood in her body was very low.
There was a great deal of abdominal pain as the
lifeless fetus in the womb. So I admitted her for
further treatment at five o’clock that evening. I then
injected her with sleep and surgically removed the
lifeless fetus by suction and evacuation. And then I
discharged her after further treatment and the next
day with a sonography to make sure the fetus was
completely gone and sent her home.
Due to the abortion pill was given to the woman
and her fetus became lifeless and because of the
previous two cesareans, the abortion was not
completed at home. Her excessive bleeding had
reduced the amount of blood in her body. Later she
came to my hospital for treatment as she was
suffering from severe abdominal pain and bleeding.
While she was admitted in our hospital, she was
accompanied by Sandhya Rathod. She was signed
our documents.
However, Pushpa Madhav Suryavanshi was in
my hospital 05-12-2016 when she was seven weeks
pregnant and she was bleeding and having
abdominal pain. Her sonography showed that her
fetus become lifeless as abortion pill had ben inserted
into her abdomen. I have treated her with suction
and evacuation.”
27. Through the perusal of the statement of the doctor, it is
revealed that the complainant herself stated that the
pregnancy was revealed to her when she tested it herself using
a pregnancy testing kit and this was stated to be seven days
before her visit to the hospital, i.e. on the day of the alleged
incident. It is mentioned in the FIR that the complainant used
to live in a separate house due to the alleged harassment by
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the appellants and their son. The appellants used to live in a
village far from Latur. However, no reason is given in the FIR
as to why the appellants and their son had visited her house
in Latur on that day. Furthermore, there is not even a whisper
in the FIR about the complainant conveying the news of the
pregnancy to the appellants or their son. It is unusual that
when the allegations under Sections 312 and 313 of IPC are
levelled against the appellants, such an important fact
surrounding her pregnancy and its knowledge to the
appellants is not to be found in the FIR. It is categorically
mentioned in the FIR that the appellants brought the poisoned
food pre-made from their village and hence, it would mean that
they would need to have prior knowledge about the pregnancy
of the complainant. No such communication or intimation is
alleged by the complainant in the FIR that would even
remotely lead to the conclusion that the appellants were aware
about the pregnancy of the complainant.
28. This Court, in the case of State of Haryana and Others
6
v. Bhajan Lal and Others , after considering all the earlier
precedents, has laid down principles which the High Court
6
1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1990 INSC 363
18
must consider while exercising its jurisdiction under Section
482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of proceedings. It will be relevant to
refer to the following observations of the court in Bhajan Lal:
102.
“ In the backdrop of the interpretation of the
various relevant provisions of the Code under
Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated
by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the
exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226
or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code
which we have extracted and reproduced above, we
give the following categories of cases by way of
illustration wherein such power could be exercised
either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may
not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly
defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible
guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive
list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power
should be exercised:
(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even
if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety do not prima
facie constitute any offence or make out a
case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first
information report and other materials, if
any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose
a cognizable offence, justifying an
investigation by police officers under
Section 156(1) of the Code except under an
order of a Magistrate within the purview of
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations
made in the FIR or complaint and the
evidence collected in support of the same
do not disclose the commission of any
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offence and make out a case against the
accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but
constitute only a non-cognizable offence,
no investigation is permitted by a police
officer without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the
Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR
or complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no
prudent person can ever reach a just
conclusion that there is sufficient ground
for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar
engrafted in any of the provisions of the
Code or the Act concerned (under which a
criminal proceeding is instituted) to the
institution and continuance of the
proceedings and/or where there is a
specific provision in the Code or the Act
concerned, providing efficacious redress
for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is
manifestly attended with mala fides
and/or where the proceeding is
maliciously instituted with an ulterior
motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due
to private and personal grudge.”
29. It can thus be seen that this Court has held that when
the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint, even if they
are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do
not prima facie constitute a case against the accused, the High
20
Court would be justified in quashing the proceedings. Further,
it has been held that where the uncontroverted allegations in
the FIR and the evidence collected in support of the same do
not disclose any offence and make out a case against the
accused, the Court would be justified in quashing the
proceedings.
30. In the present case also, as discussed above, the facts
when taken at face value, do not reveal any specific instance
of cruelty committed by the appellants herein. In our view,
only stating that cruelty has been committed by the appellants
herein due to some reason, would not amount to the offence
under Section 498-A of IPC being attracted. The next
allegation regarding a specific incident relating to the
miscarriage being caused by the appellants herein has also
been discussed above. A bare perusal of the allegation and the
analysis of the same when compared with the statement of the
Doctor reveals that even if the allegations are accepted at the
face value, it would not prima facie make out a case against
the present appellants.
