Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
GODAVARI SUGAR MILLS LTD. AND ORS.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
S. B. KAMBLE AND ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT07/03/1975
BENCH:
KHANNA, HANS RAJ
BENCH:
KHANNA, HANS RAJ
BHAGWATI, P.N.
GOSWAMI, P.K.
CITATION:
1975 AIR 1193 1975 SCR (3) 885
1975 SCC (1) 696
CITATOR INFO :
R 1978 SC1296 (18,48)
E 1990 SC1771 (9)
ACT:
Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceilings and Holdings)Act,
(27 of 1961) as amended by Acts of 1968, 1969 and 1970-
Principal Act included in the Ninth Schedule-Amending Acts
if protected by Art. 31A or 31B.
HEADNOTE:
The Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceilings on Holdings)
Act, 1961 came into force on January 26, 1962. The
constitutional validity of the Act was challenged in the
High Court and the High Court held that the provisions of
the Act, other than s. 28, were a measure of agrarian reform
and were protected by Art. 31A of the Constitution. Section
28, however, was held to be violative Art. 14. In 1964, the
Constitution (17th Amendment) Act was passed, as a result of
which the 1961 Act, including s. 28, was included in the
Ninth Schedule. The 1961 Act was amended by various
Maharashtra Acts, namely Act 16 of 1968, 33 of 1968, 37 of
1969 and 27 of 1970. The constitutional validity of the
1961-Act as amended by the various Maharashtra Acts, was
again challenged but the High Court upheld the validity of
the Act as amended on the ground that it was protected by
Arts. 3 1A and 31B of the Constitution.
Dismissing the appeal to this Court,
HELD : Though the various amendments to the Act of 1961 were
not protected by Art. 31B. they are, however, protected by
Art. 31A of the Constitution. [898 C-D; 907 A-B]
1.(a) The object of Art. 31B is to give a blanket protection
to the Acts and Regulations specified in Ninth Schedule and
the provisions of those Acts and Regulations, against any
challenge to them on the ground that they are inconsistent
with, or take away, or abridge, any of the fundamental
rights in Part III. This immunity would be available
notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court
or tribunal to the contrary. [896 H--897 B]
(b) The specification of an Act or Regulation in the
schedule would not prevent the competent legislature from
repealing or amending it. The inclusion of. the Act or
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Regulation in the Ninth Schedule would protect not only the
principal Act or Regulation which is included in the Ninth
Schedule but also the amendments which have been made
therein till the date of such inclusion even though the
constitutional amendment by which it is included in the
Ninth Schedule refers only to the Principal Act or
Regulation and not to the amendments made till then. [897 C-
D]
(c) But the inclusion in the Ninth Schedule would not
extend the protection to any amendments made in the Act or
Regulation after the date of its inclusion in the Ninth
Schedule. The inclusion of the Act or Regulation in the
Ninth Schedule is brought about only by means of an
amendment of the Constitution by the prescribed majority in
each house of Parliament under Art. 368. It is for the
prescribed majority in each house, to decide whether a
particular Act or Regulation should be inserted in the Ninth
Schedule. In case the Protection afforded by the Article is
extended to amendments made in the Act or Regulation
subsequent to its inclusion in the Schedule, the result
would be, that even those provisions would enjoy the
protection which were never scrutinised and could not, in
the very nature of things, have been scrutinised by the
prescribed majority vested with the power of amending the
Constitution. It would be tantamount to giving a power to
State Legislatures to amend the Constitution in such a way
is would enlarge the contents of Ninth Schedule. [897 D-H]
(d) The protection of Art. 31B cannot also be invoked for a
new provision inserted by amendment after inclusion of the
Act in the Ninth Schedule on the _ground that it is
ancillary or incidental to the provisions to which
protection
886
has already been afforded by such inclusion. Any provision
which has the effect of making an inroad into the guarantee
of fundamental rights should be construed very strictly and
it would not be permissible to widen the scope of such a
provision or to extend the frontiers of the protected zone
beyond what is warranted by the language of the provision.
The entitlement to protection being confined only to the
Acts, Regulations and provisions which are expressly
mentioned in that Schedule, it cannot be extended to
provisions which were not included therein. This principle
would hold good irrespective of the fact whether the
provision, to which entitlement to protection is sought to
be extended, deals with new substantive matters or whether
it deals with matters which are incidental or ancillary to
those already protected. [897 H-898 D]
Sri Rant Ram Narain Medhi v. State of Bombay (1959] Supp. 1
S.C.R. 489, Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan; [1965] 1
S.C.R. 933; State of Orissa v. Chandra Sekhar Singh Bhoi
etc. [19701 1 S.C.R. 593 and State of Maharashtra etc. v.
Madhavrao Damodar Patilchand & Ors., [1968] 3 S.C.R. 712,
followed.
(e) The case of Ramanlal Gulab Chand Shah v. State of
Gujarat [1969] 1 SCR 42 does not lay down, as had been
assumed by the High Court. that if an amending Act does not
cover a new field but contains only provisions which are
incidental and ancillary to those which are protected by
Art. 31B, the Amending Act would also get the protection of
that Article. [900 C-D]
2 (a) The principles applicable in order to find out whether
an impugned enactment for acquisition of land is protected
by Art. 31A are :
(i) Acquisition of land by the State should be for the
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purpose of agrarian reform. The scope of agrarian reform
is wider than that of land reform.
(ii) Acquisition of land by taking it from a senior member
of the family and giving it to a junior member is not a
measure of agrarian reform.
(iii) Acquisition of land for urban slum clearance or for a
housing scheme in the neighbourhood of a big city is not a
measure of agrarian reform.
(iv) Acquisition of land by the State without specifying the
purpose for which land is to be used is not a measure of
agrarian reform.
(v) But schemes of rural development envisaging not only
equitable distribution of land but also raising of economic
standards and the bettering of rural health and social
conditions in the villages, by making provision for the
assignment of land to a Panchayat for the use of the general
community or for hospitals, schools, manure pits, tanning
grounds etc. which ensure for the benefit of the rural
population, constitute a measure of agrarian reform.
(vi) Provision for reservation of land for promotion of
agriculture and for the welfare of agricultural population
constitutes a measure of agrarian reform.
(vii) If the dominant and general purpose of the scheme is
agrarian reform, the scheme may provide for ancillary
provisions to give full effect to the scheme.
(viii) A provision fixing ceiling area and providing for the
disposal of the surplus land in accordance with rules to
implement a programme of agrarian reform is a measure of
agrarian reform. [905 A-G]
Kavalappara Kottarathi Kochuni & Ors. v. The State of Madras
JUDGMENT:
Collector [1965] 1 SCR 614; Ranjit Singh & Ors. v. State of
Punjab & Ors. [1965] 1 SCR 82; Balmadies Plantations Ltd. v.
State of Tamil Nadu [19731 1 SCR 258; Kanan Devan Hills
Produce Co. Ltd. v. The State of Kerala & Anr. [19731 1 SCR
356 and State of Kerala .It Anr. v. Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg.
(Wvg.) Co. Ltd. etc. [19731 2 SCC 713, and Fida Ali v. State
of Jammu and Kashmir, [1974] 2 SCC 253 referred to.
(b) In the present case a conspectus of the different
provisions of the impugned Act goes to show that the main
purpose of the Act was to prevent concentration of
agricultural land in the hands of a few. Section 3 of the
impugned Act imposes a ceiling on holding of agricultural
land. S. 4 provides that no person shall hold land in
excess of ceiling. Under s. 14 inquiry is to
887
be made for determining such excess. On completion of
inquiry a declaration is made under s. 21 giving particulars
of the area which is delimited as surplus land. Possession
of such surplus land is then taken by the Collector on
behalf of the State Government free of all encumbrances.
