Full Judgment Text
1
REPORTBALE
2025 INSC 520
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.5213/2025
(@Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No.2511/2018)
NAFEES AHMAD & ANR. Appellant(s)
VERSUS
SOINUDDIN & ORS. Respondent(s)
O R D E R
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal arises from the judgment and order passed by the
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench dated 4-9-2017
in Second Appeal No.69/2008, by which the Second Appeal filed by
the respondents – herein came to be partly allowed and the matter
was remitted to the First Appellate Court on the ground that the
First Appellate Court failed to comply with the provisions of
Order 41 Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC).
3. The High Court, while deciding the Second Appeal, formulated
the following substantial question of law:-
“Whether it is incumbent upon the Appellate Court to
frame the point of determination as per the provisions
of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC while deciding the first appeal
or not?”
4. Order 41 Rule 31 CPC reads thus:
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
VISHAL ANAND
Date: 2025.04.21
18:12:07 IST
Reason:
“Rule 31. Contents, date and signature of judgment.─
The judgment of the Appellate Court shall be in writing
and shall state ─
(a) the points for determination;
(b) the decision thereon;
(c) the reasons for the decision; and
2
(d) where the decree appealed from is reversed
or varied, the relief to which the appellant is
entitled,
and shall at the time that it is pronounced be signed
and dated by the Judge or by the Judges concurring
therein.”
5. It appears that the High Court relying upon few decisions took
the view that Order 41 Rule 31 CPC is mandatory and the failure on
the part of the Appellate Court to frame the points for
determination as per the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC would
vitiate the entire judgment and make it wholly void.
6. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and
having gone through the materials on record, we are in complete
disagreement with the view taken by the High Court.
7. We propose to follow the dictum as laid by this Court in the
case of “G. Amalorpavam And Others v. R.C. Diocese of Madurai And
Others” reported in (2006) 3 SCC 224, wherein this Court observed
that whether in a particular case, there has been substantial
compliance, with the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC should be
determined on the nature of the judgment delivered in each case.
Non-compliance with the provisions, by itself, may not vitiate the
judgment and make it wholly void and may be ignored if there has
been a substantial compliance with it.
8. We may elaborate the issue a little further from a different
angle.
9. The Privy Council observed in “Mt. Fakrunisa v. Moulvi Izarus”
reported in AIR 1921 PC 55, at p. 56, as under:
3
“In every appeal it is incumbent upon the appellants
to show reason why the judgment appealed from should
be disturbed; there must be some balance in their
favour when all the circumstances are considered, to
justify the alteration of the judgment that stands.
Their Lordships are unable to find that this duty has
been discharged.”
10 The Privy Council decision referred to above was looked into by
a three-Judge Bench in the case of “Thakur Sukhpal Singh v. Thakur
Kalyan Singh and Anr.” reported in (1963) 2 SCR 733, wherein this
Court observed as under:
“With respect, we agree with this and hold that it is
the duty of the appellant to show that the judgment
under appeal is erroneous for certain reasons and it
is only after the appellant has shown this that the
appellate court would call upon the respondent to
reply to the contention. It is only then that the
judgment of the appellate court can fully contain all
the various matters mentioned in Ruel 31, Order 41.”
11. This Court observed in “Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal,
Kotah, Bhurey Lal Baya” reported in (1955) 2 SCR 1, at page 8:
“Now a code of procedure must be regarded as such. It
is procedure, something designed to facilitate justice
and further its ends: ... Too technical construction
of sections that leaves no room for reasonable elas-
ticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded
against (provided always that justice is done to both
sides) lest the very means designed for the further-
ance of justice be used to frustrate it.”
12. The provisions of Rule 31 should therefore be reasonably
construed and should be held to require the various particulars to
be mentioned in the judgment only when the appellant has actually
raised certain points for determination by the Appellate Court, and
not when no such points are raised.
4
13. We must also look into the provisions of Rule 30 of Order 41
for the purpose of fortifying our interpretation of Rule 31.
Order 41 Rule 30 CPC reads thus:
“30. Judgment when and where pronounced.─ (1) The
Appellate Court, after hearing the parties or their
pleaders and referring to any part of the proceedings,
whether on appeal or in the court from whose decree
the appeal is preferred, to which reference may be
considered necessary, shall pronounce judgment in open
Court, either at once or on some future day of which
notice shall be given to the parties or their
pleaders.
(2) Where a written judgment is to be pronounced, it
shall be sufficient if the points for determination,
the decision thereon and the final order passed in the
appeal are read out and it shall not be necessary for
the Court to read out the whole judgment, but a copy
of the whole judgment shall be made available for the
perusal of the parties or their pleaders immediately
after the judgment in pronounced.”
14. Thus, this Rule does not make it incumbent on the Appellate
Court to refer to any part of the proceedings in the court from
whose decree the appeal is preferred. The Appellate Court can
refer, after hearing the parties and their pleaders, to any part of
these proceedings to which reference be considered necessary. It is
in the discretion of the Appellate Court to refer to the
proceedings. It is competent to pronounce judgment after hearing
what the parties or their pleaders submit to it for consideration.
It follows therefore that if the appellant submits nothing for
its consideration, the Appellate Court can decide the appeal
without any reference to any proceedings of the courts below and,
in doing so, it can simply say that the appellants have not urged
anything which would tend to show that the judgment and decree
under appeal were wrong. [See : “Thakur Sukhpal Singh” (supra)]
5
15. In the aforesaid view of the matter, we allow this appeal.
16. The impugned judgment and order of the High Court is set
aside.
17. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
…………………………………………J
(J.B. PARDIWALA)
…………………………………………J
(R. MAHADEVAN)
NEW DELHI
16TH APRIL, 2025.
va
REPORTBALE
2025 INSC 520
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.5213/2025
(@Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No.2511/2018)
NAFEES AHMAD & ANR. Appellant(s)
VERSUS
SOINUDDIN & ORS. Respondent(s)
O R D E R
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal arises from the judgment and order passed by the
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench dated 4-9-2017
in Second Appeal No.69/2008, by which the Second Appeal filed by
the respondents – herein came to be partly allowed and the matter
was remitted to the First Appellate Court on the ground that the
First Appellate Court failed to comply with the provisions of
Order 41 Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC).
3. The High Court, while deciding the Second Appeal, formulated
the following substantial question of law:-
“Whether it is incumbent upon the Appellate Court to
frame the point of determination as per the provisions
of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC while deciding the first appeal
or not?”
4. Order 41 Rule 31 CPC reads thus:
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
VISHAL ANAND
Date: 2025.04.21
18:12:07 IST
Reason:
“Rule 31. Contents, date and signature of judgment.─
The judgment of the Appellate Court shall be in writing
and shall state ─
(a) the points for determination;
(b) the decision thereon;
(c) the reasons for the decision; and
2
(d) where the decree appealed from is reversed
or varied, the relief to which the appellant is
entitled,
and shall at the time that it is pronounced be signed
and dated by the Judge or by the Judges concurring
therein.”
5. It appears that the High Court relying upon few decisions took
the view that Order 41 Rule 31 CPC is mandatory and the failure on
the part of the Appellate Court to frame the points for
determination as per the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC would
vitiate the entire judgment and make it wholly void.
6. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and
having gone through the materials on record, we are in complete
disagreement with the view taken by the High Court.
7. We propose to follow the dictum as laid by this Court in the
case of “G. Amalorpavam And Others v. R.C. Diocese of Madurai And
Others” reported in (2006) 3 SCC 224, wherein this Court observed
that whether in a particular case, there has been substantial
compliance, with the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC should be
determined on the nature of the judgment delivered in each case.
Non-compliance with the provisions, by itself, may not vitiate the
judgment and make it wholly void and may be ignored if there has
been a substantial compliance with it.
8. We may elaborate the issue a little further from a different
angle.
9. The Privy Council observed in “Mt. Fakrunisa v. Moulvi Izarus”
reported in AIR 1921 PC 55, at p. 56, as under:
3
“In every appeal it is incumbent upon the appellants
to show reason why the judgment appealed from should
be disturbed; there must be some balance in their
favour when all the circumstances are considered, to
justify the alteration of the judgment that stands.
Their Lordships are unable to find that this duty has
been discharged.”
10 The Privy Council decision referred to above was looked into by
a three-Judge Bench in the case of “Thakur Sukhpal Singh v. Thakur
Kalyan Singh and Anr.” reported in (1963) 2 SCR 733, wherein this
Court observed as under:
“With respect, we agree with this and hold that it is
the duty of the appellant to show that the judgment
under appeal is erroneous for certain reasons and it
is only after the appellant has shown this that the
appellate court would call upon the respondent to
reply to the contention. It is only then that the
judgment of the appellate court can fully contain all
the various matters mentioned in Ruel 31, Order 41.”
11. This Court observed in “Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal,
Kotah, Bhurey Lal Baya” reported in (1955) 2 SCR 1, at page 8:
“Now a code of procedure must be regarded as such. It
is procedure, something designed to facilitate justice
and further its ends: ... Too technical construction
of sections that leaves no room for reasonable elas-
ticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded
against (provided always that justice is done to both
sides) lest the very means designed for the further-
ance of justice be used to frustrate it.”
12. The provisions of Rule 31 should therefore be reasonably
construed and should be held to require the various particulars to
be mentioned in the judgment only when the appellant has actually
raised certain points for determination by the Appellate Court, and
not when no such points are raised.
4
13. We must also look into the provisions of Rule 30 of Order 41
for the purpose of fortifying our interpretation of Rule 31.
Order 41 Rule 30 CPC reads thus:
“30. Judgment when and where pronounced.─ (1) The
Appellate Court, after hearing the parties or their
pleaders and referring to any part of the proceedings,
whether on appeal or in the court from whose decree
the appeal is preferred, to which reference may be
considered necessary, shall pronounce judgment in open
Court, either at once or on some future day of which
notice shall be given to the parties or their
pleaders.
(2) Where a written judgment is to be pronounced, it
shall be sufficient if the points for determination,
the decision thereon and the final order passed in the
appeal are read out and it shall not be necessary for
the Court to read out the whole judgment, but a copy
of the whole judgment shall be made available for the
perusal of the parties or their pleaders immediately
after the judgment in pronounced.”
14. Thus, this Rule does not make it incumbent on the Appellate
Court to refer to any part of the proceedings in the court from
whose decree the appeal is preferred. The Appellate Court can
refer, after hearing the parties and their pleaders, to any part of
these proceedings to which reference be considered necessary. It is
in the discretion of the Appellate Court to refer to the
proceedings. It is competent to pronounce judgment after hearing
what the parties or their pleaders submit to it for consideration.
It follows therefore that if the appellant submits nothing for
its consideration, the Appellate Court can decide the appeal
without any reference to any proceedings of the courts below and,
in doing so, it can simply say that the appellants have not urged
anything which would tend to show that the judgment and decree
under appeal were wrong. [See : “Thakur Sukhpal Singh” (supra)]
5
15. In the aforesaid view of the matter, we allow this appeal.
16. The impugned judgment and order of the High Court is set
aside.
17. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
…………………………………………J
(J.B. PARDIWALA)
…………………………………………J
(R. MAHADEVAN)
NEW DELHI
16TH APRIL, 2025.
va