Full Judgment Text
2025 INSC 583
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
[Arising out of SLP (C) No. 34332 OF 2010]
SHARDHAMMA & ANR. …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THE DY. COMMISSIONER
& ORS.
…RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA, J.
Leave granted.
2. The present appeal is arising out of order dated 27.07.2010
passed in Writ Appeal No. 1928 of 2004 (SC/ST) by the High
Court of Karnataka at Bangalore whereby the High Court has set
aside the order passed in Writ Petition No. 50446/2003 dated
18.12.2003.
3. The facts of the case reveal that four acres of land in old
Survey No. 14/1 (New No. 150) of Hosahalli Village, Hulikunte,
Hobli were granted on lease through auction conducted by
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
BORRA LM VALLI
Date: 2025.04.29
16:21:11 IST
Reason:
Tehsildar, Sira Taluk to one Shri Ranga @ Rangappa during the
SLP (Civil) No. 34332 of 2010 Page 1 of 8
year 1946-47 i.e. 01.04.1946 and a Saguvalli Chit was confirmed
on 12.05.1954 in his favour. The upset price was paid by Shri
Ranga towards the land and Shri Ranga continued to be in
peaceful possession and enjoyment of the land in question from
1946 to 1969, i.e., for a period of 23 years. His name continued
in existence in the revenue records. Shri Ranga, the land holder
(the Grantee), sold the land to the husband of the first appellant,
namely, Sri Basavarajappa by way of a registered sale deed and
the appellant No. 2 is son of Basavarajappa. Thus, the land in
question continued to be in possession of late Shri Ranga and
after his death in the name of his wife and son.
4. On 06.06.1992, one Dodda Hanumaiah preferred a petition
under Section 5 of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act,
1978 (hereinafter referred to as, ‘the PTCL Act’), stating that the
original grantee is the elder brother of his late father and the land
was sold on 20.06.1969 and as the land was sold on 20.06.1969,
the possession of the same has to be restored to the original
grantee and as the original grantee was not alive, to his relative.
It is pertinent to note that respondent No. 3 Doddahanumaiah is
certainly not the legal representative of the original grantee. The
Assistant Commissioner has allowed the application vide order
dated 01.03.1999 and on appeal, the Deputy Commissioner has
affirmed the aforesaid order vide order dated 16.10.2003 holding
SLP (Civil) No. 34332 of 2010 Page 2 of 8
that there was violation of alienation clause as under the Mysore
Land Revenue Rules which were in force on the date of grant,
particularly on account of the non-alienation clause, the land
could not have been alienated before the expiry of period of 20
years. The present appellants being aggrieved by the order
passed by the Assistant Commissioner as well as Deputy
Commissioner preferred a writ petition before the High Court of
Karnataka and vide order dated 18.12.2003, the writ petition was
dismissed.
5. The present appellants thereafter preferred a Writ Appeal
in the matter and the same was also dismissed by the High Court
of Karnataka vide order dated 27.07.2010.
6. This Court has carefully gone through the orders passed by
the Assistant Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, learned
Single Judge as well as Division Bench of the High Court of
Karnataka. In the present case, the land was sold to Shri Ranga,
predecessor-in-title of the appellants in the year 1946-47 and a
Saguvalli Chit was confirmed on 12.05.1954. The land was sold
by Shri Ranga on 20.06.1969 and the application under Section
5 of the PTCL Act was filed on 06.06.1992. In the considered
opinion of this Court, the application preferred in the matter
under the PTCL Act was hopelessly barred by delay and latches,
as has been held in the case of Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi Vs. State
SLP (Civil) No. 34332 of 2010 Page 3 of 8
of Karnataka and Another (2020) 14 Supreme Court Cases 232,
in paragraphs 7 and 8, as under:
“7. Shri R.S. Hedge appearing for the appellant
urged several grounds. It is contended by Shri
Hegde that proceedings are void for non-joinder of
the first purchaser of the land. It is further
contended that the non-alienation period i.e. period
for which Kriyappa could not have transferred the
land was not 15 years but was 10 years under the
Rules of the land and, therefore, transfer was legal
having been made after 10 years. However, the
applicant had not produced the original grant, and,
therefore, it was not possible for the purpose to
come to a conclusion that the transfer was in breach
of the non-alienation period. We, however, find that
one of the points raised on behalf of the appellant
deserves acceptance. That point is that the
application for restoration of the land was made by
the heir of Kriyappa after unreasonably long period
i.e. 25 years from when the Act came into force.