Section 27 provides for the distribution of surplus land,
and s. 28 makes a special provision in respect of lands
taken over from industrial undertakings to ensure efficient
cultivation and continued supply of raw-material for those
undertakings. For such a purpose, if the State Government
considers it necessary to maintain the integrity of the land
acquired from the industrial undertaking in one or more
compact blocks, it might, subject to terms and conditions,
grant the land or any part thereof to a joint farming
society or a member thereof consisting, as far as possible.
of the persons specified in that section. [905 G-906 C]
(c)From the preamble to the Amending Act 27 of 1970 and the
counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State Government it
appears that efforts to set up a joint farming society as
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contemplated by s. 28 of the Act did not bear fruit in spite
of the fact that the time for setting up of those societies
was extended. The State Government also found that short
extensions of time was hampering the full and efficient use
of the land for agriculture and the Maharashtra State
Farming Corporation, which had been cultivating that land
for the interim period, could not undertake any plans or
schemes for the improvement of the land because of the short
extensions. The State Government. therefore, decided that
the cultivation of the land might be continued with the
Maharashtra State. Farming Corporation on a permanent
basis. In arriving at this decision the State Government
was also influenced by the consideration that the
implementation of the joint farming societies scheme would
lead to fragmentation of the land and hamper its economic
development and for implementing this purpose. P. 28-IAA was
inserted in the Act and the other amendments of the
principal Act were made, by Act 27 of 1970. [906 C-F]
(d) It could not be contended that only distribution of
acquired land among landless persons or poor peasants would
constitute agrarian reform, and that. when lands of
industrial undertakings are not so distributed but had to be
cultivated by the State Farming Corporation, the acquisition
cannot be considered to be a measure of agrarian reform.
The acquisition of land held by industrial undertakings is
not to be taken in isolation but as part of the general
scheme and object of the Act that there should be a ceiling
on private holdings. S. 28-IAA has to be taken in its
context and setting with the other provisions the Act.
Ordinarily distribution of acquired surplus land of
individuals among landless persons and poor peasants is part
of the scheme of agrarian reform. The legislature here has
made special provision in respect of land held by an
industrial undertaking, in order to prevent the
fragmentation of a large tract of land and to subserve the
purpose of supplying raw-material to the undertaking and
provided that it should be cultivated by a State owned
farming corporation. Acquisition simpliciter of land by the
State to augment its resource& and without specifying the
purpose for which it is to be used after acquisition would
not get the protection of Art. 31A. To decide the question
of protection. the general scheme of the statute containing
the provision for the acquisition. the object of the
acquisition, and the reasons which weighed for retaining the
land with the State or its corporation without distributing
it among the landless persons and poor peasants. must be
considered. The concept of agrarian reform is not static
and with the change of times, under the impact of fresh
ideas and in the context of fresh situations, the concept of
agrarian reform is bound to acquire new dimensions. A
measure which has the effect of improving the rural economy
or promoting rural welfare would be a part of agrarian
reform. The fact that part of the acquired land would
remain vested in the State Government or a State owned
farming corporation would not therefore militate against the
object of agrarian reform, if the continued vesting of the
land in the Government or the corporation is a part of the
general scheme of agrarian reform and there is no oblique
deviation from the avowed purpose, especially when it is in
the interest of rural economy that the compact area instead
of being fragmented by distribution. be preserved as one
compact block cultivated by the State owned farming
corporation. [907 E-908 C] Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab
[1965] 1 S.C.R. 82, followed.
888
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&
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1426 of
1974.
From the judgment and order dated the 3/5/8-4-74 of the
Bombay High Court in S.C.A. 1271/68.
A. K. Sen M. C. Bhandare, D. M. Popat, S. I. Thakore, P. H.
Parekh and Sunanda Bhandare, for the appellant.
Niren De, Attorney General of India and M. N. Shroff, for
the respondents 1-4.
I. N. Shroff, and J. C. Bhatt, for respondent No. 5.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by :
KHANNA, J. The short question which arises in this appeal
filed on certificate by Godavari Sugar Mills Ltd. and its
two shareholder directors against the judgment of the Bombay
High Court is the constitutional validity of Maharashtra
Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961
(Maharashtra Act No. 27 of 1961) (hereinafter referred to as
the principal Act) as amended by Maharashtra Acts Nos. 16 of
1968, 33 of 1968, 37 of 1969 and 27 of 1970. The High Court
has upheld the validity of the Act on the ground that it is
protected by article 31A and 31B of the Constitution.
The principal Act came into force on January 26, 1962.
According to its long title, it was an act to impose a
maximum limit (or ceiling) on the holding of agricultural
land in the State of Maharashtra; to provide for the
acquisition and distribution of land held in excess of such
ceiling; and for matters connected with the purposes
aforesaid. Section 3 of the Act deals with ceiling on
holding of agricultural land. According to that section, in
order to provide the more equitable distribution of
agricultural land amongst the peasantry of the State of
Maharashtra (and in particular, to provide that landless
persons are given land for personal cultivation), on the
commencement of the Act, there shall be imposed to the
extent, and in the manner hereinafter provided, a maximum
limit (or ceiling) on the holding of agricultural land
throughout the State. Section 4 provides that no person
shall hold land in excess of the ceiling area, while section
5 specifies as to what area would constitute ceiling area
under each class of land in specified local area. Returns
have to be submitted to the Collector in respect of surplus
land under section 12 of the Act. Section 14 gives power to
the Collector to hold an enquiry for determining as to what
area in respect of the holding of a person should be
declared to be in excess of the ceiling area. On completion
of the enquiry if the Collector finds the holding of a
person in excess of the ceiling area the Collector shall
make a declaration under section 21 of the Act about the
area, description and full particulars of the and which is
delimited ,is surplus land. The declaration is then
notified under section 21(2) in the official Gaztte
According to sub-section (4) of that section, the Collector
for shall after the publication of the notification under
sub-section (2) take in the prescribed manner possession of
the land which is delimited is surplus
889
and. It is further provided that the surplus land shall with
effect from the date on which the possession thereof is
taken as aforesaid be deemed to be acquired by the State
Government for the, purposes of the Act and shall
accordingly vest free from ad encumbrances in the State
Government Section 27 makes provision for the distribution
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of the surplus land. Section 28 of the Act makes provision
in respect of land taken over from industrial undertaking to
ensure efficient cultivation and continued supply of raw
material. The section as it stood before its amendment by
Act 33 of 1968 read as under
"28. (1) Where any land held by an industrial
undertaking is acquired by, and vests, in the
State Government under section 21, such land
being land which was being used for the
purpose of producing or providing raw material
for the manufacture or production of any goods
articles or commodities by the undertaking,
the State Government shall take particular
care to ensure that the acquisition of the
land does not affect adversely the production
and supply of raw material from the land to
the undertaking.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in
section 27 but subject to any rules made in
this behalf for the purpose of so ensuring the
continuance of the supply of such raw material
to the imdertaking, and generally for the full
and efficient use of the land for agriculture
and its efficient management, the State
Government--
(a) may, if it is in the opinion of that
Government necessary for the purpose aforesaid
(such opinion being formed after considering
the representation of persons interested
therein) maintain the integrity of the area so
acquired, in one or more compact blocks, and
(b) may, subject to such terms and conditions
(including in particular, conditions which are
calculated to ensure the full and continued
supply of raw material lo the undertaking at a
fair price), grant the land or any part
thereof to a joint farming society (or a
member thereof) consisting as far as possible,
of--
(i) persons who had previously leased such
land to the undertaking,
(ii) agricultural labour (if any) employed by
the undertaking on such land,
(iii) technical or other staff engaged by the
undertaking on such land, or in relation to
the production or supply of any raw material,
(iv) adjoining landholder who are small
holders.
