MAKHAN SINGH vs. THE STATE OF HARYANA

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION  CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1290 OF 2010 MAKHAN SINGH           ...APPELLANT(S) VERSUS THE STATE OF HARYANA     ...RESPONDENT(S) J U D G M E N T B.R. GAVAI, J. The   appellant­Makhan   Singh  has   approached   this 1. th Court being aggrieved by the judgment dated 15  May 2009 passed   by   the   High   Court   of   Punjab   and   Haryana   at Chandigarh   in   Criminal   Appeal   No.1189­SB   of   2002   vide which the High Court, though reduced the sentence awarded from 10 years to 7 years, but concurred with the judgment Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by Indu Marwah Date: 2022.08.16 16:57:57 IST Reason: th th and order of conviction dated 13 /16   July 2002 recorded by the trial court in Sessions Case No. 55 of 1998 for the 1 offence punishable under Section 304­B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short ‘IPC’).  2. Deceased Manjit Kaur was married to the appellant­ th Makhan Singh on 28   January 1996. It is the prosecution case   that   the   appellant   used   to   demand   dowry   from   the parents   of   the   deceased   Manjit   Kaur.     It   is   further   the prosecution case that, succumbing to the demands of the appellant, an amount of Rs.30,000/­ was paid to him by the parents of the deceased Manjit Kaur.   The appellant again demanded   an   amount   of   Rs.2   lakhs.     According   to   the prosecution, the appellant had utilized the said amount for going to Moscow.  However, after coming back from Moscow in March 1998, he again tortured deceased Manjit Kaur and asked her to bring Rs.6 lakhs as he wanted to go to USA. According to the prosecution, deceased Manjit Kaur, fed up st with   the   torture,   consumed   poisonous   substance   on   21 April   1998.     Deceased   Manjit   Kaur   was   taken   by   the appellant initially to the Community Health Centre, Ladwa and   thereafter,   she   was   referred   to   L.N.J.P.   Hospital, Kurukshetra. From L.N.J.P. Hospital, deceased Manjit Kaur 2 was taken to a private Nursing Home of Dr. H.K. Sobti (PW­1) at Kurukshetra, wherein she was admitted. 3. Ms. Vani Gopal Sharma, Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Kurukshetra (DW­1) recorded the dying declaration of the deceased Manjit Kaur (Ex. DO/C), wherein the deceased stated   that   she   was   suffering   from   fever   and   since   many medicines were lying on the Angithi, by mistake, she took medicine of green colour.  It appears that thereafter, Kamlesh Kaur (PW­11) and Bhan Singh (P)W­13), parents of deceased Manjit Kaur reached the hospital on the next morning.  On th 24   April   1998,   they   made   a   request   for   recording   the statement of deceased Manjit Kaur under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C.     On   such   a   request   being   made,   Ms.   Kanchan Nariala, Judical Magistrate, First Class, Kurukshetra (PW­6) recorded the statement of deceased Manjit Kaur (Ex. PE) on th 24   April 1998, wherein she stated that her husband had demanded Rs. 6 lakhs to go to USA.  According to the said dying   declaration   (Ex.   PE),   the   appellant   as   well   as   his parents   administered   the   said   poisonous   substance   to deceased   Manjit   Kaur. On   the   basis   of   the   second   dying   3 th declaration   (Ex.   PE),   an   FIR   was   registered   on   25   April 1998.  After the said dying declaration (Ex. PE) was recorded, Sub­Inspector Gurdwaya Ram (PW­14), Investigating Officer th (for short ‘IO’) recorded her oral statement (Ex. PV) on 28 th April 1998.   On 28   April 1998, deceased Manjit Kaur was th referred to PGIMS, Chandigarh, where she expired on 9  May 1998. 4. Upon   completion   of   investigation,   though   on verification by K.K. Rao, DSP (DW­2) who found the accused innocent, Sub­Inspector Gurdwaya Ram (PW­14), IO was of the opinion that there were sufficient grounds for trial and therefore, he  filed the charge­sheet.   Charges came to be framed for the offence punishable under Section 304­B of the IPC.  At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court convicted the appellant under Section 304­B of the IPC.  However, the trial court found that the other two accused, i.e., the parents of the appellant were entitled to get benefit of doubt and acquitted   them.   The   appellant   was   sentenced   to   suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of 10 years.  In an appeal preferred by the appellant before the High Court, though the 4 High Court confirmed the conviction under Section 304­B of the IPC, it reduced the sentence awarded to 7 years.  Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeal. We have heard Shri R.K. Rathore, learned counsel 5. appearing on behalf of the appellant and Shri Piyush Hans, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State. 6. Shri Rathore submitted that the trial court and the Appellate Court have failed to take into consideration that in the very first dying declaration (Ex. DO/C), deceased Manjit Kaur had stated that she had consumed the medicine by mistake.   He   therefore   submitted   that   the   death   was accidental.     He   further   submitted   that   the   second   dying declaration (Ex. PE), which was recorded after 3 days, had been   recorded   after   the   parents   of   deceased   Manjit   Kaur instigated her to implicate the appellant.  