Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (crl.) 432 of 1996
PETITIONER:
STATE OF RAJASTHAN
RESPONDENT:
NATHU AND ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 28/04/2003
BENCH:
Y.K. SABHARWAL & H.K. SEMA
JUDGMENT:
JUDGMENT
2003 (3) SCR 967
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SEMA, J. This appeal by special leave is preferred by the State of
Rajasthan against the order of the High Court dated 11.1.1995 whereby and
whereunder the High Court has maintained the conviction of accused Dhulla
under Section 302 IPC simpliciter and recorded acquittal of the accused-
respondents Nathu s/o Nana, Walji (Balji) s/o Moola, Heera s/o Nana and
Dheera S/o Moola, thereby reversing the sentences and convictions recorded
by the Trial Court in case No. 90 of 1985 under Section 302 with aid of
Section 149 IPC and sentenced them to RI for life. The accused Dhulla is
not before us.
Two children of Bhima (PW-1) - son-Dinesh aged about four years and
daughter-Jeevi aged about seven years, were butchered to death by
inflicting axe blows between 12.00 - 1.00 noon on 26.6.1985. The post
mortem shows that the necks of deceased Dinesh and Jeevi were choked and
the same were connected with a thin layer of skin. The prosecution story
briefly stated is that on 26.6.1985 at about 12.00 - 1.00 noon while the
complainant Bhima (PW-1) was sleeping on the cot along with his son Dinesh
aged 4 years and his daughter Jeevi aged 7 years who were also sleeping on
the palm carpet on the earth near the cot, he heard the noise of persons
coming from the backyard of his house. He then got up and saw from the
wall, made of wood, the accused persons - Nathu armed with gun; Heera armed
with gun; Dheera armed with ’dhariya’; Balji armed with axe and Dhulla
armed with axe and the other persons armed with lathis. Being frightened he
ran out of his house and hid himself behind the hut situated in front of
his house and started watching from there. The accused persons entered into
his house after breaking the wall of wood from the backyard of the house.
When he heard his daughter Jeevi’s sound of ’Aah’, Bhima (PW1) presumed
that both the children have been killed and he would also be killed. So he
fled from the place towards the house of his father and raised an alarm.
Being attracted by his alarm his mother Kanku, brother Shankar, Arun etc.
reached there. They also saw the accused persons leaving the house.
Thereafter, the mother of Bhima went to see the children. She found that
both the children have been murdered. There was enmity between the accused
persons and Bhima and a quarrel also took place between the complainant and
the accused party 7-8 days prior to the incident. The accused were stated
to have taken avenge by committing the crime. Thereafter, PW-1 along with
his brothers went to the police station Pahara and lodged the FIR
(Ext.P-1). Inspector Bakhtawar Singh (PW-15) investigated the case. He also
prepared panchnama of dead bodies (Ext. P-2 and P-3) of Dinesh and Jeevi
respectively. He also prepared sketch memo of the scene of crime. He also
got the post mortem conducted of the deceased Dinesh and Jeevi by Dr.
Ramesh Chander Ohri (PW-I2), (Ext.P-1 land P-12). The accused were arrested
vide memo Ext.P-21 to Ext.P-27. The accused Nathu, Heera, Dhulla and Balji
gave disclosure statements vide Ext.P-28 to P-32 and pursuant to the
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disclosure statements lathis of cane were recovered vide Ext.P-11 and P-12.