(v) landless persons :
Provided that the State Government may-
(a) for such period as is necessary for the
setting up of joint farming societies as
aforesaid being not more than
890
three years in the first instance (extensible
to a further period not exceeding two years)
from the date of taking possession of the
land, direct that the land acquired, or any
part thereof, shall be cultivated by one or
more farms run or managed by the State, or by
one or more corporations (including a Company)
owned or controlled by the State
(b) grant to the landlord so much of the
surplus land leased by him to the undertaking,
which together with any other land held by him
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does not exceed the ceiling area (but if the
landlord be a public trust and the major
portion of the income from the land is being
appropriated for purposes of education or
medical relief, grant the entire land to the
public trust) on condition that the landlord,
or as the case may be, the public trust lease
the land to a farm or corporation described in
clause (a) aforesaid, and thereafter, in the
case of a landlord (not being a public trust)
that he becomes a member of the joint farming
society, and in the case of a public trust,
that it lease the land to a joint farming
society.
(3) The State Government may provide that,-
(a) for the breach of any term or condition
referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (2),
or
(b) if the landlord to whom the land is
granted falls to lease the land to the farm or
corporation or to become a member of a joint
farming society;
(c) if it considers after such inquiry as it
thinks fit, that the production and supply of
raw material to the undertaking is not
maintained it the level or in the manner
which, with proper and efficient management it
ought to be maintained, or
(d) for any other reason it is undesirable in
the interest of the full and efficient
cultivation of the land, that the joint
farming society, should continue to cultivate
the land, the grant shall. after giving three
months’ notice or termination thereof and
after giving the other party reasonably
opportunity of showing cause, be terminated,
and the land resumed. Thereafter, the State
Government may make such other arrangements as
it thinks fit for the proper cultivation of
the land and maintenance of the production and
supply of raw material to the undertaking.
At this stage we may advert to the facts giving rise to the
present appeal. The appellant company owns two factories
for the manufacture of sugar and allied products. The
company hold large areas of land in Ahmednagar district for
the cultivation of sugarcane for its factories. On March 1,
1963 Special Deputy Collector respondent No. 2 declared an
area of 8468 acres 261/2 gunthas in village Sakarwadi held
by the appellant company to be in excess of the ceiling
891
area. On March 7, 1963 Special Deputy Collector respondent
No. 1 passed an order declaring 2677 acres 16 gunthas of
appellant-company’s land situated in Lakshmiwadi to be in
excess of the ceiling area. Thus a total area of 12146
arres 1/2 guntha was declared to be surplus. Appeals
against the aforesaid orders were filed by the appellant
company to the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. The appellants
& some others also filed petitions challenging the
constitutional validity of the principal Act. A Division
Bench of the Bombay High Court as per judgment dated October
25, 1963 delivered in a petition filed by another party
upheld the constitutional validity of all the provisions of
the principal Act, except section 28 which was struck down,.
It was held that the provisions of the Act other than
section 28 were a measure of agrarian reform and as such
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protected by article 31A of the Constitution. Section 28
was held to be violative of article 14 of the Constitution.
On June 20, 1964 the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment)
Act was passed. As a result of the Seventeenth Amendment of
the Constitution the principal Act including section 28 was
included in the. Ninth Schedule,. The petition filed by
the, appellants challenging the validity of the principal
Act was in view of the Seventeenth Amendment dismissed by a
Division Bench of the Bombay High Court on March 10, 1965.
The appellants came up in appeal to this Court against the
judgment of the Bombay High Court but that appeal was
dismissed by this Court on April 10, 1968. The judgment of
this Court is reported in (1968) 3 SCR 712. It may be
stated that a stay order was made during the pendency of the
appeal filed by the appellants. After the dismissal of the
appeal on application filed by the respondents, the counsel
for the appellants gave an undertaking on April 26, 1968 to
deliver possession of 10315 acres of land on or before May
2. 1968. Possession of 10315 acres of land in pursuance of
the above undertaking was handed over by the appellant
company in May 1968. As the joint farming societies
referred to in section 28 had not yet been formed, till such
formation the said land along with some other land taken
over from others in similar circumstances was given for
cultivation to the Maharashtra State Farming Corporation
Limited respondent No. 5. The said Corporation was
incorporated on March 6, 1963 under the Companies Act and is
owned and controlled by the State of Maharashtra respondent
No. 3.
On May 17, 1968 amending Act 16 of 1968 was published. As a
result of the amending Act section 28-IA was inserted in the
princiPal Act. This section extended the period for the
setting up of joint farming societies contemplated by
section 28 of the principal Act by one year. It also
empowered the State Government to make a scheme for the
interim period. On June 26, 1968 the appellants filed
petition under article 226 and 227 of the Constitution for a
declaration that the principal Act as amended by Act 16 of
1968 was unconstitutional Interim injunction was issued
restraining the respondents from taking any steps under the
amended Act on June 27, 1968. The injunction was thereafter
vacated in respect of 10315 acres of land. The appellants
also gave an undertaking that they would not press their-
892
appeals before the Tribunal in respect of 10315 acres of
land. Accordingly, on July 22, 1968 the Maharashta Revenue
Tribunal dismissed the appeals of the appellants in respect
of 10317 acres 37 gunthas of land. The appeals regarding
the rest of the land measuring 1829 acres were kept pending
in view of the injunction issued by the High Court.
On December 28, 1968 amending Act 33 of 1968 was published.
Section 2 of the amending Act added an explanation in
section 28 as trader :
"Explanation.-For the avoidance of doubt, it
is hereby declared that a producer of raw
material (being a person, a joint farming
society, or corporation) (including a company)
referred to in sub-section (2) shall be liable
to supply raw material to the undertaking
concerned only on that undertaking agreeing to
accept such supply at the fair price."
The amending Act also introduced section 28-IB, the material
part of which was as under :
"28-1B. The supply of raw material by any
producer (being a person, a joint farming
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society or corporation) (including a company)
to the undertaking during any shall be
regulated, and the fair prices at which such
supply is to be made to the undertaking shall
be fixed, in accordance with the provisions of
the Third Schedule."
Clause 3 of the Third Schedule provided for the formation of
a committee for fixation of the fair price.
On July 26, 1969 amending Act 37 of 1969 was published. The
amending Act made changes in the Third Schedule and provided
for the setting up of a Board for fixation of the fair price
of the raw material supplied to an undertaking under the
principal Act.
Amending Act 27 of 1970 was published on May 19, 1970. The
long preamble of the Act reads as under :
"Whereas, section 28 of the Maharashtra
Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holding,,) Act,
1961 inter alia provides that the State
Government shall take particular care to
ensure that the acquisition of land held by an
industrial undertaking (being land which was
being used for the purpose of Producing or
providing raw material for the manufacture or
production of any goods, articles or
commodities by ’he undertaking) does not
affect adversely the production and supply of
raw material from such land to the udertaking,
and that for the purpose of so ensuring the
continuance of supply of such raw material
from such land to the undertaking and
generally for the full and efficient use of
the for agriculture and its efficient
management the State Government may maintain
the, integrity of the area so acquired in one
or more compact block.
