Full Judgment Text
$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Reserved on : 31.10.2025
Date of decision: 23.12.2025
+ CRL.A. 199/2021 & CRL.M.A. 8720/2021
SHAHID YOUSUF .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Nitai Hinduja, Ms. Aditi Sarswat &
Mr. Jawahar Raja, Advs.
versus
NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Akshai Malik SPP, NIA with Mr.
Khawar Saleem, Advs.
+ CRL.A. 201/2021 & CRL.M.A. 8954/2021
SYED AHMAD SHAKEEL .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Nitai Hinduja, Ms. Aditi Sarswat &
Mr. Jawahar Raja, Advs.
versus
NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Akshai Malik SPP, NIA with Mr.
Khawar Saleem, Advs.
+ CRL.A. 369/2022
MASARAT ALAM BHAT .....Appellant
Through: Ms. Nitya Ramakrishnan, Sr. Adv. Ms.
Warisha Farasat, Ms. Suvarna Swain,
Ms. Stuti Rai & Ms. Rupali Samuel,
Advs.
versus
NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Sidharth Luthra, Sr. Adv. with Mr.
Akshai Malik (SPP) with Mr. Ayush
Agarwal & Mr. Khawar Saleem, Advs.
Mr. B. B. Pathak, DSP, NIA.
Signature Not Verified
CRL.A. 199/2021 & connected Page 1 of 26
Digitally Signed
By:RAHUL
Signing Date:23.12.2025
13:15:07
+ CRL.A. 27/2023, CRL.M.A. 699/2023, CRL.M.A. 701/2023 &
CRL.M.A. 716/2023
SHABIR AHMED SHAH .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Kamran Khwaja, Adv.
versus
NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Sidharth Luthra, Sr. Adv. with Mr.
Akshai Malik (SPP) with Mr. Ayush
Agarwal & Mr. Khawar Saleem, Advs.
Mr. B. B. Pathak, DSP, NIA.
+ CRL.A. 276/2023 & CRL.M.A. 8212/2023
ZAHOOR AHMAD SHAH WATALI .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Shariq J. Reyaz, Advocate.
versus
NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Sidharth Luthra, Sr. Adv. with Mr.
Akshai Malik (SPP) with Mr. Ayush
Agarwal & Mr. Khawar Saleem, Advs.
Mr. B. B. Pathak, DSP, NIA.
+ CRL.A. 379/2023, CRL.M.A. 11874/2023 & CRL.M.A. 14170/2024
NAYEEM AHMAD KHAN .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Anirudh Ramanth & Ms. Tamanna
Pankaj, Advs.
versus
STATE (THROUGH NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY)
.....Respondent
Through: Mr. Sidharth Luthra, Sr. Adv. with Mr.
Akshai Malik (SPP) with Mr. Ayush
Agarwal & Mr. Khawar Saleem, Advs.
Mr. B. B. Pathak, DSP, NIA.
Signature Not Verified
CRL.A. 199/2021 & connected Page 2 of 26
Digitally Signed
By:RAHUL
Signing Date:23.12.2025
13:15:07
+ CRL.A. 479/2022 & CRL.M.A. 25736/2023
JAVED ALI @ JAVED .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Aarif Ali Adv. Mr. Chand Qureshi
Adv. Mr. Mujahid Ahmad, Adv. Mr.
Mohd Tauheed Adv. Mr Md. Imran
Siddiqui Adv. Mr Mohd Faiz Adv. Ms.
Saima Anjum Advs. (Through VC)
versus
NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Rahul Tyagi, SPP (NIA) with Mr.
Jatin, Mr. Amit Rohila, Advs. with Insp.
Ajay Singh Parmar, CIO (NIA)
+ CRL.A. 679/2022 & CRL.M.A. 27596/2022
ALEMLA JAMIR .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Tanveer Ahmed Mir, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. MD Imran Ahmad, Adv.
Mr. Aarif Ali Adv. Mr. Chand Qureshi
Adv. Mr. Mujahid Ahmad, Adv. Mr.
Mohd Tauheed Adv. Mr Md. Imran
Siddiqui Adv. Mr Mohd Faiz Adv. Ms.
Saima Anjum Advs. (Through VC)
versus
NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY .....Respondent
Through: Ms. Shilpa Singh, SPP with Ms. Priyam
Aggarwal, Advs.
+ CRL.A. 680/2022 & CRL.M.A. 27598/2022
MASASASONG AO .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Tanveer Ahmed Mir, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. MD Imran Ahmad, Adv.
