Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
JULLUNDUR RUBBER GOODS MANUFACTURERS’ASSOCIATION
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
25/08/1969
BENCH:
GROVER, A.N.
BENCH:
GROVER, A.N.
SHAH, J.C.
RAMASWAMI, V.
CITATION:
1970 AIR 1589 1970 SCR (2) 68
1970 SCC (2) 644
CITATOR INFO :
R 1984 SC 420 (47)
RF 1986 SC 649 (28)
ACT:
Rubber Act (24 of 1947), s. 12 and Rules 33, 33A and 33D-
Duty leviable from users of rubber-If violative of Art. 14
and Entry 84 of List I of VII Schedule of the Constitution.
HEADNOTE:
The appellants, an ’association of rubber chappal
manufacturers who were using rubber in their manufacturing
process, filed a petition in the High Court challenging the
levy and collection from the manufacturers of chappals, of a
duty under s. 12 of the Rubber Act, 1947 aS amended by
Rubber Amendment Act, 1960. The grounds of challenge were:
(1) that the imposition on the appellants was outside the
ambit of Entry 84 of List I of VII Schedule of the
Constitution, which deals with the duties which can be
levied on goods manufactured or produced in India; (2)
Section 12(2) which provides the machinery for levy and
collection has given uncontrolled and unbridled discretion
to the Rubber Board and no guiding principle or policy was
laid down in the Act to enable the Board to choose between
the owners of estates of rubber or the users of the rubber;
and (3) the rules framed under the section do not indicate
with sufficient clarity and precision on whom the levy was
to be made. The High Court dismissed the petition.
In appeal to this Court,
HELD: (1) (a) The excise duty could be imposed at the stage
which was found to be most convenient and lucrative as that
is a matter relating to the machinery of collection and did
not affect the essential nature of the tax. Therefore,
merely because the incidence of tax is shifted to the users
of rubber under s. 12(2) which provides for the method of
collection, the tax would not cease to be one falling within
Entry 84.[73 B--C;F G]
R.C. fall v. Union of India, [1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 436,
followed.
Re: the Central Provinces and Berar Act, 14 of 1938,
[1939] F.C.R. 18, applied.
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(b) If the duty is not excise duty because it is imposed
on the user Parliament would even then have legislative
competence to provide for its collection from users,
whatever be its nature, under Entry 97 of List I read with
Art. 248 of the Constitution. [73 H; 74 A B]
(2) The task of subordinate legislation necessary for
implementing the purpose and objects of an enactment can be
delegated, so long as the law has provided the method by
which the. delegate can be controlled, there is a guidance
for fixing rates of tax and there is a provision to see that
reasonable rates are fixed. [74 D--F]
Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Birla Cotton, Spinning
and Weaving Mills, [1968] 3 S.C.R. 251, followed.
In the present case, the Act was enacted for the purpose
of development of rubber industry under the control of the
Union Parliament has
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enacted that the Rubber Board can levy and collect the duty
either from the owner of the rubber estate or the user of
the rubber. But the Board is enjoined to do so in
accordance with the Rules made by Central Government under
s. 25(1) (a) of the Act and which are placed before each
House of Parliament for approval. The Board itself is a
high powered body and all interests are represented among
its members ’and all its acts are subject to the control of
the Central Government under s. 22. [74 H; 75 Ii; 78 C]
Further. the Board is vitally interested in the
collection of the duty and it has to see that such duty is
collected without undue delay and proper expedition. The
objects and reasons of the Amending Act (which can be taken
into consideration for the purpose of seeing if there is any
alleged infringement of Art. 14) show that the Board was
finding it difficult to levy and collect the duty from the
owners and it was considered that it would be much more easy
to collect it from the users, in accordance with the rules.
Thus it is necessary that it should be left to the rule
making authority to indicate the cases and the circumstances
in which the duty was to be collected from the owner or
user. [75 C; 77 H; 78 A B]
Since the policy of the Act has been enunciated with
sufficient clarity, and guidance has been furnished as to
how the Board should exercise its powers in the matter of
levy, there is no discrimination and Art. 14 is not
violated.
Ipoh v.C.I.T. Madras, [1968] 1 S.C.R. 65 and Raghubar
Dayal Jai Prakash v. Union of India, [1962] 3 S.C.R. 547,
referred to.
