Full Judgment Text
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 2
PETITIONER:
BALBIR SINGH..
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF PUNJAB
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 19/08/1999
BENCH:
G.T. Nanavati, S.N.Phukan
JUDGMENT:
NANAVATI J.
The appellant had married Sukhwinder Kaur ’ (the
deceased) about four years before the date of incident which
took place on 10,12.1990. The prosecution case was that
neither the appellant nor other family members liked
Sukhwinder Kaur and all of them had desired that she should
die so that the appellant can marry again. It was also the
prosecution case that on 10.12.1990, the appellant gave some
tablets to Dhan Kaur, his mother, for giving them to
Sukhwinder Kaur who was not feeing well,
As a result of taking those tablets she became
restless and was required to be taken to Civil hospital at
Barnala on the same day In the evening. On being informed
about the condition of Sukhwinder Kaur, the police had gone
to the hospital and recorded her statement(Exibit PW8/8) and
on the basis thereof an offence was registered under Section
304-B I.P.C. against the appellant and Dhan Kaur. Her
dying declaration was also got recorded through a Judicial
Magistrate on 11.12.1930 when she was in the hospital at
Ludhiana. Sukhwinder Kaur expired on 12.12.1930 and the
offence, which was earlier registered under Section 304-B
IPC was converted into an offence under Section 302 IPC.
The appellant and Dhan Kaur were then charge-sheeted
and tried for the offencs punishable under Section 302 read
with Section 34 IPC and in the alternative under Section
304-S read with Section 34 IPC. The Trial Court convicted
both under Section 30.2 read with Section 34 IPC. They
challenged their conviction by filing an appeal in the High
Court but the same was dismissed. The present appeal is
filed by Balbir Singh, the husband, and he is challenging
his conviction on the ground that he could not have been
convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC on the
basis of the evidence led in this case.
The only evidence against the appellant was an extra
judicial confession stated to have been made by the
appellant before the Sarpanch of the village, the dying
declaration of Sukhwinder Kaur recorded by the Police on
10.12.1990 and the dying declaration recorded by the
judicial Magistrate on 11.12.90. Both the Trial Court and
the High Court relied upon the two dying declarations and
also the extra judicial confession for the purpose of
convicting the accused. It was submitted by the learned
counsel for the appellant that the Courts below have
committed a grave error in relying upon the extra judicial
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 2
confession as it was highly improbable that in absence- of
any relationship with the sarpanch or for any other good
reason, the appellant would have gone to the Sarpanch and
confessed that he had purchased the poisonous tablets which
led to the death of Sukhwinder Kaur. If what the Sarpanch
has deposed was really true, the investigating officer would
have then tried to find out from whose shop the tablets were
purchased. No such attempt was made. The evidence of
Ssrpanch is not such as could have been accepted without any
"independent corroboration. Even the trial Court and the
High Court have not considered the said extra judicial
confession as sufficient to prove the guilt of the
appellant. It has been regarded as a piece of evidence
furnishing independent corroboration to the dying
declarations. An extra judicial confession even if believed
is considered a very weak piece of evidence and ordinarily
is not accepted without independent corroboration. In this
case, it was of a doubtful character and therefosre it was
wrong to rely upon it and ho7d that it afforded good
corroboration to the dying declarations.
The two dying declarations are also not consistent as
regards the part played by the appellant. in’ the First
Information Report-cum-Dying declaration, Sukhwinder Kaur
had stated that on 10.12.1990 both the .appellant and Dhan
Kaur had administered tablets to her. When that statement
is scrutinised carefully it becomes apparent that what
Sukhwinder Kaur had stated against the appellant was by way
of an inference and not as a