THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA vs. BALU

Case Type: Criminal Appeal

Date of Judgment: 13-11-2019

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1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1681 OF 2019 [SLP (Crl)...... @ D. No. 25956 of 2019] State of Maharashtra & Ors.       .. Appellants Versus Balu S/o Waman Patole        .. Respondent J U D G M E N T M.R. SHAH, J. Delay condoned. Leave granted. 2. Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned Judgment and Order dated 26.03.2019 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Bench at Aurangabad, in Criminal Writ Petition No. 155 of 2019, by which the High Court has quashed and   set   aside   the   order   dated   15.10.2018   passed   by   the Commissioner of Police, Aurangabad under Sections 3(1) and (2) of   the   Maharashtra   Prevention   of   Dangerous   Activities   of Slumlords,   Bootleggers,   Drug­Offenders,   Dangerous   Persons, Signature Not Verified Video Pirates, Sand Smugglers and Persons Engaged in Black­ Digitally signed by MEENAKSHI KOHLI Date: 2019.11.13 17:30:59 IST Reason: Marketing   of   Essential   Commodities   Act,   1981   (hereinafter 2 referred to as the Act) and also the order of confirmation of the order of detention made by the State Government, the detaining authority has preferred the present appeal. 3. That in exercise of powers under Sections 3(1) and (2) of the Act, the Commissioner of Police, Aurangabad passed an order to detain   the   respondent   herein   treating   and   considering   the respondent as a ‘dangerous person’.   The respondent herein was served with the grounds of detention. The order of detention was approved by the State Government.  The matter was referred to the Advisory Board.   The Advisory Board gave the opinion that there   was   sufficient   cause   for   preventive   detention   of   the respondent­detenu.     That,   thereafter   the   detention   order   was approved by the State Government.   The detention order passed by the detaining authority, approved by the State Government, came to be challenged by the respondent herein before the High Court.   That, by the impugned Judgment and Order, the High Court has set aside the detention order on merits as well as on the ground that the order of detention prescribing the detention for 12 months is in breach of Section 3 of the  Act.   Feeling aggrieved with the impugned Judgment and Order passed by the High Court, the detaining authority has preferred this appeal. 3 4. Though served, nobody has remained present on behalf of the   respondent­detenu.   Shri   Nishant   Ramakantrao Katneshwarkar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State­ detaining authority has vehemently submitted that so far as one of   the   grounds   on   which   the   High   Court   has   set   aside   the detention order, namely, that the detention order prescribing the detention for 12 months is contrary to Section 3 of the Act, is not sustainable   at   law.     It   is   submitted   that   the   said   finding   is contrary to the law laid down by this Court in the case of   T. Devaki v. Government of Tamil Nadu  (1990) 2 SCC 456. 4.1 It is vehemently submitted by Shri Katneshwarkar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State that while holding that the detention order is in breach of Section 3 of the Act, the High Court has not properly appreciated and/or considered the scope and ambit of Section 3 and Section 13 of the Act.  It is submitted that the High Court has not considered Section 3 of the Act in its proper perspective.   It is submitted that Section 3(2) of the Act refers to delegation of powers to the District Magistrate or the Commissioner of Police to detain a person under Section 3(1) of the Act and not with respect to the period of detention to be 4 mentioned in the detention order.   It is submitted that, as per Section 13 of the Act, a person can be detained for such period not exceeding the maximum period of 12 months from the date of detention.  It is submitted that neither Section 3 nor Section 13 of the Act mandates the detaining authority to specify the period for which the detenu is required to be detained.  In support of his above   submissions,   Mr.   Katneshwarkar,   learned   counsel appearing on behalf of the State has heavily relied upon para 10 of the decision of this Court in   (supra). T. Devaki 5. We have heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State at length. 5.1 Now, so far as the impugned Judgment and Order passed by   the   High   Court   quashing   and   setting   aside   the   order   of detention   is   concerned,   having   gone   through   the   impugned Judgment and Order passed by the High Court, we are of the view that the same is not required to be interfered with by this Court in exercise of powers under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.  However, at the same time, one of the grounds on which the detention order is set aside, namely, that in the detention order the detaining authority prescribed the period of detention for 12 months and the same is in breach of Section 3 of the Act is 5 concerned,   considering   the   provisions   of   Section   3   read   with Section 13 of the Act, the same cannot be sustained.  Sections 3 and 13 of the Act read as under:   “ 3.  