(3) A combined reading of rr. 33, 33A and 33D indicates
that a definite provision is made with regard to the
category of persons on whom the collection of the duty is to
be made, namely, the users of rubber.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1220 of 1966.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order
dated April 6, 1965 of the Punjab High Court, Circuit Bench
at Delhi in Letters Patent Appeal No.. 58-D of 1966.
M.C. Chagla, B. Datta and J.B. Dadachanji, for the
appellant.
Niren De, Attorney-General, V. A. Seyid Muhammad, R.H.
Dhebar and S.P. Nayar, for respondent No. 1.
Niren De, Attorney-General, V.A. Seyid Muhammad, R.H.
Dhebar, S.P. Nayar and Joy Joseph, for respondent No. 2.
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S.J. Sorabji, A.J. Rana K.L. Hathi and K.N. Bhat, for
the interveners.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Grover, J. This is an appeal by special leave from
a judgment of the Punjab High Court (Circuit Bench) Delhi
in which the validity and legality of the levy of cess by
way of excise duty on the rubber used by manufacturers of
chappals under the provisions of the Rubber Act 1947, (Act
XXIV of 1947) as amended, hereinafter called the Act, have
been assailed.
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M/s. Jullundur Rubber Goods Manufacturers’ Association
is an association of rubber chappal manufacturers at
Jullundur in the State of Punjab. Its members, who
manufacture chappals, are stated to use. about 15 to 20% of
rubber in the process of their manufacture while the rest
’of the material used by them consists of various other
articles. A petition was filed under Arts. 226 & 227 on
behalf of the aforesaid Association, the second petitioner
being its Secretary, challenging the levy and collection
from the manufacturers of chappals under the provisions of
the Act, the Rules framed and the relevant notification
issued thereunder of a duty as a result of the amendment
made in s. 12 of the Act by the Rubber Amendment Act of
1960. A learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition
and his judgment was affirmed by a division bench of the
High Court.
The contentions which have been raised are: (1 ) the
duty sought to be imposed under s. 12 as amended being
outside the ambit of Entry 84 of List I in the Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution is beyond the legislative
competence of the Parliament; (2) Section 12(2) suffers from
the vice of excessive delegation. It confers uncontrolled
and unrestricted discretion upon the Rubber Board to levy
upon and collect duty of excise from either the owners of
the rubber producing estates or the users so called
manufacturers (of rubber) without specifying the
circumstances under which it should be imposed upon the one
or the other nor has any guiding policy or principle been
laid down in the Act for making a choice. (3) In any case,
the Rules which have been framed do not satisfy the
provisions of s. 12(2) of the Act and do not indicate with
sufficient clarity and precision on whom the levy is to be
made and from whom the duty is to be collected as between
the owners of the estates and the manufacturers.
The relevant statutory provisions may first be noticed.
In 1947 the Central legislature enacted The Rubber
(Production and Marketing) Act, 1947. Its name was changed
to Rubber Act 1947 by the Rubber (Production and Marketing)
Amendment Act, 1954. The Act was enacted to provide for the
development under the control of the Union of the rubber
industry. Under s. 4 the Rubber Board was to be
constituted. The functions of the Board were enumerated in
s. 8. It was to be its duty to promote by such measure as
it thought fit development of the rubber industry. Under
s. 10 it was obligatory on every person owning land planted
with rubber plants to get himself registered as an owner by
applying to the Board. Section 12 provided for the
imposition of rubber cess. Under s. 14 no person could
sell or otherwise dispose of or buy or otherwise acquire
rubber
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except in accordance with the terms of general or special
license issued by the Board. The Central Government was
given the over-all control over the acts of the Board by s.
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22. Section 25 empowered the Central Government to make
Rules. Prior to the amendment made by the Rubber Amendment
Act of 1960 (Act XXI of 1960) the duty of excise was payable
under s.12(2) by the owners of the estates on which rubber
was produced and it was to be paid by’ them to the Board
within one month from the date on which they received a
notice of demand. By Act XXI of 1960 an important change
was made which affected the manufacturers and the duty could
be collected by the Board either from the owners of the
estates or from the manufacturers by whom the rubber is
used.