Section 4 of the Act itself has a ubiquitous effect in
it, annulling the transfer of granted land “made
either before or after the commencement of the Act”
as null and void. The Act does not specify how much
before the commencement of the Act. Thus, on a
plain and critical reading of the Act, it seems that it
covers proceedings made in time before the Act was
enacted. However, we are not called upon to deal
with the reasonableness of this provision and we do
not propose to say anything on this. The validity of
the Act has been upheld by a judgment of this Court
in Manchegowda v. State of
Karnataka [Manchegowda v. State of Karnataka,
(1984) 3 SCC 301].”
SLP (Civil) No. 34332 of 2010 Page 4 of 8
“8. However, the question that arises is with regard
to terms of Section 5 of the Act which enables any
interested person to make an application for having
the transfer annulled as void under Section 4 of the
Act. This section does not prescribe any period
within which such an application can be made.
Neither does it prescribe the period within which
suo motu action may be taken. This Court in Chhedi
Lal Yadav v. Hari Kishore Yadav [Chhedi Lal
Yadav v. Hari Kishore Yadav, (2018) 12 SCC
527:(2018) 5 SCC (Civ) 427] and also
in Ningappa v. Commr.[Ningappa v. Commr.(2020)
14 SCC 236] reiterated a settled position in law that
whether statute provided for a period of limitation,
provisions of the statute must be invoked within a
reasonable time. It is held that action whether on an
application of the parties, or suo motu, must be
taken within a reasonable time. That action arose
under the provisions of a similar Act which provided
for restoration of certain lands to farmers which
were sold for arrears of rent or from which they
were ejected for arrears of land from 1-1-1939 to
31-12-1950. This relief was granted to the farmers
due to flood in Kosi River which make agricultural
operations impossible. An application for
restoration was made after 24 years and was
allowed. It is in that background that this Court
upheld that it was unreasonable to do so. We have
no hesitation in upholding that the present
application for restoration of land made by
respondent Rajappa was made after an
unreasonably long period and was liable to be
dismissed on that ground. Accordingly, the
judgments of the Karnataka High Court, namely, R.
Rudrappa v. Commr. [R.Rudrappa v. Commr., 1998
SCC OnLine Kar 671:(2000) 1 Kant LJ
SLP (Civil) No. 34332 of 2010 Page 5 of 8
523], Maddurappa v. State of
Karnataka [Maddurappa v. State of Karnataka,
(2006) 4 Kant LJ 303] and G.
Maregoudav. Commr. [G. Maregouda v. Commr.,
(2000) 2 Kant LJ SN 4B] holding that there is no
limitation provided by Section 5 of the Act and,
therefore, an application can be made at any time,
are overruled. Order accordingly."
7. In the light of the aforesaid judgment, as in the present
case, the application was preferred only on 06.06.1992 and the
land was sold on 20.06.1969, it was certainly beyond reasonable
period and, therefore, the order passed by the Assistant
Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, learned Single Judge and
the impugned orders are set aside. The appellants had purchased
the land by virtue of the sale deed, and, therefore, have all rights
over the land in question. This Court again in the case of Vivek
M. Hinduja and Others Vs. M. Ashwatha and Others (2020) 14
Supreme Court Cases 228 dealing with the similar Act, in paras
10 to 12, has held as under:
“10. In Pune Municipal Corpn. v. State of
Maharashtra [Pune Municipal Corpn. v. State of
Maharashtra, (2007) 5 SCC 211] this Court
reproduced the following observations with regard
to the declaration of orders beyond the period of
limitation as invalid: (SCC p. 226, para 39)
“39. Setting aside the decree passed by all the
courts and referring to several cases, this
Court held that if the party aggrieved by
invalidity of the order intends to approach the
court for declaration that the order against
SLP (Civil) No. 34332 of 2010 Page 6 of 8
him was inoperative, he must come before the
court within the period prescribed by
limitation. ‘If the statutory time of limitation
expires, the court cannot give the declaration
sought for’.”