Mr. Aarif Ali Adv. Mr. Chand Qureshi
Adv. Mr. Mujahid Ahmad, Adv. Mr.
Mohd Tauheed Adv. Mr Md. Imran
Siddiqui Adv. Mr Mohd Faiz Adv. Ms.
Saima Anjum Advs. (Through VC)
Signature Not Verified
CRL.A. 199/2021 & connected Page 3 of 26
Digitally Signed
By:RAHUL
Signing Date:23.12.2025
13:15:07
versus
NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Rahul Tyagi, SPP (NIA) with Mr.
Jatin, Mr. Amit Rohila, Advs. with Insp.
Ajay Singh Parmar, CIO (NIA)
+ CRL.A. 1065/2023
ABDUR REHMAN @DR. BRAVE .....Appellant
Through: Ms. Warisha Farasat, Mr. Anirudh
Ramanathan, Ms. Tamanna Pankaj &
Ms. Priya Vats, Ms. Suvarna Swain,
Advs.
versus
NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Rahul Tyagi, SPP (NIA) with Mr.
Jatin, Mr. Amit Rohila, Advs. with Insp.
Ajay Singh Parmar, CIO (NIA)
+ CRL.A. 60/2023
MD WAQAR LONE .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Aarif Ali Adv. Mr. Chand Qureshi
Adv. Mr. Mujahid Ahmad, Adv. Mr.
Mohd Tauheed Adv. Mr Md. Imran
Siddiqui Adv. Mr Mohd Faiz Adv. Ms.
Saima Anjum Advs. (Through VC)
versus
NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Rahul Tyagi, SPP (NIA) with Mr.
Jatin, Mr. Amit Rohila, Advs. with Insp.
Ajay Singh Parmar, CIO (NIA)
+ CRL.A. 159/2024
RAJKUMAR@LOVEPREET@LOVELY .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Anirudh Ramanathan, Ms.
Tamanna Pankaj & Ms. Priya Vats,
Advs.
Signature Not Verified
CRL.A. 199/2021 & connected Page 4 of 26
Digitally Signed
By:RAHUL
Signing Date:23.12.2025
13:15:07
versus
STATE OF NCT OF DELHI .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Ritesh Kumar Bahri, APP with Mr.
Lalit Luthra, Adv. with SI Vikas
Kumar, NR/Spl. Cell, Delhi.
+ CRL.A. 971/2024 & CRL.M.A. 31541/2024
ROUF AHMAD BHAT .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Harsh Bora, Adv.
versus
NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Gautam Narayan, Sr. Adv. (SPP)
with Ms. Asmita Singh, Ms. Disha
Joshi, Ms. Ankita Malkhan & Mr.
Shashank Jain, Advs. with SI Avdesh
Yadav and SI Lokesh Raghav.
+ CRL.A. 984/2024 & CRL.M.A. 31986/2024
MATEEN AHMED BHAT .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Kartik Venu & Mr. R. Jude Rohit,
Advs.
versus
NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY & ANR. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Gautam Narayan, Sr. Adv. (SPP)
with Ms. Asmita Singh, Ms. Disha
Joshi, Ms. Ankita Malkhan & Mr.
Shashank Jain, Advs. with SI Avdesh
Yadav and SI Lokesh Raghav.
+ CRL.A. 1073/2024, CRL.M.A. 34616/2024 & CRL.M.A. 34617/2024
HARIS NISAR LANGOO .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Anirudh Ramanathan, Ms.
Tamanna Pankaj & Ms. Priya Vats,
Advs.
versus
Signature Not Verified
CRL.A. 199/2021 & connected Page 5 of 26
Digitally Signed
By:RAHUL
Signing Date:23.12.2025
13:15:07
NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Gautam Narayan, Sr. Adv. (SPP)
with Ms. Asmita Singh, Ms. Disha
Joshi, Ms. Ankita Malkhan & Mr.
Shashank Jain, Advs. with SI Avdesh
Yadav and SI Lokesh Raghav.
+ CRL.A. 1076/2024, CRL.M.A. 34739/2024 & CRL.M.A. 34740/2024
MANAN DAR@MANAN .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Anirudh Ramanathan, Ms.
Tamanna Pankaj & Ms. Priya Vats,
Advs.
versus
NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Gautam Narayan, Sr. Adv. (SPP)
with Ms. Asmita Singh, Ms. Disha
Joshi, Ms. Ankita Malkhan & Mr.
Shashank Jain, Advs. with SI Avdesh
Yadav and SI Lokesh Raghav.