At this stage the relevant provisions of the Act with which
we are concerned may be reproduced :--
S. B(e) "manufacturer" means any person
engaged in the manufacture of any article
in the making of which rubber is used;"
(h) "rubber" means--
(i)
(ii)
(iii) latex, (dry rubber content) in
any state of concentration, and includes scrap
rubber, sheet rubber, rubber in powder and
all forms and varieties of crepe rubber, but
does not include. rubber contained in any
manufactured article;"
S. 4(3 ) "The Board shall consist of-
(a) a Chairman to be appointed by the
Central Government;
(b) two members to represent the State of
Madras, one of whom shall be a person
representing rubber producing interests;
(c) eight members to represent the State
of Kerala, six of whom shall be persons
representing the rubber producing interests,
three of such six being persons representing
the small growers;
(d) ten members to be nominated by the
Central Government of whom two. shall
represent the manufacturers and four labour;
and
(e) three members of Parliament of whom
two shall be elected by the House of the
People and one by the Council of States; and
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(f) the Rubber Production Commissioner,
ex-Officio."
S. 12(4)"For the purpose of enabling
the Board to assess the amount of duty of
excise levied under the section--
(a) the Board shall, by notification in the
Official Gazette, fix a period in respect of
which assessments shall be made; and
(b) without prejudice to the provisions of
section 20, every manufacturer shall furnish
to the Board a return not later than fifteen
days after the expiry of the period to. which
the return relates, stating-
(i) in the case of an owner, the total
quantity of rubber produced on the estate in
each such period; Provided that in respect
of an estate situated only partly in India,
the owner shall in the said return show
separately the quantity of rubber
produced within and outside India;
(ii) in the case of a manufacturer, the
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total quantity of rubber used by him in such
period out of the rubber produced in
India."
The contention raised on behalf of the appellant-
association is that under Entry 84 of List I in the Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution the duties can be levied on
goods manufactured or produced in India. Excise duty, it is
pointed out, can be levied only on the actual producers and
manufacturers of rubber but in the very nature of such duty
it could not be imposed on users o.r consumers of that
commodity. It is suggested that sub-s. (1 ) of s. 12 is the
charging section and sub-s. (2) provides for the machinery
for levy and collection of tax. But sub-section (2) cannot
alter the substantive provision in the charging sub-section
(1) and since the Parliament has employed the words ’:duty
of excise" which have a well understood meaning the
incidence of tax would fall only on the actual producers.
Once the incidence of tax was shifted to the users the tax
would cease to be one which would fall within Entry 84. In
re the Central Provinces and Berar Act No.. XIV of 1938(1)
Gwyer C.J. described "excise duty" thus:
"But its primary and fundamental meaning in
English is still that of a tax on articles produced or
(1) [1939] F.C.R. 18, 40-41.
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manufactured in the taxing country and intended for
home consumption".
The learned Chief Justice, however, proceeded to add that
there could be no reason in theory why such duty should not
be imposed even on the retail sale of an article if the
taxing .Act so provided. It could obviously be imposed at
the stage which was found to be most convenient and
lucrative as that was a matter of the machinery of
collection and did not affect the essential nature of the
tax. Referring to this decision of the Federal Court and
several other cases it was observed in R.C. Jail v. Union
of India(1) at page 451:
"Excise duty is primarily a duty on the
production or manufacture of goods produced
or manufactured within the country. It is an
indirect duty which the manufacturer or
producer passes on to the ultimate consumer,
that is, its ultimate incidence will always be
on the consumer. Therefore, subject always
to the legislative competence of the taxing
authority, the said tax can be levied at a
convenient stage so long as the character of
the impost, that is, it is a duty on the
manufacture or production, is not lost. The
method of collection does not affect the
essence of the duty, but only relates to-the
machinery of collection for administrative
convenience. Whether in a particular case
the tax ceases to be in essence an excise
duty, and the rational connection between the
duty and the person on whom it is imposed
ceased to exist, is to be decided on a fair
construction of the provisions of a particular
Act".
The above statement of law in no way supports the
argument that the excise duty cannot be collected from
persons who are neither producers nor manufacturers. Its
incidence certainly falls directly on the production or
manufacture of goods but the method of collecting will not
affect the essence of the duty. In our opinion sub-s. (2)
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of s. 12 provides for the method of collection as the excise
duty can be collected either from the producers or from
the manufacturers as defined by the Act which would include
members of the appellant association who use rubber in the
manufacture of chappals.