893
and may grant the, land, or any part thereof, to a joint
farming society (or a member thereof) consisting of persons
referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (2) of that
section;
And Whereas, that section inter alia further provides that
for such period as is necessary for the setting up of joint
farming societies as provided in sub-section (2) of that
section (being not more than five years in the, aggregate
from the date of taking possession of the land), the land
acquired or any part thereof should be cultivated by one or
more farms run or managed by the State, or by one or more
corporations (including a company) owned or controlled by
the State;
And whereas, the State Government have accordingly
constituted the Maharashtra State Farming Corporation
Limited (a company formed and registered under the pro-
visions of the Companies Act, 1956), for managing the farms
till the setting up of the joint farming societies afore-
said;
And whereas, efforts so far made in the setting up of such
societies including the efforts made for the setting UP of
such societies under the Maharashtra Agricultura Land
(Ceiling on Holdings) Setting up of Joint Farming Societies
Scheme, 1968, made under section 28-IA of the said Act have
not borne fruit, and the periods for the setting up of such
societies are due to expire between the months of May and
October 1970;
And whereas, in the light of experience mentioned aforesaid,
it is not possible to say that any such joint farming
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societies can be set up at all;
And whereas, short extensions of time for the setting up of
such joint farming societies is hampering the full and effi-
cient use of the land for agriculture and its efficient
management for the reason that the Maharashtra State Farming
Corporation is thereby prevented from undertaking any plans
or schemes for the improvement of the Land and it is finding
it difficult to carry out the objects of clause (b) of sub-
section (2) of section 28;
And whereas, most of the undertakings have also represented
to the State Government that cultivation of the land may be
continued with the Maharashtra State Farming Corporation on
a permanent basis for the reason that implementation of the
Joint Farming Societies Scheme aforesaid will lead to
fragmentation of land and that since the economic
development of land is part of agrarian reform, the
continuation of the management of the lands by the said
Corporation will subserve the purpose of agrarian reform in
consonance with the object of the said Act;
894
And whereas the State Government after
carefully considering the question, in
particular, in the light of what has been set
out hereinabove, is also of opinion that the
cultivation of the land should be continued
with the Maharashtra State Farming Corporation
on a permanent basis;
And whereas, it is necessary to amend the said
Act for the purposes aforesaid, and also for
certain other purposes hereinafter appearing;
it is hereby enacted in the Twenty-first Year
of the Republic of India as follows :--"
Sections 2 and 3 of the amending Act inserted additional
words In the long title and preamble of the principal Act so
as to include the words :
"also to provide that the lands taken over
from undertakings and the integrity of which
is maintained in compact blocks for ensuring
the full and efficient use of the land for
agriculture and its efficient management
through corporations (including a company)
owned or controlled by the State, be granted
to such corporations or company;"
Section 4 of the amending Act amended section 21 of the
principal Act by providing in a newly inserted sub-section
(5) that where possession of any land delimited as surplus
is handed over by the holder in pursuance of an undertaking
given by him in any court, and the appeal filed by the
bolder against the declaration of that land as surplus has
been subsequently withdrawn or dismissed, the land, not-
withstanding anything contained in sub-section (4), shall
with effect from the date on which the possession thereof is
taken by the Collector, be deemed to be duly acquired by the
State Government for the purposes of the Act. Section 7 of
the amending Act deleted section 28-IA of the principal Act.
Section 28-IAA was inserted by section 8 of the amending
Act, Sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 28-lAA read as
under :
"28-1AA. (1) The State Government may, by
notification in the Official Gazette, not
later than ninety days from the commencement
of the Maharastra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling
on Holdings) (Amendment) Act, 1970, grant the
surplus land taken over from the industrial
undertakings and referred to in section 28 and
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which is being cultivated by one or more
corporations (including a company) owned and
controlled by the State to such corporation,
or corporations, as the case may be, subject
to such terms and conditions, including in
particular, the condition of maintaining the
integrity oil the surplus land, in one or more
compact blocks, and conditions which are
calculated to ensure the full and continued
supply of raw material to the undertaking at a
fair price. On the grant of such surplus land
to one or more corporations ,is aforesaid, the
provisions of section 28 so far as they
provide for setting up of joint farming
societies shall not apply in relation to such
surplus land.
895
(2) The State Government may provide that,-
(a) for the breach of any term or condition
referred to in subsection (1), or
(b) if it considers after such inquiry as it
thinks fit, that the production and supply
of raw material to the undertaking is not
maintained at the level or in the manner
which, with proper and efficient management
it-ought to be maintained, or
(c) for any other reason it is undesirable in
the interest of the full and efficient
cultivation of the land, that the corporation,
(including a company) should continue to
cultivate the land,
the grant shall, after giving three months’
notice of termination thereof, and after
giving the corporation reasonable opportunity
of showing cause be terminated, and the land
resumed. Thereafter, the State Government may
itself take steps by running or managing one
or more farms for the proper cultivation of
the land and maintenance of the production and
supply of raw material to the undertaking at a
fair price.
Explanation.-For the avoidance of doubt, it is
hereby
declared that a producer of raw
material being
the corporation (including a
company) or the
State Government referred to in
this section
shall be liable to supply raw
material to the
undertaking concerned only on
that undertaking
agreeing to accept such supply at
the fair
price."
It may be mentioned that the principal Act has also been
amended by Maharashtra Act 50 of 1973 which was published on
December 22, 1973. Petitions challenging the validity of
the principal Act as amended by Act 50 of 1973 are stated to
be pending in the High Court. The High Court in the case
which is the subject matter of the present appeal allowed
amendment of the petition so as to include challenge to the
principal Act as amended by Act 27 of 1970. It may also be
stated that before the amendment made by Act 27 of 1970, the
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principal Act was amended by various amending Acts, besides
those to which reference has already been made, but we are
not concerned with those other amending Acts.
To complete the narration we may also refer to the
Maharastra Agricultural Lands (Ceilings on Holdings) Grant
of Surplus Lands Taken Over from Industrial Undertaking
Order, 1970 which was issued by the Maharashtra Government
on August 13, 1970 in exercise of the powers conferred by
section 28-1AA of the Act. Clause 2(c) of the Order defines
"Corporation" to mean the Maharashtra State Farming
Corporation Ltd. Clause 3 of the Order reads as under :
"Grant of lands to Corporation.-The lands
specified in column 3 of the schedule hereto
(being surplus lands taken over from the
undertakings referred to in section 28 and
specified in column 2 of that schedule) and
which are being culti-
896
vated by the Corporation are hereby granted to
the Corporation on payment of occupancy price
and on the terms and conditions specified in
this Order."
Clause 4 of the Order specifies the conditions for
maintaining the integrity of surplus land, whole clause 5
deals with conditions so as to ensure full and continued
supply of raw material to industrial undertakings. Clause 6
provides for conditions as to termination of grants.
By the judgment under appeal the High Court, as already men-
tioned, has upheld the validity of the impugned Act on the
ground that it is protected by articles 31A and 31B of the
Constitution.
Mr. Sen on behalf of the appellants has at the outset
assailed the finding of the High Court in so far as it has
held the impugned Act to be protected by article 31B of the
Constitution.
The High Court while affording the protection of article 31B
of the Constitution to the impugned Act has referred to the
fact that the principal Act including section 28 was
inserted in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution as item
No. 34 by the Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution.