He submitted that in   case   of   conflicting   dying   declarations,   the   accused   is entitled to get benefit of doubt.  He therefore submitted that the order of conviction deserves to be set aside. 7. Shri Hans vehemently submitted that each of the dying declarations has to be appreciated independently.  He 5 submitted that the courts below have rightly found that the first dying declaration (Ex. DO/C) was given by the deceased Manjit Kaur under the influence of her husband, whereas the second   dying   declaration   (Ex.   PE)   was   given   by   her independently out of her free will.  He further submitted that in view of the concurrent findings of fact, this Court should not   interfere.   Shri   Hans   has   relied   on   the   following authorities in support of his submission: 1 Harjit Kaur v. State of Punjab ,  Sayarabano v. State of 2 3 , , Maharashtra   Sher   Singh   v.   State   of   Punjab 4 5 Munnawar v. State of U.P. ,   Lakhan v. State of M.P. , 6 , Shudhakar v. State of M.P.   Raju Devade v. State of 7 8 Maharashtra ,   Kashmira Devi v. State of Uttarakhand 9 and .   State of U.P. v. Veerpal 8. The law with regard to dying declaration has been summarized by this Court in the case of   (supra), Lakhan   1 (1999) 6 SCC 545 2 (2007) 12 SCC 562 3 (2008) 4 SCC 265 4 (2010) 5 SCC 451 5 (2010) 8 SCC 514 6 (2012) 7 SCC 569 7 (2016) 11 SCC 673 8 (2020) 11 SCC 343 9 (2022) 4 SCC 741 6 wherein the Court considered various oral judgments on the issue and observed thus:  

9. It could thus be seen that the Court is required to examine   as   to   whether   the   dying   declaration   is   true   and reliable; as to whether it has been recorded by a person at a time when the deceased was fit physically and mentally to make the declaration; as to whether it has been made under any tutoring/duress/prompting.   The dying declaration can be the sole basis for recording conviction and if it is found 7 reliable and trustworthy, no corroboration is required.   In case   there   are   multiple   dying   declarations   and   there   are inconsistencies between them, the dying declaration recorded by the higher officer like a Magistrate can be relied upon. However,   this   is   with   the   condition   that   there   is   no circumstance   giving   rise   to   any   suspicion   about   its truthfulness.   In case there are circumstances wherein the declaration has not been found to be made voluntarily and is not supported by any other evidence, the Court is required to scrutinize the facts of an individual case very carefully and take   a   decision   as   to   which   of   the   declarations   is   worth reliance. 10. In the present case, there are two dying declarations. The first one in point of time is recorded by Ms. Vani Gopal Sharma   (DW­1)   and   the   second   one   is   recorded   by   Ms. Kanchan Nariala (PW­6).  In her first dying declaration (Ex. DO/C), deceased Manjit Kaur has exonerated the appellant and his family members.   In the second dying declaration (Ex. PE), she has implicated the appellant as well as his parents.  In the first dying declaration (Ex. DO/C), she stated 8 that she was having fever and by mistake, she took another medicine of green colour.  On a specific query being made to her by Ms. Vani Gopal Sharma (DW­1) as to whether she has suspicion on anyone, she has replied in the negative.   The first dying declaration (Ex. DO/C) is also endorsed by Dr. Sobti   (PW­1)   stating   therein   that   the   patient   remained conscious throughout her statement. 11. In her second dying declaration (Ex. PE), she has stated that the appellant’s father and mother caught hold of her and the appellant forcibly administered her the medicine. 12. It is pertinent to note that the prosecution had not examined Ms. Vani Gopal Sharma (DW­1), who had recorded the   first   dying   declaration   (Ex.   DO/C)   and   therefore,   the defence was required to examine her as DW­1.  A perusal of her evidence would reveal that on ASI Ranjit Singh making a request, she went to the hospital of Dr. Sobti (PW­1) and asked   her   whether   Mrs.   Manjit   Kaur   was   fit   to   make   a statement and thereupon, the doctor opined that she was fit to   make   the   statement.   Thereafter,   she   recorded   the statement of deceased Manjit Kaur.   She stated that when 9 she was recording the statement, nobody except Dr. Sobti (PW­1) was present there and everyone else was asked to go out.   She stated that she found that deceased Manjit Kaur was in sound disposing mind but still she gave her sometime to relax so that she could compose herself and could give statement voluntarily.  She stated that she was satisfied that the deceased Manjit Kaur was prepared to make statement voluntarily.   Thereafter, her statement was recorded.   After recording her statement, right thumb impression of deceased Manjit Kaur was taken.   She deposed that deceased Manjit Kaur remained conscious throughout and she appended a certificate to that effect.  She has also deposed with regard to the certificate issued by Dr. Sobti (PW­1). 13. Ms. Vani Gopal Sharma (DW­1) was cross­examined by Additional Public Prosecutor.   In her cross­examination, she   has   reiterated   that   she   had   satisfied   herself   that deceased Manjit Kaur was making statement voluntarily and only then, she recorded it and even satisfied herself after recording her statement. 10 14. Ms.   