Power to make orders detaining certain persons . — (1) The State Government may, if satisfied with   respect   to   any   person   that   with   a   view   to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained. (2)   If,   having   regard   to   the   circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail in any area within the local limits of the jurisdiction of a District Magistrate or a Commissioner of Police, the State Government is satisfied that it is necessary so to do, it may, by order in writing, direct, that during such period as may be specified   in   the   order,   such   District   Magistrate   or Commissioner   of   Police   may   also   if   satisfied   as provided   in   sub­section   (1),   exercise   the   powers conferred by the said sub­section: Provided that the period specified in the order made   by   the   State   Government   under   this   sub­ section   shall   not,   in  the   first  instance,   exceed   six months, but the State Government may, if satisfied as aforesaid that it is necessary so to do, amend such order to extend such period from time to time by any period not exceeding six months at any one time. (3) When any order is made under this section by an   officer   mentioned   in   sub­section   (2),   he   shall forthwith report the fact to the State Government, together with the grounds on which the order has been   made   and   such   other   particulars   as,   in   his opinion, have a bearing on the matter, and no such order shall remain in force for more than twelve days after the making thereof, unless, in the meantime, it has been approved by the State Government.” 6 “ 13.     Maximum   period   of   detention. —   The maximum   period   for   which   any   person   may   be detained, in pursuance of any detention order made under   this   Act,   which   has   been   confirmed   under section 13, shall be twelve months from the date of detention.” On fair reading of Section 3 of the Act, more particularly, sub­ section (2) of Section 3 of the Act, upon which much reliance has been   placed   by   the   High   Court,   sub­section   (2)   of   Section   3 relates to the period for which the order of delegation issued by the State Government is to remain in force.  It has no relevance to the period of detention.   The Legislature has entrusted the power of detention to the State Government.   However, those powers can be delegated to the Jurisdictional District Magistrate or the Commissioner of Police, as provided in sub­section (2) of Section 3 of the Act.  As per Section 13 of the Act, a person can be detained  under the   Act  for  such period  not  exceeding  the maximum period of 12 months from the date of detention.  The order of detention passed by the authorities mentioned in sub­ section (2) of Section 3 of the Act is required to be confirmed by the State Government.   As per Section 13 of the Act, once the order of detention is confirmed by the State Government, the maximum period for which the detenu shall be detained cannot 7 exceed 12 months from the date of detention.  The Act nowhere requires the detaining authority to specify the period for which the detenu is required to be detained.    5.2 An identical question came to be considered by this Court in the case of   (supra).  In paragraph 10, this Court has T. Devaki observed and held as under: “10.  Provisions   of   the   aforesaid   sections   are inbuilt   safeguards   against   the   delays   that  may   be caused in considering the representation. If the time frame, as prescribed in the aforesaid provisions is not adhered to, the detention order is liable to be struck down and the detenu is entitled to freedom. Once the order   of   detention   is   confirmed   by   the   State Government,   maximum   period   for   which   a   detenu shall be detained cannot exceed 12 months from the date   of   detention.   The   Act   nowhere   requires   the detaining authority to specify the period for which the detenu is required to be detained. The expression “the   State   Government   are   satisfied   that   it   is necessary so to do, they may, by order in writing direct that during such period as may be specified in the order” occurring in sub­section (2) of Section 3 relates to the period for which the order of delegation issued by the State Government is to remain in force and it has no relevance to the period of detention. The legislature has taken care to entrust the power of detention to the State Government; as the detention without   trial   is   a   serious   encroachment   on   the fundamental right of a citizen, it has taken further care   to   avoid   a   blanket   delegation   of   power,   to subordinate   authorities   for   an   indefinite   period   by providing that the delegation in the initial instance will not exceed a period of three months and it shall be   specified   in   the   order   of   delegation.   But   if   the State Government on consideration of the situation 8
finds it necessary, it may again delegate the power of<br>detention to the aforesaid authorities from time to<br>time but at no time the delegation shall be for a<br>period of more than three months. The period as<br>mentioned in Section 3(2) of the Act refers to the<br>period of delegation and it has no relevance at all to<br>the period for which a person may be detained. Since<br>the Act does not require the detaining authority to<br>specify the period for which a detenu is required to<br>be detained, order of detention is not rendered<br>invalid or illegal in the absence of such specification.”