The submission advanced on behalf of the respondents that
the amending Acts of 1968 and 1970 were only ancilliary or
incidental to section 28 of the principal Act and as such
the amended Act was protected under article 31B found favour
with the High Court. The High Court accordingly observed:
"We, therefore, hold that section 28-1A, and
section 281AA are only ancillary or incidental
to section 28 of the principal Act and section
21(5) is also ancillary or incidental to
section 21 and, therefore, all these three
amendments are protected by article 31B of the
Constitution."
We have given the matter our consideration and are unable to
agree with the above conclusion of the High Court. Article
31B reads as under :
"31B. Without prejudice to the generality of
the provisions contained in article 31A, none
of the Acts and Regulations specified in the
Ninth Schedule nor any of the provisions
thereof shall be deemed to be void, or ever to
have become void, on the ground that such Act,
Regulation or provision is inconsistent with,
or takes away or abridges any of the rights
conferred by, any provisions of this Part, and
notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 13 of 24
of any court or tribunal to the contrary, each
of the said Acts and Regulations shall,
subject to the power of any competent
Legislature to repeal or amend it, continue in
force. "
The above article was inserted in the Constitution by the
First Amendment. The object of this article is to give a
blanket protection to the Acts and Regulations specified in
the Ninth Schedule and the provisions of those Acts and
Regulations against any challenge to those Acts,
897
Regulations or the provisions thereof on the ground that
they are inconsistent with or take away or abridge any of
the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution. The
result is that howsoever violative of the fundamental rights
may be the provisions of an Act or Regulation, once the Act
or Regulation is specified in the Ninth Schedule it would
not be liable to be struck down on that score. This
immunity against the above challenge would be available
notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court
or tribunal to the contrary. The effect of article 31B,
however, is not to prevent challenge, to an enactment on the
ground that it is beyond the legislative competence of the
legislature which enacted it. It is also plain from the
language of the article that the specification of an Act or
Regulation would not prevent the competent legislature to
repeal or amend it.
The protection and immunity afforded by article 31B is,
however, restricted to the provisions of the Act or
Regulation as they exist on the date the Act or Regulation
is included in the Ninth Schedule. The inclusion of the Act
and Regulation would protect not only the principal Act or
Regulation which is included in the Ninth Schedule but also
the amendments which have been made therein till the date of
its inclusion in the Ninth Schedule, even though the
constitutional amendment by which the Act or Regulation is
included in the Ninth Schedule refers only to the principal
Act and Regulation and not to the amendments thereof. The
protection or immunity enjoyed by the Act or Regulation,
including the amendments thereof till the date of its
inclusion in the Ninth Schedule would not, however, extend
to the amendments made in the Act or Regulation after the
date of its inclusion in the Ninth Schedule. The reason for
that is that the inclusion of an Act or Regulation in the
Ninth Schedule can be brought about only by means of an
amendment of the Constitution. The amendment of the
Constitution can be carried out in accordance with article
368 of the Constitution. Such a power is exercised not by
the legislature enacting the impugned law but by the
authority which makes the constitutional amendment under
article 368, viz., the prescribed majority in each House of
Parliament. Such a power can be exercised in respect of an
existing Act or Regulation of which the provisions can be
scrutinized before it is inserted in the Ninth Schedule. It
is for the prescribed majority in each House to decide
whether a particular Act or Regulation should be inserted in
the Ninth Schedule, and if so, whether it should be so
inserted in its entirety or partly, In case the protection
afforded by article 31B is extended to amendments made in an
Act or Regulation subsequent to its inclusion in the Ninth
Schedule, the result would be that even those provisions
would enjoy the protection which were never scrutinized and
could not in the very nature of things have been scrutinized
by the prescribed majority vested with the power of amending
the Constitution. It would, indeed, be tantamount to giving
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a power to the State legislature to amend the Constitution
in such a way as would enlarge the contents of Ninth
Schedule to the Constitution.
The protection of article 31B can also not be extended to a
new provision inserted as a result of amendment on the
ground that it is
11--564SCI/75
898
ancillary or incidental to the provisions to which
protection has already been afforded by including them in
the Ninth Schedule. Article 31B carves out a protected
zone. It has inserted Ninth Schedule in the Constitution
and gives immunity to the Acts, Regulations and provisions
specified in the said schedule from being struck down on the
ground of infringement of fundamental rights even though
they are violative of such rights. Article 31B thus
excludes the operation of fundamental rights in matters
dealt with by those Acts, Regulations and provisions. Any
provision which has the effect of making an inroad into the
guarantee of fundamental rights in the very nature of things
should be construed very strictly, and it would not, in our
opinion, be permissible to widen the scope of such a
provision or to extend the frontiers of the protected zone
beyond what is warranted by the language of the provision.
No Act, Regulation or provision would enjoy immunity and
protection of article 31B unless it is expressly made a part
of the Ninth Schedule. The entitlement to protection being
confined only to the Acts, Regulations and provisions
mentioned in the Ninth Schedule, it cannot be extended to
provisions which were not included in that schedule. This
principle would hold good irrespective of the fact whether
the provision to which entitlement to protection is sought
to be extended deals with new substantive matters or whether
it deals with matters which are incidental or ancillary to
those already protected.
We are fortified in the above conclusion by the previous
decisions of this Court. In the case of Sri Ram Ram Narain
Medhi v. State of Bombay(1) the ’Constitution Bench of this
Court dealt with the question as to whether an amendment
made by an Act of 1956 would be protected by article 31B if
the 1948 Act in which that amendment was made had been
included in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution. The
question was answered in the negative. Bhagwati, J.
speaking for the Court observed :
"The impugned Act which was passed by the
State Legislature in 1956 was a further
measure of agrarian reform carrying forward
the intentions which bad their roots in the
1948 Act. Having regard to the comparison of
the various provisions of 1948 Act and the
impugned Act referred to above it could be
legitimately urged that if the cognate provi-
sions of the 1948 Act were immune from attack
in regard to their constitutionality, on a
parity of reasoning similar provisions
contained in the impugned Act, though they
made further strides in the achievement of the
objective of a socialistic pattern of society
would be similarly saved. That position,
however, could not obtain because whatever
amendments were made by the impugned Act in
the 1948 Act were future laws within the
meaning of Art. 13 (2) of the Constitution and
required to be tested on the self-same
touchstoNe. They would not be in terms saved
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by Art. 31B and would have to be scrutinized
on their own merits before the courts came to
the conclusion that they were enacted within
the
(1) [1959] Supp.1 S.C.R. 489.
899
consistitutional limitations. The very terms
of Art. 31B envisaged that any competent
legislature would have the power to repeal or
amend the Acts and the Regulations specified
in the 9th Schedule thereof and if any such
amendment was ever made the vires of that
would have to be tested."
.lm0
To the same effect is the decision of this
Court in the case of Sajjan Singh v. State of
Rajasthan(1). Gajendragadkar C.J. speaking
for the majority observed
"There is one more point to which we would
like to refer. In the case of Sankari
Prasad(2) this Court has observed that the
question whether the latter part of Art. 31B
is too widely expressed, was not argued before
it, and so, it did not express any opinion
upon it. This question has, however, been
argued before us, and so, we would like to
make it clear that the effect of the last
clause in Art. 3 1 B is to leave it open to
the respective legislatures to repeal or amend
the Acts which have been included in the Ninth
Schedule. In other words, the fact that the
said Acts have been included in the Ninth
Schedule with a view to make- them valid, does
not mean that the legislatures in question
which passed the said Acts have lost their
competence to repeal them or to amend them.
That is one consequence of the said provision.
The other inevitable consequence of the said
provision is that if a legislature amends any
of the provisions contained in any of the said
Acts, the amended provision would not receive
the protection of Art. 31 B and its validity
may be liable to be examined on the merits."
