Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
ABDUL RAZAK NANNEKHAN PATHAN
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
POLICE COMMISSIONER, AHMEDABAD & ANR.
DATE OF JUDGMENT27/07/1989
BENCH:
RAY, B.C. (J)
BENCH:
RAY, B.C. (J)
PANDIAN, S.R. (J)
CITATION:
1989 AIR 2265 1989 SCR (1) 890
1989 SCC (2) 222 JT 1989 (1) 478
1989 SCALE (1)542
CITATOR INFO :
R 1989 SC2274 (11)
RF 1990 SC1202 (4)
RF 1991 SC1640 (12)
D 1991 SC2261 (5)
ACT:
Gujarat Prevention of Anti-SOcial Activities Act,
1985--Section 3 (1)--Detenu--Detention Order--Mention of
Criminal cases registered under I.P.C.--Detenu had become
dangerous person of the area--Held that reach and effect not
so deep as to affect public at large-Detention Order
quashed.
HEADNOTE:
By the present petition the Petitioner challenged the
legality and validity of the detention order passed by the
Respondent against him under Section 3(1) of the Gujarat
Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985. The detenu
was arrested and kept in Sabarmati Central Jail on
5.10.1988. The detenu immediately thereafter, made represen-
tation to the detaining authority as well as to the State
Government as also to the Advisory Board against the deten-
tion order but he having not received any reply, he filed
this Writ Petition.
The grounds of detention which were supplied to the
detenu inter alia mentioned that by reason of various crimi-
nal acts committed by him with the help of his companions
which included looting of persons, causing injuries by
lethal weapons, he had become a terror in the area and as
such a dangerous person within the meaning of s. 2(c) of the
said Act. Grounds also enumerated seven criminal cases which
had been registered against the detenu. The detenu was
stated to have committed offences affecting haman body by
holding deadly weapons such as razor, knife, Tamancha,
Sword, Hockey stick etc. It was specifically mentioned that
if the passers by refused to pay to the detenu the money as
demanded by him, he used to threaten them of murder by
showing weapons. It was also stated in the grounds that
particulars of detenu’s anti-social activities were given by
four persons of the area, who did not desire that their
names he disclosed which were accordingly not disclosed
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claiming: privilege in that behalf.
Taking into consideration all the aforesaid facts the
detaining authority felt satisfied that the detenu has been
committing offences punishable under I.P.C. and that due to
those activities of the detenu, public order was disturbed,
he having become a hurdle in the main-
570
tenance of public order. This is how the detention order
referred to above came to be passed.
The Petitioner challenged the detention order principal-
ly on two grounds, viz.,. (i) that the grounds of detention
are not germane and relevant as they are vague lacking in
material particulars and (ii) that there has been complete
non-application of mind by the detaining authority in making
the order of detention.
The Court immediately after conclusion of the hearing of
the Writ Petition pronounced an order on May 5, 1988 allow-
ing the Writ Petition and stating that the written judgment
shall follow later. These are the reasons given by the Court
in support of the said order whereby the Court,
HELD: The averments made in the grounds of detention are
absolutely vague inasmuch as no particulars as to which
persons have been robbed or what offences have been commit-
ted by showing deadly weapons and at what place have not
been mentioned. [577B]
There is also no mention when and where the detenu in a
drunken condition demanded money from whom nor it has been
stated when the detenu threatened, whom to murder by showing
razor or Rampuri knife. There is no particular instance also
as to which peace loving citizens and in which area the
Petitioner has beaten in public believing, that they are
giving information of his criminal activities to the police.
It is also a vague statement that the detenu is coming in
the way of maintenance of public order. [575G, 576D-G]
The grounds and averments made in the grounds which were
served on the detenu are vague and as such they are viola-
tive of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. [576H-
577A]
Pushkar Mukharjee & Ors. v. The State of West
Bengal,[969] 2 SCR 635 at page 641; and Piyush Kantilal
Mehta v. Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad City & Anr., JT
1988 4 SC 703 at page 710.
An act may create a ’law and order’ problem but such an
act does not necessarily cause an obstruction to the mainte-
nance of public order. [579A]
Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar & Ors., [1966] 1
SCR 709 at page 746.