Pursuant to the disclosure statement of accused Nathu, gun was recovered
vide (Ext.P-9). Pursuant to the disclosure statement of accused Dhulla and
Balji axes were recovered vide Ext.P-8 and P-10. After the completion of
the investigation seven accused persons were challened. Accused Dhulla and
Balji were charged under Sections 148, 302 & 414 IPC. Accused Kalu and
Jumji were charge-sheeted under Sections 148, 302 read with Section 149
IPC. Accused Nathu, Heera and Dheera were charged under Sections 148, 302
read with Section 149 and 454 IPC. The accused pleaded not guilty and
sought to be tried. The learned trial court framed as many as five issues
and after examining the evidence and documents on record found all the
issues established against the accused and held the accused Dhulla guilty
of offence punishable under Sections 302 read with Section 149, 454 and 148
IPC; accused Balji guilty of offence punishable under Sections 302 read
with Section 149, 454 and 148 IPC; and. the accused persons Heera, Dheera
and Nathu also guilty for the offence punishable under Sections 302 read
with Section 149,451 and 148 IPC. Accused Jumji s/o Nanji and accused Kalu
s/o Nanji were acquitted of the charges of the aforesaid offences. Accused
Dhulla was awarded life imprisonment under Section 302 IPC and a fine of
Rs.100 and in default RI for one month. He was also awarded life
imprisonment under Section 302 read with Section 149 and a fine of Rs. 50
and in default RI for 15 days. He was also awarded two years RI for offence
under Section 454 IPC and a fine of Rs.100 and in default RI for one month
and two years RI for offence punishable under Section 148 IPC. Accused
Balji was awarded life imprisonment under Section 302 read with Section 149
IPC and a fine of Rs.50 and in default RI for 15 days. He was also awarded
two years RI for an offence punishable under Section 454 and a fine of
Rs.100 and in default RI for one month and two years RI for the offence
under Section 148 IPC. Accused Heera, Dheera and Nathu had been awarded
life imprisonment under Section 302 read with Section 149 and a fine of
Rs.50 and in default RI for 15 days. They were also awarded sentence of one
year RI for the offence under Section 451 IPC and two years RI for the
offence under Section 148 IPC. The sentences were ordered to run
concurrently.
At this stage it will be pertinent to point out that altogether eight
accused were mentioned in the FIR. Accused Kana was separately tried by the
Juvenile Court and the remaining seven accused faced trial before the Trial
Court - out of which five accused were convicted as noticed above and two
were acquitted by the Trial Court.
Aggrieved by the above conviction five accused Nathu, Balji, Heera, Dheera
and Dhulla filed criminal appeal before the High Court of Rajasthan being
Criminal Appeal No. 342 of 1986. The High Court on re-appraisal of the
evidence on record and after hearing counsel for both the sides maintained
the conviction of accused Dhulla under Section 302 IPC and acquitted
accused Nathu, Balji, Heera and Dheera for the offence under Section 302
read with Section 149 IPC on the ground that common object has not been
established by the prosecution and no overt act whatsoever has been
attributed to them. This is what the High Court has said:
"We are, however, of the opinion that in the absence of any common object
on behalf of the other accused to cause culpable injury either to Bheema or
any member of his family. Provisions of Sec. 149 of the I.P.C. cannot be
resorted to in order to attract the theory of any common object of revenge.
There must be on record evidence of formation of such object and in any
case, there must be a statement regarding such being object of the accused.
In the absence of any such statement and evidence it is impermissible in
law to take recourse to provisions of Sec. 149 of the I.P.C. or convicting
others who admittedly are present and who have not been attributed over
tact whatsoever.
The maximum that has been proved in the present case is that the accused
persons did assemble together and went towards the house of Bheema. Having
found that he is not there, three remained away, five entered the premises.
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Dheera is alleged to have hit the children of Bheema who has run away but
even this is not proved and only Dhoola has struck a fatal blow. We are,
therefore, unable to agree with the learned Sessions Judge in convicting
the other accused persons under Sec. 302 read with Sec. 149 of the l.P.C."
(Emphasis supplied)
From the above finding of the High Court the accused formed themselves an
unlawful assembly and went together towards the house of Bhima is proved.
Having found the unlawful assembly of five accused proved, the High Court
proceeded on wrong assumption of law that only accused Dhulla had struck a
fatal blow and no overt act has been attributed to the rest of four
accused. The view taken by the High Court, in our opinion, is a complete
negation of the settled position of law enunciated by a catena of decisions
of this Court, which we shall be dealing at an appropriate time.
As already noticed, accused Dhulla did not challenge his conviction
affirmed by the High Court and, therefore, only remaining four accused are
before us.
