Full Judgment Text
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 9
PETITIONER:
PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK LIMITED
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
K. L. KHARBANDA
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
02/02/1962
BENCH:
WANCHOO, K.N.
BENCH:
WANCHOO, K.N.
GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.
SARKAR, A.K.
CITATION:
1963 AIR 487 1962 SCR Supl. (2) 977
CITATOR INFO :
R 1964 SC 743 (8,19)
R 1965 SC1488 (5)
F 1968 SC 218 (3)
RF 1969 SC 590 (6)
RF 1970 SC 237 (13)
RF 1972 SC2189 (7)
D 1978 SC 275 (6)
ACT:
Industrial Dispute-Provisions for computing
benefit in terms of money-If applciable to
monetary benefit-Bank Clerk made supervisor-Basic
wages, computation of-All India Industrial
Tribunal (Bank Disputes) Award, para 292 (7)-
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (XIV of 1947) s. 33C
(2).
HEADNOTE:
The Sastri Award provided one scale of wages
for clerks in all banks. It further provided for a
special allowances to clerks who were assigned
special posts requiring special skill. Paragraph
297 (7) of the Award provided for fixing the basic
wages of employees of a bank who joined after
January 31,1951 in the new scales prescribed. The
respondent, who was a clerk in the appellant bank,
was appointed a supervisor in 1951. The appellant
fixed his basic wages according to the scale
payable to graduate clerks and gave him the
special allowance prescribed by the Sastri Award.
The respondent made an application under s. 33C
(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, for
computing in terms of money the benefit to which
he was entitled under the Sastri Award claiming
that his basic wages should be fixed according to
the scale prescribed by the Bank for supervisors.
The appellant contended that s. 33C (2) was not
applicable to monetary benefits and that the
respondent being a clerk his wages were rightly
fixed.
^
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 9
Held, that s. 33C (2) of the Act was
applicable to computation of monetary benefits
also to which a workman was entitled and the
application was maintainable. The word "benefit"
included both ’monetary benefit’ as well as ’non
monetary benefit’ and there was no reason to
exclude ’monetary benefit’ therefrom. The word
used in s. 33C (2) was "computed" and not
"converted" and compute means to calculate. The
provision of s. 33C (2) was concerned purely with
execution and there was no reason to hold that it
applied to non-monetary benefits alone.
Glaxo Laboratories (India) Limited, Bombay v.
Shri A. Y. Manjrekar, (1955) L. A. C. 505.
South Arcot Electricity Distribution Company
Limited v. Elumalai, (1959) I.L.L.J. 624 and
978
M.S. N.S. Transports, Tiruchirapalli v.
Rajaram (K) (1960) I.L.L.J. 316, referred to.
Held, further that the respondent was
entitled to basic salary according to the scale
fixed supervisors. The grades of supervisors were
also grades for workmen prevalent in the appellant
bank. The Sastri Award provided one grade for all
clerical workmen by whatever name they were known
in the bank. In view of para 292 (7) of the Award
basic wages of the respondent could not be reduced
below what they would be under a point-to-point
adjustment on the corresponding scale which he was
drawing before the Sen Award, in this bank as a
workman.
Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. Their Workmen,
C.A. 450 of 1959, Decided on December 6,1960,
referred to.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal
No. 103 of 1961.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated August 2,1960, of the Central
Government Labour Court at Delhi in L. C. A. No.
80 of 1960.
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and Naunit Lal, for
the appellant.
S. T. Desai and Janardan Sharma, for the
respondent.