(emphasis supplied)
“11. We are in respectful agreement with the
aforesaid observations. It is, however, necessary to
add that where limitation is not prescribed, the
party ought to approach the competent court or
authority within reasonable time, beyond which no
relief can be granted. As decided earlier, this
principle would apply even to suo motu actions.”
“12. We find from the impugned judgments [Vivek
M. Hinduja v. M. Ashwatha, 2006 SCC OnLine Kar
882] , [George Thomas v. K.P. Krishnappa, 2011
SCC OnLine Kar 4496] that the High Court has not
given due regard to the period of time within which
the action was taken in the present cases. The
competent authorities in all these cases had
declined relief to the respondents and had refused to
annul the transfers. In the circumstances, the
impugned judgment(s) and order(s) passed by the
High Court are set aside.”
8. In the light of the ratio laid down in the aforesaid
judgments, it can be safely gathered that as the application under
Section 5 of the PTCL Act was preferred after expiry of more
than 10 years period, the same should have been dismissed on the
ground of delay and latches.
9. There is one another important aspect with regard to
Saguvalli Chit which was confirmed on 12.05.1954. The
SLP (Civil) No. 34332 of 2010 Page 7 of 8
vernacular version and the English translation which are on
record reveal that there is a non-alienation clause which provides
that the land in question shall not be transferred before expiry of
period of 10 years and, therefore, in the light of this categoric
recital in the Saguvalli Chit, the sale deed executed in the matter
could not have been declared as null and void as has been done
by the authorities and affirmed by the learned Courts below.
10. Resultantly, the appeal deserves to be allowed and is
accordingly allowed. The respondents before this Court were also
not having any locus in the matter as they are not descendants of
Shri Ranga, the original grantee and, therefore, they could not
have preferred an application under Section 5 of the PTCL Act.
On this count also, the impugned orders deserve to be set aside
and are hereby set aside.
11. The appeal is allowed. No orders as to costs.
……………………………………J.
[B. V. NAGARATHNA]
……………………………………J.
[SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA]
NEW DELHI
April 29, 2025.
SLP (Civil) No. 34332 of 2010 Page 8 of 8
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
[Arising out of SLP (C) No. 34332 OF 2010]
SHARDHAMMA & ANR. …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THE DY. COMMISSIONER
& ORS.
…RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA, J.
Leave granted.
2. The present appeal is arising out of order dated 27.07.2010
passed in Writ Appeal No. 1928 of 2004 (SC/ST) by the High
Court of Karnataka at Bangalore whereby the High Court has set
aside the order passed in Writ Petition No. 50446/2003 dated
18.12.2003.
3. The facts of the case reveal that four acres of land in old
Survey No. 14/1 (New No. 150) of Hosahalli Village, Hulikunte,
Hobli were granted on lease through auction conducted by
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
BORRA LM VALLI
Date: 2025.04.29
16:21:11 IST
Reason:
Tehsildar, Sira Taluk to one Shri Ranga @ Rangappa during the
SLP (Civil) No. 34332 of 2010 Page 1 of 8
year 1946-47 i.e. 01.04.1946 and a Saguvalli Chit was confirmed
on 12.05.1954 in his favour. The upset price was paid by Shri
Ranga towards the land and Shri Ranga continued to be in
peaceful possession and enjoyment of the land in question from
1946 to 1969, i.e., for a period of 23 years. His name continued
in existence in the revenue records. Shri Ranga, the land holder
(the Grantee), sold the land to the husband of the first appellant,
namely, Sri Basavarajappa by way of a registered sale deed and
the appellant No. 2 is son of Basavarajappa. Thus, the land in
question continued to be in possession of late Shri Ranga and
after his death in the name of his wife and son.
4. On 06.06.1992, one Dodda Hanumaiah preferred a petition
under Section 5 of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act,
1978 (hereinafter referred to as, ‘the PTCL Act’), stating that the
original grantee is the elder brother of his late father and the land
was sold on 20.06.1969 and as the land was sold on 20.06.1969,
the possession of the same has to be restored to the original
grantee and as the original grantee was not alive, to his relative.