+ CRL.A. 1096/2024, CRL.M.A. 35241/2024 & CRL.M.A. 35242/2024
HANAN GULZAR DAR .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Anirudh Ramanathan, Ms.
Tamanna Pankaj & Ms. Priya Vats,
Advs.
versus
NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Gautam Narayan, Sr. Adv. (SPP)
with Ms. Asmita Singh, Ms. Disha
Joshi, Ms. Ankita Malkhan & Mr.
Shashank Jain, Advs. with SI Avdesh
Yadav and SI Lokesh Raghav.
+ CRL.A. 1097/2024, CRL.M.A. 35244/2024 & CRL.M.A. 35245/2024
ZAMIN ADIL BHAT .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Anirudh Ramanathan, Ms.
Signature Not Verified
CRL.A. 199/2021 & connected Page 6 of 26
Digitally Signed
By:RAHUL
Signing Date:23.12.2025
13:15:07
Tamanna Pankaj & Ms. Priya Vats,
Advs.
versus
NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Gautam Narayan, Sr. Adv. (SPP)
with Ms. Asmita Singh, Ms. Disha
Joshi, Ms. Ankita Malkhan & Mr.
Shashank Jain, Advs. with SI Avdesh
Yadav and SI Lokesh Raghav.
+ CRL.A. 558/2025, CRL.M.A. 13078/2025 & CRL.M.A. 13079/2025
ARSALAN FEROZE AHENGER (THROUGH PAIROKAR)
.....Appellant
Through: Mr. Sowjhanya Shankaran, Mr.
Siddharth Satija, Mr. Akash Sachan,
Mr. Anuka Bachawat and Ms. Charu
Sinha, Advs.
versus
NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY & ANR. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Rajesh Mahajan, SPP with Mr.
Ranjeeb Kamal Bora, with DSP
Surender Pal, NIA for R-NIA.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIVEK CHAUDHARY
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ JAIN
J U D G M E N T
1. These appeals, filed under Section 21 of the National Investigation
Agency Act, 2008 (“NIA Act”), challenge orders of Special Courts whereby
Charges are framed against the appellants in different cases. A preliminary
objection is raised by the Respondent/NIA that an appeal against an Order
framing Charge is not maintainable under Section 21 of the NIA Act.
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2. The submission of learned counsel for the appellants is that as per
Section 21 of the NIA Act, an appeal is maintainable against every order other
than an interlocutory order. It is already settled by the Supreme Court, that, an
Order framing Charge is not an interlocutory order, but an intermediate order,
thus, from a plain reading of the section, an appeal would be maintainable.
3. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent submits that a
plain reading cannot be given to Section 21 as the same would not serve the
purpose of the NIA Act. It should rather be interpreted in a manner which
fulfils the purpose of the rest of the sections along with the Act, and, thus, a
purposeful interpretation needs to be given.
4. Both parties have, broadly, referred to the same set of judgments of the
Supreme Court, albeit , interpreting those in their own manner, which have
been duly considered by us.
5. Section 21 of the NIA Act reads as follows:-
“21. Appeals — (1) Notwithstanding anything
contained in the Code, an appeal shall lie from
any judgment, sentence or order, not being an
interlocutory order, of a Special Court to the
High Court both on facts and on law.
(2) Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be
heard by a bench of two Judges of the High Court
and shall, as far as possible, be disposed of
within a period of three months from the date of
admission of the appeal.
(3) Except as aforesaid, no appeal or revision
shall lie to any court from any judgment,
sentence or order including an interlocutory
order of a Special Court.
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in
sub-section (3) of section 378 of the Code, an
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appeal shall lie to the High Court against an
order of the Special Court granting or refusing
bail.
(5) Every appeal under this section shall be
preferred within a period of thirty days from the
date of the judgment, sentence or order appealed
from: Provided that the High Court may
entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said
period of thirty days if it is satisfied that the
appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring
the appeal within the period of thirty days:
Provided further that no appeal shall be
entertained after the expiry of period of ninety
days.”
6. Section 21(1) permits an appeal from “any judgment, sentence or order
not being an interlocutory order” . Under Sub-Section (3), it bars any other
appeal or revision.
7. Let us first refer to the judgments relied upon by the parties. In “Amar
Nath and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Anr. ” , (1977) 4 SCC 137 the
Supreme Court, while considering challenge to an Order of framing Charge,
held:
“(6)……It seems to us that the term
“interlocutory order” in Section 397(2) of the
1973 Code has been used in a restricted sense
and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely
denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary
nature which do not decide or touch the
important rights or the liabilities of the parties.
