Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (crl.) 1127 of 1995
PETITIONER:
VISHNU NAGNATH DESHMUKH
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/11/2000
BENCH:
UMESH C. BANERJEE & K.G. BALAKRISHNAN
JUDGMENT:
JUDGMENT
2000 Supp(4) SCR 462
The following Order of the Court was delivered :
The appellant in this appeal by grant of special leave challenges the
judgment and order dated 13.4.1993 passed by the learned single Judge of
the Bombay High Court upholding on appeal the appellant’s conviction under
section 5(2) read with section 5(i)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1947 and under section 161 IPC. The Special Judge, Solapur, in Case No.
4/1986 convicted the appellant with rigorous imprisonment for six months
and a fine of Rs. 100 and in default of payment of fine the appellant to
undergo further rigorous imprisonment for 15 days.
The subject-matter of the appeal pertains to illegal gratification of Rs.
10. The learned advocate appearing in support of the appeal took us in
great detail to the evidence tendered and contended that question of there
being any corruption involved does not arise since the Tahsildar himself
has allowed the appellant to retain a book for collection of money for
soldiers welfare fund. Payment of Rs. 10 thus stands admitted. The dispute
being whereas the appellant is contending that the same was collected at
the instance of the Tahsildar on account of soldiers welfare fund, the
prosecution harped upon illegal gratification. The record depicts that PW2
Yunus went to the office of the Tahsildar on 8.1.1986 and gave an
application for issuance of necessary succession certificate and it is the
accused who is said to have informed Yunus (PW2) that the application would
be sent for inquiry but one can get a certificate only upon payment of
certificate fees and in that case fees was prescribed at Rs. 10 and it is
on this score that a complaint was lodged with the Anti- Corruption
Department and the usual formalities regarding these matters were duly
complied with. Before we proceed further in the matter we ought to
appreciate that this Court does not examine the evidence for itself in
appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution except when the interest of
justice so requires. In the instant case the facts have been gone in detail
by both the Special Judge as also by the learned single Judge of the High
Court in appeal. The question of any intervention on the factual situation
at this stage of the proceedings is not warranted. On the factual aspect
also and having due regard to the evidence, we also cannot come as a matter
of fact to a different conclusion than what has been arrived at, except
however on the question of sentence. The learned advocate appearing in
support of the appeal in the alternative submitted that by reason of the
smallness of the amount involved and by reason of the factum that the
appellant being in jail for a period of four months, the question of
further punishment would not arise in the factual context and submitted
that the appellant has enough sufferings already by reason of the long
lapse of time during the pendency of the proceedings and interest of
justice would be sub-served in having the punishment for the period already
undergone. In support of the alternative submission strong reliance is
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placed on the decision of this Court in B.G. Goswami v. Delhi
Administration, [1974] 1 SCR 222 wherein this Court recorded that the
purpose of sentence is that the accused must realise that he has committed
an act which is not only harmful to the society of which he forms an
integral part but is also harmful to his own future both as an individual
and as a member of the society. This Court thereafter observed :-
"Punishment is designed to protect society by deterring potential offenders
as also by preventing the guilty party from repeating the offence: it is
also designed to reform the offender and re-claim him as a law abiding
citizen for the good of the society as a whole. Reformatory, deterrent and
punitive aspects of punishment thus play their due part in judicial
thinking while determining this question. In modern civilized societies,
however, reformatory aspect is being given somewhat greater importance. Too
lenient as well as too harsh sentences both lose their efficaciousness. One
does not deter and the other may frustrate thereby making the offender a
hardened criminal. In the present case, after weighing the consideration
already noticed by us and the fact that to send the appellant back to jail
now after 7 years of the agony and harassment of these proceedings when he
is also going to lose his job and to earn a living for himself and for his
family members and for those dependent on him, we feel that it would meet
the ends of justice if we reduce the sentence of imprisonment to that
already undergone but increase the sentence of fine from Rs. 200 to Rs.
400. Period of imprisonment in case of default will remain the same."
On the wake of the observations above, we also do feel it inclined to
accept the submissions made on behalf of the appellant that the interest of
justice would be met if we reduce the imprisonment to that already
undergone by reason of the smallness of the amount involved. We take it on
record that the amount of fine has already been paid and as such we do not
wish to enhance the amount either. Learned counsel for the appellant in
support of the appeal has stated that the appellant has undergone four
month sentence. The appeal thus stands accepted in part and disposed of in
terms of the above.