1962. February 2. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
WANCHOO, J.-This is an appeal by special
leave in an industrial matter. The respondent
Kharbanda is a supervisor in the Punjab National
Bank Limited which is the appellant before us. The
dispute relates to the fixation of his salary in
accordance with the All India Industrial Tribunal
(Bank Disputes) Award (hereinafter referred to as
the Sastry award). The respondent made an
application to the Central Labour Court, Delhi,
under s. 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act,
No. XIV of 1947, (hereinafter called the Act), and
his case was that he was entitled to certain
benefits capable of being computed in terms of
money under the Sastry Award, but the appellant
had made a wrong
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 9
979
calculation in fixing his basic salary. Therefore,
the respondent prayed that the benefit to which he
was entitled by fixation of his basic salary
correctly should be computed in terms of money and
determined by the Labour Court. His case further
was that when his basic salary was rightly fixed
under Sastry Award he would be entitled to a sum
of Rs. 6,428.28 nP. as arrears upto the date of
his application.
The application was opposed on behalf of the
appellant and two contentions were raised to meet
the case put forward by the respondent. In the
first place it was urged that the application was
not maintainable under s. 33-C(2) of the Act and
the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to decide it
Secondly, it was urged that the manner in which
the appellant had fixed the basic salary was
correct and there was therefore no force in the
contention of the respondent that he was entitled
to certain benefits of which he had been deprived
and which should be calculated by the labour
court.
Before we deal with the two points which
arise in the present appeal we may refer to the
provisions of the Sastry Award out of which the
present dispute arises. Originally another
tribunal known as the Sen Tribunal was appointed
in June 1949 to go into the disputes between
various banks all over the country and their
employees. The Sen Tribunal made an award after an
exhaustive inquiry but on appeal to this Court the
said award was set aside in 1951. Thereafter Act
II of 1951 was passed as a temporary measure for
freezing certain provisions of the said award in
order to prevent the spread of the prevalent
unrest amongst the bank employees in question. The
said dispute was then referred by the Central
Government to the Sastry tribunal in January 1952.
This tribunal held an elaborate inquiry and made
its award which was published on April 20, 1953.
980
Appeals were preferred by the banks and their
employees against the said award before the Labour
Appellate Tribunal, and on April 28, 1954, the
Appellate Tribunal substantially confirmed the
recommendations and directions of the Sastry
tribunal with certain modifications. In the
present appeal, we are not concerned with the
further history of the dispute, for it is admitted
that the provisions of the Sastry award with
respect to the matter in controversy before us
have remained unmodified when finally the dispute
was set at rest by the Industrial Disputes
(Banking Companies) Decision Act, (XLI of 1955).
The Sastry tribunal decided after considering
the matter from all aspects to provide only one
scale for clerks in all banks, though banks
themselves were divided into four classes and the
places where the banks were situate were divided
into three areas. In the present appeal we are
concerned with Class A, area I, for which the
grade provided was from Rs. 85 to Rs. 280 with
varying increments (see para 119 of the award) to
which it is unnecessary to refer. After having
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 9
provided one cadre of clerks, the Sastry tribunal
then considered the question of certain special
posts where the incumbent required special skill
for the efficient discharge of his duties and the
problem before it was whether there should be a
separate scale for such special posts or whether
the incumbents of such posts should be in the same
scale as clerks with certain advantages in the
shape either of additional increments in the same
scale or additional allowance over and above the
scale or a combination of both. The Sastry
Tribunal rejected the formulation of a separate
scale for these special posts and decided to grant
a special allowance over and above the pay of the
clerical scale. One such class of special posts
with which the Sastry award was concerned was the
class of supervisors to which the respondent
belongs and it
981
provided a special allowance of Rs. 50/- in the
case of A class banks in area I for supervisors by
para. 164 thereof.
Then arose the question of fixing the pay of
the employees of the banks into the new scale
provided in the award and that matter was dealt
with in para. 292. The Sastry award divided the
employees into categories, namely, (i) those who
entered the service of the banks before January
31, 1950, and (ii) those who entered the service
of the banks after January 31, 1950. In the
present case we are concerned with those who
joined the service of the bank after January 31,
1950. The relevant provision with respect to such
employees is cl. (7) of para 292 which reads as
follows :-
"(7). The workman shall be fitted into
the new scale of pay on a point-to-point
basis as though it had been in force since he
joined the service of the bank, provided that
his adjusted basic pay is not less than what
it would be under a point to-point adjustment
on the corresponding ‘pre-Sen’ scale."