Any order which substantially affects the right of
the accused, or decides certain rights of the
parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory
order so as to bar a revision to the High Court
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against that order, because that would be against
the very object which formed the basis for
insertion of this particular provision in Section
397 of the 1973 Code. Thus, for instance, orders
summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing
orders for bail, calling for reports and such other
steps in aid of the pending proceeding, may no
doubt amount to interlocutory orders against
which no revision would lie under Section 397(2)
of the 1973 Code. But orders which are matters
of moment and which affect or adjudicate the
rights of the accused or a particular aspect of
the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order
so as to be outside the purview of the revisional
jurisdiction of the High Court. ”
(emphasis added)
8. The Supreme Court, while considering scope of a criminal revision
under Section 397 of the Cr.P.C., found that the term interlocutory order has
been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad sense, and thus
distinguished that there is something other than interlocutory and final order,
i.e., order falling somewhere in between. The term used for the same was
“matters of moment” affecting or adjudicating the rights of the accused or a
particular aspect of the trial . In the same year, Amar Nath came up for
consideration before a three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in “Madhu
Limaye v. State of Maharashtra” , (1977) 4 SCC 551. In this case, Supreme
Court, while interpreting also considered at length the scope of revisional
jurisdiction under Section 397(1) of Cr.P.C. in reference to Bar contained in
Section 397(2) of Cr.P.C. with regard to interlocutory order and its legislative
progress with time, held:
“10. As pointed out in Amar Nath case the
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purpose of putting a bar on the power of revision
in relation to any interlocutory order passed in
an appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding, is
to bring about expeditious disposal of the cases
finally. More often than not, the revisional power
of the High Court was resorted to in relation to
interlocutory orders delaying the final disposal
of the proceedings. The Legislature in its wisdom
decided to check this delay by introducing
sub-section (2) in Section 397. On the one hand,
a bar has been put in the way of the High Court
(as also of the Sessions Judge) for exercise of the
revisional power in relation to any interlocutory
order, on the other, the power has been conferred
in almost the same terms as it was in the 1898
Code. On a plain reading of Section 482,
however, it would follow that nothing in the
Code, which would include sub-section (2) of
Section 397 also, “shall be deemed to limit or
affect the inherent powers of the High Court”,
But, if we were to say that the said bar is not to
operate in the exercise of the inherent power at
all, it will be setting at naught one of the
limitations imposed upon the exercise of the
revisional powers. In such a situation, what is the
harmonious way out? In our opinion, a happy
solution of this problem would be to say that the
bar provided in sub-section (2) of Section 397
operates only in exercise of the revisional power
of the High Court, meaning thereby that the
High Court will have no power of revision in
relation to any interlocutory order. Then in
accordance with one of the other principles
enunciated above, the inherent power will come
into play, there being no other provision in the
Code for the redress of the grievance of the
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aggrieved party. But then, if the order assailed
is purely of an interlocutory character which
could be corrected in exercise of the revisional
power of the High Court under the 1898 Code,
the High Court will refuse to exercise its
inherent power. But in case the impugned order
clearly brings about a situation which is an
abuse of the process of the Court or for the
purpose of securing the ends of justice
interference by the High Court is absolutely
necessary, then nothing contained in Section
397(2) can limit ]or affect the exercise of the
inherent power by the High Court. But such
cases would be few and far between. The High
Court must exercise the inherent power very
sparingly. One such case would be the
desirability of the quashing of a criminal
proceeding initiated illegally, vexatiously or as
being without jurisdiction. Take for example a
case where a prosecution is launched under the
Prevention of Corruption Act without a sanction,
then the trial of the accused will be without
jurisdiction and even after his acquittal a second
trial, after proper sanction will not be barred on
the doctrine of autrefois acquit. Even assuming,
although we shall presently show that it is not
so, that in such a case an order of the Court
taking cognizance or issuing processes is an
interlocutory order, does it stand to reason to
say that inherent power of the High Court
cannot be exercised for stopping the criminal
proceeding as early as possible, instead of
harassing the accused up to the end? The
answer is obvious that the bar will not operate to
prevent the abuse of the process of the Court
and/or to secure the ends of justice. The label of
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the petition filed by an aggrieved party is
immaterial. The High Court can examine the
matter in an appropriate case under its inherent
powers. The present case undoubtedly falls for
exercise of the power of the High Court in
accordance with Section 482 of the 1973 Code,
even assuming, although not accepting, that
invoking the revisional power of the High Court
is impermissible.