It seems to us that if the provisions of Entry 97 in List
I in the Seventh Schedule as also the provisions of Art. 248
of the Constitution are kept in view the Parliament would
have legislative competence even with regard to the
imposition of a tax which does not fall within Entry 84. It
will be a kind of non-descripts tax which has been given the
nomenclature of a duty of excise.
(1) [1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 436.
Sup. CI/70--6
74
Counsel for the appellant-association quite properly has
not challenged this position but has merely sought to lay
emphasis on sub-s.-( 1 ) being the charging section. We
find it difficult to endorse the reading of sub-s. (1 )
and sub-s. (2) of s. 12 in isolation. Not only the statute
but also, the section have to be read as a whole and
together, and in our judgment whatever be the nature of
duty, Parliament would undoubtedly have legislative
competence under Entry 97 of List I in the Seventh Schedule
read with Art. 248 of the Constitution.
We may next deal with the question whether s. 12(2)
suffers from the vice of excessive delegation and whether
there has been violation of Art. 14 as uncontrolled and
unbridled discretion has been conferred on the Board to levy
and collect the tax from either the producer or the
manufacturer (the user of rubber). It is pointed out that
there is no guiding principle or policy laid down in the Act
to enable the Board to make a choice between the two
categories. The principles governing such questions have
been laid down in several decisions of this Court. It is
well established that essential legislative functions
consist of the determination of the legislative policy and
its formulation as a binding rule of conduct and cannot be
delegated by the legislature. What can be delegated is the
task of subordinate legislation necessary for implementing
the purpose and objects of an enactment. Where legislative
policy is enunciated with sufficient clearness or a
standard is laid down the ’courts will not interfere. It
will depend on consideration of the provisions of a
particular Act including its preamble as to the guidance
which has been given and the legislative policy which has
been laid down in the matter. In a taxing statute the
guidance may take the form subjecting the rate to be fixed
by the local body to the approval of the Government which
acts as a watch-dog on the actions of the local body in this
matter on behalf of the legislature. The reasonableness of
the rates may be ensured by providing Safeguards laying down
the procedure for consulting the wishes of the local
inhabitants. So long as the law has provided the method by
which the local body can be controlled and there is a
provisions to see that reasonable rates are fixed it can be
said that there is guidance in the matter of fixing the
rates for local taxation; vide Wanchoo, C.J. in Municipal
Corporation of Delhi v. Birla Cotton, Spinning and Weaving
Mills, Delhi & Anr.(1)
In s. 12(2) the Parliament has made it quite clear that
the Board can levy and collect the duty of excise either
from the owner of a rubber estate on which the rubber is
produced or from the manufacturer by whom such rubber is
used. The Board has
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(1) [1968] 3 S.C.R. 251 at pp. 269-270.
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further been enjoined to do so in accordance with Rules made
in this behalf. The Board, as constituted under s. 4, has
to be a high powered body and among its members those
representing the rubber producing interests, the small
growers, the manufacturers and the labour are included. It
can, therefore, keep in view the interests of all concerned.
AccOrding to the preamble of the Act it was meant for the
development of the rubber industry under the control of the
Union. That is the main purpose for which the Board has to
function. All amounts paid to the Board by the Central
Government under s. 12(7) of the Act have to go to the
general fund of the Board under s. 9A. Section 12(7)
provides that the proceeds of the duty of excise collected
has first to be credited to the Consolidated Fund of India
reduced by the cost of collection and then it has to be paid
over by the Central Government to the Board. The Board is
thus vitally interested in the collection of the duty and
it has to see that such duty is collected without undue
delay and proper expedition. It has also to look to the
best possible method of realization. In the light of this
scheme as embodied in the Act it is difficult to sustain the
challenge on the ground of excessive delegation. The policy
of the Act has been enunciated with sufficient clarity and
the guidance has been furnished by the provisions to which
reference has been made as to how the Board should exercise
its powers in the matter of levy and collection of tax.
There is also another important safeguard which is contained
in s. 22 of the Act. All acts of the Board by virtue of
that section shall be subject to the control of the Central
Government which may cancel, suspend or modify any action
taken by the Board.
