The Union of India , Ministry of law and justice , Department of law affairs vs. MaheshKumar G Garodia

2026:BHC-OS:4296-DB
Digitally signed
by BALAJI
GOVINDRAO
PANCHAL
Date:
2026.02.14
11:18:35

+0530
BALAJI
GOVINDRAO
PANCHAL
WP-5362-24 & 471-21.docx
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
Panchal
WRIT PETITION NO.5362 OF 2024
Maheshkumar Gordhandas Garodia .. Petitioner
Vs.
The State of Maharashtra & Ors. .. Respondents
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION (L) NO.31719 OF 2025
IN
WRIT PETITION NO.5362 OF 2024
The Union of India,
Ministry of Law and Justice,
Department of Law Affairs .. Applicant
In the matter between :
Maheshkumar G. Garodia .. Petitioner
Vs.
The State of Maharashtra & Ors. .. Respondents
WRIT PETITION NO.471 OF 2021
Maheshkumar G. Garodia .. Petitioner
Vs.
The State of Maharashtra & Ors. .. Respondents
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO.408 OF 2021
IN
WRIT PETITION NO.471 OF 2021
Mumbai Metropolitan Region
Development Authority .. Applicant
In the matter between :
Maheshkumar G. Garodia .. Petitioner
Vs.
The State of Maharashtra & Ors. .. Respondents
...
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Mr. Aspi Chinoy, Senior Advocate with Mr. Aditya Bapat,
Mr. Shehzad A. K. Najam-es-sani i/b. Maneksha & Sethna,
Advocates for the Petitioner in WP/5362/2024 and
WP/471/2021.
Dr. Milind Sathe, Advocate General with Ms. Jyoti Chavan,
Additional Government Pleader and Mr. Himanshu Takke,
AGP for Respondent Nos. 1 & 2-State.
Dr. Milind Sathe, Advocate General with Mr. Saket Mone,
Mr. Subit Chakrabarti, Mr. Raghav Taneja & Ms. Aashka
Vora i/b. Vidhi Partners, Advocates for Respondent No. 3-
MMRDA.
Mr. Anil C. Singh, Additional Solicitor General with Mr. R. V.
Govilkar, Senior Advocate, Mr. Rui Rodrigues, Mr. Aditya
Thakkar, Mr. D. P. Singh, Mr. Adarsh Vyas, Mr. Gauraj Shah,
Mr. Krish Kant, Mr. Rajdatt Nagre & Mr. Ranjeet Kumar,
Advocates for Respondent Nos. 5 to 7-UoI.
CORAM : SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR, CJ &
GAUTAM A. ANKHAD, J.
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Reserved on : 10 December 2025
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Pronounced on : 13 February 2026
JUDGMENT
Per, S hree Chandrashekhar, CJ :-
In Writ Petition No.5362 of 2024, the petitioner seeks to
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challenge the order dated 17 April 2023 passed by the Collector,
Mumbai Suburban District who is an officer appointed by the State
of Maharashtra to be in charge of the revenue administration of
the Mumbai Suburban District. The petitioner challenges the order
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dated 17 April 2023 as arbitrary, illegal and capricious and a
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replica of the order dated 1 October 2020 which has been
challenged by him in Writ Petition No. 471 of 2021. The petitioner
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seeks to draw strength from the interim order dated 16 December
2020 passed in Writ Petition No. 471 of 2021 to contend that the
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order dated 17 April 2023 is contrary to law and passed in brazen
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defiance of the said interim order of this Court.
2. The petitioner, namely, Maheshkumar G. Garodia, aged
about 78 years and engaged in business, states that the Secretary
of State for India in Council granted a lease through an Indenture
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dated 16 February 1922 in favor of Nanabhoy Hormusji
Bhiwandiwala for a period of 99 years commencing from
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15 October 1917. The lease so granted and contained in the
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Indenture dated 16 February 1922 comprised of 251 acres and 21
gunthas of land within the limits of village Kanjur in the South
Salsette Taluka of Bombay which are covered under Survey Nos.
13, 14, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 as also the Khoti Marsh land of
village of Kanjur; called Arthur Salt Works. Similarly, an Indenture
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dated 16 February 1922 was executed between the Secretary of
State for India in Council and Nanabhoy Hormusji Bhiwandiwala
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for a period of 99 years commencing from 15 October 1917
comprising 151 acres and 16 gunthas within village Kanjur in the
South Salsette Taluka of Bombay annexed as Plot No. III; known as
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Jenkins Salt Works. On 1 April 1930, an Indenture of Assignment
was made by the Administrators of the estate of late Jamasji
Framji Umrigar for the residual term of 99 years of piece and
parcel of land admeasuring superficial area of 97 acres and 24
gunthas situated within the limits of village Kanjur and Bhandup
in the South Salsette Taluka of Bombay. The present controversy
involves the aforementioned Arthur Salt Works and Jenkins Salt
Works which are referred to hereinafter as the subject properties.
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On 27 December 1947, the subject properties were transferred by
Nanabhoy Hormusji Bhiwandiwala to the purchasers, namely,
Shivchandrai Rampratap, Badri Narayan Rampratap, Shiv
Karanlal Harakchand and Hiralal Rampratap for valuable
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consideration for the balance portion of the lease period on the
terms and conditions as prescribed thereunder. The petitioner
states that he is a transferee in interest and lessee of the subject
properties. According to the petitioner, there were subsequent
transfers through sale, gift deeds, etc. and the records in the Salt
Department were corrected accordingly. He further states that the
possession of his predecessor in interest as a lessee in respect of
the subject properties has been accepted by the Department of
Legal Affairs, Ministry of Law and Justice and Corporate Affairs in
the Government of India and he is in use, occupation and
possession of the subject properties. The petitioner further states
that his possession over the subject properties is protected by the
interim injunction in Suit No.1173 of 2005 and the interim order
passed by this Court in WP No. 471 of 2021. He exercised his right
for renewal of the leases as per Clause VI (2) under the lease by
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writing two letters both dated 11 February 2016 for a further
period of 99 years and the matter is pending adjudication in civil
Court.
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3. On 4 March 2004, a notice was issued to Gordhandas
Shivchandrai Garodia, the predecessor in interest of the petitioner,
for termination of both the leases. The Deputy Salt Commissioner
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passed two separate orders on 2 November 2004 terminating the
leases which were challenged in Writ Petition No. 904 of 2004. The
High Court interfered in the matter and the writ petition was
allowed with a direction to the Deputy Salt Commissioner to give a
personal hearing to the lessee. In the meantime, the predecessor
in interest of the petitioner instituted Suit No. 1173 of 2005
seeking a declaration that the lease termination orders both dated
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2 November 2004 were illegal, null and void ab-initio .
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4. In the pending suit, the predecessor in interest of the
petitioner moved Notice of Motion No.1246 of 2005 for temporary
injunction restraining the defendants from taking any steps
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pursuant to the order dated 2 November 2004 by which the
leases for the subject properties were terminated. The plaintiff
pleaded that the subject properties were transferred from the
Ministry of Industries to the Ministry of Urban Development but
those properties were still in the control of the Salt Department.
This was the case setup on behalf of the plaintiffs that there was
no privity of contract between the lessor and the transferee of the
Salt Department, which did not proceed against the original lessee
and had no jurisdiction to issue the show-cause notice dated
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27 January 2004 and to terminate both leases by separate
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orders both dated 2 November 2004.
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5. By an order dated 26 April 2005 in Notice of Motion No.