It may be mentioned that the respondent was
appointed as a superiors by the appellant on April
22, 1951 on the basic salary of Rs. 120/- per
mensem. At that time the basic scale for
supervisors was Rs. 120-8-200-EB-10-300 while
there was a basic scale for graduate clerks etc.
of Rs. 75-5-120-8-200. The respondent was
appointed on the initial basic salary of Rs. 120/-
per mensem. The dispute between the parties is
that the respondent claims that his basic salary
should be fixed under para 292(7) according to the
supervisor’s scale for the purposes of the proviso
while the appellant claims that it can only be
fixed at the highest on the scale for graduate
clerks, and the appellant fixed the respondent’s
pay on that basis, and that led to the
respondent’s making the present application under
s. 33-C(2) of the Act. The tribunal has found in
favour of the
982
respondent. The appellant therefore applied for
special leave which was granted ; and that is how
the matter has come up before us.
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 9
The first question therefore that falls for
decision is whether such an application can be
made under s. 33- C(2) of the Act, Section 33-C
(2) reads as follows :-
"(2) Where any workman is entitled to
receive from the employer any benefit which
is capable of being computed in terms of
money, the amount at which such benefit
should be computed may, subject to any rules
that may, made under this Act, be determined
by such Labour Court as may be specified in
this behalf by the appropriate Government,
and the amount so determined may be recovered
as provided for in sub-section (1)."
It is contended on behalf of the appellant that s.
33-C(2) deals only with such cases where the
workman is entitled to receive from the employer
any benefit which is non-monetary but which could
be computed in terms of money. It is said that it
is only in such a case where the workman claims a
non-monetary benefit from his employer that he can
apply to the labour court for converting the value
of this non-monetary benefit into money and
computing the amount due in terms of money. On the
other hand, it has been contended on behalf of the
respondent that the benefit to which a workman may
be entitled need not necessarily be non-monetary
and that any benefit to which he is entitled under
an award if it requires computation can be the
subject-matter of an application under s. 33-C
(2). Reliance has been placed on behalf of the
respondent in this connection on a course of
decisions by the industrial tribunals and the High
Courts where the meaning of the word "benefit" in
sub-s.(2) has not been confined to non-monetary
benefits only.
983
The crucial words which we have to interpret
are "any benefit which is capable of being
computed in terms of money". The word "benefit" is
of wide import, and the dictionary meaning thereof
is "advantage, profit". This would naturally
include monetary advantage or monetary profit.
There is no reason therefore for excluding
‘monetary benefits, from the word "benefit" used
in this sub-section, unless it is clear from the
words used that monetary benefits were not
intended to be included in the wide word "benefit"
used therein. It is urged on behalf of the
appellant that we should exclude monetary benefits
from the meaning of this word in the context of
this sub-section because the word is qualified by
the words "which is capable of being computed in
terms of money". This, it is urged, suggests that
the meaning of the word "benefit" here excludes
monetary benefits, for, according to the
appellant, there would be no sense in computing
monetary benefits in terms on money. But this
contention overlooks the fact that the word used
in the qualifying clause is "computed" and not
"converted". If the word had been "converted" and
the clause had read "which is capable of being
converted in terms of money" there would have been
a clear indication that the benefit which was to
be converted in terms of money was other than
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 9
monetary benefit. The dictionary meaning of the
word "convert" is "to change by substituting an
equivalent"; and if the word "convert" had been
used in the qualifying words, the argument that
the word "benefit" only means non-monetary benefit
might be incontrovertible. But the word in the