In the case of Ramanlal Gulab Chand Shah etc. v. State of
Gujarat & Ors(3). Hidayatullah C.J. also dealt with a
similar question and observed :
"The first question to consider is the vires
of the addition to s.65 by the Amending Act,
which addition has been shown in the section
quoted already. This matter has to be
considered with reference to Arts. 31-A and
31-B read with the Ninth Schedule. The
protection is claimed on the basis of these
two articles by the State. Article 31-B no
doubt gives protection to all statutes listed
in Schedule IX of the Constitution and this
Act is so listed. But it was listed before
the amendment of s.65 and that amendment came
to be said to have been considered when the
Amendment of the Constitution was made. That
Amendment if accepted as unassailable will
have the indirect effect of amending the
original Schedule IX by including something in
it which was not there before. This is
undoubtedly beyond the competence of any state
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Legislature. The argument of the learned
Attorney General that the general schemes of
the Preamble and the provisions of s.44 made
applicable by
(1) [1965] 1 S.C R. 933.
(3) [1969] S.C.R. 42.
(2) [1952] S.C.R. 89.
900
s.65 (2) both of which have the protection of
Art.31-B must give protection is fallacious.
Even if the preamble and s.44 could be read
(and we do not decide that they can be so
read) to give validity it is clear that the
preamble talked only of landholders and the
addition of the words to s.65 is intended to
apply to principle to non-landholders.
Similarly the provisions of s.44 under the
unamended Act, could not have been made
applicable to such non-landholders. The
amendment of s.65 was really carrying the Act
into new fields and not being considered as an
amendment of the Constitution, how can it
claim the protection given to the unamended
Act ? Therefore Art. 31 B and the Ninth
Schedule cannot be called in aid."
The concluding part of the above passage did not lay down,
as seems to have been assumed by the High Court, that if an
amending Act does not cover a new field but contains
provisions which are incidental and ancillary to those which
are protected by article 31B, the amending Act would also
get the protection of article 31B. This Court in the
concluding part merely repelled the contention which bad
been advanced by the Attorney General. The principle which
should guide the courts in such cases was, however, laid
down in the earlier part of the passage wherein this Court
repelled the argument that the amending Act was unassailable
because of the original Act having been included in the
Ninth Schedule.
It may be stated that Shah J. was also a party to the above
decision. In the subsequent case of State of Orissa v.
Chandra Sekhar Singh Bhoi etc.,(1) Shah J. relied upon the
above decision and observed as under :
"By the amendments made in the Constitution by
the 17th Amendment Act the principal Act is
incorporated in the Ninth Schedule to the
Constitution with effect from June 20, 1964.
The Act is therefore not liable to be attacked
on the plea that it is inconsistent with or
takes away or abridges any of the fundamental
rights conferred by Part III of the Consti-
tution. But the power of the competent
Legislature to repeal or amend the Act
incorporated in the Ninth Schedule is not
thereby taken away. The amending Act passed
after the enactment of the Constitution
(Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964 does not
therefore qualify for the protection of Art.
31-B. See Ramanlal Gulabchand Shah etc. v.
State of Gujarat & Ors. and Sri Ram Ram Narain
Medhi v. State of Bombay (supra). This
position is not disputed."
In the case of State of Maharashtra etc. v. Madhavrao
Damodar Patilchand & Ors. etc. (2) which was decided between
these very parties, a seven-Judge Bench of this Court
repelled the contention that article 31B does not protect
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amending Act 13 of 1962 because in the Ninth Schedule to the
Constitution only the Maharashtra State
(1) [1970] 1 S.C.R. 593.
(2) [1968] 3 S.C.R. 712.
901
Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961 had been
included and not the amending Act of 1962. Sikri J. (as he
then was) speaking for the Court observed :
"But then there are many other Acts which had
been amended before they were inserted in the
Ninth Schedule, and we can. hardly imagine
that Parliament intended only to protect the
Acts as originally passed and not the amend-
ments made up to the date of their
incorporation into the Ninth Schedule. The
reason for this express insertion of certain
amending Acts seems to be that some States,
out of abundant caution, recommended that
their amending Acts be specifically inserted
in the Ninth Schedule."
It was further observed
"Accordingly we must overrule the first
submission made by the learned counsel for the
appellant and hold that Art. 31B protects the
impugned Act including the amendments made in
it upto the date of its incorporation into the
Ninth Schedule."
The next question which arises for consideration is whether
the impugned provisions are protected by article 31A of the
Constitution. According to Mr. Sen, the effect of the
aforesaid provisions is to acquire land held by the
appellants and as the acquisition is not for the purpose of
agrarian reform, the provisions do not enjoy the protection
of article 31A. As against that, the learned Attorney
General on behalf of the respondents has contended that the
impugned provisions constitute a measure of agrarian reform
and as such are protected by article 31A.
It is now well-established that before the protection of
article 31A can be afforded to the acquisition of any land
by the State, the acquisition should be for the purpose of
agrarian reform. As observed by Subba Rao J. (as he then
was) speaking for the majority in the case of Kavalappara
Kottarathil Kochuni & Ors. v. The State of Madras & Anr.(1)
the object of inserting article 31A in the Constitution and
of subsequently amending it was to facilitate agrarian
reforms. It was held in that case that an enactment which
sought to regulate the rights of sthanees and the junior
members of a tarwad by depriving the sthanee of its
properties and vesting them in the tarwad under the Madras
Marumakkathayam (Removal of Doubts) Act, 1955 was not a
measure of agrarian reform.
In P. Vajravelu Mudaliar v. Special Deputy Collector (2)
Subba Rao J. speaking for the Court while reiterating that
the object of article 31A was to enable the State to
implement pressing agrarian reforms held that the purpose of
slum clearance for which the land was sought to be acquired
under the Land Acquisition (Madras Amendment) Act, 1961
could not be related to agrarian reform. It is significant
(1) [1960] 3 S.C. R. 887.
(2) [1965] 1 S. C. R. 614.
902
that this Court in that case dealt with the acquisition of
land for development of the area as "neighbourhood" in the
city of Madras for housing schemes.
In the case of Ranjit Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors.
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(1) this Court dealt with the validity of the East Punjab
Holdings. (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation)
Act, the Punjab Gram Panchayat Act and the Punjab Village
Common Lands (Regulation) Act and the proceedings taken
under these enactments, as a result of which proprietor’s
interest was acquired by the State without compensation. It
was held that the impugned provisions as also the provisions
of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act were all a part
of a general Scheme of agrarian reform and the modifications
of rights envisaged by them had the protection of Art. 31
(A). Hidayatullah, J. (as he then was) speaking for the
Court observed :
"The scheme of rural development today
envisages not only equitable distribution of
land so that there is no undue imbalance in
society resulting in a landless class on the
one hand and a concentration of land in the
hands of a few on the other, but envisages
also the raising of economic standards and
bettering rural health and social conditions.
Provisions for the assignment of lands to
village Panchayat for the use of the general
community, or for hospitals, schools, manure
pits, tanning grounds etc. enure for the
benefit of rural population must be considered
to be an essential part of the redistribution
of holdings and open lands to which no
objection is apparently taken. If agrarian
reforms are to succeed, mere distribution of
land to the landless is not enough. There
must be a proper planning of rural economy and
conditions and a body like the village
Panchayat is best designed to promote rural
welfare than individual owners of small
portions of lands."
