Full Judgment Text
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 7
PETITIONER:
DR. K. RAMULU AND ANR. ETC.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
DR. S. SURYAPRAKASH RAO AND ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 15/01/1997
BENCH:
K. RAMASWAMY, S. SAGHIR AHMAD, G.B. PATTANAIK
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 406-407 OF 1997
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 2281/87(CC 6799-6800/96)
O R D E R
Leave granted.
We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
These appeals by special leave arise from the Order of
the Andhra Pradesh administrative Tribunal, made on June 5,
1996 in O.A. No. 1224/96 and Order made on 19.8.1996 in
Review M.A. No. 2039/96 in O.A. No. 1224/96.
The facts are, very fairly, not in dispute. Respondent
No.1 both sets of appeals is a Veterinary Assistant Surgeon
in A.P. Animal Husbandry Department. He filed O.A. seeking
direction for preparation of a panel of candidates for
promotion as Assistant Director under Rule 4 of the A.P.
Subordinate Service Rules [for short, the ‘General Rules’].
The Tribunal directed the respondent-Government to prepare
and operate the panel for the years 1995-96 for promotion to
the post of Assistant Director in the A.P. Animal Husbandry
Service. Calling that order in question, these appeals have
been filed by the contesting respondents as well as by the
State.
Shri L. Nageswara Rao, learned counsel for the
appellants, have raised three-fold contention. It is firstly
submitted that the respondent has no right to be considered
for promotion as Assistant Director. Secondly, even if he
has got such a right to appointment to the post, the
Government have power to revise its policy of accordance
with the revised policy. The direction given by the Tribunal
is contrary to the policy decision taken by the Government,
namely, to reconsider the policy of promotion in the Service
and to make rules afresh in the place of the existing Rules.
In this premise, the Tribunal has committed manifest error
in directing the Government to prepare, finalise and operate
the panel for the years 1995-96 for promotion as Assistant
Director of the A.P. Animal Husbandry Department. Shri H.S.
Gururaja Rao, learned senior counsel appearing for the first
respondent, in the main appeals, has contended that the
first respondent has a right to be considered to promotion
to the post in accordance with the Rules existing in the
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 7
year 1995-96. The Rules made afresh do not take away the
right of the first respondent to be considered in accordance
with the existing Rules. Rule 4 read with Rule 3 of the
General Rules gives mandate to the Government to prepare the
panel by September 30 of every year to be operative till the
end of December of the succeeding year or preparation of the
fresh panel, whichever is earlier. In this case, since the
process of the preparation of the panel has already been
commenced for filling up the existing vacancies, the
Government is required to complete the preparation of the
panel, finalise the panel and operate the panel. The
Tribunal, therefore, was right in giving the impugned
direction. He also contended that the right given by the
Tribunal cannot be taken away by the Rules made
prospectively w.e.f. June 12, 1996, the date on which the
amended Rules made in G.P. Ms. No. 54 of Animal Husbandry &
Fisheries Department, Government of A.P. came into force.
In view of the rival contentions, the question that
arises for consideration is: whether the view taken by the
Tribunal is correct in law? It is seen that A.P. Animal
Husbandry Service Rules, 1996 made in G.O. Ms. No. 54 of
Animal Husbandry & Fisheries Department dated June 6, 1996
[for short, the ‘Rules’] came into force with effect from
June 12, 1996. The Rules repealed the existing Rules made in
G.O. Ms. No. 729 dated 24.9.1977. The Pules prescribe four
classes of services. Class ‘A’ consists of Category-I,
Director of Animal Husbandry, Category-II, the Additional
Director, Category-III, the Joint Director, Category-IV, the
Deputy Director, Category-V, the Assistant Director and
Category-VI, the Veterinary Assistant Surgeons. It is
prescribed at the end that "all the posts in each category
are inter-changeable for the purpose of seniority,
promotion, transfer and postings". It is not in dispute that
prior to the Rules came into time under the old Rules [for
short, the ’repealed Rules’], for the purpose of promotion
in each category, each class of post was considered to be a
separate unit. The Government had appointed one-man
Commission headed by Sri V. Sundaresan, I.A.S. to go into
the anomalies into the operation of the Rules. The report
was submitted by Sundaresan Commission on June 25, 1990. It
would appear from the record that even as on November 22,
1988, a decision was taken by the Government in the Animal
Husbandry Department to amend the repealed Rules by making
necessary changes. While the process was going on, after the
receipt of the report of the Sundaresaan Commission, the
Government had called for the comments from the Director of
Animal Husbandry Department. The Director had submitted his
comments on September 20, 1995. Thereafter, several meetings
were held to follow up the matter of amendment of the
repealed Rules. The Rules ultimately came to be made. It is
also clear from the record that the Government had taken
decision not to fill up any of the vacancies until the
repealed Rules were duly amended. After the direction issued
by the Tribunal, the Department was advised to make
temporary promotion pending finalization of the Rules. The
Director submitted the proposal to prepare the penal and
several sittings were fixed to consider the cases but the
same could not materialise.