5.3 Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid<br>decision and, even otherwise, considering the provisions of<br>Section 3 read with Section 13 of the Act, the High Court has<br>committed a grave error in holding that as the period of detention<br>of 12 months was mentioned in the order of detention, the same<br>is contrary to Section 3 of the Act and, therefore, the same is<br>liable to be quashed and set aside.
5.4 The High Court has wrongly relied upon and mis­interpreted<br>Section 3 (2) of the Act with respect to the period of detention. As<br>observed hereinabove, sub­section (2) of Section 3 of the Act<br>relates to the period for which the order of delegation issued by<br>the State Government is to remain in force and does not relate to<br>the period of detention. Under the circumstances, the<br>observations made by the High Court in paragraph 33 of the<br>impugned Judgment and Order and one of the grounds on which
9 the   order   of   detention   is   set   aside,   namely,   that   as   in   the detention   order   the   period   of   detention   for   12   months   is mentioned,   the   same   is   illegal,   the   same   is   contrary   to   sub­ section   (2)   of   Section   3   of   the   Act,   cannot   be   sustained   and deserves to be quashed and set aside. 5.5 Even the directions issued by the High Court in Clauses (IV), (V) and ((VI) of the operative part, namely, “ (i)  A   copy   of   this decision to be sent to each District Legal Services Authority and also   to   the   High   Court   Legal   Services   Authority   at   places   like Aurangabad, Mumbai, Nagpur and Goa for providing legal aid in cases of preventive detention; (ii) A copy of this decision to be sent to Home Department for circulation, sending to detaining authority. After   executing   detention   order   a   copy   of   detention   order   and grounds of arrest need to be supplied by detaining authority to District Legal Services Authority of that district within 48 hours of the detention; and (iii) District Legal Services Authority to give legal aid to detenu on the day when the copy of detaining authority is received.     A copy of this decision to be supplied to the counsel appointed through legal aid.” , are absolutely unwarranted and not required and the same deserve to be set aside. 10 6. In   view   of   the   above   and   for   the   reasons   stated   above, though we confirm the impugned Judgment and Order passed by the High Court quashing and setting aside the detention order on merits, we set aside the finding in the impugned Judgment and Order passed by the High Court by which the High Court has set aside   the   order   of   detention   on   the   ground   that   as   in   the detention order the period of 12 months is mentioned, the same is   contrary   to   sub­section   (2)   of   Section   3   of   the   Act,   more particularly   the   observations   made   by   the   High   Court   in paragraph   33   of   the   impugned   Judgment   and   Order.     The directions issued by High Court contained in Clauses (VI), (V) and (VI)   of   the   operative   portion   of   the   impugned   Judgment   and Order, reproduced hereinabove, are also quashed and set aside. Disposed of in the aforesaid terms. ……………………………….J.    [INDIRA BANERJEE]    ……………………………….J.    [M. R. SHAH]    New Delhi, November 13, 2019.