It is pertinent to note that respondent No. 3 Doddahanumaiah is
certainly not the legal representative of the original grantee. The
Assistant Commissioner has allowed the application vide order
dated 01.03.1999 and on appeal, the Deputy Commissioner has
affirmed the aforesaid order vide order dated 16.10.2003 holding
SLP (Civil) No. 34332 of 2010 Page 2 of 8
that there was violation of alienation clause as under the Mysore
Land Revenue Rules which were in force on the date of grant,
particularly on account of the non-alienation clause, the land
could not have been alienated before the expiry of period of 20
years. The present appellants being aggrieved by the order
passed by the Assistant Commissioner as well as Deputy
Commissioner preferred a writ petition before the High Court of
Karnataka and vide order dated 18.12.2003, the writ petition was
dismissed.
5. The present appellants thereafter preferred a Writ Appeal
in the matter and the same was also dismissed by the High Court
of Karnataka vide order dated 27.07.2010.
6. This Court has carefully gone through the orders passed by
the Assistant Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, learned
Single Judge as well as Division Bench of the High Court of
Karnataka. In the present case, the land was sold to Shri Ranga,
predecessor-in-title of the appellants in the year 1946-47 and a
Saguvalli Chit was confirmed on 12.05.1954. The land was sold
by Shri Ranga on 20.06.1969 and the application under Section
5 of the PTCL Act was filed on 06.06.1992. In the considered
opinion of this Court, the application preferred in the matter
under the PTCL Act was hopelessly barred by delay and latches,
as has been held in the case of Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi Vs. State
SLP (Civil) No. 34332 of 2010 Page 3 of 8
of Karnataka and Another (2020) 14 Supreme Court Cases 232,
in paragraphs 7 and 8, as under:
“7. Shri R.S. Hedge appearing for the appellant
urged several grounds. It is contended by Shri
Hegde that proceedings are void for non-joinder of
the first purchaser of the land. It is further
contended that the non-alienation period i.e. period
for which Kriyappa could not have transferred the
land was not 15 years but was 10 years under the
Rules of the land and, therefore, transfer was legal
having been made after 10 years. However, the
applicant had not produced the original grant, and,
therefore, it was not possible for the purpose to
come to a conclusion that the transfer was in breach
of the non-alienation period. We, however, find that
one of the points raised on behalf of the appellant
deserves acceptance. That point is that the
application for restoration of the land was made by
the heir of Kriyappa after unreasonably long period
i.e. 25 years from when the Act came into force.
Section 4 of the Act itself has a ubiquitous effect in
it, annulling the transfer of granted land “made
either before or after the commencement of the Act”
as null and void. The Act does not specify how much
before the commencement of the Act. Thus, on a
plain and critical reading of the Act, it seems that it
covers proceedings made in time before the Act was
enacted. However, we are not called upon to deal
with the reasonableness of this provision and we do
not propose to say anything on this. The validity of
the Act has been upheld by a judgment of this Court
in Manchegowda v. State of
Karnataka [Manchegowda v. State of Karnataka,
(1984) 3 SCC 301].”
SLP (Civil) No. 34332 of 2010 Page 4 of 8
“8. However, the question that arises is with regard
to terms of Section 5 of the Act which enables any
interested person to make an application for having
the transfer annulled as void under Section 4 of the
Act. This section does not prescribe any period
within which such an application can be made.
Neither does it prescribe the period within which
suo motu action may be taken. This Court in Chhedi
Lal Yadav v. Hari Kishore Yadav [Chhedi Lal
Yadav v. Hari Kishore Yadav, (2018) 12 SCC
527:(2018) 5 SCC (Civ) 427] and also
in Ningappa v. Commr.[Ningappa v. Commr.(2020)
14 SCC 236] reiterated a settled position in law that
whether statute provided for a period of limitation,
provisions of the statute must be invoked within a
reasonable time. It is held that action whether on an
application of the parties, or suo motu, must be
taken within a reasonable time. That action arose
under the provisions of a similar Act which provided
for restoration of certain lands to farmers which
were sold for arrears of rent or from which they
were ejected for arrears of land from 1-1-1939 to
31-12-1950. This relief was granted to the farmers
due to flood in Kosi River which make agricultural
operations impossible. An application for
restoration was made after 24 years and was
allowed. It is in that background that this Court
upheld that it was unreasonable to do so. We have
no hesitation in upholding that the present
application for restoration of land made by
respondent Rajappa was made after an
unreasonably long period and was liable to be
dismissed on that ground. Accordingly, the
judgments of the Karnataka High Court, namely, R.