In this perspective, the question arises; whether the
omission on the part of the Government in preparing and
finalizing the panel for promotion of the Assistant
Veterinary Surgeons to the post of Assistant Director is
vitiated by any inaction on the part of the Government and
whether it is in violation of Rule 4 of the General Rules?
It is seen and is not in dispute that under Rule 4 of the
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 7
General Rules all first appointment to the State Service and
all promotions/appointments by transfer shall be made on
grounds of merits and ability and shall be made in
accordance with the special Rules. It also envisages that
list of approved candidates requires to be prepared in
accordance with the Rules. It shall be prepared ordinarily
during the month of September every year on the basis of
estimated vacancies sent in terms of sub-clause (iv) and
30th of September shall be reckoned as the qualifying date
to determine the eligibility of the candidate for such
appointment, which shall cease to be in force on the
afternoon of the 31st December of the succeeding year or
till the new panel is prepared, whichever is earlier. Second
proviso to the Rule provides that if the vacancies are not
available for the particular panel period, subject to the
appointing authority recording a certificate to that effect;
or "where the appointing authority does not consider it
necessary", it is not necessary to prepare the panel. At
this stage, it is necessary to emphasis that the opinion of
the Government by the proviso would not be arbitrary. As
rightly pointed out by Shri L. Nageshwara Rao, the decision
not to prepare the panel should be on valid and relevant
considerations and it should not be arbitrary decision taken
by the Government. The object of Rule 4 is that all eligible
candidates should be considered in accordance with the
Rules. Panel should be finalized and operated so as to give
an opportunity to the approved candidates to scale higher
echelons of service which would augment the efficacy of
service, inculcate discipline and enthuse officers to
assiduously work hard and exhibit honesty and integrity in
the discharge or their duties. Nonetheless, it is seen that
clause (ii) of the second proviso gives power to the State
Government not to prepare the panel and to consider the
cases though the vacancies are available, as stated earlier,
pending amendment of the Rules or recasting the Rules
afresh. The Government have taken conscious decision not to
fill up any of the pending vacancy until the process is
completed which they had started on "administrative
grounds". As seen, the process was completed and the Rules
have come into force w.e.f. June 12, 1996.
In the light of the above factual matrix and the legal
setting, the question is: whether the Tribunal was right in
directing the Government to prepare and operate the panel in
accordance with its directions? The Constitution Bench f
this Court in Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India [(1991) 3
SCC 47], had considered the question in an analogous
situation. Therein, pursuant to the selection made by the
UPSC for appointment to the Civil Services, a list of I.P.S.
officers was prepared and the appellant was one of the
candidates in the waiting list. The Government of India had
taken a decision not to fill up the vacancies except to the
extent of the Scheduled Tribe candidates who were selected
and were in the waiting list. The appellant therein filed
O.A. which was dismissed by the Tribunal. On appeal, this
Court held thus:
"It is not correct to say that if a
number of vacancies are notified
for appointment and adequate number
of candidates are found fit, the
successful candidates acquire an
indefeasible right to be appointed
which cannot be legitimately
denied. Ordinarily the notification
merely amounts to an invitation to
qualified candidates to apply for
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 7
recruitment and on their selection
they do not acquire any right to
the post. Unless the relevant
recruitment rules so indicate, the
State is under no legal duty to
fill up all or any of the
vacancies. However, it does not
mean that the State has the licence
of acting in an arbitrary manner.
The decision not to fill up the
vacancies has to be taken bona fide
for appropriate reasons. And if the
vacancies or any of them are filled
up, the State is bound to respect
the comparative merit of the
candidates, as reflected at the
recruitment test, and no
discrimination can be permitted.
This correct position has been
consistently followed by this
court, and we do not find any
discordant note in the decisions in
State of Haryana v. Subhash Chander
Marwaha, Neelima Shangla v. State
of Haryana, or Jatendra Kumar v.