The provision in s. 12(2) that the Board shall levy and
collect the duty, in accordance with the Rules is another
important safeguard against the Board acting arbitrarily in
the matter of collection of duty from the owners of the
rubber estates or the manufacturers. These Rules are to be
framed by the Central Government under s. 25(1)(xxa) which
is to the following effect:
"the cases and circumstances in which the duty of
excise under section 12 shall be payable by the owner and
the manufacturers respectively, the manner in which the duty
may be assessed, paid or collected, the regulation of the
production, manufacture, transport or sale of rubber in so
far as such regulation is necessary for the proper levy,
payment or collection of duty;"
Section 25(3) makes it obligatory on the Central Government
to place every rule before each House of Parliament for a
specified period of 30 days and those Rules can be subject
to criticism and can be modified or even be abrogated. Thus
it is not possible
76
to hold that the Parliament has abdicated its functions in
enacting s. 12(2) of the Act.
Learned Attorney General has relied on certain decisions
of this Court according to which it can be left to the
authority which has to levy and collect the tax to decide
whether to collect from one category of persons or the other
category where persons in both categories can be subjected
to tax. In M.M. Ipoh & Ors. Income-tax Madras(1) the
validity of s. 3 the Income-tax Act, 1922 was challenged
on the ground that it was violative of Art. 14 of the
Constitution. That section invested the taxing authority
with an option to assess to tax the income collectively of
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the association of persons. The argument raised was that
that Act set no principles and disclosed no guidance to
the Income-tax Officer in exercising the option. The scheme
of the Income-tax Act was considered and it was observed
that the duty of the Income-tax Officer was to administer
its. provisions in the interest of public revenue and to
prevent evasion of tax and his function was mainly quasi-
judicial. The decision of bringing to tax either the income
of the association collectively or the shares of the members
of the association separately was not final and was subject
to appeal. It was held that the very nature of the
authority exercised by the Income-tax Officer and his duty
to prevent evasion or escapement of liability constituted
adequate enunciation of principles and policy for his
guidance. In Raghubar Dayal Jai Prakash v. The Union of
India(2) the validity of certain provisions of the Forward
Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1952 was assailed. In regard to
s. 15 of that Act the argument was that it conferred
unguided and arbitrary power upon the Central Government
to choose any commodity it liked and bring the Act into
operation in respect of the commodity which the Government
chose at any time it pleased. In this manner the interest
of the traders could be vitally affected by rendering
illegal a contract which was. perfectly legal when it was
entered into. This Court referred to the Report of the
Expert Committee on the Bill which became an Act, dealing
with the economic implications of forward trading and for
the necessity of regulating such- contracts in particular
goods. It was observed that the suitability of a commodity
for forward trading depended on factors which were far from
static and which were subject to variations over a period
of, time. A continuous assessment was required of all
elements which would necessitate regulation. All this could
not. be specified in a statute. It was for that reason that
a Forward Markets Commission had been constituted on whom
the duty had been cast of advising the Government on the
situation as it existed from time to time. The following
observations are pertinent and may be reproduced:
(1) [1968] 1 S.C.R. 65. (2) [1962] 3 S.CR.
547.
77
"In our opinion, the selection of the
commodity the regulation of forward trading in
it or of prohibition such trading can
only be left to the Government and the purpose
for which the power is to be used and the
machinery created for the investigation
furnish sufficient guidance as to preclude any
challenge on the ground a violation of Art.
14."
In the statement of objects and reasons appended to Bill
No. 32 of 1960 when amendments were made in s. 12 of the Act
by the Rubber Amendment Act, 1960, it was stated inter alia:
"This method of collection of the cess
provided under the Act has led to considerable
evasion of cess by the owners of the estates,
either by evasion of registration or by
failure to submit correct returns or any
returns at all. There are about 26,000
estates under production in the country and
most of them are small holdings. Many of them
do not render returns of production to the
Rubber Board and thus evade payment of duty.
From October, 1947 to December 1954, it was
found that 20,608 tons of rubber escaped
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assessment and the Board suffered during the
period a loss Rs. 2,30,805. The Rubber
Board estimates that under the present
system there is no likelihood of more than 65
per cent of the potential revenue being
realised each year.
With a view to improving the efficiency
of collection, it is proposed to amend section
12 of the Act so as to enable the cess to be
collected either from the owners or the
manufacturer who ultimately consumes the
rubber produced in the estates.