31. Furthermore, the complaint was lodged after the notice
of Divorce was given by the complainant, wherein, there was
21
not even a whisper of the allegation of the cruelty or the
miscarriage caused by the appellants. The alleged incident
took place in 2016, whereas the complaint was filed after the
notice of Divorce was given by the complainant, i.e. in 2018.
The latest alleged incident in the FIR is of the year 2016,
wherein the most serious allegations under Sections 312 and
313 of the IPC is raised. The explanation for the delay in filing
of the complaint given by the complainant is that she did not
want to spoil the marital relations. However, she has herself
stated that she began residing separately and had moved out
of the matrimonial house. Further, she had sent the notice of
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Divorce on 15 May 2018. This would certainly mean that she
believed that the marriage had broken down without there
being any hope of reconciliation. It is difficult to believe that
despite the complainant taking such drastic steps, she did not
file the present FIR for another six months after the notice of
Divorce was sent. Moreover, the notice of Divorce was
completely silent about the allegations raised in the FIR which
was subsequently filed. The notice of Divorce on the other
hand contained allegations relating to the demand of money
and jewellery from the complainant by the son of the
22
appellants. It also contained vague allegations of physical
assault inflicted by the son of the appellants. No allegation of
cruelty or the miscarriage allegedly caused by the appellants
was raised.
32. These facts lead us to conclude that the proceedings were
initiated with an ulterior motive of pressurizing the son of the
appellant herein to consent to the divorce according to the
terms of the complainant and the proceedings were used as a
weapon by the complainant in the personal discord between
the couple.
33. It would again, be apposite to refer to the case of Dara
Lakshmi Narayana (supra) wherein this Court has discussed
the objective of Section 498-A of IPC and has also raised its
concerns over the misuse of this Section in matrimonial
disputes. This Court observed thus:
“ 28. The inclusion of Section 498A of the IPC by way
of an amendment was intended to curb cruelty
inflicted on a woman by her husband and his family,
ensuring swift intervention by the State. However, in
recent years, as there have been a notable rise in
matrimonial disputes across the country,
accompanied by growing discord and tension within
the institution of marriage, consequently, there has
been a growing tendency to misuse provisions like
Section 498A of the IPC as a tool for unleashing
personal vendetta against the husband and his
23
family by a wife. Making vague and generalised
allegations during matrimonial conflicts, if not
scrutinized, will lead to the misuse of legal processes
and an encouragement for use of arm twisting tactics
by a wife and/or her family. Sometimes, recourse is
taken to invoke Section 498A of the IPC against the
husband and his family in order to seek compliance
with the unreasonable demands of a wife.
Consequently, this Court has, time and again,
cautioned against prosecuting the husband and his
family in the absence of a clear prima facie case
against them.
29. We are not, for a moment, stating that any
woman who has suffered cruelty in terms of what has
been contemplated under Section 498A of the IPC
should remain silent and forbear herself from making
a complaint or initiating any criminal proceeding.
That is not the intention of our aforesaid
observations but we should not encourage a case like
as in the present one, where as a counterblast to the
petition for dissolution of marriage sought by the first
appellant-husband of the second respondent herein,
a complaint under Section 498A of the IPC is lodged
by the latter. In fact, the insertion of the said
provision is meant mainly for the protection of a
woman who is subjected to cruelty in the
matrimonial home primarily due to an unlawful
demand for any property or valuable security in the
form of dowry. However, sometimes it is misused as
in the present case.”
34. We therefore hold that the continuance of the criminal
proceedings against the appellants would result in an abuse
of process of law.
35. In the present case, the High Court has held that the
allegations made by the complainant cannot be presumed to
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be false and whether they are believable or not will be
examined by the Trial Court. We hold that this was an
erroneous approach taken by the High Court as according to
Bhajanlal
the principles laid down in the case of (supra), the
allegations levelled in the complaint should at the very least
be given a prima facie consideration.
36. In the result, we find that, this was a fit case wherein the
High Court should have exercised its inherent powers under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings.
37. We are therefore inclined to allow the present appeal.
38. We accordingly pass the following order:
(i) The appeal is allowed;
rd
(ii) The impugned judgment and order dated 23 January
2020 passed by the High Court of Judicature at
Bombay at Aurangabad in Criminal Application No.
859 of 2019 is quashed and set aside; and
(iii) The criminal proceedings against the appellants in FIR
No. 339 of 2018 and Final Report No. 10 of 2021 on
the file of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Latur and all
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subsequent proceedings arising therefrom are
quashed and set aside.
39. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
..............................J.
(B.R. GAVAI)
..............................J.
(K. V. VISWANATHAN)
NEW DELHI;
DECEMBER 20, 2024.
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