Full Judgment Text
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4252 OF 2018
[Arising out of SLP (C) No.34261 of 2012]
Amina Bi Kaskar (D) Thr. Lr. .. Appellant(s)
Versus
Union of India & Ors. .. Respondent(s)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4253 OF 2018
[Arising out of SLP (C) No.34647 of 2012]
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1) Leave granted.
Signature Not Verified
2) These appeals have been filed against the final
Digitally signed by
ASHA SUNDRIYAL
Date: 2018.04.20
15:42:26 IST
Reason:
judgment and order dated 27.09.2012 passed by the
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High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in L.P.A. Nos.656
and 657 of 2011 whereby the Division Bench of the
High Court dismissed the appeals filed by the
appellants herein and upheld the order dated
14.07.2011 passed by the Single Judge in W.P. [C]
1426 & 1439/1999.
3) The issue involved in these appeals is short and
it relates to the question as to whether the Tribunal
was justified in dismissing the appellants’ appeals as
being barred by time and was justified in holding that
there was no sufficient cause for condoning the delay
in filing the appeals and secondly, whether the High
Court was justified in upholding the order of the
Tribunal.
4) Few relevant facts need to be mentioned to
appreciate the short controversy.
5) An order was passed by the Competent
Authority under Section 7 of the Smugglers and
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Foreign Exchange Manipulators (forfeiture of
Property) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as
“SAFEMA”) against the appellants on 14.07.1998 and
14.10.1998 in relation to their properties.
6) The appellants felt aggrieved of the
aforementioned orders and filed appeals on
20.10.1998 under Section 12(4) of SAFEMA before
the Appellate Tribunal for Forfeited Property, New
Delhi (hereinafter referred to as “the Tribunal”).
7) The limitation to file an appeal before the
Tribunal is 45 days from the date of the service of the
order as prescribed under SAFEMA. However, if the
appeal is filed beyond the period of 45 days then on
sufficient cause being shown, the Appellate Authority
is empowered to condone the delay in filing the
appeal only up to 60 days but not beyond the period
of 60 days.
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8) In this case, the appeals were filed beyond the
st
period of 60 days, i.e., the appeals were filed on 81
day after the service of the order. The appellants,
therefore, filed application for condonation of delay in
the appeals alleging therein that there was a
sufficient cause in filing the appeals beyond the
period of limitation.
9) The Tribunal dismissed the appeals as being
barred by time. In other words, the Tribunal was of
the view that even, according to the appellants’ own
version mentioned in the appeals’ memo, there was
no sufficient cause made out for condoning the delay.
It was also held that since the appeals were filed
beyond 60 days, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to
condone such delay.
10) In other words, it was held that the power to
condone the delay in filing the appeal is only when
the appeal is filed beyond 45 days but not beyond 60
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st
days. Since in this case, the appeals were filed on 81
day, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to condone the
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delay beyond the period of 60 day. The Tribunal,
therefore, did not find any apparent error to review
their order in the absence of any power to review and
further any error to rectify such order.
11) The appellants, felt aggrieved by the order of the
Tribunal, filed writ petition under Article 226/227 of
the Constitution before the High Court. By order
dated 14.07.2011/27.07.2011, Single Judge of the
High Court dismissed the petitions.
12) Against the order of the Single Judge, the
appellants filed intra court appeals. By impugned
judgment, the Division Bench of the High Court
dismissed the appeals and affirmed the order passed
by the Single Judge which has given rise to filing of
the present appeals by way of special leave in this
Court.
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13) Heard Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, learned senior
counsel for the appellants and Mr. K.
Radhakrishnan, learned senior counsel for the
respondents.
14) Having heard the learned counsel for the parties
at length and on perusal of the record of the case, we
find no merit in the appeals.
15) In our opinion, when even according to the
appellants, the orders impugned in the appeals
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before the Tribunal were served on them on 29/30
July 1998, then in such event, the question as to the
manner in which the service was effected and
whether it was in accordance with the procedure
prescribed under Section 22 of SAFEMA has no
significance and really does not arise for
consideration.
16) We, however, consider it apposite to reproduce
Para 3 of the impugned judgment for perusal:
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“ Some facts would be necessary to
decide these appeals. The competent
authority under SAFEMA passed an order
dated 14.07.1998 for forfeiture of several
properties under Section 7 of SAFEMA. The
common appeal filed on behalf of the
appellants was beyond the period of 60 days
from the passing of the order dated
14.07.1998 by the competent authority. We
may point out, at this stage, that the
appellants had admitted in their said appeal
before the Tribunal that the order dated
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14.07.1998 was served upon them on 29/30
July, 1998. This admission has clearly been
made in paragraph 3 as well as paragraph 8 of
the appeal. The clear admission was to the
following effect:
‘that the said order dated 14.07.1998 was
received by the appellant sometime around
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29-30 of July, 1998’.
A condonation of delay application was also
filed alongwith the said appeal before the said
Tribunal. Paragraph 4 of the said condonation
of delay application reads as under:
“The impugned order dated 14.07.1998,
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was served on the appellant on 29/30
July, 1998, and the appellant should
have preferred an appeal within 45 days
therefrom. The appellants are illiterate
and paradanashini widows and the
appellant No. 1 has the duty of bringing
up for minor children and an ailing
aged mother who is appellant No. 2 in
addition to other social obligations.”
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17) In the light of the aforementioned finding of fact
recorded by the Tribunal and affirmed by the High
Court, we do not consider it necessary to examine the
question though vehemently argued by Dr. Rajeev
Dhavan, learned senior counsel for the appellants,
namely, whether in a given case service of the order
on the appellants’ lawyer is proper or not and
whether the service on the appellants’ minor
daughter was in accordance with the procedure
prescribed under Section 22 of SAFEMA or not.
18) If the appellants had the knowledge of the order
passed against them and which they admit to have as
per their own admission mentioned above, pursuant
to which they filed appeals, then in our opinion, so
called irregularity in the manner of effecting the
service of the order on them etc. was of no
consequence and cannot be termed as illegal per se
(if found to exist though denied by the Revenue).
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19) In the light of the foregoing discussion, the
decisions cited by learned senior counsel in Kuntesh
Gupta Dr.(Smt.) vs. Management of Hindu Kanya
Mahavidyalaya, Sitapur(U.P.) & Ors. , 1987 (4) SCC
525, Yakub Abdul Razak Memon vs. Competent
Authority, 1997 (11) SCC 421, Chingleput Bottlers
vs. Majestic Bottling Co., AIR 1984 SC1030 and
Attorney General For India & Ors. vs. Amartlal
Prajivandas & Ors., 1994 (5) SCC 54 are
distinguishable on facts.
20) In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the
considered view that the Tribunal, Single Judge and
Division Bench of the High Court were right in
dismissing the appeals as being barred by limitation
holding that there was no sufficient cause in filing
the appeals beyond the period of limitation and that
the Tribunal did not have power to condone the delay
beyond 60 days.
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21) This being a finding of fact in a given case and
apart from it, neither being illegal and nor perverse,
we do not find any good ground to interfere in such
finding and accordingly uphold the same.
22) The appeals thus fail and are accordingly
dismissed.
………………………………..J
(R.K. AGRAWAL)
…..………………………………J.
(ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE)
New Delhi,
April 20, 2018
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