571
The criminal cases in the instant case are confined to
certain private individuals and it is merely a ’law and
order’ problem and it has nothing to do with "maintenance of
public order". Its reach and effect is not so deep as to
affect the public at large. It does not create or tend to
create any panic in the mini of the people of a particular
locality or public in general nor it affects adversely the
maintenance of public order. There is nothing to show that
the activities of the Petitioner have affected or tended to
affect the even tempo of life of the community. [571G-572A]
It has been stated by the detaining authority that on
relevant inquiry, it found the statements to he true and as
such the names and addresses of those witnesses have not
been given to the detenu as provided in Section 9(2) of the
PASA Act, 1985. The Court did not enter into that controver-
sy as in its opinion the detaining authority was satisfied
not to disclose then names of those witnesses. [581G-582A]
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Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Administration, [1982] 2 SCC 403;
not applicable--distinguished.
JUDGMENT:
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 15 of
1989.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).
T.U. Mehta and S.C. Patel for the Petitioner.
G.A. Shah, M.N. Shroff and K.M.M. Khan for the Respond-
ents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B.C. RAY, J. We have already pronounced in Court on May 5,
1986 the order allowing the writ petition and stating there-
in that the written judgment will follow later on.
Pursuant to this, are passing the judgment embodying
reasons. This writ petition is directed against the order of
detention made under s. 3(1) of Gujarat Prevention of Anti-
Social Activities Act, 1985, mainly on the grounds that the
grounds are not germane and relevant and there has been
non-application of mind by the detaining authority in making
the said order.
The detenu was arrested and kept in Sabarmati Central Jail
on
572
October 5,: 1988 under the impugned detention order made on
October 5, 1988 by the respondent No. 1, Shri S.N. Sinha,
Police Commissioner, Ahmedabad City and the grounds had been
served on him.
The detenu immediately thereafter made representations
to the detaining authority as well as to the State Govern-
ment and also to the Advisory Board against the impugned
order of detention questioning the legality and validity of
the detention order. But uptil now he has not received any
intimation in respect of his aforesaid representation. The
detenu thereafter challenged the impugned order of detention
before this Court by the instant Writ Petition No. 15 of
1989for quashing the same.
Before proceeding to consider on merit it is necessary
to quote excerpts of the grounds of detention.
"That in the Shahalam Chandola Tank area you, with the
help of your companions, are committing acts affecting human
body as shown in Chapter XVI of the Indian Penal Code with
the help of Rampuri knife, Razor etc. You are creating
atmosphere of terror and danger by causing injuries and by
showing lethal weapons to innocent citizens. You are known
as dangerous and terrible person in the said area. Therefore
you are a ’dangerous person’ as defined under s. 2(c) of the
said Act and you are, by creating atmosphere of danger and
terror, becoming hurdle in the way of maintenance of law and
order in the said area. For such acts of yours the following
criminal offences under the Indian Penal Code have been
registered in the police record against you. The details
thereof are as under:
S. No. Police Stn. Crime R. No. Section Result
1. Kagdapith 96/85 324,504, 114 Compounded
IPC, 135(1) B.P.
2. Maninagar 120/86 Secs. 336,337, Compounded
427, 114 IPC
3. Kagdapith 225/87 Sec. 135(1) B .P. Conviction
4. Maninagar 122/86 Secs. 307/451,
147, 148, 149,436,
440, 1208 IPC, 25C
Arms Act, 3, 4,
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Explosive. Not proved.
573
5. Maninagar 33/88 Sec. 324, 504, Under in-
114 IPC, 135(1) vestigation.
B.P. Act.
6. Kagdapith 51/88 307,232, 114 IPC Under in-
135(1) B.P. Act. vestigation.
7. Kagadapith 81/88 326, 114 IPC, Under in-
135(1) B.P- Act vestigation.
Thus, on scrutiny of the complaints, proposals and other
papers therewith, it appears that you are committing of-
fences affecting human body in the said area by holding
deadly weapons such as knife, razor, tamancha, sword, hockey
stick, iron pipes etc. Therefore, you are a dangerous person
as defined in s. 2(c) of the said Act. Further, you are
robbing persons who pass from there for business or service
by showing deadly weapons. In the said area in drunken
condition you are demanding money from those passing from
there. If they do not give money you are threatening them of
murder by showing razor of Rampuri knife. You are beating
peace loving citizens in the said area in public believing
that they are giving information of your activities to the
police. By this you are coming in the way of maintenance of
public order.
Particulars in support of your aforesaid anti-social
activities have been given by four persons residing in the
said area or doing trade or business in the said area in
their statements. Copies thereof are given herewith.
Being afraid of you. the aforesaid witnesses have asked
not to disclose their names and addresses, because they are
afraid of damage to their person and property and their
safety and on reliable inquiry it is found to be true.