11 . In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [AIR 1960
SC 866 : (1960) 3 SCR 388 : 1960 Cri LJ 239]
Gajendragadkar, J., as he then was, delivering
the judgment of this Court pointed out, if we may
say so with respect, very succinctly the scope of
the inherent power of the High Court for the
purpose of quashing a criminal proceeding. Says
the learned Judge at pp. 392-93:
“Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted
against an accused person must be tried under
the provisions of the Code, and the High Court
would be reluctant to interfere with the said
proceedings at an interlocutory stage. It is not
possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any
inflexible rule which would govern the exercise
of this inherent jurisdiction. However, we may
indicate some categories of cases where the
inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised
for quashing the proceedings. There may be
cases where it may be possible for the High Court
to take the view that the institution or
continuance of criminal proceedings against an
accused person may amount to the abuse of the
process of the Court or that the quashing of the
impugned proceedings would secure the ends of
justice. If the criminal proceeding in question is
in respect of an offence alleged to have been
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committed by an accused person and it
manifestly appears that there is a legal bar
against the institution or continuance of the said
proceeding the High Court would be justified in
quashing the proceeding on that ground. Absence
of the requisite sanction may, for instance,
furnish cases under this category. Cases may
also arise where the allegations in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they
are taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in
such cases no question of appreciating evidence
arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the
complaint or the first information report to
decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or
not. In such cases it would be legitimate for the
High Court to hold that it would be manifestly
unjust to allow the process of the criminal court
to be issued against the accused person. A third
category of cases in which the inherent
jurisdiction of the High Court can be successfully
invoked may also arise. In cases falling under
this category the allegations made against the
accused person do constitute an offence alleged
but there is either no legal evidence adduced in
support of the case or evidence adduced clearly
or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing
with this class of cases it is important to bear in
mind the distinction between a case where there
is no legal evidence or where there is evidence
which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with
the accusation made and cases where there is
legal evidence which on its appreciation may or
may not support the accusation in question. In
exercising its jurisdiction under Section 561-A
the High Court would not embark upon an
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enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is
reliable or not. That is the function of the trial
Magistrate, and ordinarily it would not be open
to any party to invoke the High Court's inherent
jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable
appreciation of the evidence the accusation made
against the accused would not be sustained.”
We think the law as stated above is not affected
by Section 397(2) of the new Code. It still holds
good in accordance with Section 482.
xxxxxx
13….On the one hand, the Legislature kept intact
the revisional power of the High Court and, on
the other, it put a bar on the exercise of that
power in relation to any interlocutory order. In
such a situation it appears to us that the real
intention of the Legislature was not to equate
the expression “interlocutory order” as
invariably being converse of the words “final
order”. There may be an order passed during
the course of a proceeding which may not be
final in the sense noticed in Kuppuswami case,
but, yet it may not be an interlocutory order —
pure or simple. Some kinds of order may fall in
between the two. By a rule of harmonious
construction, we think that the bar in
sub-section (2) of Section 397 is not meant to be
attracted to such kinds of intermediate orders.
They may not be final orders for the purposes of
Article 134 of the Constitution, yet it would not
be correct to characterize them as merely
interlocutory orders within the meaning of
Section 397(2). It is neither advisable, nor
possible, to make a catalogue of orders to
demonstrate which kinds of orders would be
merely, purely or simply interlocutory and which
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kinds of orders would be final, and then to
prepare an exhaustive list of those types of orders
which will fall in between the two. The first two
kinds are well-known and can be culled out from
many decided cases. We may, however, indicate
that the type of order with which we are
concerned in this case, even though it may not
be final in one sense, is surely not interlocutory
so as to attract the bar of subsection (2) of
section 397. In our opinion it must be taken to
be an order of the type falling in the middle
course. ”
(emphasis added)
9. In Madhu Limaye , the Supreme Court again while interpreting scope
of revisional power under Cr.P.C. found some orders to be more than an
interlocutory order but still not final orders, fit for challenge under revisional
jurisdiction or under inherent powers. It, however, held that such revisional or
inherent jurisdiction should be exercised by Courts rarely and sparingly only
in cases where continuation of proceedings might result in manifest
miscarriage of justice, where process of law is being abused or where a
complaint or prosecution is legally unsustainable or initiated without
jurisdiction. The scope of hearing of such revision or petition under inherent
jurisdiction was kept supervisory and minimal, not extending to appreciation
of evidence.