1246 of 2005, this Court granted ad-interim relief in favor of the
predecessor in interest of the petitioner in terms of the prayer
clause (a). Later on, Suit No. 1173 of 2005 was transferred to the
Bombay City Civil Court at Greater Mumbai and renumbered as
Suit No. 6256 of 2005. The relevant portions of the order dated
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26 April 2005 passed in Notice of Motion No.1246 of 2005 are
extracted below:
“10. The learned advocate for plaintiffs has submitted that the
defendant No.1 has made the ground not mentioned in the show cause
notice for termination of the lease in respect of the suit lands, and
therefore, these orders are not sustainable in law.
11. I find considerable force in the submission made by the learned
advocate for plaintiffs. In the orders dated 2-11-2004, the Deputy Salt
Commissioner has made the alleged failure of plaintiffs to achieve the
production norms of 20 metric tons per acer as one of the grounds for
termination of the lease in respect of the suit lands. However, in the show
cause notice dated 27-1-2004, the said ground was not raised. Therefore,
plaintiffs had no opportunity to meet this ground.
12. The defendant No.1 has relied upon the inspection report, but the
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copy thereof was not supplied to plaintiffs. It, therefore, prima facie
appears that the defendant No. 1 has passed the orders dated 2-11-2004
in violation of the principles of natural justice. So, in view of the ratio laid
down in M/s. R. Bl. Shreeram Durga Prasad and another Vs. Settlement
Commission (IT & WT) and another (AIR 1989 SC 1038), Govindsingh
Ramsinghbhai Waghela Vs. G. Subbarao and others (1970 Gujarat Law
Reporter 897), the orders dated 2-11-2014 must be held to be bad in law.
13. The learned advocate for defendants has fervently submitted that
the lease deeds in question were executed prior to 1930, and therefore, in
view of the provisions of Sections 2 and 3 of the Government Grants Act, it
was not necessary for defendants to adopt due process of law and only
intention to repossess the suit lands was sufficient. Under these
circumstances, plaintiffs, who have no privity of contract with defendants
have no locus standi to challenge the orders dated 12-11-2004.
14. Admittedly, the lease deeds in respect of the suit lands were
executed prior to the enforcement of the Transfer of Property (Amendment)
Act, 1929. In Azim Ahmad Kazmi and others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh
and another [(2012) 7 Supreme Court Cases 278), the Hon'ble Supreme
Court has held that Government can dispossess the lessees in accordance
with the Government Grant Act, 1895 without resorting to the other
proceedings established by any other law. So also, in Eswari Bai Vs. The
Collector of Madras (AIR 1974 Madras 114), it has been held that a lessee
of the government land can be summarily evicted and resort to civil court
is not necessary. In Namdeo Lokman Lodhi Vs. Narmadabhai Keshoodoo
and others (AIR 1950 Bombay 123), it has been held that where a lease is
entered into prior to 1-4-1930, no notice for determination of a lease is
required.
15. From the aforesaid decisions, it is clear that for determination of a
lease in respect of the government lands, it is not necessary to take resort
to the due process of law and mere intention to repossess the land is
sufficient. However, in the case in land, defendants issued show cause
notice to plaintiffs as per the order dated 30-4-2004 in Writ Petition No.
904/2004 without challenging it, and therefore, they cannot be heard to
say that they were not required to give personal hearing to plaintiffs.
16. In N. M. Nayak Vs. Chhotalal Hariram and others (AIR 1968
Bombay 51), it has been held that an assignee of a lessee has privity of
contract between the assignee of a lessee estate, but there is no and
lessor. From the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case
of Raghuranı Rao and others Vs. Eric P. Mathias and others (AIR 2002
Supreme Court 797), it is clear that as there is no privity of contract
between lessor and the transferee, the lessor is necessary party for
determining the lessee.
17. Admittedly, plaintiffs are the assignees of the original lessee
named Nanabhoy Hirmusjee Bhiwandiwalla. As such, they have no
privity of contract with defendants. Defendants have not taken any action
against the original lessee named Nanabhoy Hirmusjee Bhiwandiwalla.
The defendant No. 1 has issued show cause notice dated 27-1-2004 and
passed the orders dated 2-11-2004 against plaintiffs with whom they
have no privity of contract. Thus, the orders dated 2-11-2004 terminating
the lease of the suit lands are prima facie infructuous.
18. From the record, it prima facie appears that plaintiffs are in
possession of the suit lands. Plaintiffs have raised substantial question of
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law and facts as regards the validity of the orders dated 2-11-2004,
which need to be decided on merit. Under these circumstances, it is
necessary to maintain status quo as to the suit lands. If a relief of
temporary injunction is not granted to plaintiffs, and they are
dispossessed by defendants on the dint of the orders dated 2-11-2004,
the suit would become infructuous.
19. In the case of Walawalkar Vs. Deputy Salt Commissioner (AIR 2006
Bombay 265), the Hon'ble Bombay Court in the similar set of facts was
pleased to grant a relief of temporary injunction to the plaintiff in that case
restraining defendants from acting upon the order terminating the lease. It
is true that defendants have preferred an appeal against the said order,
but the same is not stayed or set aside. So, I hold that in the present case,
plaintiffs are entitled to the relief of temporary injunction on the ground of
parity.
20. Plaintiffs have thus, made out prima facie case. The balance of
convenience lies in their favour. So, I hold that they are entitled to the
relief of temporary injunction as sought. Accordingly, I hold that the notice
of motion deserves to be allowed in terms of prayer clause (a). Hence, the
order:
ORDER
1. Notice of Motion No.1246 of 2005 is made absolute in terms of
prayer clause(a).
2. Costs shall be the costs in the cause.”
6. After the suit was transferred to the Bombay City Civil Court
and re-numbered as Suit No. 6256 of 2005, sixth respondent
moved a motion vide Notice of Motion No. 321 of 2005 for a
restraining order against the petitioner from dealing with or
disposing of the suit properties or transferring or alienating the
same to any third party, which was allowed by an order dated
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16 April 2016 and the plaintiff has been restrained from creating
any third party rights. The relevant portions of the order dated
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16 April 2016 passed in Notice of Motion No.321 of 2005 are
extracted below:
“7. From the affidavit filed in reply, it prima facie appears that
plaintiffs had negotiated with Shri Ghevarchand Babulal Nahar in respect
of the suit lands and entered into memorandum of understanding dated
26-12-2005 with him. They have accepted the cheque of Rs. 11,00,000/-
from him. They have however, contended that they did not encash the
said cheque and pursuant to the letter dated 13-8-2008, they had
submitted the consent deed with M/s. Shapoorji Pallonji and Co. Ltd. to
the State Government of Maharashtra to explore the possibility of the
Public-Private partnership project obtaining approvals of the Union
Government and the Government of Maharashtra, for affordable housing
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and to support them in such development, in the event the Government
decide to permit and facilitate the development. The report submitted by
Sub-Divisional Officer, Mumbai, Suburban goes to show that plaintiffs
have not created any third party interest in the suit lands. However, the
possibility that they would create third party interest therein cannot be
ruled out safely. In Notice of Motion No. 1246/2005, an order of temporary
injunction restraining defendants from taking action pursuant to the order
dated 12-11-2004 terminating the lease in respect of the suit lands has
been granted in favour of plaintiffs. So, the equity demands that plaintiffs
should also maintain status quo with regard to the suit lands by not
creating third party interest therein.
8. In the case of N. M. Nayak Vs. Chhotalal Hariram and others [AIR
1968 Bombay 51 (V 55 C. 11)], it has been held that an assignee of a
lessee has privity estate, but there is no privity of contract between the
assignee of a lessee and lessor. In the case in hand, plaintiffs are the
assignees of the original lessee named Nanabhoy Hirmusjee
Bhiwandiwalla. Considering the said fact, if plaintiffs, who have no privity
of contract with defendants succeed in creating third party interest in the
in the suit suit lands as apprehended by defendants, their right in lands
would be jeopardized. On the contrary, if they are restrained from creating
a third party interest in the suit lands, no prejudice or loss will be caused
to them.