qualifying clause is "computed" and the dictionary
meaning of the word "compute" is merely "to
calculate". Therefore, where the benefit to which
a workman may be entitled has not already been
calculated, for example, in an award which confers
on him the benefit, it stands to reason that sub-
s.(2) would apply for computation of such benefit
if
984
there is dispute about it. Further, if we compare
sub-s.(1) with sub-s(2) of this section, it will
appear that sub-s.(1) applies to cases where any
money is due to a workman from an employer under a
settlement or an award or under the provisions of
Chap. VA and that contemplated that the amount is
already computed or calculated or at any rate
there can be no dispute about the computation or
calculation; while sub-s.(2) applies to cases
where though the monetary benefit has been
conferred on a workman under an award, it has not
been calculated or computed in the award itself,
and, there is dispute as to its calculation or
computation. It cannot therefore be said looking
to the words used in sub-s.(2) that it only
applies to cases of non-monetary benefit which has
to be converted in terms of money. It appears to
us that it can also apply to monetary benefits to
which a workman may be entitled which have not
been calculated or computed, say, for example, in
an award and about their calculation or
computation there is dispute between the workman
and the employer. It may be added that s. 33-C was
put in the Act for the purposes of execution in
1956 after the Industrial Disputes (Appellate
Tribunal) Act, (48 of 1950) was repealed in that
year. The Appellate Tribunal Act contained s. 20
which provided for execution of awards and was in
terms almost similar to s. 33 C. When the
Appellate Tribunal Act was repealed in 1956 a
provision similar to that contained in s. 20 was
brought into the Act at the same time. It is clear
therefore that s. 33-C is a provision in the
nature of executing and where the amount to be
executed is worked out (for example in an award)
or where it may be worked out without any dispute,
s. 33-C(1) will apply. But where the amount due to
workman is not stated in the award itself and
there is a dispute as to its calculation, sub-
s.(2) will apply and the workman would be entitled
to apply thereunder to have the amount computed
provided he is
985
entitled to a benefit, whether monetary or
nonmonetary, which is capable of being computed in
terms of money.
This matter had come up before Appellate
Tribunal in 1955 in Glaxo Laboratories (India)
Limited Bombay v. Shri A. Y. Manjrekar. (1). The
appellate tribunal took the view that s. 20 of the
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 9
appellate Tribunal Act was concerned purely with
execution and there was no reason to hold that
sub-s. (2) only applied to non-monetary benefits.
The same view was taken by the Madras High Court
in South Electricity Distribution Company Limited
v. Elumalal (2) by a learned Single Judge and
again by the same High court in M.S.N.S.
Transports’ Tiruchirapalli v. Rajaram (K)(3) by a
Division Bench. Looking therefore to the words of
the sub-section and the provious decisions with
respect to them we are of opinion that the word
’benefit’ used in sub-s.(2) is not confined merely
to non-monetary benefit which could be converted
in terms of money but is concerned with all kinds
of benefits, whether monetary or non-monetary, to
which a workman may be entitled, say, for example,
under an award and that the sub-section comes into
play when the benefits have to be computed or
calculated and there is a dispute as to the
calculation or computation. After the benefits
have been so computed, the workman can apply under
sub-s. (1) for recovery of the amount in the same
manner as arrears of land-revenue. As in this
case, the Sastry award had conferred a benefit on
the respondent and those like him by providing for
fixation of pay in the new scale, even though that
benefit may be monetary and there was a dispute
between the parties as to the amount of that
benefit, it was open to the respondent to apply to
the labour court for computation of that benefit
in terms of money, and the labour court would have
986
jurisdiction to entertain the application and
compute the amount due on the basis of the benefit
conferred by the award.