Rudrappa v. Commr. [R.Rudrappa v. Commr., 1998
SCC OnLine Kar 671:(2000) 1 Kant LJ
SLP (Civil) No. 34332 of 2010 Page 5 of 8
523], Maddurappa v. State of
Karnataka [Maddurappa v. State of Karnataka,
(2006) 4 Kant LJ 303] and G.
Maregoudav. Commr. [G. Maregouda v. Commr.,
(2000) 2 Kant LJ SN 4B] holding that there is no
limitation provided by Section 5 of the Act and,
therefore, an application can be made at any time,
are overruled. Order accordingly."
7. In the light of the aforesaid judgment, as in the present
case, the application was preferred only on 06.06.1992 and the
land was sold on 20.06.1969, it was certainly beyond reasonable
period and, therefore, the order passed by the Assistant
Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, learned Single Judge and
the impugned orders are set aside. The appellants had purchased
the land by virtue of the sale deed, and, therefore, have all rights
over the land in question. This Court again in the case of Vivek
M. Hinduja and Others Vs. M. Ashwatha and Others (2020) 14
Supreme Court Cases 228 dealing with the similar Act, in paras
10 to 12, has held as under:
“10. In Pune Municipal Corpn. v. State of
Maharashtra [Pune Municipal Corpn. v. State of
Maharashtra, (2007) 5 SCC 211] this Court
reproduced the following observations with regard
to the declaration of orders beyond the period of
limitation as invalid: (SCC p. 226, para 39)
“39. Setting aside the decree passed by all the
courts and referring to several cases, this
Court held that if the party aggrieved by
invalidity of the order intends to approach the
court for declaration that the order against
SLP (Civil) No. 34332 of 2010 Page 6 of 8
him was inoperative, he must come before the
court within the period prescribed by
limitation. ‘If the statutory time of limitation
expires, the court cannot give the declaration
sought for’.”
(emphasis supplied)
“11. We are in respectful agreement with the
aforesaid observations. It is, however, necessary to
add that where limitation is not prescribed, the
party ought to approach the competent court or
authority within reasonable time, beyond which no
relief can be granted. As decided earlier, this
principle would apply even to suo motu actions.”
“12. We find from the impugned judgments [Vivek
M. Hinduja v. M. Ashwatha, 2006 SCC OnLine Kar
882] , [George Thomas v. K.P. Krishnappa, 2011
SCC OnLine Kar 4496] that the High Court has not
given due regard to the period of time within which
the action was taken in the present cases. The
competent authorities in all these cases had
declined relief to the respondents and had refused to
annul the transfers. In the circumstances, the
impugned judgment(s) and order(s) passed by the
High Court are set aside.”
8. In the light of the ratio laid down in the aforesaid
judgments, it can be safely gathered that as the application under
Section 5 of the PTCL Act was preferred after expiry of more
than 10 years period, the same should have been dismissed on the
ground of delay and latches.
9. There is one another important aspect with regard to
Saguvalli Chit which was confirmed on 12.05.1954. The
SLP (Civil) No. 34332 of 2010 Page 7 of 8
vernacular version and the English translation which are on
record reveal that there is a non-alienation clause which provides
that the land in question shall not be transferred before expiry of
period of 10 years and, therefore, in the light of this categoric
recital in the Saguvalli Chit, the sale deed executed in the matter
could not have been declared as null and void as has been done
by the authorities and affirmed by the learned Courts below.
10. Resultantly, the appeal deserves to be allowed and is
accordingly allowed. The respondents before this Court were also
not having any locus in the matter as they are not descendants of
Shri Ranga, the original grantee and, therefore, they could not
have preferred an application under Section 5 of the PTCL Act.
On this count also, the impugned orders deserve to be set aside
and are hereby set aside.
11. The appeal is allowed. No orders as to costs.
……………………………………J.
[B. V. NAGARATHNA]
……………………………………J.
[SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA]
NEW DELHI
April 29, 2025.
SLP (Civil) No. 34332 of 2010 Page 8 of 8