9. In Notice of Motion No. 2441/2006 in Appeal No. 534/206, the
Hon'ble Bombay High Court in the similar set of facts was pleased to
direct the plaintiff in that suit not to create any third party interest in the
subject matter of the suit. So, I hold that in the case in hand also, in order
to avoid multiplicity of the proceedings and further complication in the
matter it is necessary to maintain status quo in respect of the suit lands,
more so what period of original lease is about to lapse.
10. For the reasons enumerated ut supra, I hold that the notice of
motion deserves to be allowed in terms of prayer clause (a). Accordingly, I
proceed to pass the following order:
ORDER
1. Notice of Motion No. 321 of 2015 is made absolute in terms of
prayer clause (a).
2. Costs shall be the costs in the cause.”
7. While the aforesaid interim injunction orders were subsisting,
the Collector, Mumbai Suburban District issued a direction vide
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order dated 1 October 2020 for handing over the possession of the
subject properties to the MMRDA for transfer to the Delhi Metro
Rail Corporation Ltd. (in short, DMRCL). The petitioner has laid a
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challenge to the order dated 1 October 2020 in Writ Petition
No.471 of 2021. He is seeking an ad-interim direction to the
MMRDA and Union of India to restore “ status-quo ante” in respect
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of the subject properties, to remove machinery etc. and restore
possession of the subject properties in its original condition to him.
The prayers in Writ Petition No.471 of 2021 are reproduced as
under:
“(a) that this Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue a Writ of Certiorari, or a
Writ in the nature of Certiorari, or any other appropriate Writ, Order or
direction, calling for the papers and proceedings leading to the passing of
the impugned order dated 1st October, 2020 and after going [Exhibit
&herefo into the legality, validity and propriety thereof, to quash and set
aside the same;
(b) that this Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue a Writ of Mandamus, or
a Writ in the nature of Mandamus, or any other appropriate Writ, Order or
direction, directing Respondent Nos.4 & 5 to restore status-quo ante in
respect of the said lands by removing itself, its equipment, machineries
and men and material from the said lands and restore the said lands to
the Petitioner in its original condition;
(c) that pending the hearing and final disposal of the writ petition:
(i) Respondent No.4 by itself, its servants and or agents and /
or subordinates be restrained by an order and injunction from
acting upon and/or taking any steps in furtherance of, and/or in
implementation of and/or pursuant to the impugned order dated
1st October 2020, or in any manner whatsoever dealing with the
said land;
(ii) Respondent No.4 by itself, its servants and/or agents
and/or subordinates be restrained by an order and injunction of
this Hon'ble Court from further encroaching upon or entering the
said lands or placing any material and equipment on the said
lands or any part thereof in any manner whatsoever;
(iii) Respondent No.4 by itself, its servants and/or agents
and/or subordinates be ordered and directed by a mandatory
order and injunction of this Hon'ble Court to forthwith remove all its
equipment, machineries and men and material from the said lands
and restore the complete possession thereof to the Petitioner;
(iv) the Respondent No.4 by itself, its servants and /to yah or
agents and / or subordinates be restrained by Man order and
injunction from performing all further activities on the said lands in
furtherance of the order dated 1st October 2020;
(d) for ad-interim relief in terms of prayer (c) above;
(e) for costs of the petition and orders thereon; and
(f) for such further and other reliefs, as this Hon’ble Court may deem
fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.”
8. The Union of India also challenged the order dated
st
1 October 2020 passed by the Collector, Mumbai Suburban
District by filing Writ Petition No.3931 of 2022. This writ petition
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has been disposed of on 30 August 2022 in the light of a
subsequent order passed by the Collector, Mumbai Suburban
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District whereunder earlier order dated 1 October 2020 was
withdrawn.
9. During pendency of the afore-mentioned writ petitions, the
Collector, Mumbai Suburban District has passed an order on
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17 April 2023 for transferring 15 hectares out of the subject
properties to the MMRDA and this order has been challenged by
the petitioner in Writ Petition No.5362 of 2024 with the following
prayers:
“(a) This Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue a writ of certiorari or a writ
in the nature of certiorari and/or any other appropriate writ, order and/or
direction, inter alia, calling for the records and proceedings before
Respondent No. 2 in respect of the impugned Order dated 17 April 2023,
[Ex. A hereto] and after considering the legality, validity and/or
constitutionality thereof, this Hon'ble Court be pleased to quash and set
aside the impugned Order as being illegal, ultra vires and/or
unconstitutional;
(b) This Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or a
writ in the nature of mandamus and/or any other appropriate writ, Order
and/or direction, inter alia directing Respondent No. 2 to withdraw the
impugned Order dated 17 April 2023 and prohibiting Respondent Nos. 1
to 4, and their employees, officers or agents from in any way
implementing, acting in furtherance of, exercising any powers under, or
pursuant to the impugned Order dated 17 April 2023;
(c) This Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or a
writ in the nature of mandamus and/or any other appropriate writ, Order
and/or direction, inter alia prohibiting Respondent Nos. 1 to 4, and their
employees, officers or agents from attempting to take possession of
trespassing on, or in any manner altering the status quo on the said lands
(defined in paragraph 7 to 9 hereinabove) including carrying out any
development or construction thereon and or from obstructing and
preventing the petitioner and his employees, agents, representatives,
workmen etc from entering the said lands or any part thereof.
(d) Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in
the nature of mandamus and/or any other appropriate writ, Order and/or
direction, to Respondent Nos.1, 3 and 4 to dismantle and remove the
temporary shelter constructed on the said land (defined in paragraph 7 to
9 hereinabove) and withdraw their security personnel from the said lands.
(defined in paragraph 7 to 9 hereinabove)
(e) Pending the hearing and final disposal of the present Petition, it is
just, convenient, necessary and in the interests of justice that this Hon'ble
Court be pleased to issue a temporary Order and injunction:
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(i) Staying the effect, implementation and operation of the
impugned Order dated 17 April 2023 [Ex. A hereto];
(ii) restraining Respondent Nos. 1 to 4, and their employees,
officers or agents from in any way implementing, acting in
furtherance of, or exercising any powers under, or pursuant to the
impugned Order dated 17 April 2023; and
(iii) restraining Respondent Nos. 1 to 4, and their employees,
officers or agents from attempting to take possession of, trespass
on, or in any manner alter the status quo on the said lands (defined
in paragraph 7 to 9 hereinabove).
(iv) direct Respondent Nos. 1, 3 and 4 to dismantle and remove
the temporary shelter constructed on the said land and withdraw
their security personnel from the said lands. (defined in paragraph
7 to 9 hereinabove)
(f) Ad interim reliefs in terms of prayer clause (d) above;
(g) For costs; and
(h) Such other reliefs as the Hon'ble Court may deem fit in the interests
of justice may kindly be granted.”
10. In its affidavit-in-reply, the MMRDA states that the Collector,
Mumbai Suburban Division granted advanced possession of 15
hectares of land under Survey 275, City Survey No.657A in village
Kanjur within Taluka Kurla for setting up the Metro Car Depot and
other ancillary works in Metro Line 6 stretched over Swami
Samarth Nagar to Vikhroli through Jogeshwari. The corridors of
the Metro Line includes the Metro Line-6 which is being
implemented as an important Urban Transport Project. The
MMRDA has been appointed as the Special Planning Authority vide
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Government Resolution dated 25 October 2016 under section
40(1)(c) of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966
for the said Project. The Project is at an advanced stage and
expenditure of Rs.2293.12 crores has already been incurred. The
civil works via duct has progressed to 87.60% and the civil works
for station were complete upto 77.30% as per the progress report
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issued by the DMRCL on 23 October 2025. It is stated that the
Project is time-sensitive and requires to be completed by
December, 2026.