This brings us to the next question, namely,
as to how the basic salary should be fixed. The
main emphasis on behalf of the appellant in this
connection is on the word "corresponding"
appearing in cl. (7) of para. 292. It is urged
that the Sastry tribunal fixed one scale for all
clerks and as supervisors are clerks the
respondent could only be considered as belonging
to the corresponding scale for clerks in the
appellant-bank for the application of the proviso
and thereafter he would be entitled to the special
allowance of Rs. 50/- per mensem. On the other
hand, the respondent contends that supervisors are
workmen, as has been held in a dispute between
this very bank and its supervisors, referred to an
industrial tribunal which gave an award on April
4, 1957, (see the observations of this Court in
the Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. Their Workmen)
(1), and therefore all that was necessary to find
out the corresponding scale was to see in what
scale of workmen the respondent was at the
relevant time. In this connection, we may
incidentally add that it is not disputed by the
appellant that its supervisors, accountants and
accounts in-charge are generally workmen under the
Act, though some may not be so. The difficulty, so
far as the appellant is concerned, arose on
account of the fact that the appellant had nine
scales which applied to workmen of all kinds
beginning with peons and chaukidars and ending
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 9
with accountants and accounts in-charge. Three of
these scales were for what may be called
subordinate staff under the Sastry award while six
were for what is clerical staff under the Sastry
award. These six included the grade of
supervisors. The appellant however contends that
only
987
four grades, namely (i) Assistant Cashiers (ii)
Head Cashiers, (iii) Undergraduate clerks, typists
and Godown keepers, and (iv) Graduate clerks, all
stenographers in sanctioned stenographer’s posts,
should be treated as clerks for purposes of
correspondence with the scale for clerks fixed by
the Sastry award and the remaining two grades,
namely, (i) Supervisors, and (ii) Accountants and
Accounts in-charge, should not be treated as
clerks for the purpose of correspondence. In view,
however, of the decision of the industrial
tribunal in the dispute between the appellant and
some of its supervisors and accountants already
referred to, it is obvious that these two grades
for supervisors and accountants and accounts in-
charge were also grades for workmen prevalent in
the appellantbank. What the Sastry award did was
to make one grade for all clerical workmen and
when cl. (7) speaks of correspondence it relates
in our opinion to the corresponding grades of
workmen by whatever name they may have been known
in particular banks. The fact that certain
clerical workmen in this bank were called clerks
while certain others were called supervisors,
accountants and accounts in-charge would not in
our opinion make any difference to the question of
correspondence, para 292 deals with workmen
generally and not separately with clerical staff
and subordinate staff. Further cl. (7) itself lays
down that the workmen shall be fitted into the new
scale of pay on a point-to-point basis and
therefore when we have to find the corresponding
scale for the purpose of the proviso in cl. (7) we
have to look at the corresponding scale which
relates to a workman at a time before the Sen
award. Now if the supervisor’s scale was the scale
of a workman previous to the Sen award then it
must be held to be a corresponding scale for the
purpose of fixation so far as the respondent is
concerned, irrespective of the name by which this
class of workmen was designated in this particular
bank. The proviso
988
says that after adjustment the basic pay shall not
be less than what it would be under a point-to-
point adjustment on the corresponding pre-Sen
scale. If therefore the supervisor’s scale is a
workman’s scale it must be the corresponding pre-
Sen scale so far as the respondent is concerned;
consequently his basic pay cannot be fixed in the
new scale prescribed by the Sastry award below
what it would be on the corresponding pre-Sen
scale. We have already pointed out that it has
been already held between this very bank and its
workmen that supervisor’s are workmen and
therefore the supervisor’s scale in this bank was
a workmen’s scale; therefore when the fixation of
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 9
pay has to be made under cl. (7) we have to find
out the corresponding workmen’s scale in the case
of the respondent at a time before the Sen award
was made and that in our opinion can only be the
supervisor’s scale, for supervious have been held
to be workmen between the parties to the present
dispute. The fact that the Sastry award provided
for a social pay for certain employees including
supervisors has no relevance on the question of
correspondence which has to be worked out under
cl. (7) in order to find out the basic pay for
purposes of fixation. In view of what we have
said, the supervisor’s scale being a scale for
workmen in this bank, the respondent is right in
his claim that his basic pay cannot be reduced
below what it would be under a point-to-point
adjustment on the corresponding scale which he was
drawing before the Sen award, in this bank as a
workman. In this view of the matter the view taken
by the labour court is correct. Once the principle
is fixed, there is no dispute as the amount due to
the respondent.
The appeal therefore fails and is hereby
dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
989