There are at present 347 registered
rubber manufacturers in the country. It is
felt that it would be far more easy to collect
the cess from a small number of manufacturers
than from about 26,000 producers whose
number will increase year by year. The
proposed amendment of section 12 in the
amending Bill is an enabling measure for the
administrative change in the method of
collection being contemplated."
Although it may not be permissible to take the statement
of objects and reasons into consideration for construing the
provisions of an Act the facts contained in such a
statement can certainly be looked at for the purpose of
seeing any alleged infringement of Art. 14. It is quite
clear from the data given that the Rubber Board was
finding it difficult to levy and collect
78
the duty from the owners of rubber estates and it was
considered that it would be much easier to collect the same
from the manufacturers. The Board was, therefore, to
collect the duty in accordance with the rules made in this
behalf by the Central Government. Thus it was necessary,
in view of the entire facts and circumstances stated
before, that it should be left to the rule-making authority
to indicate the cases and the circumstances in which the
duty of excise was to be collected from the owner or the
manufacturer respectively. It was open to the rule making
authority to vary the rules according to the changing
circumstances and conditions. The Board which was a high
powered body was mainly responsible for collection of the
duty and the rules would naturally be made in consultation
with it from time to time. We are unable to see how the
challenge on the ground of discrimination under Art. 14 can
be sustained in view of all these reasons. It does not
appear that the Board can ’discriminate in an arbitrary
manner between owners of rubber estates and the
manufacturers or between persons inter se of the same
category.
The Central Government has framed rules pursuant to the
power conferred by s. 25 of the Act. Unfortunately the
rules relating to furnishing of returns and collection of
duties are not properly worded and suffer from lack of
clarity. Under Rule 33 the Board can call for information
and documents from owners of rubber estates or any licensed
dealer or manufacturer relating to the stock of rubber held
and sale of rubber etc. Under el. (e) all manufacturers
have to submit half yearly returns in form M showing the
total quantity of all rubber purchased or otherwise acquired
and consumed or used in the process of manufacture. Rule 33A
provides for production of accounts by an owner if he fails
to furnish in time the return referred to in sub-s. (4) of
s. 12 or if he furnishes a defective return. The Board
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can, after checking the amounts and after, making such
further enquiry as it may deem fit assess the amount payable
under sub-s.(2) of s. 12. Similar provision is made with
regard to manufacturers by Rule 33B. Rule 33D, however, is
material and may be reproduced:
(1 ) "Every manufacturer shall by demand
notice sent through registered post or in
such other manner as the Board may direct be
intimated of the amount assessed on the
quantity of rubber acquired during the periods
specified in rule 33(e). On receipt of such
notice, the manufacturer shall pay to the
Board the amount specified
therein either in cash at the Board’s
office at Kottayam or by money order or
by
79
bank draft or .cheque duly crossed and payable
at Kottayam to the Secretary of the Board
within 30 days of the receipt of the said
notice.
(2) On such demand being made, if a
manufacturer fails to pay the amount within
the due date, the Board may take steps to
report the fact to the Central Government or
the State Government concerned for recovery
of the outstanding amount as an after of
land revenue."
Now the above rule seems to contemplate the filing of
return both by the owners of rubber estates and
manufacturers. But under Rule 33D the demand notice can be
sent only to a manufacturer on receipt of which he must make
payment to the Board of the amounts specified therein. On
his failure to make such payment the Board can take steps
for recovery of the amounts due as arrears of land revenue
by reporting to the Central Government or the State
Government as the case may be There is no such procedure
prescribed with regard to owners of estates. It would follow
that under the rules the demand notice is to be sent only to
the manufacturers and the amounts of duty are to be realised
from them alone. The substantive provisions of sub-ss.
(4), (5) and (6) of s. 12 also contemplate assessment being
made with regard to the returns to be furnished by owners
and manufacturers. Any person aggrieved by an assessment
has been given the right of appeal to the District
Judge. But as pointed out before, there is no provision
either in the statute or in the rules for a demand to be
made and a coercive process to be employed in the event of
failure to make the payment. That is done by Rule 33D alone
from which it would be reasonable to conclude that under the
rules it is only the manufacturers who are liable to pay the
amount of duty. The rules can, therefore, be said to make a
definite provision with regard to the category of persons
from whom the collection of the duty is to be made, namely,
the manufacturers.
For all the reasons given above the appeal fails and it
is dismissed with costs.
Y.P. Appeal dismissed.
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