Before we advert further, we may dispose of a few arguments of Mr. Sudhir
Walia, learned amicus curiae as we are of the view that such submissions
should not detain us any longer. It is the contention of Mr. Walia that in
the FIR PW-1 had mentioned that a lalkara had been raised by the accused
whereas in the evidence before the Court he had not stated so, and
therefore, there is inconsistency in the FIR and in the statement of PW1 in
the Court. Such minor discrepancy, in our view, is inconsequential and that
would not demolish the prosecution story otherwise found established by
convincing evidence. The other contention of Mr. Walia is that the recovery
of axe pursuant to the disclosure statement of accused Dhulla (Ext.31) is
doubtful inasmuch as the voluntary disclosure about axe by the accused
Dhulla was made on 27.6.1985 whereas vide Ext.P-8 the axe was recovered on
30.6.1985 after a delay of three days. Apart, from this aspect the matter
has been dealt in detail by the Trial Court, which has rejected the
contention. As already noticed, accused Dhulla is not before us and the
recovery of the axe pursuant to the disclosure statement of the accused
Dhula has attained its finality.
The main thrust of submission of Mr. Walia is that the prosecution has
failed to establish common object to eliminate Bhima (PW-1) by leading
convincing evidence.
Section 141 1PC defines an unlawful assembly to be an assembly of five or
more persons, where the common object of the persons comprising that
assembly is to commit any of the acts enumerated in the five clauses of
that Section. Section 149 provides that every member of unlawful assembly
is guilty of offence committed in prosecution of common object and if an
offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution
of the common object of that assembly or such as the members of that
assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object,
every person who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is a
member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offence. In the instant
case, the accused persons were comprised of five and they had formed an
unlawful assembly, is being found by both the courts concurrently.
The next question that remains to be considered is as to what is the common
object of that assembly.
In Lalji and Ors. v. State of U.P., [1989] 1 SCC 437, this Court pointed
out at SCC p.441 as under:
"The two essentials of the section are the commission of an offence by any
member of an unlawful assembly and that such offence must have been
committed in prosecution of the common object of that assembly or must be
such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed. Not
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every person is necessarily guilty but only those who share in the common
object. The common object of the assembly must be one of the five objects
mentioned in Section 141 IPC. Common object of the unlawful assembly can be
gathered from the nature of the assembly, arms used by them and the
behaviour of the assembly at or before scene of occurrence. It is an
inference to be deduced from the facts and circumstances of each case. "
(Emphasis supplied)
In Masalti v. State of U.P., [1964] 8 SCR 133, a Constitution Bench of five
learned Judges presided over by P.B. Gajendragadkar,CJ (as his Lordship
then was) considered the scope of Section 149 in depth and held at SCR pp.
148-149 thus:
"The crucial question to determine in such a case is whether the assembly
consisted of five or more persons and whether the said persons entertained
one or more the common objects as specified by s. 141. While determining
this question, it becomes relevant to consider whether the assembly
consisted of some persons who were merely passive witnesses and had joined
the assembly as a matter of idle curiosity without intending to entertain
the common object of the assembly. It is in that context that the
observations made by this Court in the case of Baladin (AIR 1956 SC 181)
assume significance; otherwise, in law, it would not be correct to say that
before a person is held to be a member of an unlawful assembly, it must be
shown that he had committed some illegal overt act or had been guilty of
some illegal omission in pursuance of the common object of the assembly. In
fact, s. 149 makes it clear that if an offence is committed by any member
of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that
assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be
committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of
the committing of that offence; is a member of the same assembly, is guilty
of that offence; and that emphatically brings out the principle that the
punishment prescribed by s. 149 is in a sense vicarious and does not always
proceed on the basis that the offence has been actually committed by every
member of the unlawful assembly. Therefore, we are satisfied that the
observations made in the case of Baladin (AIR 1956 SC 181) must be read in
the context of the special facts of that case and cannot be treated as
laying down an unqualified proposition of law such as Mr. Sawhney
suggests,"
The principle enunciated by this Court in Masalti (supra) and Lalji (supra)
has been followed consistently by this Court thereafter in catena of
decisions. Avoiding multiciplity see: Stale of U.P. v. Dan Singh and Ors.,
[1997] 3 SCC 747; State of A. P. v. Thakkidiram Reddy and Ors., [1998] 6
SCC 554; Anil Rai v. State of Bihar, [2001] 7 SCC 318; Gangadhar Behera and
Ors. v. State of Orissa, [2002] SCC 381.
