Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
M/S. BHAGWAN DASS RAMA SHANKER (DEAD) THROUGH L.RS.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 25/02/2000
BENCH:
U.C.Banerjee, S.S.M.Quadri
JUDGMENT:
D E R
The plaintiff in O.S. No. 4 of 1960 on the file of
the Civil Judge, Ballia, is the appellant herein. It laid
the suit for recovery of damages for non-delivery of the
goods entrusted to the Railways. The plaintiff consigned
the goods at the Tata Freight Railway Station for delivery
at Ballia on 29th September, 1958 vide RR No. 026790
Invoice No.502. As the goods were not delivered to the
plaintiff, it filed the suit for recovery of damages etc.
of Rs.15,477/-. The trial court decreed the suit in a sum
of Rs.13,347/-. The respondents carried the matter in
appeal. The first appellate court confirmed the findings of
the trial court so far as damages were concerned but found
that the suit was barred by limitation in view of Article 31
of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (Article 11 of 1963 Act)
and accordingly dismissed the suit. The plaintiff filed the
second appeal in the High Court of Allahabad, aggrieved by
the judgment of the first appellate court dated 20th March,
1972. The High Court agreed with the first appellate court
and dismissed the second appeal of the plaintiff. That is
how the plaintiff is before us in this appeal. Mr. Manoj
Swarup, learned counsel for the appellants, submits that the
statement of P.W.1, ought not to have been taken for
reckoning the period of limitation and the date on which the
goods ought to be delivered to the appellant and that the
High Court ought to have taken into consideration the
special circumstances that the goods had arrived at Ballia
but on verification the goods were not found to be the same
as were consigned by the appellant. To appreciate the
contention of the learned counsel, it would be necessary to
refer to Article 31 of the Limitation Act, 1908, which reads
as follows: Description of Suit Period of Limitation Time
for which period begins to run
Against a carrier for compensation for non-delivery
of, or delay in delivering, goods. One year when the goods
ought to be delivered.
From a perusal of column 3 of the extract of the
Schedule to the Limitation Act, it is clear that in a suit
against a carrier for compensation for non-delivery of or
delay in delivering goods, the period of limitation is one
year and time from which the period begins to run, the
starting point of limitation, is when the goods ought to be
delivered. The period of limitation under the 1908 Act was
one year which is enhanced to three years in Article 11 of
the Limitation Act of 1963. The period of limitation
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prescribed in Article 31 of 1908 Act alone will apply in
this case. The limitation starts from the time when the
goods ought to be delivered. The time of delivery of goods
to the consignee has to be ascertained from the terms of the
contract between the consignor/consignee and the carrier.
In the absence of any contract, express or implied, the
normal time of delivery of goods will have to be determined
having regard to nature of carrier, distance and other
relevant factors on the facts of each case. The phrase
when the goods ought to be delivered fell for
consideration of this Court in Boota Mal vs. Union of India
[AIR 1962 SC 1716]. It was laid down that it contemplated
that the time would begin to run after reasonable time had
elapsed on the expiry of which the delivery ought to have
been made. It was observed: The word when the goods
ought to be delivered can only mean the reasonable time
taken (in the absence of any term in the contract from which
the time can be inferred expressly or implied) in the
carriage of the goods from the place of despatch to the
place of destination.
It is pointed out that this should depend on the facts
and circumstances of each case and that the carrier may have
to show eventually what is the reasonable time for carriage
of goods. In this case, though there is no evidence by the
carrier-respondent on the question of reasonable time which
would be necessary to carry the goods from the Tata Freight
Railway Station, place of consignment, to Ballia, the place
of destination. However, the plaintiff- appellant placed on
record evidence of P.W.1 which suggests that it would take
10 to 15 days. Taking that period as the reasonable time,
the first appellate court and the second appellate court
have worked out the period of limitation and found that the
suit was filed beyond the period one year. In view of the
fact that there is no other evidence before the court to
dislodge the statement of P.W.1, in our view, the first
appellate court and the High Court have not committed any
error of law warranting interference by this Court. We find
no merit in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed, but
in the circumstances of the case we make no order as to
costs.