Therefore, you are not given names and addresses of those
witnesses as provided in s. 9(2) of PASA ACT, 1985 however
contents of the facts states by them are given to you."
".............................................
............................................."
"Taking into consideration all the aforesaid facts, I am
fully satisfied that you are committing offences punishable
under the Indian Penal Code and affecting to human body. You
are a notorious, terrible and dangerous person. Due to such
activities of yours public order is disturbed very often in
the said area. By such activities you have
574
become hurdle in maintenance of public order."
The respondent No. 1 has thus referred to seven criminal
cases filed against the petitioner and also the statements
of four persons residing in the area recorded by the police.
The respondent No. 1 has also made averments in the grounds
alleging various anti-social activities of the petitioner
and after considering the same made the impugned order of
detenu on forming an opinion that the petitioner is a dan-
gerous person within the meaning of s. 2(c) of the said Act.
The names and addresses of the four witnesses have not been
disclosed claiming privilege under s. 9(2) of ’PASA’ Act.
As regards the seven criminal cases, the detenu has been
acquitted of the charges ,in the first two cases that is,
Kagdapith case No. 96/85 and Maninager case No. 120/86 which
have been compounded, In the third case under s. 135 of the
Bombay Police Act, that is, Kagdapith case No. 225/87, the
detenu has been convicted. But it has no relevance for the
purpose of forming an opinion that the petitioner is a
dangerous person .under s. 2(c) of PASA Act. As regards the
case No. 4, that is criminal case No. 122/86, the petitioner
has been acquitted. The other three criminal cases that is
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Maninagar case No. 33/88, Kagdapith case No. 51/88, & Kagda-
pith case No. 81/88 are all under investigation and in these
cases the petitioner has been enlarged on bail. It has also
been stated that the grounds of detention supplied to the
petitioner are vague and indefinite and as such the detenu
could not make an effective and proper representation under
Art. 22(5) of the Constitution. It has further been stated
that out of the aforesaid seven criminal cases, the first
two criminal cases are not proximate to the date of making
the impugned order of detention. There is absolute non-
application of mind by the detaining authority in coming to
his subjective satisfaction that the impugned order was
necessary to be made to prevent the detenu from acting in
any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.
The respondent No. 1, filed an affidavit-in-reply stat-
ing inter alia that the petitioner-detenu is indulging in
criminal activities prejudicial to the maintenance of the
public order and as such the order of detention was made
against the detenu after considering that recourse to ac-
tions under the provisions of ordinary law will not be
adequate. It has been further denied in paragraph (d) of the
said affidavit the statement that no effective representa-
tion could be made due to non-supply of the names and ad-
dresses of the so called witnesses and other relevant mate-
rials as made in the petition. It has also been stated that
on the basis of the apprehension expressed by those four
witnesses
575
whose statements have been recorded by the Police Inspector
and verified by the Superintendent of Police that their
names and addresses have not been disclosed by the detaining
authority claiming the privilege available under s. 9(2) of
the Gujarat Prevention of AntiSocial Activities Act, 1985.
It has also been stated that the detaining authority has
been subjectively satisfied that the petitioner is indulging
in nefarious activities prejudicial to the maintenance of
public order and as such the impugned order of detention was
made by him against the detenu- It has also been stated that
in Criminal Case No. 225/87, the detenu was found with razor
and he was convicted in that particular case. It has also
been. stated that from the cases registered against the
detenu from 1985 to 1988 that the detenu is involved in
prejudicial activities from 1985 to 1988 and as such it was
inferred that the passing of detention order was the only
remedy to restrain the petitioner from indulging in similar
prejudicial activities.
It is evident from the grounds of detention that the
impugned order of detention was made on the ground that the
petitioner is a dangerous and terrible person in the area as
defined in s. 2(c) of the PASA Act. The said section states:
"dangerous person" means a person, who either
by himself or as a member or leader of a gang,
during a period of three successive years
habitually commit, or attempts to commit or
abets the commission of any of the offences
punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII
of the Indian Penal Code (XLV of 1860) or any
of the offences punishable under Chapter V of
the Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959)."