Reverting to the facts of the case, evidence on record clearly established
that accused Dhulla, Balji, Nathu, Heera and Dheera entered into the house
of Bhima by breaking down the wall of the house and amongst them accused
Dhulla was armed with axe, Balji was armed with axe, Heera and Dheera were
armed with lathis and Nathu was armed with gun. A long standing enmity
between PW-1 Bhima and the accused persons is proved from the statements of
Bhima, Shankar, Vasu, Nani and Kanku. It is also revealed from the above
evidence that 7-8 days prior to the incident Bhima and others had a quarrel
with other members of the families of the accused persons.
As noticed above, the murder has been committed in broad day light between
12.00 noon and 1 p.m. Witnesses and accused are known persons. The accused
persons had formed an unlawful assembly armed with formidable weapons; came
to the house of Bhima; broke down the wall and entered into the house. They
found Bhima not in the house and butchered his two children by inflicting
axe injuries. As has been held by this Court in Lalji (supra) the common
object of an unlawful assembly can be gathered from the nature of the
assembly, arms used by them and the behaviour of the assembly at or before
scene of occurrence. Deduced from the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it
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is quite apparent that the accused had formed an unlawful assembly with
object to eliminate Bhima to take avenge of long standing animosity and the
quarrel ensued 7-8 days prior to the incident. It is quite apparent,
therefore, that the accused persons had formed an unlawful assembly with a
common object to take avenge from Bhima and family members and committed
the murder. The common object to murder Bhima and his family can be
gathered from the formidable arms carried by the accused, entering the
house by breaking the wall and finding Bhima not there, butchered his
children. Gathered from the above facts and circumstances and evidence on
record it cannot be said that the four accused joined the assembly as a
matter of idle curiosity or they were passive onlookers without intending
to entertain the common object of that assembly.
Mr. Walia, learned amicus curiae contended that the prosecution did not
prove the breaking down of the wall by all the accused persons. We are
unable to countenance this submission. The Trial Court after careful
appreciation of the evidence gave a clear finding that two accused persons
Dhulla and Balji entered into Bhima’s house after breaking the rear wall of
the house and the remaining three accused persons Nathu, Heera and Dheera
entered through the door. This would go to show that all the five accused
had entered into the house of Bhima. The question whether two accused came
to the house after breaking the rear wall and remaining accused persons
entered through door is inconsequential for determining their common
object. The fact that all the accused persons formed an unlawful assembly
and entered into the house of PW1 with formidable weapons is clearly
deducible that they formed common object to eliminate Bhima and his family.
As already noticed, the common object to kill Bhima can be gathered from
the formidable weapons, which the accused carried and their aggressive
behaviour of entering the house by breaking down the wall. No other
conclusion is possible. Mr. Walia next contended that the prosecution has
failed to prove as to which of the accused from the members of the unlawful
assembly had caused the death of deceased Dinesh. This contention is also
liable to be rejected. If death had been caused in prosecution of common
object of unlawful assembly, it is not necessary to record a definite and
specific finding as to which particular accused out of the members of the
unlawful assembly caused the fatal injury. Once an unlawful assembly has
come into existence, each member of the assembly becomes vicariously liable
for the criminal act of any other member of the assembly committed in
prosecution of the common object of the assembly. See: Rajendra Shantaram
Todankar v. State of Maharashtra, [2003] 2 SCC 257 at SCC p.264).
For the afore-stated reasons, we allow the appeal, preferred by the State,
by setting aside the order of acquittal recorded by the High Court and
restore the convictions and sentences recorded by the Trial Court against
the accused persons viz., Nathu s/o Nana, Walji s/o Moola, Heera s/o Nana
and Dheera s/o Moola. They are directed to surrender to their bail bonds to
serve out the sentence imposed by the Trial Court.
Before parting with the record we record our deep appreciation to Mr.
Walia, learned amicus curiae for rendering abled assistance to the Court.