10. Reference is also made by the learned Senior Counsel for both the
sides to judgments of the Supreme Court in “ Asian Resurfacing of Road
Agency (P) Ltd. And Anr. v. CBI ”, (2018) 16 SCC 299 and “Sanjay Kumar
Rai v. State of U.P. and Anr. ”, (2022) 15 SCC 720, but, these only reaffirm
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the law settled by Amar Nath and Madhu Limaye cases and hence, are not
being repeated by us.
11. Next referred to is the Constitution Bench judgment in “V.C. Shukla v.
State” , (1980) Supp SCC 92. The said judgment arises from the Special
Courts Act, 1979 (22 of 1979), where restricted procedure of Cr.P.C. was
applicable and a revision was barred. The High Court was the Special Court
under the said Act of 1979, and, thus, even the inherent power under Section
482 Cr.P.C. was not available, therein. The Constitutional Bench, while
considering scope of challenge to Order framing Charge with regard to the
said Special Act, held:
“ 24. To sum up, the essential attribute of an
interlocutory order is that it merely decides some
point or matter essential to the progress of the
suit or collateral to the issues sought but not a
final decision or judgment on the matter in issue.
An intermediate order is one which is made
between the commencement of an action and the
entry of the judgment. Untwalia, J. in the case
of Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra [
(1977) 4 SCC 551 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 10 : (1978)
1 SCR 749] clearly meant to convey that an order
framing charge is not an interlocutory order but
is an intermediate order as defined in the
passage, extracted above, in Corpus Juris
Secundum, Vol. 60. We find ourselves in
complete agreement with the observations made
in Corpus Juris Secundum. It is obvious that an
order framing of the charge being an
intermediate order falls squarely within the
ordinary and natural meaning of the term
“interlocutory order” as used in Section 11(1)
of the Act. Wharton's Law Lexicon (14th Edn.,
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p. 529) defines interlocutory order thus:
“An interlocutory order or judgment is one
made or given during the progress of an action,
but which does not finally dispose of the rights
of the parties. ”
xxxxxx
34. There is yet another aspect of the matter
which has to be considered so far as this decision
is concerned, to which we shall advert when we
deal with the last plank of the argument of the
learned counsel for the appellant. Suffice it to say
at the moment that the case referred to also fully
endorses the view taken by the Federal Court and
the English decisions viz. that an order is not a
final but an interlocutory one if it does not
determine or decide the rights of parties once for
all. Thus, on a consideration of the authorities,
mentioned above, the following propositions
emerge:
“(1) that an order which does not determine the
right of the parties but only one aspect of the suit
or the trial is an interlocutory order;
(2) that the concept of interlocutory order has to
be explained in contradistinction to a final order.
In other words, if an order is not a final order, it
would be an interlocutory order;
(3) that one of the tests generally accepted by the
English courts and the Federal Court is to see if
the order is decided in one way, it may terminate
the proceedings but if decided in another way,
then the proceedings would continue, because, in
our opinion, the term „interlocutory order‟ in
the Criminal Procedure Code has been used in
a much wider sense so as to include even
intermediate or quasi-final orders;
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(4) that an order passed by the Special Court
discharging the accused would undoubtedly be a
final order inasmuch as it finally decides the
rights of the parties and puts an end to the
controversy and thereby terminates the entire
proceedings before the court so that nothing is
left to be done by the court thereafter;
(5) that even if the Act does not permit an appeal
against an interlocutory order the accused is not
left without any remedy because in suitable
cases, the accused can always move this Court
in its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the
Constitution even against an order framing
charges against the accused. Thus, it cannot be
said that by not allowing an appeal against an
order framing charges, the Act works serious
injustice to the accused.”
35. Applying these tests to the order impugned
we find that the order framing of the charges is
purely an interlocutory order as it does not
terminate the proceedings but the trial goes on
until it culminates in acquittal or conviction. It
is true that if the Special Court would have
refused to frame charges and discharged the
accused, the proceedings would have
terminated but that is only one side of the
picture. The other side of the picture is that if
the Special Court refused to discharge the
accused and framed charges against him, then
the order would be interlocutory because the
trial would still be alive. Mr Mridul tried to repel
the argument of the Solicitor-General and
explained the decisions, referred to above, on the
ground that the English decisions as also the
Federal Court's decisions made the observations
while interpreting the provisions of the
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Government of India Act or the provisions of the
Constitution where the word “final” order was
expressly used. It was urged that the same
construction would not apply to the present case
where the word “order” is not qualified by the
word “final”. With due respect to the learned
counsel, in our opinion, the distinction sought to
be drawn is a distinction without any difference.