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11. The MMRDA has laid a stress over the importance of Mumbai
Metro Line-6 and a need for its timely completion with the
following details:-
“Importance of Mumbai Metro Line-6:
9. Metro Line-6 forms an integral part of the entire Mumbai Metro
Railway Project which is aimed at reducing travel distance and time
thereby greatly reducing the acute problems of traffic congestion in
Mumbai Further, the Metro Railway shall provide a much-needed
alternative and an environment friendly public transportation which is
expected to greatly reduce the traffic congestion and improve the
environment in the city of Mumbai.
10. The aim and objective behind developing the Metro Line-6 is to
provide a supplementary system to an already existing, albeit
overburdened, Mumbai Local Trains. Setting up of the Metro Line is the
need of the hour to take off some burden from the Mumbai Local Trains
onto the Metro Line, as on an average 2500 people die annually due to
overcrowding of the local trains.
11. The proposed Metro Line-6 is founded on the principles of
public utility, sustainable development and eco-friendly transportation
system, aimed at benefiting the public and thus is not a private project
being executed, to generate profits.
Salient features of Metro Line-6 as studied by DMRCL are mentioned
herein below:

Thus, a total population of over 8 lakhs is expected to benefit by year
2031 by implementation of Metro Line-6.
Importance of Metro Car Depot and its timely completion:
12. The Metro Car Depot is a mandatory and essential facility for
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functioning, commissioning and operating of any metro line, it acts and
functions like a Heart in the Body and is also termed as the Nervous
system of the entire Metro Line, without a proper and a functioning
Metro Car Depot, the entire Metro Line-6 will be rendered handicapped.
13. As per the DPR as prepared by DMRCL, the following are the
operations that shall be conducted at the Metro Car Depot at a total
estimated cost of Rs. 547.54 Crores:
(i) Major overhauls of all the trains;
(ii) All minor schedules and repairs;
(iii) Lifting for replacement of heavy equipment and testing
thereafter;
(iv) Repair of heavy equipments
Thus, as evident, Metro Car Depot is mandatory for ensuring smooth
and seamless operation of Metro Line-6, it is further imperative that
the Metro Car Depot be constructed at the proposed location i.e. the
Subject Land situated at Eastern Expressway Highway at Kanjurmarg
Mumbai to ensure that Metro Car Depot is in close proximity to the
Metro Line-6, as in the event of the Metro Car Depot being shifted to a
far away location then the entire purpose of having a Metro Car Depot
will be rendered infructuous.
14. Considering the relevance and urgency of developing the Metro
Car Depot, MMRDA has already commenced the work on the Subject
Land of survey, soil investigation, barricading, peripheral roads etc, in
th
fact, MMRDA has vide Letter of Acceptance ("LOA") dated 12 March
2024 appointed M/s. Sam (India) Builtwell Private Limited as the Civil
Contractor for carrying out the civil works of the Metro Car Depot for a
project cost of Rs. 547,45,34,060/- (Rupees Five Hundred Forty-Seven
Crore Forty-Five Lakh Thirty Four Thousand and Sixty Only). MMRDA
th
has vide LOA dated 12 March 2014 appointed M/s. CEG-Korea
National Railway (JV) as the Consultant, specifically, for Metro Car
Depot for a project cost of Rs. Rs. 20,42,36,199/- (Rupees Twenty
Crores Forty-Two Lakhs Thirty Six Thousand One Hundred and Ninety
th
Nine Only). Copies of the LOA's dated 12 March 2024 are hereto
marked and annexed as Exhibit - J and K.
15. MMRDA has a duty to ensure that the Metro Car Depot is
completed within the prescribed time-frame, as any delay in execution
of the Metro Car Depot shall lead in delay in implementing the entire
Metro Line-6, which will cause a loss of approx. Rs. 2.5-3 Crores per
day to the public exchequer.
16. Further, as evident from the abovementioned, MMRDA has
already invested huge amount of monies in execution of Metro Line-6,
which will go futile in the event there is any stay, delay or disruption
in developing the Metro Car Depot on the Subject Land.
Current status of Metro Line - 6:
rd
17. DMRCL on 23 October 2025 issued a progress report to
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MMRDA inter alia informing the progress of Metro Line-6 as follows:

18. As mentioned hereinabove, MMRDA through DMRCL has
completed substantial amount of the work in respect of Metro Line-6
th
and has incurred the following expenditure up to 30 September
2025 :

rd
A copy of the progress report as issued by DMRCL dated 23 October
2025 along with Photographs are hereto marked and annexed as
Exhibit-L-1, L-2, L-3, L-4, L-5, L-6, L-7, L-8, L-9, L-10, L-11, L-12 and L-
13.
19. Needless to state that the said Project is a time sensitive
project, as the projected completion date is December 2026, and
involves heavy finances of the exchequer, as any unwarranted delay
in implementation of the said Project will cause grave monetary loss to
the exchequer.
Benefits of Metro Line-6:
20. As mentioned hereinabove, the entire Metro Rail System is
being implemented with the aim and objective of providing better
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connectivity and reduced time travel for the commutes, apart from this,
the following the benefits which the Metro Line-6 aims to provide to its
commuters:
(a) Integration with Existing Lines: Metro Line-6 will integrate with
other major transport lines, including Mumbai's suburban railway
network and other metro lines like Line 2A (Dahisar East to Andheri
West/DN Nagar) & 7 (Dahisar East to Andheri East). This integration
allows commuters to easily transfer between different modes of
transport, providing seamless connectivity across the city. Also
connects to Metro Line-4 (Wadala-Ghatkopar-Mulund-Thane-
Kasarwadavali) which is under construction.
b) Reduced Travel Times: The metro line will offer a faster and
more efficient mode of transportation compared to road travel.
Commuters traveling along Metro Line 6's route, such as from Swami
Samrath Nagar - Vikhroli EEH, can expect significantly reduced travel
times, especially during peak hours when road congestion is high.
(c) Reliable Service: Metro systems are known for their reliability
in terms of schedule adherence and frequency of services. Metro Line-6
will provide commuters with a reliable transport option, ensuring that
they can reach their destinations on time without worrying about
traffic delays or uncertainties.
(d) Access to Key Areas: Metro Line-6 will pass through or be in
close proximity to key areas, commercial centers, educational
institutions, and residential neighborhoods. This accessibility
enhances convenience for commuters, allowing them easy access to
important destinations without the hassle of multiple transfers or long
travel times.
(c) Improved Connectivity to Employment Hubs: Many commuters
travel to major employment hubs in Mumbai for work. Metro Line-6's
connectivity with other transport lines and its route through key areas
East-West connection in Mumbai suburban will make it easier for
workers to access these employment centers, promoting economic
activity and productivity.
(f) Environmental Benefits: By encouraging more people to use
public transport, Line 6 contributes to reducing individual vehicle
usage and associated emissions. This benefits both the environment
and public health by lowering pollution levels and congestion on roads.
(g) Enhanced Mobility for Residents: Line 6 not only benefits
commuters but also improves mobility for residents living along its
route. It provides them with a convenient and efficient mode of
transport for daily commuting, shopping, leisure activities, and other
purposes.
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12. Mr. Aspi Chinoy, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner
contended that the State of Maharashtra which has no right, title
or interest over the subject properties could not have taken forcible
possession over the subject properties which came to the petitioner
by virtue of the valid instruments of transfer. The learned senior
counsel heavily relied upon the decision in “ Maharaja Dharmander
1 th
Prasad Singh ” and the order dated 16 December 2020 in Writ
Petition No. 471 of 2021. It is submitted that this Court by an
st
interim order stayed the operation of the order dated 1 December
2020 and the DMRCL was restrained from carrying the ongoing
operations on the subject properties. However, the Collector,
th
Mumbai Suburban District passed the order dated 17 April 2023
in complete disregard to the said interim order. The learned senior
counsel emphasized that these writ petitions are maintainable
against the arbitrary and illegal actions of the respondents and, in
particular, the Collector, Mumbai Suburban District.