State of Punjab".
In paragraph 8, this Court considered the ratio in
State of Haryana V/s. Subhash Chander Marwaha [(1974) 3 SCC
220] wherein though the vacancies were existing and select
list candidates were available, pursuant to the
recommendation made by the High Court not to appoint any
candidate who had secured less than 55% marks, the
Government acted upon it and did not appoint the candidates
in the waiting list. When they claimed their right to
appointment, and the order was issued by the High Court for
filling up all the vacancies from persons in the waiting
list, this Court had laid that though the candidates were
waiting in the list, they had no right to be appointed. It
was held that the plea of arbitrariness does not arise since
the Government have taken a decision not to appoint any of
the persons who secured less than 55% of the marks. This
Court also has pointed out in Shankarsan Dash case that when
the Government have taken a conscious policy decision not to
fill up the vacancies, the decision must be reasonable and
not arbitrary. Since it was a policy decision it could not
be interfered with. It was held that the vacancies for the
Scheduled Tribe candidates were being filled up for the
reason that vacancies reserved for them were not being
filled up due to non-availability of the select candidates.
The decision to fill up the vacancies reserved for Scheduled
Tribe candidates was justified on the ground that non-
filling up of the vacancies belonging to the general
candidates cannot be characterized as arbitrary decision. It
was observed that "the fact that it was not for the Public
Service Commission to take a decision in this regard was
emphasised in this judgment. None of these decisions,
therefore, supports the appellant". Thus it could be seen
that it the decision of the Government is supported by valid
reasons, it cannot be stated that the decision taken by the
Government as arbitrary.
This position was reiterated by this Court in State of
Bihar & Ors. v. Md. Kalimuddin & Ors. [(1996) 2 SCC 7].
Therein, the Government of Bihar also have taken a decision
to revise the policy of reservation and pending decision the
appointments of the wait listed candidates were deferred.
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 7
The High Court, however, approached the matter and gave
direction thus:
"The Panel thus does not appear to
be violative of the reservation
policy of the State. So far s the
proposed rules of recruitment are
concerned, the details of which
have not been furnished from which
it could be gathered as to whether
any substantial or drastic
deviation is sought to be made from
the existing rules regarding the
procedure no longer to be a
necessary qualification or
condition of eligibility I do not
want to go into the correctness of
the policy of the State dispensing
with the necessity of the training
as a condition of eligibility.
However, I have serious doubt
whether appointment of untrained
teachers in preference to the
trained ones who are already in
panel and available for appointment
can be said to be in public
interest."
This Court further held thus:
"The ultimate outcome of that
exercise is not fully brought out
on record but it is obvious that
the State Government was not acting
mala fide and merely with a view to
denying appointment to the
respondents herein. Merely because
notwithstanding the availability of
trained personnel the State
Government was inclined to change
the rules in that behalf does not
appear to be valid ground for
contending that the Government had
acted mala fide. Without knowing
the nature of change it was not
open to the High Court to
anticipate the policy and brand it
as unreasonable."
In paragraph, 9 it was observed that "we are of the
opinion that even if it is assumed that the panel or select
list had not expired at the date of filing of the writ
petition, the refusal on the part of the Government to make
appointment from the panel or select list, vide letter date
27.5.1993, could not be condemned as arbitrary, irrational
and or mala fide.
The same ratio was reiterated in U.O.I. & Ors. v. K.V.
Vijeesh [(1996) 3 SCC 139, paras 5 and 7]. Thus, it could be
seen that for reasons germane to the decision, the
Government is entitled to take a decision not to fill up the
existing vacancies as on the relevant date. Shri H. S.
Guraraja Rao, contends that this Court in Y.V. Rangaiah &
Ors. v. J. Sreenivasa Rao & Ors. [(1983) 3 SCC 284] had held
that the existing vacancies were required to be filled up as
per law prior to the date of the amended Rules. The mere
fact that Rules came to be amended subsequently does not
empower the Government not to consider the persons who are
eligible prior to the date of appointment. It is sen that
the case related to the amendment of the Rules prior to the
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 7
amendment of the Rules. Two sources were available for
appointment as sub-Registrar, namely, UDCs and LDCs.