This Court as also the Federal Court have
clearly pointed out that so far as the tests to be
applied to determine whether an order is final
or interlocutory, apply as much to a civil case as
to a criminal case. Furthermore, as already
indicated, it is impossible to spell out the
concept of an interlocutory order unless it is
understood in contradistinction to or in contrast
with a final order. This was held in a number of
cases referred to, including Madhu Limaye
case [(1977) 4 SCC 551: 1978 SCC (Cri) 10 :
(1978) 1 SCR 749] which has been expressly
stressed by us in an earlier part of the judgment.
For these reasons, therefore, the contention of
the learned counsel for the appellant on this
aspect of the matter fails and is hereby
overruled.”
(emphasis added)
12. Thus, the law settled by the Supreme Court, both in Madhu Limaye and
V. C. Shukla , is that, in context of Criminal Procedure Code, an Order
framing Charge is more than an interlocutory order, but also does not fall
within the category of a final order. It falls somewhere in between and is
termed as “ matters of moment ” or “intermediate order”. The forum of
challenge to such order is by a revision under Section 397 Cr.P.C. or in
exercise of inherent power of the Court provided under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
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and now under appropriate provisions of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha
Sanhita, 2023 (“BNSS”). The scope of challenge is also limited, as being
supervisory, i.e., only to look at surface level as to whether any case is made
out against the accused and presence of sufficient evidence to support the
case; there is no miscarriage of justice; process of law is not being abused and
proceedings are legally sustainable and are not without jurisdiction. While in
Madhu Limaye , the Supreme Court has permitted challenge to an Order
framing Charge by revision or under inherent powers, in V. C. Shukla as the
High Court itself was the Special Court challenge was only possible and
permitted under Article 136 to the Supreme Court itself.
13. Both in Madhu Limaye and in V. C. Shukla case, the Supreme Court
held that scope of a section providing challenge to an Order framing Charge
should be such as would also give a purposeful meaning to other sections and
to the purpose of the Act. Thus, in the present case also, while interpreting
Section 21 of the NIA Act, the same principle should be applied. For the
same, the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the National Investigation
Agency Act, 2008 read as under :-
“An Act to constitute an investigation agency at
the national level to investigate and prosecute
offences affecting the sovereignty, security and
integrity of India, security of State, friendly
relations with foreign States and offences under
Acts enacted to implement international treaties,
agreements, conventions and resolutions of the
United Nations, its agencies and other
international organisations and for matters
connected therewith or incidental thereto.”
14. NIA Act was amended in the year 2019 and the Statement of
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Objects and Reasons of the Amending Act, 2019 read as follows:-
“1. The National Investigation Agency Act, 2008
(the Act) was enacted with a view to constitute an
investigation agency at the national level to
investigate and prosecute offences affecting the
sovereignty, security and integrity of India,
security of State, friendly relations with foreign
States and offences under Acts enacted to
implement international treaties, agreements,
conventions and resolutions of the United
Nations, its agencies and other international
organisations.
2. In order to facilitate the speedy investigation
and prosecution of Scheduled Offences,
including those committed outside India against
the Indian citizens or affecting the interest of
India and to insert certain new offences in the
Schedule to the Act as Scheduled Offences
which adversely affect the national security, it
has become necessary to amend certain
provisions of the Act.
3. The National Investigation Agency
(Amendment) Bill, 2019, inter alia, provides for
the following, namely:—
(i) to insert a new clause (d) in sub-section
(2) of section 1 of the Act so as to apply the
provisions of the Act also to persons who
commit a Scheduled Offence beyond India
against the Indian citizens or affecting the
interest of India;
(ii) to amend sub-section (2) of section 3 of
the Act to provide that the officers of the
National Investigation Agency shall have the
similar powers, duties, privileges and
liabilities, being exercised by the police
officers in connection with the investigation
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of offences, not only in India but also outside
India;
(iii) to amend section 6 of the Act so as to
empower the Central Government, with
respect to a Scheduled Offence committed
outside India, to direct the Agency to register
the case and take up investigation as if such
offence has taken place in India;
(iv) to amend sections 11 and 22 of the Act so
as to provide that the Central Government
and the State Governments may designate
one or more Courts of Session as Special
Court or Special Courts for conducting the
trial of offences under the Act; and
(v) to amend Schedule of the Act so as to
insert certain new offences in the said
Schedule.
4. The Bill seeks to achieve the above
objectives.”