In the case of Balmadies Plantations Ltd. & Anr. v. State of
Tamil Nadu (2) it was held while dealing with the provisions
of Gudalur Janmam Estates (Abolition and Conversion into
Ryotwari) Act that the object and general scheme of the Act
was to abolish intermediaries between the state and the
cultivator and to help the acutal cultivator by giving him
the status of direct relationship between himself and the
state. The Act, as such, in its broad outlines was held to
be a measure of agrarian reform and protected by article
31A. The acquisition of forests in Janmam estates was held
to be not in furtherance of the objective of agrarian reform
and consequently not protected by article 31A. This Court
in that context observed :
"In the absence of anything in the Act to show
the purpose for which the forests are to be
used by the Government, it cannot be said that
the acquisition of the forests in Janmam land
would be for a purpose related to agrarian
reform. The mere fact that the ownership of
forests would stand transferred to the State
would not show that the object of the
(1) [1965] 1 S.C.R. 82. (2) [1973] 1 S. C. R. 258.
903
transfer is to bring about agrarian reform.
Augmenting the resources of the State by
itself and in the absence of anything more
regarding the purpose of utilisation of those
resources, cannot be held to be a measure of
agrarian reform. There is no material on the
record to indicate that the transfer of
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forests from the Janmi to the Government is
linked in any way with a scheme of agrarian
reform or betterment of village economy."
In the case of Kanan Devan Hills Produce Co. Ltd. v. The
State of Kerala & Anr.(1) this Court dealt with the
provisions of Kannan Devan Hills (Resumption of Lands) Act.
One of the questions which arose for determination in that
case was whether the three purposes mentioned in section 9
of the Act, namely :
(1) reservation of lands for promotion. of
agriculture;
(2) reservation of land for the welfare of
agricultural population;
(3) assignment of remaining lands to
agriculturists and agricultural labourers;
were covered by the expression "agrarian reform" and as such
the aforesaid provision was protected by article 31A of the
Constitution. Sikri CJ. while holding that the above
objects were covered by the expression "agrarian reform"
observed :
"It is urged that the wording of the first two
purposes in s.9 is too wide. But if we look
at the definition of ’common purpose,’ which
was sustained by this Court in Ranjit Singh’s
case (supra), it shows that the purposes
sustained thereby would come under either the
expression ’promotion of agriculture’ or
’welfare of agricultural population’ in s. 9.
Indeed some would fall under both. For
instance, reservation of lands for manure
pits, waterworks or wells, village water
courses or water channels and grazing grounds
would promote agriculture; schoo
ls and
playgrounds, dispensaries, public latrines
etc. would be for the welfare of
agriculturists.
If the State were to use lands for purposes
which have no direct connection with the
promotion of agriculture or welfare of
agricultural population the State could be
restrained from using the lands for those
purposes. Any fanciful connection with these
purposes would not be enough.
It seems to us that if we read these two
purposes to mean that these include only
’common purposes,’ which were sustained by
this Court and purposes similar thereto it
would be difficult to say that they are not
for agrarian reform. In a sense agrarian
reform is wider than land reform. It includes
besides land reform something more and that
some-
(1) [1973] S.C.R. 356.
904
.lm15
thing more is illustrated by the definition of ’common pur-
pose,’ which was sustained by this Court in Ranjit Singh’s
case."
In the case of State of Kerala & Anr. v. Gwalior Rayon Silk
Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. etc.(1) this Court dealt with the
provisions of the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and
Assignment) Act, under which private forest lands situated
in the former Malabar district stood transferred to the,
State. The Act was held to be a measure of agrarian reform
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 20 of 24
and as such protected by article 31A. Palekar J. speaking
for the majority in that case observed :
"The objectives of increasing the agricultural
production and the promotion of the welfare of
the agricultural population are clearly a
predominant element in agrarian reform. How
those objectives are to be implemented are
generally stated in sections 10 and 11. All
the private forests, after certain
reservations, are to be assigned to
agriculturists or agricultural labourers and
to the poorer classes of the rural population
desiring bona fide to take up agriculture as a
means of their livelihood. The reservation in
respect of certain portions of the forests is
also made in the interest of the agricultural
population because the section says that the
reservations will be such as may be necessary
for purposes directed towards the promotion of
agriculture or welfare of the agricultural
population or for purposes ancillary thereto."
Krishna Iyer J. speaking for himself and Bhagwati J. agreed
with the conclusions of the majority and observed :
"Once we accept the thesis that development
orientation and distributive justice are part
of and inspire activist agrarian reform, its
sweep and reach must extend to cover the needs
of the village community as well. What
programme of agrarian reform should be
initiated to satisfy the requirement of rural
uplift in a particular community under the
prevailing circumstances is a matter for
legislative judgment."
In Kh. Fida Ali & Ors. v. State of Jammu and Kashmir(2)
this Court held that the provisions of the Jammu and Kashmir
Agrarian Reforms Act were protected by article 31A. One of
us (Goswami J.)observed :
"From a review of the foregoing provisions it
is obvious that the Act contains a clear
programme of agrarian reforms in taking stock
of the land in the State which is not in per-
sonal cultivation (section 3) and which though
in personal cultivation is in excess of the
ceiling area (section 4). A ceiling area is
fixed for land or orchards or both measuring
121 standard acres. After the land vests in
the State, in accordance with the provisions
of the Act, a provision is made for disposal
of the surplus land in accordance with the
rules."
(1) [1973] 2 S.C.C. 713.
(2) [1974] 2 S.C.C. 253.
905
The following principles can be infered from the decided
cases in order to find whether an impugned enactment for
acquisition of land is protected by article 31A :
(1) Acquisition of Iand by the State in order
to enjoy the protection of article 31A should
be for the purpose of agrarian reform.
(2) Acquisition of land by taking it from a
senior member of the family and giving it to a
junior member is not a measure of agrarian
reform.
(3) Acquisition of land for urban slum
clearance or for a housing scheme in the
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neighbourhood of a big city is not a measure
of agrarian reform.
(4) Acquisition of land by the State without
specifying the purpose for which land is to be
used is not a measure of agrarian reform.
(5) Schemes of rural development envisage not
only equitable, distribution of land but also
raising of economic standards and bettering of
rural health and social conditions in the
villages. Provision for the assignment of
land to a Panchayat for the use of the general
community or for hospitals, schools, manure
pits, tanning grounds enure for the benefit of
the rural population and as such constitute a
measure of agrarian reform.
(6) Provision for reservation of land for
promotion of agriculture and for the welfare
of agricultural population constitutes a
measure of agrarian reform. Agrarian reform
is wider than land reform.
(7) If the dominant and general purpose of the
scheme is agrarian reform, the scheme may
provide for ancillary provisions to give full
effect to the scheme.
(8) A provision fixing ceiling area and
providing for the disposal of surplus land in
accordance with the rules is a measure of
agrarian reform.
Keeping in view the above, principles, let us now examine
the impugned provisions in the present case. Section 3 of
the impugned Act imposes ceiling on holding of agricultural
and. Section 4 provides that no person shall hold land in
excess of the ceiling area. Enquiry is to be made under
section 14 of the Act by the Collector for determining as to
what area should be declared to be in excess of the ceiling
area. On completion of the enquiry if the Collector finds
the holding of a person to be in excess of the ceiling area,
he makes a declaration under section 21 of the Act giving
particulars of the area which is delimited as surplus land.
Possession of the surplus and is then taken by the
Collector. From the date of delivery of possession the land
vests free from all encumbrances in the State Government.