13. On the other hand, Mr. Anil Singh, the learned Additional
Solicitor General submitted that the petitioner has no subsisting
right or any interest whatsoever in the subject properties after
nd
termination of the lease deeds by the orders dated 2 November
2004 and therefore the prayers made in these writ petitions cannot
th
be granted. The lease deeds both dated 16 February 1922 were
terminated on the ground that the leasehold properties were not
utilized for the manufacture of salt and the petitioner has not even
stated in these writ petitions that he was utilizing the demised
premises for the said purpose. The learned Additional Solicitor
General emphasized that the petitioner who is not a lessee as on
date has no locus to maintain the present writ petitions. There has
1 State of U.P. & Ors. v. Maharaja Dharmandar Prasad Singh & Ors.: (1989) 2 SCC 505
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been a change in law and any claim or entitlement for renewal of
the leases does not survive in view of the Resolution dated
th
9 October 2013 whereunder the Ministry of Commerce and
Industry resolved that no renewal of lease shall be granted, and
any assignment of land for salt manufacture shall be by way of
fresh tender. The learned Additional Solicitor General submitted
that a Division Bench of this Court has held in “Jugalkishore R.
2
Joshi & Ors.” that every salt pan lands used for manufacturing of
the salt within the Mumbai city and suburbs as also within the
vicinity must strictly be allotted or leased in terms of the
th
Resolution dated 9 October 2013. It was submitted by the learned
Additional Solicitor General that the equitable and discretionary
writ jurisdiction may not be exercised in favor of a person who has
no subsisting right and it shall be in public interest that the public
asset is utilized for the larger public welfare. The learned
Additional Solicitor General further submitted that the petitioner
who made contradictory statements on oath and sought conflicting
reliefs in both the writ petitions must be held to have made false
affidavits on oath. He referred to an order passed in Writ Petition
3
No.3366 of 2017 titled “Rajiv Yashwant Bhale” and submitted that
the petitioner who has approached this Court with unclean hands
does not deserve any indulgence of this Court and the writ
petitions are liable to be dismissed.
14. Opposing these writ petitions, Dr. Milind Sathe, the learned
senior counsel for the MMRDA submitted that the ownership of the
subject properties has been resolved and the orders dated
st th
1 October 2020 and 17 April 2023 are no longer under challenge
Jugalkishore R. Joshi & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. : 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 2027
2
3 Rajiv Yashwant Bhale v. Principal Commissioner of Income Tax : [2018] 401 ITR 408
(Bom)
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by the Union of India. The petitioner has no subsisting interest in
the demised premises and he has no locus to challenge the orders
passed by the Collector. It is contended that the petitioner who is
seeking an order for restoration of his possession over the demised
premises in Writ Petition No.471 of 2021 cannot take U-turn and
claim that he is in possession of the demised premises. The prayer
seeking restoration of possession cannot be granted on the ground
th
of a breach of the order dated 26 April 2005 and, that, sections
20A(1) and 41(ha) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 constitute a kind
of bar to the relief sought by the petitioner in these writ petitions.
th
The observations made in the order dated 16 December 2020
were prima-facie opinion of the Court and such observations
th
cannot form the basis for challenging the order dated 17 April,
2023. Dr. Sathe submitted that the project of Metro Line-6 car
shed has been declared as an urgent and an important Urban
Transport Project and the allotment of 15 hectares of land is for
public purpose.
15. In the proceedings before this Court, there were claims made
by the Union of India based on certain documents and the State of
Maharashtra claimed that it is the owner and in actual physical
st
possession of the subject properties. The order dated 1 October
2020 passed by the Collector, Mumbai Suburban Division stands
withdrawn and, consequently, Writ Petition No.5983 of 2020 filed
by the Union of India has been disposed of. This is also a matter of
th
record that the order dated 11 November 2022 dismissing the
application vide Notice of Motion No.3788 of 2016 seeking
dismissal of the suit is under challenge in the pending Civil
Revision Application (L) No.23914 of 2023. The misunderstanding
between the Government of Maharashtra and Union of India has
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been resolved and a decision has been taken by the Union of India
to allot the lands to the Government of Maharashtra vide order
th
dated 17 March 2024. In view thereof, Writ Petition No.4769 of
th
2024 challenging the order dated 17 April 2023 has been
th
withdrawn by the Union of India on 5 May 2025. In the changed
scenario, a challenge to the jurisdiction of the Collector to pass the
th
order dated 17 April 2023 on a premise that a person who has no
right, title or interest over any immovable property cannot seek
eviction of the leaseholder or issue a direction for handing over
possession of the demised premises to the MMRDA shall not
survive and must fail.
16. The State of Maharashtra contended that the interest of the
petitioner, if any, has been protected under the order dated
th
17 April 2023. The said order imposed several conditions on the
MMRDA and there is a prohibition on transfer, sell, mortgage or
subletting of the land by the MMRDA, which shall abide by any
order passed by this Court in pending writ petitions and it shall be
responsible for compensation, if any determination comes in the
st
future. Under the Government Resolution dated 21 December
2017, the MMRDA has been empowered to acquire and utilize the
government and semi government lands for implementation of the
Mumbai Metro Rail Project. The MMRDA is a statutory body under
the Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Act, 1974. It was
way back in May 2023, that the MMRDA conceived a master plan
for Mumbai Metro for reducing traffic congestion and providing
more efficient mode for transportation to the public. The MMRDA
has taken a stand that it is not concerned with the title of the
subject properties and has obtained the subject properties and
taken possession thereof following the due process in law. In the
previous proceeding, the MMRDA committed itself through an
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interim application to give all benefits to the owner of the subject
properties if those properties are acquired by the MMRDA or on its
behalf. It is contended that the petitioner has no subsisting right
over the subject properties inasmuch as the leases have been
th
terminated and expired by efflux of time on 16 October 2016 and,
even putting on the highest pedestal, the petitioner can at best
claim compensation. In the present proceedings, an application
has again been filed by the MMRDA for accepting its undertaking
to the effect that all benefits shall be provided to the owner of the
subject properties on its acquisition. The Collector while
considering the request made by the MMRDA for allotment of the
subject properties for setting up a car-shed and casting yard for
the Metro Line (Metro car-shed) was conscious of the proceedings
between the parties and therefore imposed several conditions in
the orders for allotment of the subject properties in favor of the
MMRDA and its possession thereof. This is recorded by the writ
th
Court in paragraph no.8 of the order dated 16 December 2020
that the possession of the subject properties was delivered to the
th
MMRDA on 6 October 2020. This is also not disputed before this
Court that the possession of the subject properties was handed
over by the MMRDA to the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd.
17. In our opinion, these writ petitions which extensively refer to
different Indentures and Instrument of transfer necessarily require
this Court to trace and examine a right in the petitioner for a relief.