In the grounds, it has been stated that the detenu by creat-
ing atmosphere of danger and terror has become hurdle in the
way of maintenance of law and order in the said area. It has
also been stated that for such acts as well as due to the
following criminal offences under the Indian Penal Code
registered against him, the detenu has become a dangerous
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person of the area. It has also been stated that the detenu
has been robbing persons who pass from there for business or
service by showing deadly weapons. It has also been stated,
"In the said area in drunken condition you are demanding
money from those passing from there. If they do not give
money you are threatening them of murder by showing razor or
Rampuri knife. You are beating peace-loving citizens in the
said area in public believing that they are giving informa-
tion of your criminal activities to the police. By this you
are coming in the way of maintenance of public order."
576
It has already been stated hereinbefore that offences
under Chapter XVI of Indian Penal Code have been compounded.
and the detenu has been acquitted. As regards the third case
that is, Kagdapith case No. 225/87 under s. 135 of Bombay
Police Act, the petitioner was convicted. This offence is
not one of the offences falling within the offences men-
tioned in s. 2(c) of the PASA Act and as such this case
cannot be taken into consideration to hold the detenu a
dangerous person. As regards the fourth case--Maninagar case
no. 122/86, being not proved against the petitioner he has
been acquitted of the offences charged in the said case. The
other three remaining cases that is, Maninagar case no.
33/88, Kagdapith case no. 15/88 and 81/88 are all under
investigation. Therefore, the fourth case in which the
petitioner had already obtained acquittal could not be taken
into consideration. For the purpose of determining the
petitioner as a dangerous person, it is also very relevant
to notice that s. 2(c) defines dangerous person as a person
who habitually commits or attempts to commit offences pun-
ishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of Indian Penal
Code or any of the offences under Chapter V of the Arms Act.
From the aforesaid seven criminal cases, two cases are of
1985 and 1986 which are not proximate to the date of the
order of detention and so stale. Moreover, the petitioner
being acquitted the said cases could not be taken into
consideration. Similarly case No. 3 also fails outside the
purview of the s. 2(c) of the said Act. Fourth case No.
122/86 can also not be considered as petitioner earned
acquittal. Merely on consideration of the other three crimi-
nal cases which are under investigation and are yet to be
decided the detaining authority cannot come to his subjec-
tive satisfaction that the detenu was a dangerous person who
habitually indulges in committing offences referred in s.
2(c) of the PASA Act. The other averments made in the said
grounds and referred to hereinbefore are absolutely vague in
as much as no particulars as to which persons have been
robbed or what offences have been committed by showing
deadly weapons at what place have not been mentioned. There
is also no mention when and where the detenu in a drunken
condition demanded money from whom nor it has been stated
when the detenu threatened whom to murder by showing razor
or Rampuri knife. There is no particular instance also as to
which peace-loving citizens and in which area the petitioner
has beaten in public believing, that they are giving infor-
mation of his criminal activities to the police. It is also
a vague statement that the detenu is coming in the way of
maintenance of public order. Similarly the statement of the
said four witnesses mentioned in the grounds of detention
are also very vague and without any particulars of the names
of the four witnesses and their addresses were not dis-
closed. These statements are also
577
vague. In such circumstances, it is not at all possible for
the detenu to make a proper and effective representation
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except merely denying the alleged grounds of detention as
mandatorily required under Art. 22(5) of the Constitution of
India. This ArtiCle confers on a detenu two fundamental
rights namely, (1) that the detaining authority has to
communicate to the detenu the grounds as early as possible
on which the order of detention has been made and secondly
the right to make an effective representation against the
said order. This obviously requires that the grounds must
not be vague but must be specific, relevant in order to
enable the detenu to make an appropriate and effecting
representation against the same before the Advisory Board as
well as before other authorities including detaining author-
ity. The grounds and the averments made in the grounds which
were served on the detenu are Vague and as such they are
violative of the Art. 22(5) of the Constitution of India. It
is pertinent to refer in this connection the decision re-
ported in Pushkar Mukharjee & Ors. v. The State of West
Bengal, [1969] 2 SCR 635 at page 641. "Similarly, if some of
the grounds supplied to the detenu are so vague that they
would virtually deprive the detenu of the statutory right of
making a representation, that again may make the order of
detention invalid."
That has been referred to have been relied upon in the
subsequent decision in the matter of Piyush Kantilal Mehta
v. Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad City & Anr., JT 1988(4)
SC 703 at page 710.
"It was held by this Court that the ground was extremely
vague and gave no particulars to enable the petitioners to
make an adequate representation against the order of deten-
tion and it infringed the constitutional safeguard provided
under Art. 22(5) of the Constitution of India."