Kanchan   Nariala   (PW­6),   who   recorded   the second dying declaration (Ex. PE), has also stated that she had satisfied herself that deceased Manjit Kaur was making a voluntarily statement.   Attendants sitting by her side were asked to leave the premises.  She stated that when she was recording the statement, except deceased Manjit Kaur, none were present.   She has admitted in her cross­examination that she did not consider obtaining certificate of fitness from the Medical Officer to the effect that deceased Manjit Kaur was fit to make a statement.  She has admitted that she did not obtain any opinion from any Medical Officer of L.N.J.P. Hospital, where she recorded the dying declaration.  She has also admitted that Bhan Singh (PW­13) and Kamlesh Kaur (PW­11),   father   and   sister   of   deceased   Manjit   Kaur   were present in the hospital. In  the present case, we are faced with two dying 15. declarations, which are totally inconsistent and contradictory to each other.  Both are recorded by Judicial Magistrates. A difficult question that we have to answer is which one of the dying declarations is to be believed.  11 16. The first dying declaration (Ex. DO/C) is recorded by Ms. Vani Gopal Sharma (DW­1).  A perusal of the said would reveal   that   prior   to   recording   the   statement   of   deceased Manjit Kaur, Dr. Sobti (PW­1) had examined as to whether she was in a fit state of mind and conscious to make the statement.     After   certification,   Ms.   Vani   Gopal   Sharma (DW­1) got herself satisfied as to whether deceased Manjit Kaur   was   voluntarily   making   the   statement   or   not   and thereafter,   recorded   her   statement.   The   said   dying declaration (Ex. DO/C) is also endorsed by Dr. Sobti (PW­1) with the remarks that deceased Manjit Kaur was conscious throughout while making statement. Ms. Vani Gopal Sharma (DW­1)   has   also   deposed   that   even   after   making   the statement, she confirmed from the deceased as to whether the statement was voluntarily made by her. As   against   this,   as   far   as   the   second   dying 17. declaration (Ex. PE) which was recorded by another Judicial Magistrate   Ms.   Kanchan   Nariala   (PW­6)   after   3   days   is concerned, it was recorded without there being examination by a doctor with regard to the fitness of the deceased Manjit 12 Kaur   to   make   the   statement.     Though   the   statement   is recorded   in   L.N.J.P.   Hospital   and   though   doctors   were available,   Ms.   Kanchan   Nariala   (PW­6)   did   not   find   it necessary   to   get   the   medical   condition   of   the   deceased examined from the doctors available in the hospital.   It is further to be noted that Ms. Kanchan Nariala (PW­6) herself has admitted that Bhan Singh (PW­13) and Kamlesh Kaur (PW­11),   father   and   sister   of   deceased   Manjit   Kaur   were present in the hospital.  The possibility of the second dying declaration (Ex. PE) being given after tutoring by her relatives cannot therefore be ruled out.   18. Not   only   that,   it   is   also   relevant   to   refer   to   the testimony   of   K.K.   Rao   (DW­2),   who   was   the   Deputy Superintendent   of   Police   (DSP).     He   has   stated,   in   his deposition, thus: “However, no witness supported the version detailed Mrs. Manjit Kaur in that statement.   According to my   investigation   the   said   statement   dated 24.4.1998   was   made   by   Mrs.   Manjit   after   being tutored by her relatives and it did not contain the true version of the incident.” 19. It is also relevant to note that the prosecution had not examined Ms. Vani Gopal Sharma (DW­1) and K.K. Rao, 13 DSP (DW­2).  It therefore creates a serious doubt with regard to fairness and impartiality of the IO.  Apart from that, it is to be noted that on the basis of very same evidence, the trial court, by giving benefit of doubt, has acquitted the father and mother of the appellant. In that view of the matter, conviction of the appellant on the very same evidence, in our view, was improper. 20. We   therefore   find   that   in   the   facts   and circumstances of the present case, the first dying declaration (Ex. DO/C) will have to be considered to be more reliable and trustworthy as against the second one (Ex. PE).  In any case, the   benefit   of   doubt   which   has   been   given   to   the   other accused by the trial court, ought to have been equally given to   the   present   appellant   when   the   evidence   was   totally identical against all the three accused. Before   we   part   with   the   judgment,   we   place   on 21. record our appreciation for the painstaking efforts made by Shri Piyush Hans, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State for supporting the conviction. In the result, we pass the following order: 22. 14 (i) The appeal is allowed;   th (ii) The judgment dated 15   May 2009 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal   Appeal   No.1189­SB   of   2002   and   the th th judgment and order dated 13 /16  July 2002 passed by the trial court in Sessions Case No. 55 of 1998 are quashed and set aside; (iii) The appellant is acquitted of all the charges charged with and his bail bonds shall stand discharged. 23. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of in the above terms.  …..….......................J. [B.R. GAVAI] …….................................................J. [PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA] NEW DELHI; AUGUST 16, 2022. 15