An exercise of this nature can be undertaken in a proceeding
before the Civil Court where the parties by leading evidence may
prove a fact and seek relief. The petitioner has pleaded that b y an
th
Indenture dated 27 December 1947 Khan Bahadur Nanabhoy
Harmusji Bhiwandiwala assigned his rights to Shivchandrai
Rampratap, Badrinarayan Rampratap, Shivkaranlal Harakchand
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and Hiralal Rampratap as tenants for a consideration of
Rs.2,51,000/-. Later on, Shivkaranlal Harakchand sold his shares
to Shri Bankatlal, Gopikishan, Shrinivas Gopikishan and Omkarlal
Bansilal; Shivchandrai Rampratap executed an instrument of gift
in favor of his wife Smt. Laxmidevi Shivchandrai Rampratap and;
Badrinarayan Rampratap gifted his share to Smt. Jethidevi
Harakchand Garodia, Smt. Banarasidevi Badrinarayan Garodia
and Smt. Ramadevi Badrinarayan Garodia. There were disputes in
the family which led to the filing of Suit No.1799 of 1980 wherein a
memorandum of the consent terms executed between Ramadevi
Garodia and the defendant nos.1 to 23 was filed. Under the
consent terms, the defendant nos.23 and 24 who were
beneficiaries of the Will of late Shivchand Rampratap Garodia gave
up their shares to Gordhandas Shivchandrai Garodia–defendant
nos.24 and Maheshkumar Gordhandas Garodia–defendant no.26.
The other defendants also gave up their shares, right, title and
interest or claim in the property in their favor. These persons are
not made parties in these writ petitions and there is no material on
record to suggest that the petitioner alone can claim any right
flowing from the Indentures and instruments which he has
narrated in these writ petitions.
th
18. Pertinently, the Indentures dated 19 February 1922
contained a recital that the said Indenture was executed in
consideration of “royalties, covenants and conditions” and the
consideration thereof to be paid by the lessee and upon the
conditions to be observed and performed by the lessee. Clause (1)
(d) of the deed provided that the lessee shall not assign or underlet
the lease or any part thereof or the rights and privileges granted
thereunder to any person without the prior written sanction of the
Deputy Commissioner of Salt Excise, Central Division. The lessee
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was permitted to use the demised premises only for the purpose of
manufacturing common and edible salt and related products in
accordance with the terms of the license. Under Clause (III)(b), the
lessee has to submit a programme of work for each year to the
Commissioner and to engage himself in the manufacture of
common and edible salt or the relatable product as per the
approved programme. Under Clause (V), the lessor can cancel the
lease notwithstanding its term of 99 years upon breach of the
condition of the license granted under the Bombay Salt Act, 1890.
The lessor has reserved its rights to re-enter upon any part of the
demised premises and take possession thereof after canceling the
lease. This is a covenant in the Indenture that the lessor, his
agents and servants will have every right of ingress and egress to
survey and examine the demised premise and every part thereof at
all time. Furthermore, the Indenture was made subject to the
observance and performance of covenants and conditions that (i)
the demised premises shall be used for the purposes of
manufacturing common edible salt and by-products only and (ii) to
manufacture salt on demised premises in accordance with the
terms of the license to be granted in that behalf. There were other
conditions such as (i) not to make excavation or remove any stone,
stone gravel, clay or earth from the demised premises except for
the purpose of erecting embarkments for protecting the demised
premise and other purposes associated with salt manufacturing,
(ii) not to assign or under let the lease or any part thereof or the
rights and privileges therein to any person without previous
consent in writing of the Deputy Commissioner of Salt and Excise,
Central Division and (iii) the manufacture the products subject to
the payment of royalty at such rates as government may fix from
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time to time.
19. Clause (VI)(2) provides that the lessee may renew the lease by
giving the lessor a written notice at least six months prior to the
expiry of the lease term and the lessor shall grant further lease of
demised premises for such term and upon such condition as may
be determined by the lessor. Evidently, the covenant under Clause
(VI) (2) shall operate only upon due performance and observance of
the stipulation under the lease deed. The notice given by the
petitioner to the lessor seeking extension of the lease term under
Clause (VI) (2) has been rejected and that order is under challenge
in the pending suit by way of amendment. In Suit No.1173 of 2005
which is still pending, the following reliefs are sought:
“(a) That this. Hon'ble Court be pleased to declare that the orders dated
2nd November, 2004 being Exhibit "Y" & "Z" terminating the Lease qua the
Plaintiffs is illegal, null and void ab-initio and for a declaration that
Agreement dated 16th February, 1922 is valid, subsisting and binding on
the Defendant.
[b] Pending the hearing and final disposal of the suit the Defendants or
any one from the office of the Defendants be restrained by and order of
injunction from taking any further steps pursuant to order dated 2nd
November 2004 issued by Defendant No.1 without due process of law.
[c] for ad-interim reliefs in terms of prayer clauses [a], [b] and [c]
above;
[d) for such further and other reliefs as the nature and circumstances
of the case may require.”
20. There is no specific prayer made or an order passed in the
suit or in any proceeding taken out by the petitioner before this
Court seeking stay of operation of the lease termination order
nd
dated 2 November 2004. The effect of absence of such an order in
favor of the petitioner is that the lease deeds stand terminated and
there is no subsisting right flowing to the petitioner. The petitioner
claims to be in possession of the subject properties after
nd
2 November 2004 by virtue of an ad-interim order passed by the
Court, that the defendant no.1 shall not take any further steps
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nd
pursuant to the order dated 2 November 2004 without due
process of law. A notice under section 113 of the Transfer of
th
Property Act was given to the lessee on 16 April 2016 and the
leases have lapsed by efflux of time.
21. There are marked distinctions between a proceeding in a civil
Court and before a writ Court. The writ Court is required to see
whether the fundamental facts and requirements in law are
fulfilled or not for issuing directions. The High Court cannot
overlook all technicalities and take a view disregarding the tangent
pleadings by the petitioner in Writ Petition Nos. 471 of 2021 and
5362 of 2024. These writ petitions seek such reliefs which are not
amenable to the writ jurisdiction and the stand taken by the
respondents to the enforceability of clause VI (2) cannot be
overlooked. Any claim for the enforcement of rights of the
th
petitioner through Indentures dated 16 February 1922 is not
permissible in writ jurisdiction. This is not a case where merely
some dispute has been raised by the respondents to project a legal
4
bar on maintainability of the writ petition. In “Sohan Lal” , the
Hon’ble Supreme Court held that where there is a serious dispute
on questions of fact and a dispute regarding right, title or interest
to the subject matter of dispute, a proceeding by way of writ
petition is not appropriate inasmuch as any decision by the writ
Court would amount to a decree declaring a party’s title. The High
Court acts upon the indisputed facts and the claim of the
aggrieved party is determined on the basis of the factual position
acknowledged by the respondent. In “ A. V. Venkateshwaran,
5
Collector of Customs, Bombay” the Hon’ble Supreme Court
Sohan Lal v. Union of India & Anr. 1957 : SCC OnLine SC 39
4
5 A. V. Venkateshwaran, Collector of Customs, Bombay v. Ramchandra Sobhram
Wadhwani and Anr. : 1961 AIR 1506
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observed that the exercise of writ jurisdiction shall depend on the
facts of each particular case. The powers under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India are extraordinary, plenary and without any
fetters. But such a power is exercised in a reasonable manner and
in the interest of justice. There is substance in the objections
raised by the respondents that the writ petition based on an
allegation of dispossession from the subject properties during
subsistence of the interim injunction is not maintainable. Even a
prayer seeking restoration of possession over the subject properties
cannot be entertained on the basis of the injunction order passed
in Notice of Motion No. 1246 of 2005. The dismissal of Chamber
Summons No.1462 of 2018 filed by the MMRDA seeking its
intervention in the suit for the purpose of obtaining an order of
temporary possession of 40H land for Metro Line IV and VI shall
not curtail its right to contest the matter on merits.