In the case of Pushkar Mukharjee, the ground no. 2 states:
"You have become a menace to the society and
there have been disturbances and confusion in
the lives of peaceful citizens of Barnset and
Khardah P.S. areas under 24 Parganas District
and the inhabitants thereof are constant
threat of disturbances of public order." It
was held in this case that, "It is manifest
that this ground is extremely vague and gives
no particulars to enable the petitioner to
make an adequate representation against the
order of detention and thus infringes the
constitutional safeguard provided under Art.
22(5)."
578
The second crucial question that fails for consideration
in this case is whether the grounds of detention particular-
ly referring to the seven criminal cases are relevant and
germane grounds for passing of an order of detention under
s. 3(1) of the PASA Act. All the seven criminal cases men-
tioned relate to problem of law and order and not public
order in as much as they disclose cases relating to particu-
lar persons which has nothing to do with the maintenance of
public order. As has already been said hereinbefore that out
of the seven criminal cases, two have been compounded and in
the fourth case the criminal charges have not been proved
against the petitioner as such he was acquitted. The third
case being under s. 135 of the Bombay Police Act does not
fall within the purview of the s. 2(c) of the Act and it is’
confined to a private individual. The other three cases
which are under investigation also relate to assault to
private individuals and they have nothing to do with the
disturbance of even tempo of the life of the community or of
men of a particular locality nor does it affect the even
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flow of life of the public as a whole. Section 3(1) clearly
mandates that the order of detention can be made only when
the State Government or its authorised officer has come to a
subjective satisfaction that a person is required to be
detained in order to prevent him from acting in any manner
prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. Sub-
section 4 embodies a deeming clause to the effect that a
person should be deemed to act in any manner prejudicial to
the maintenance of public order when such person is engaged
in any activities as a dangerous person which affect ad-
versely or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of
public order. Explanation 2 clause 4 further provides that
for the purpose of this sub-section public order shall be
deemed likely to be affected adversely or shall be deemed
likely to be affected adversely inter alia if any of the
activities of any person referred to in this sub-section
directly or indirectly, is causing or is likely to cause any
harm, danger or alarm or feeling of insecurity among the
general public or any section thereof or a grave or wide-
spread danger of life, property or public health. Coming to
this particular case, the criminal cases mentioned in the
grounds do not refer to any dangerous, harmful or adverse
act or alarm which gives rise to a feeling of insecurity for
the general public amongst the persons of a locality. The
criminal cases are confined to certain private individuals
and it is merely a law and order problem and it has nothing
to do with maintenance of public order. Its reach and effect
is not so deep as to affect the public at large. It does not
create or tend or create any panic in the mind of people of
particular locality or public in general nor it affects
adversely the maintenance of public order. There is nothing
to show that the above activities of the petitioner have
579
affected or tended to affect the even tempo of fife of the
community. An act may create a law and order problem but
such an act does not necessarily cause an obstruction to the
maintenance of public order. The difference between ’the law
and order and public order has been very succinctly stated
by this Court in Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar &
Ors., [966] 1 SCR 709 at page 746 wherein it has been stated
that:
"It will thus appear that just as "public
order" in the rulings of this Court (earlier
cited) was said to comprehend disorders of
less gravity than those affecting "security of
State" "law and order" also comprehends disor-
ders of less gravity than those affecting
"public order". One has to imagine three
concentric circles. Law and order represents
the largest circle within which is the next
circle representing public order and the
smallest circle represents security of State.
It is then easy to see that an act may affect
law and order but not public order just as an
act may affect public order but not security
of the State. But using the expression,
"maintenance of law and order" the District
Magistrate was widening his own field of
action and was adding a clause to the Defence
of Indian Rules."
In Pushkar Mukharjee v. State of West
Bengal, (supra), it has been stated that:
"It is manifest that every act of assault or
injury to specific persons does not lead to
public disorder. When two people quarrel and
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fight and assault each other inside a house or
in a street, it may be said that there is
disorder but not public disorder. Such cases
are dealt with under the powers vested in the
executive authorities under the provisions of
ordinary criminal law but the culprits cannot
be detained on the grounds that they were
disturbing public order. The contravention of
any law always affects order but before it can
be said to affect public order, it must affect
the community or the public at large. In this
connection we must draw a line of demarcation
between serious and aggravated forms of disor-
der which directly affect the community or
injure the public interest and the relatively
minor breaches of peace of a purely local
significance which primarily injure specific
individuals and only in a secondary sense
public interest. A mere disturbance of law and
order leading to.