Subsequently, Rules came to be amended taking away the right
of the LDCs for appointment as sub-Registrar. When the
vacancies were not being filled up in accordance with the
existing Rules, this court had pointed out that prior to the
amendment of the Rules, the vacancies were existing and that
the eligible candidates were required to be considered in
accordance with the prevailing Rules. Therefore, the mere
fact of subsequent amendment does not take away the right to
be considered in accordance with the existing Rules. As
proposition of law, there is no dispute and cannot be
disputed. But the question is: whether the ratio in
Rangaiah’s case would apply to the facts of this case? The
Government therein merely amended the Rules, applied amended
Rules without taking any conscious decision not to fill up
the existing vacancies pending amendment of the Rules on the
date the new Rules came into force. It is true, as contended
by Mr. H.S. Gururaja Rao, that this Court has followed the
ratio therein in many a decision and those cited by him are
P. Ganeshwar Rao & Ors. v. State of A.P. & Ors. [(1988)
Supp. SCC 740], P. Mahendranath v. State of Karnataka
[(1990) 1 SCC 411], A.A. Caljon v. Director of Education
[(1983) 3 SCC 33], N.T. Dev v. Karnataka PSC [(1990) 3 SCC
157, Ramesh Kumar Choudha & Ors. v. State of M.P. & Ors.
[(1996) 7 Scale 619]. In none of these decisions, situation
which has arisen in the present case had come up for
consideration. Even Rule 3 of the General Rules is not of
any help to the respondent for the reason that Rule 3
contemplates making of an appointment in accordance with the
existing Rules.
It is seen that since the Government have taken a
conscious decision not to make any appointment till the
amendment of the rules, Rule 3 of the General Rules is not
of any help to the appellant. The ratio in the case of
Ramesh Kumar Choudha & Ors. v. State of M.P. & Ors. [(1996)
7 SCALE 619] is also not of any help to the respondent.
Therein, this Court had pointed out that the panel requires
to be made in accordance with the existing Rules and
operated upon. There cannot be any dispute on that
proposition or direction issued by this Court. As stated
earlier, the Government was right in taking a decision not
to operate Rule 4 of the General Rules due to their policy
decision to amend the Rules. He then relies on paragraph 14
of the unreported judgment of this Court made in Union of
India V/s. S.S. Uppal & Anr. [ (1996) 1 Unreported Judgments
(SC) 393]. Even that decision is not of any help to him. He
then relies upon the judgment of this Court in Gajraj Singh
etc. v. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal & Ors. etc.
[(1996) 7 SCALE 31] wherein it was held that the existing
rights saved by the repealed Act would be considered in
accordance with the Rules. The ratio therein is not
applicable because the existing Rules do not save any of the
rights acquired or accruing under the Rules. On the other
hand, this court had pointed out in paragraph 23 thus:
"Whenever an Act is repealed it
must be considered, except as to
transactions past and closed, as if
it had never existed. The effect
thereof is to obliterate the Act
completely from the record of the
Parliament as if it had never been
passed it, (sic) it never existed
except for the purpose of those
actions which were commenced,
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 7
prosecuted and concluded while it
was existing law. Legal fiction is
one which is not an actual reality
and which the law recognises and
the court accepts as a reality.
Therefore, in case of legal fiction
the court believes something to
exist which in reality does not
exist. It is nothing but a
presumption of the existence of the
state of affairs which in actuality
is non-existent. The effect of such
a legal fiction is that a position
which otherwise could not obtain is
deemed to obtain under the
circumstances. Therefore, when
Section 217(1) of the Act repealed
Act 4 of 1939 w.e.f July 1, 1989,
the law in Act 4 of 1939 in effect
came to be non-existent except as
regards the transactions, past and
closed or save."
Re: Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal [(1993) Supp. 1 SCC
96] also does not help the appellant. Therein when the
judgment of this Court had become final, the Governor issued
an ordinance not to implement the judgment of this Court.
The constitution Bench, therefore, had held that since the
judgment was allowed to become final, it is not open to the
Government not to implement the judgment by issuing an
ordinance holding that it amounts to interferes with power
of judicial review of this Court.
Thus, we hold that the first respondent has not
acquired any vested right for being considered for promotion
in accordance with the repealed Rules in view of the policy
decision taken by the Government which we find is
justifiable on the material available from the record placed
before us. We hold that the Tribunal was not right and
correct in directing the Government to of Assistant
Directors of Animal Husbandry Department in accordance with
the repealed Rules and to operate the same.
The appeals are accordingly allowed. The order of the
Tribunal is set aside but, in the circumstances, without
costs.