th
22. The observations in the order dated 16 December 2020 on
which the petitioner places heavy reliance are prima facie opinion
of the Court, that a very strong case for admission and grant of
interim relief was made out notwithstanding that a public project
would be held up. This interim order basically centers around the
careless approach of the executives in their approach. A reference
6
of the decision in “Bishan Das” was made in the context of the
Collector, Mumbai Suburban Division treating the subject
properties as the properties of the Government of Maharashtra and
allotting the said properties to the MMRDA without any notice to
the Union of India or to the petitioner. The conflicting stand taken
by the State of Maharashtra with reference to Civil Application
No.84 of 2016 wherein a request was made to the Court for a
6 Bishan Das & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors.: 1961 SCC OnLine SC 136
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permission to utilize the subject properties had also intrigued the
Court and caused considerable doubt as to ownership of the
subject properties. The relevant portions of the order dated
th
16 December 2020 in Writ Petition (L) No.3523 of 2020 (since
withdrawn by the Union of India) with connected Writ Petition
No.471 of 2021 are extracted below:
“27. Although, at the first blush, it could appear that the writ court has
been urged to decide a question of title in respect of an immovable
property, on an in-depth scrutiny, what we are left to examine is whether
the decision-making process leading to the impugned order of the Collector
dated October 1, 2020 suffers from any vice of illegality, irrationality or
procedural impropriety to attract judicial review. What is revealed from the
materials on record is dispossession of parties interested in a property not
by procedure known to law, but by an executive fiat. The Collector has
treated the subject land as the property of the GoM and allowed
possession thereof to be taken by the MMRDA by referring to certain
notifications/resolutions, without giving any opportunity either to the UoI
or to the petitioner in WP-III to respond to the prayer of MMRDA. In a
society where ‘Rule of Law’ has primacy, the minimum that we expect of a
responsible office as the Collector is to adopt a fair, reasonable and
impartial approach. That is unfortunately lacking in the present case.
Despite given an opportunity to proceed in accordance with law, he has
not availed it. We are, thus, constrained to hold that the impugned order is
in the teeth of the decision of the Supreme Court in Bishan Das & ors. Vs.
State of Punjab & ors., reported in AIR 1961 SC 1570. Although such
decision was rendered when ‘Right to Property’ was a Fundamental Right,
the dictum of the Constitution Bench still has relevance in view of ‘Right to
Property’ being recognized as a Constitutional right.
28. That apart, in the process of allowing the prayer of the MMRDA, the
Collector does not appear to have considered the evidence which was
relevant, material and germane for a decision on the prayer of the
MMRDA. This was obviously because the request of the MMRDA was
disposed of without putting the UoI and the petitioner in WP-III on notice.
The order and the two letters referred to in paragraph 11 supra do not
appear to have been placed before the Collector and, therefore, he too did
not have the occasion to consider the same. If indeed the same had been
placed before him, he ought to have referred to it. Non-consideration of
evidence that was relevant, material and germane is a serious flaw in the
decision-making process vitiating the impugned order and rendering it
perverse.
29. Next, the presentation of Civil Application No.84 of 2016 by the
State of Maharashtra has left us intrigued. Permission having been sought
for from the Court [obviously because the request of the Salt Department in
the UoI for correcting revenue records in terms of the order of the OSD
dated September 30, 1996 not having been granted referring to the interim
order passed in Bafna’s WP (letter dated April 16, 1999 of the Desk
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Officer, Revenue and Forests Department, page 2 of the compilation of Mr.
Singh)] and the Court being seized of such application, it stands to reason
that the GoM could not have on its own utilized the subject land for any
public purpose conceived by it. However, we are aghast to note that while
Civil Application No.84 of 2016 has been pending, the Collector on his own
and without waiting for the outcome of such application has passed the
impugned order and delivered possession to the MMRDA. Significantly,
the plan annexed to such application and the plan placed before us by Dr.
Sathe bear clear resemblance evincing that the site for the proposed Metro
car shed is one and the same, i.e., the subject land. We, thus, see no
reason as to how during its pendency the Collector could pass such an
order. Looking at the decision in Amrita Prithishwar Bhattacharjee (supra),
it seems to be clear that there has been a change in policy with change in
the ruling dispensation in the State. While changes can be effected
keeping in mind what the larger public interest warrants, extraneous
considerations ought not to outweigh all other considerations of propriety,
legality and fairness in administrative action. The decision-making
process leading to the impugned order does not pass the test of judicial
scrutiny on this count. We are conscious of the element of public interest
involved in setting up of the Metro car shed on the subject land; at the
same time, we cannot remain oblivious if a person is divested of its/his
right in property without the authority of law.
30. We also find an attempt on the part of the Collector to conveniently
not refer to the subsisting order of injunction in Suit No.6256 of 2005, yet,
imposing a condition (which we have extracted supra) suggesting that the
MMRDA would be bound by its decision. The ad-interim order of this
Court, which has since been extended till disposal of the notice of motion,
has been given a complete go-bye by the Collector. We do not wish to be
harsh at this stage because all the materials are yet to be placed before
us, but cannot desist from observing that the Collector’s action of passing
the impugned order in the manner he did does border on committing a
‘fraud on power’.
31. Further, the application made by the MMRDA on which the Collector
has passed the impugned order is yet not on record. We are left to guess
whether the MMRDA disclosed therein that it had sought to intervene in
Suit No.6256 of 2005 acknowledging that the subject land belongs to the
Salt Department, that it requires such land for its use, that such attempt
was unsuccessful and that it had agreed to transfer of the subject land by
the UoI on permanent basis. If not disclosed, we cannot but deprecate the
attempt of the MMRDA to steal a march over the UoI by withholding
relevant information. At this stage, it does not appear from the impugned
order of the Collector that the MMRDA’s application disclosed all events
and incidents of the past relating to its unsuccessful attempt to have
possession of the subject land. We need to examine this point too once the
pleadings are complete.
32. The decisions of the Supreme Court relied on by Mr. Kumbhakoni
reiterates the settled law that an admission is the best piece of evidence
but an admission can be explained by its maker. To what extent the
admissions in the present case can be explained for not being acted upon
is a question that could come up for consideration when the writ petitions
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are finally heard. At the moment, we cannot discard the admissions from
our consideration, far less turn a blind eye to the same, based on
consideration of such decisions.
33. The common contention of Mr. Kumbhakoni and Dr.Sathe that the
order dated September 30, 1996 of the OSD is of no effect has not
impressed us. An order does not bear a stamp of invalidity on its
forehead. It has to be declared void upon institution of proceedings in that
behalf. Till this date, the order of the OSD remains a public order, which
was publicly made and is effective till such time it is invalidated in
appropriate proceedings upon a challenge being laid at the instance of an
appropriate person. Also, it is settled law that a respondent in a writ
petition cannot attack its own order. If any authority is required, we may
usefully refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Assam Vs.
Raghav Rajagopalachari, reported in 1972 SLR 44 (paragraph 13).
34. We are also of the view that the order in Resident Association of
Chincholi Bunder Area (supra) relied on by Dr. Sathe cannot be of any
assistance for him since it cannot bind the UoI or the petitioner in WP-III,
without it being shown that they were parties to the proceedings before
the Supreme Court. The contents of the order does not show that the UoI
or the petitioner in WP-III was a party to the proceedings before the Court.
35. These are our prima facie observations, upon consideration of
materials placed and the events that have unfolded before us. Resting on
the same, we hold the view that a very strong case for admission of WP-II
and WP-III as well as for grant of interim relief has been set up,
notwithstanding that a public project would be held up in view of the
nature of relief that we propose to grant. However, the executive must take
the blame for it for being careless in its approach.
36. There shall be Rule as prayed for in WP-II and WP-III, returnable in
February, 2021. It is, however, made clear that the subject matter of WP-II
and WP-III being confined to the subject land and not any property with
which the respondent nos.4 to 8 in WP-I and WP-II are concerned, such
respondents shall stand discharged from the array of parties.