906
Section 27 provides for the distribution of surplus land and
fixes priorities for the purpose. Section 28 made a special
provision in respect of lands taken over from industrial
undertakings to ensure efficient cultivation and continued
supply of raw material for those undertakings. For the
aforesaid purpose if the State Government considered it
necessary to maintain the integrity of the land acquired
from the industrial undertaking in one or more compact
blocks, it might, subject to such terms and conditions,
including in particular conditions which were calculated to
ensure the full and continued supply of raw material to the
undertaking at a fair price, grant the land or any part
thereof to a joint farming society or member thereof
consisting as far as possible of the persons specified in
that section. Provision was also made in that section for
terminating the grant of the land for the reasons mentioned
in sub-section (3) of that section and for making such other
arrangement as the State Government thought fit for the
proper cultivation of the land and the maintenance,
production and supply of raw material to the undertaking.
It would appear from the preamble to amending Act 27 of 1970
and the affidavit of Shri I. G. Karandikar, Under Secretary
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to Government of Maharashtra that efforts to set up joint
farming societies contemplated by section 28 of the Act did
not bear fruit in spite of the fact that the time for the
setting up of those societies was extended. The State
Government then found that short extensions of time for the
setting up of those societies was hampering the full and
efficient use of land for agriculture and the Maharashtra
State Farming Corporation which had been cultivating that
land for the interim period could not undertake any plans or
schemes for the improvement of the land because of the short
extensions. The State Government, therefore, decided that
the cultivation of the land might be continued with the
Maharashtra State Farming Corporation on a permanent basis.
In arriving at this decision, the State Government was also
influenced by the consideration that the implementation of
the joint farming societies scheme would lead to
fragmentation of the land and hamper its economic
development. This led to the insertion of section 28-IAA in
the Act and the other amendments of the principal Act by Act
27 of 1970.
Conspectus of the different provisions of the impugned Act,
in our opinion, goes to show that the main purpose of the
Act was to prevent concentration of agricultural land in the
hands of a few. A ceiling was consequently imposed
regarding the extent of land which might be held by an
individual. Surplus land was distributed in accordance with
section 27 of the Act. It cannot be disputed that the
provisions of the impugned Act in so far as the above
objects were concerned effectuated the object of agrarian
reform. As regards lands which were held by the industrial
undertakings for the purpose of producing and providing raw
material for the manufacture of goods by those undertakings,
the legislature made special provision in order to ensure
that the acquisition of the aforesaid land did not affect
adversely the production and supply of the raw material to
the undertaking. The object was further to make full and
efficient use of the land for agriculture and also if
considered necessary to maintain the integrity of the area
so acquired in one or more compact blocks. The legislature
for this purpose initially made provision for the grant of
the
907
aforesaid lands to joint farming societies but as the
proposal to set up these societies did not bear fruit the
legislature made provision that the aforesaid lands be given
for cultivation to the State Corporation. Section 28-IAA,
in our opinion, was an integral part of a general scheme of
Act to bring about agrarian reform and, in our opinion the
impugned provisions of the Act, including section 28-lAA,
are protected by article 31A of the Constitution. It has
been argued by Mr. Sen that distribution of acquired land
among landless persons or poor peasants is an essential
attribute of agrarian reform and that as the lands of the
industrial undertakings are not to be distributed but have
to be Cultivated by the Farming Corporation owned by the
State, the acquisition cannot be considered to be a measure
of agrarian reform. We are not impressed by this argument.
Acquisition of land held by industrial undertakings is not
to be taken in isolation but as a part of the general scheme
and object of the Act that there should be a ceiling on
private holdings. While surplus lands of individuals are to
be distributed, the legislature has made special provision
in respect of land held by an industrial undertakings which
had been cultivated for supplying raw material to the
industrial undertaking. It has been provided in the case of
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such land that it should be cultivated by the Farming
Corporation in an efficient manner so that the supply of raw
material to the industrial undertaking might not be
affected. It is, no doubt, true that distribution of
acquired land among landless persons and poor peasants in a
vast majority of cases is a part of the scheme of agrarian
reform; the fact that in the case of some huge tract of land
which is used for a particular purpose the statute in order
to prevent its fragmentation and to subserve that purpose
provides that it should be cultivated by a State owned
farming corporation would not justify the inference that the
statutory requirement in this respect is not a part of a
general scheme, of agrarian reform. Section 28-lAA does not
operate in a vacuum. The section has to be taken in its
context and setting with the other provisions of the Act.
If the provisions of the Act seek to remove economic
imbalance by taking the surplus lands of holders in excess
of a ceiling and if the provisions of the Act further
contemplate that most of the, lands after acquisition be
distributed to poor peasants and landless persons, the fact
that a few blocks of land because of their size and past use
for cultivation of raw material for industrial undertakings
are required under the provisions of the Act to be not
fragmented, which would inevitably be the result if they
were to be distributed like other lands acquired under the
Act, but to be retained as compact blocks for being
cultivated by the farming corporation so that the industrial
undertakings are not starved of the raw material, the last
mentioned provision cannot be detached from the rest of the
Act and struck down as being not a measure of agrarian
reform. It is no doubt true that acquisition simpliciter of
the land by the State to augment its resources and without
specifying the purpose for which it is to be used after
acquisition would not get the protection of article 31A. To
decide the question of protection we, must look at the
general scheme of the statute containing provision for the
acquisition, the object of the acquisition and the reasons
which weigh for retaining the land with the State or its
corporation and not distributing it among the landless
persons and the poor peasants. The concept of agrarian
reform, it needs to be emphasised. is not static and cannot
always be put in a straitjacket. With the change of times
908
Under the impact of fresh ideas and in the context of fresh
situations, the concept of agrarian reform is bound to
acquire new dimensions. A measure which has the effect of
improving the rural economy or promoting rural welfare would
be a part of agrarian reform. Although in most of the
cases. as already mentioned, the agrarian reform would
require ,distribution of surplus land among the poor
peasants and landless persons living in the villages,
situations might well arise where it would be in the
interest of rural economy that any compact area of land
instead of being fragmented by distribution should be
preserved as one compact block and be cultivated by a State-
owned farming corporation. The fact that part of the
acquired land would remain vested in the State Government or
State-owned farming corporation would not militate against
the object of agrarian reform if the continued vesting of
the land in the Government or the Corporation is a part of a
general scheme of agrarian reform and there is no oblique
deviation from the avowed purpose. In the case of Ranjit
Singh v. State of Punjab (supra), part of the acquired land
was to vest in the State Government for schools, play-
,grounds, dispensaries, hospitals, waterworks, tubewells and
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as the above vesting was a part of a general scheme of rural
welfare, the statute providing for that vesting was upheld
and afforded the protection of article 31A. Ancillary
provisions to give full effect to a scheme of agrarian
reform.. it may be stressed, would also have the protection
of article 31A,
We may note that argument has also been advanced by the
learned Attorney General regarding the locus standi of the
appellants to file the petition giving rise to the present
appeal. It is urged that the appellants have no locus
standi to file the petition in respect of land measuring
10315 acres as unconditional possession thereof was
delivered in May 1908. In the alternative, it is submitted
that clause (5) of section 21 of ’the impugned Act which
was introduced by amending Act 27 of 1970 is severable from
the other provisions of the amending Act and is in any case
constitutionally valid. As land measuring 1,0315 acres in
accordance with the above clause had already vested before
the filing ,of the petition in the State Government, the
appellants had no locus standi to file petition in respect
of that area of land. It is III out opinion, not necessary
to express an opinion on the above submissions of the
Attorney General in view of our finding that the impugned
provisions are protected by article 31 A of the
Constitution.
The appeal consequently fails and is dismissed. In the
circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.
V.P.S
Appeal dismissed.
909