580
disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient
for action under the Preventive Detention Act
but a disturbance which will affect public
order comes within the scope of the Act. A
District Magistrate is therefore entitled to
take action under s. 3(1) of the Act to pre-
vent subversion of public order but not in aid
of maintenance of law and order under ordinary
circumstances."
It has also been observed in a recent decision of the
Supreme Court in Piyush Kantilal Mehta v. The Commissioner
of Police, Ahmedabad City, (supra) that:
"The allegations made against the petitioner
may give rise to a question of law and order
but, surely, they have nothing to do with the
question of public order. A person may be very
fierce by nature, but so long as the public
generally are not affected by his activities
or conduct, the question of maintenance of
public order will not arise. In order that an
activity may be said to affect adversely the
maintenance of public order, there must be
materials to show that there has been a feel-
ing of insecurity among the general public. If
any act of a person creates panic or fear in
the minds of the members of the public upset-
ting the even tempo of life of the community,
such act must be said to have a direct bearing
on the question of maintenance of public
order. The commission of an offence will not
necessarily come within the purview of ’public
order’."
Our attention has been drawn to the decision in the case
of Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Administration, [1982] 2 SCC 403. In
that case in the grounds of detention thirty six criminal
cases have been referred to showing the prejudicial activi-
ties of the detenu leading to public disorder. This Court in
considering these series of criminal cases committed by the
detenu held that the detenu appears to have taken a life of
crime and become a notorious character. The fact that the
petitioner and his associates are facing trial or the mat-
ters are still under investigation only shows that they are
such dangerous characters that people are afraid of giving
evidence against him. The armed holdup gangsters in an
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exclusive residential areas of the city where persons are
deprived of their belongings at the point of knife or re-
volver reveal organised crime. The particular acts enumerat-
ed in the grounds of detention clearly show that the activi-
ties of the detenu, cover a wide field and fall within the
contours of the concept of public order. The
581
grounds furnished were also neither vague nor irrelevant or
lacking in particulars or were not inadequate or insuffi-
cient for the objective satisfaction of the detaining au-
thority. Considering these, this Court held in the particu-
lar facts and circumstances of that case that the order of
detention made by the detaining authority after being sub-
jectively satisfied that the acts of the detenu hinder the
maintenance of public order.
The facts and circumstances of that case are distin-
guishable from the facts of the present case and as such it
has got no application. There is nothing in this case to
show that the petitioner was a member of a gang which are
engaged in criminal activities systematically in a particu-
lar locality and those create a panic and a sense of insecu-
rity amongst the residents of that particular area in con-
sideration of which the impugned order was made. Considering
the above decisions, we are unable to hold that the criminal
cases mentioned in the grounds and the statements of the
witnesses referred to in the vague and irrelevant grounds of
detention do not in any way pose a threat to the maintenance
of public order nor it disturbs the even tempo of public
life as envisaged in s. 3(1) of PASA Act. So there has been
complete non-application of mind by the detaining authority
before reaching a subjective satisfaction to make the im-
pugned order of detention.
It has been urged on behalf of the detenu that there has
been no consideration by the detaining authority of the
relevant facts and circumstances before making an order
under s. 9(2) of the PASA Act in not disclosing the names
and addresses of the witnesses on whose statements the
subjective satisfaction has been arrived at. It has also
been stated in this connection that in the grounds of deten-
tion it has merely been stated, "Being afraid of you the
aforesaid witnesses have asked not to disclose their names
and addresses because they are afraid of persons. It has
been urged with force that this ground does not refer that
the detaining authority has himself considered and satisfied
that the disclosure of their names and addresses are likely
to cause damages to their person and properly. It has been
stated by the detaining authority that on relevant enquiry,
it found those statements to be true and as such the names
and addresses of those witnesses have not been given to the
detenu is provided in s. 9(2) of the PASA Act, 1985. It has
been contended on behalf of the petitioner that there is
nothing to show that the detaining authority has himself
considered that in public interest the names and addresses
of these persons should not be disclosed and so such non-
disclosure is vague. We do not want to enter into this
controversy and decide the same as in our opinion the
582
detaining authority has been satisfied not to disclose the
names of those witnesses under s. 9(2) of the said Act. No
other grounds have been urged before us on behalf of the
petitioner.
For the reasons aforesaid, we hold the order of deten-
tion is legal and bad and as such we allow the writ peti-
tion. The order of detention is quashed and set aside and
the detenu is set free forthwith.
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Lal Petition allowed.
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