Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 732 OF 2009
(Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 677 of 2004)
The State of Andhra Pradesh ....Appellant
Versus
Aravapally Venkanna & Anr. ....Respondents
J U D G M E N T
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by learned Single
Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court allowing the prayer made by the
appellant to quash the FIR in Crime No. 433/2002-2003 of Prohibition and
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Excise Station, Mahabubabad, Warangal District registered under Section 7
(A) read with Section 8(e) of A.P. Prohibition Act, 1995 read with Section
109 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the ‘IPC’). The Petition was
filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short
the ‘Code’).
3. In support of the appeals, learned counsel appearing for the State of
Andhra Pradesh submitted that the High Court's approach is clearly
erroneous. These are not cases where there was no material to show the
commission of a crime. Whether there was adequate material already in
existence or which could have been collected during investigation and their
relevance is essentially a matter of trial The High Court was not therefore
justified in quashing the FIR. The exercise of power under Section 482 of
the Code is clearly indefensible.
4. There is no appearance on behalf of the respondent-accused.
5. Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in a case of this
nature is the exception and not the rule. The Section does not confer any
new powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the
Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three
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circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised,
namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of
the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is
neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would
govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment
dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise.
Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of
law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties
imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in
the Section which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the
High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of
any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as
are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in the course of
administration of justice on the principle quando lex a liquid aliquot
concedit, conceditur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest (when the law
gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist).
While exercising powers under the Section, the Court does not function as a
court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the Section though
wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only
when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the
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Section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and
substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist.
Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is
made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power
to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow
any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice.
In exercise of these powers court would be justified to quash any
proceeding if it finds that initiation or continuance of it amounts to abuse of
the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve
the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court
may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be
quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the
complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the
allegations are accepted in toto.
6. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab (AIR 1960 SC 866) this Court
summarized some categories of cases where inherent power can and should
be exercised to quash the proceedings.
(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against
the institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction;
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(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or
complaint taken at its face value and accepted in their entirety
do not constitute the offence alleged;
(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no
legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or
manifestly fails to prove the charge.
7. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in mind the
distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is
evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case
where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not
support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of
the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry
whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a
reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the
function of the trial Judge. Judicial process no doubt should not be an
instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. Court should be
circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all
relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process,
lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to
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unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time the
Section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a
prosecution and bring about its sudden death. The scope of exercise of
power under Section 482 of the Code and the categories of cases where the
High Court may exercise its power under it relating to cognizable offences
to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice were set out in some detail by this Court in State of Haryana v.
Bhajan Lal [ 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335]. A note of caution was, however,
added that the power should be exercised sparingly and that too in rarest of
rare cases. The illustrative categories indicated by this Court are as follows:
"(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report
or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any
offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and
other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a
cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police
officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an
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order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of
the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the F.I.R. or
complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do
not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a
case against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a Police Officer
without ah order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section
155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so
absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no
prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the
provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a
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criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and
continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific
provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing
efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with
mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted
with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused
and with a view to spite him due to private and personal
grudge.
8. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Section
482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires
great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in
exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power
should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. High Court being
the highest Court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima
facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more
so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court
and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and
cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of
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course, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which
the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the
proceeding at any stage. It would not be proper for the High Court to
analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order
to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such
premises, arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It
would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the
complaint cannot be proceeded with. In proceeding instituted on complaint,
exercise of the inherent powers to quash the proceedings is called for only
in a case where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous,
vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not
constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken by the
Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the
inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code. It is not, however,
necessary that there should be meticulous analysis of the case before the
trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal. The
complaint/F.I.R. has to be read as a whole. If it appears that on
consideration of the allegations in the light of the statement made on oath of
the complainant or disclosed in the F.I.R. that the ingredients of the offence
or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the
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complaint/F.I.R. is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there
would be no justification for interference by the High Court. When an
information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, then
the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the
material collected during the investigation and evidence led in Court which
decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against
the informant are of no consequence and cannot by itself be the basis for
quashing the proceeding.
8. Keeping in view the principles of law as enunciated above, the action of
the High Court in quashing the FIR cannot be maintained so far as Criminal
Appeal arising out of SLP(Crl.) NO. 677 OF 2004 is concerned.
9. Whether the material already in existence or to be collected during
investigation would be sufficient for holding the concerned accused persons
guilty has to be considered at the time of trial. At the time of framing the
charge it can be decided whether prima facie case has been made out
showing commission of an offence and involvement of the charged persons.
At that stage also evidence cannot be gone into meticulously. It is
immaterial whether the case is based on direct or circumstantial evidence.
Charge can be framed, if there are materials showing possibility about the
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commission of the crime as against certainty. That being so, the interference
at the threshold with the F.I.R. is to be in very exceptional circumstances as
held in R.P. Kapoor’s case supra.
10. Ultimately, the acceptability of the materials to fasten culpability on the
accused persons is a matter of trial. These are not the cases where it can be
said that the FIR did not disclose commission of an offence. Therefore, the
High Court was not justified in quashing the FIR in the concerned cases.
11. The appeal is allowed.
.....................................................J.
(Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)
…….............................................J.
(LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA)
…….............................................J.
(P. SATHASIVAM)
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New Delhi;
April 15, 2009
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