(emphasis added)
15. A bare perusal of the same shows that to avoid multiplicity of
jurisdiction in investigation and trial, for the first time with regard to specified
offences, a separate National Investigation Agency has been created to
investigate Scheduled offences and to prosecute the same. The very purpose
of creating such Special Agency at the Central level is to expeditiously
investigate and try these serious crimes. Under Section 11 of NIA Act, the
Special Courts are designated for the trial of such offences, Section 11(8)
provides that once a trial has commenced, even the superannuation of the
Special Judge would not come in way and he would continue till the
conclusion of trial or till a specified date. Under Section 16, the Special
Courts are empowered to take cognizance of any offence, even without the
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accused being committed to it for trial, only upon receiving of complaint or a
police report that constitutes such an offence. Section 19 provides that the trial
of offences by the Special Court shall be held on day to day basis on all
working days and have precedence over the trial of any other case against the
accused in any other Court not being a Special Court and accordingly the trial
of such other case shall, if necessary, remain in abeyance. Similarly, Section
21(3) bars filing of any revision under the Special Act and only appeal “ from
any judgment, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a
Special Court to the High Court both on facts and on law” can be filed. Only
exception of appeal against an interlocutory order is by Sub-Section (4) which
provides an appeal against an order of bail.
16. Thus, the Scheme of Act is that for the Scheduled offences covered by
the NIA Act, the investigation as well as trial shall be speedy. A revision
challenging any order is absolutely barred to enable Court to hold proceedings
expeditiously. An appeal is provided only from any judgment, sentence or
order, not being an interlocutory order, to a Division Bench of the High Court
both on facts and on law. The term “order” here is preceded by words
„judgment‟ and „sentence‟ and followed by „not being an interlocutory order‟.
The scope of challenge to such order is by way of appeal both on facts and
law. Thus, the order has to be a final order, like a judgment or sentence which
can be challenged both on facts and law and conclude proceeding finally.
Unlike Amar Nath and Madhu Limaye, where the Court was interpreting the
term „interlocutory order‟ in a revision, hereunder NIA Act, this Court is
interpreting the term “order” with reference to an „appeal on facts and law‟.
There, anything more than an interlocutory order was found not hit by
restriction of interlocutory order of Section 397(2) Cr.P.C., but, here it has to
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be an order from which appeal, on facts and law, may be made available.
Further, under NIA Act, though a revision is barred, we do not find any
provision enlarging the scope of challenge of an Order framing Charge from
supervisory jurisdiction to challenge on facts and law. At the stage of framing
of Charge, as settled by a catena of judgments, the Court is to summarily look
into the evidence collected by the prosecution and to find if a Charge is made
out. It is also obliged to see that there is no abuse of process of law or
jurisdictional defects in the proceedings. However, the evidence is yet to be
led by the parties before the Court and thus, at this stage, the Special Court is
not expected to give any definite finding on facts and law, consequently an
appeal on facts and law cannot be envisaged. Even otherwise, in case
legislature desired to provide an appeal against an Order framing Charge, as
against a bail order is provided under Sub-Section (4), it would have so
legislated. However, it would not mean that the accused would be left
remediless as the NIA Act does not bar application of Section 482 Cr.P.C./528
BNSS. Any person aggrieved can challenge the same under inherent powers
of the High Court.
17. The Delhi High Court in “Bachraj Bengani @ B. R. Jain v. State and
Anr.”, 2004 SCC OnLine Del 128 ; and “ Ghulam Mohd. Bhat v. NIA ”, Order
dated 18.04.2012 passed in CRL. A. No. 416/2012; also held that an appeal
would not be maintainable and a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (now
Section 528 of BNSS) would be maintainable.
18. In view of the above discussions, we come to the following
conclusions:-
i. Both Amar Nath and Madhu Limaye cases are on scope
of revision and are, thus, not applicable in the present
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case, where it is the scope of an appeal under
consideration before this Court.
ii. An Order framing Charge, as against final order is an
interlocutory order, as it does not decide any proceeding
finally and the term „intermediate order‟ is a concept of
revisional jurisdiction, which cannot be applied while
interpreting the term „appeal‟ both on facts and law.
iii. A conjoint reading of Section 21, other sections and
purpose of the NIA Act shows that the term „order‟ in
Section 21(1) refers to a final order and not an
interlocutory or intermediate order.
19. In view of the aforesaid, all the present appeals, on ground of
maintainability, are dismissed.
20. All pending applications also stand disposed of.
VIVEK CHAUDHARY
(JUDGE)
MANOJ JAIN
(JUDGE)
DECEMBER 23, 2025 /rs/r/nc/kp
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