37. Reply affidavits be filed by the respective respondents by January
22, 2021; rejoinder affidavits thereto, if any, be filed by the respective
petitioners by January 29, 2021.
38. We are also of the view that the petitioners in WP-II and WP-III are
entitled to interim protection for the prima facie view and the reasons
discussed above. There shall be interim order in terms of prayer clauses
(h) and (i) of WP-II, reading as follows:
“(h) That pending the hearing and final disposal of the Petition,
this Hon’ble Court be pleased to stay the operation of the Order
dated 01.10.2020 passed by the Respondent No.10, Collector, MSD
to transfer the possession of 102 Acres (41.28 Ha) of land from
Survey No.275 pt. (CTS No. 657-A) of village Kanjur MSD to the
Respondent No.11, MMRDA and consequent transfer made to
Respondent No.12;
(i) That pending the hearing and final disposal of the Petition, this
Hon’ble Court may be pleased to pass a restraint order staying the
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ongoing operations being carried out by the Respondent No.12,
DMRCL on the site of the subject land;”
23. In “ Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh ”, a proposal for
construction of a multi story building on the demised property was
granted but the government in purported exercise of its powers
under Section 41 (1) of U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act,
1973 cancelled the permission. The observations by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in paragraph nos. 30 and 31 are made in the
context of an apprehension raised on behalf of the lessee and the
builder that the State Government may attempt a resumption of
possession by physical force. That was the time when the right to
property was a fundamental right under Article 31 of the
Constitution of India. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the
expression “re-entry” in a lease deed does not authorize the lessor
to resume possession through extra judicial method, and a lessee
or the trespasser can be removed and dispossessed by following
due course of law and not by an executive order. In “ Maharaja
Dharmander Prasad Singh”, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that
the possession can be resumed by the government only in a
manner known to or recognized by law and not otherwise than in
th
accordance with law. Pertinently, the order dated 16 December
2020 does not indicate that possession of the suit property was
given to the MMRDA by use of force.
24. The Constitution of India requires the State to strive to
promote the welfare of the people by securing and protecting the
social order imbibed with justice; social, economic and political. A
lease contemplates a demise or transfer of a right to enjoy land for
a term or in perpetuity in consideration of a price paid or promised
or of money or a share of crops or services or other things. The
general laws do not abhor a lease in perpetuity but, in our opinion,
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the State is bound to act in manner so as to promote the public
trust and it cannot act to the detriment to public interest. This
seems to be the guiding object behind the Resolution dated
th
9 October 2013 of Ministry of Commerce and Industries
th
published in the Gazette of India on 26 October 2013 whereunder
the President has been pleased to approve that (i) the Central
Government land will be leased out for salt manufacture for a
period of 20 years by invitation of tender and; (ii) no renewal of
lease will be done and fresh tender for the assignment of land for
the salt manufacture will be called. This is the stand of the Union
of India and the Government of Maharashtra that there is a
settlement between them whereunder the Central Government
agreed to allot the suit property to the Government of Maharashtra
and the State Government has initiated the proceedings for change
in land user. Consequently, the writ petition filed by the Union of
India vide Writ Petition No.4769 of 2024 challenging the order
th th
dated 17 April 2023 was withdrawn on 5 May 2025. In “Namdeo
7
Lokman Lodhi" , the High Court held that no notice for
determination of lease is required where the lease was executed
st
prior to 1 April 1930. We may refer to “Eswari Bai v. The Collector
8
of Madras” wherein the High Court held that there is no necessity
for resuming a government land to resort to the civil Court and the
9
lessee can be summarily evicted. “Azim Ahmad Kazmi also
provides some insight to the power of the Government by holding
that a lessee of the government land can be dispossessed under
the Government Grants Act, 1895 and without resorting to other
proceedings under the law.
25. There is no dispute that the Indentures were for a period of
Namdeo Lokman Lodhi v. Narmadabhai Keshoo Deo & Ors. : AIR 1950 Bombay 123
7
8 Eswari Bai v. The Collector of Madras: AIR 1974 Madras 114
9 Azim Ahmad Kazmi & Ors. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.” (2012) 7 SCC 278
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th
99 years commencing from 15 October 1917 and expired on
th
14 October 2016. The lessee may have a right to give notice for
renewal of the lease but only upon due observance of the
conditions under the lease. However, the renewal Clause (VI) (2)
nd
does not survive on termination of the lease on 2 November 2004,
and may still not revive upon a determination by the Civil Court
that the termination order was illegal, arbitrary and wrong. There
is no order passed in the suit or by this Court staying the
nd
operation of the order dated 2 November 2004 by which lease
th
deeds dated 16 February 1922 were terminated. The Government
th
Notification dated 10 March 2021 revoked all reservations over
43.76 hectares land comprised under City Survey No.657A (part)
and 857 (part) in Mouje Kanjur within Taluka Kurla and that area
has been reserved for the Metro Car Depot, Casting Yard and other
Metro uses. The development plan which was prepared under the
Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 made multiple
reservations over the Arthur Salt Works and Jenkins Salt Works
land and such reservations were not limited to the gardens,
schools, playgrounds, hospitals etc. The revised Development Plan
of the year 1991 also made several reservations thereon, such as,
recreation grounds, regional training institute, public housing,
retail market, municipal dispensary etc. It is stated that the
sanctioned Development Plan, 2034 makes provisions for
affordable housing, rehabilitation and resettlement, garden/parks,
police station, fire station etc. For making changes in the
reservation thereof, the Government of Maharashtra issued the
th
said Notification dated 10 March 2021 under section 37(1AAA)(c)
of the MRTP Act, 1966 and significant portions of the Arthur Salt
Works and Jenkins Salt Works lands are included in the modified
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reservation for the Metro Car Depot, Casting Yard and Metro uses;
but that Notification is not under challenge.
26. There is a considerable force in the submission that a writ
petition based on the purported violation of interim injunction
granted by the Civil Court is not maintainable. The plaintiff who
was the predecessor in interest of the petitioner instituted the suit
nd
to challenge the order dated 2 November 2004 terminating the
lease deeds made an application for renewal of the lease deeds and
such application has been dismissed. The prayer made in Writ
Petition No.471 of 2021 for restoring a status-quo ante is not
maintainable on the ground of a violation of the order of interim
injunction passed in Notice of Motion No.1246 of 2005. The
th
allegation of violation of the interim order dated 16 October 2016
is not a ground to exercise the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. The petitioner does not make any complaint
in Writ Petition No.471 of 2021 that he was dispossessed from the
subject properties by force or without following due process in law,
changed his stand and took a position in Writ Petition No.5362 of
2024 that he is in possession of the subject properties. He has
made incorrect statements and seeks to enforce his contractual
right in the lease deeds which have already been terminated and
lapsed. The change in the regime for allotment or lease of salt pan
lands for manufacturing salt is a relevant consideration which
cannot be overlooked and the new statutory regime contained in
th
Resolution dated 9 October 2023 has been enforced by this Court
in “Jugalkishore R. Joshi”. This is also quite relevant that in the
th
order dated 16 December 2020 passed by this Court there is no
reference of any challenge to the jurisdiction of the Collector to
st
pass the order dated 1 October 2020. T he question of validity of
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th nd
the order dated 17 April 2023 passed by the 2 respondent-
Collector on the ground that the Government of Maharashtra is
not the owner of the subject properties is also no longer an issue.
27. In view of the aforesaid discussions, we do not find any merit
in these writ petitions, and accordingly, Writ Petition Nos.5362 of
2024 and 471 of 2021 are dismissed.
28. All interim orders passed in these proceedings are vacated
and Interim Application (L) No.31719 of 2025 and Interim
Application No.408 of 2021 are disposed of.
[GAUTAM A. ANKHAD, J.] [CHIEF JUSTICE]

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