Full Judgment Text
2026 INSC 124
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2026
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.4452 of 2025)
PRAMOD KUMAR NAVRATNA …APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE OF CHHATTISGARH & OTHERS …RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
NAGARATHNA, J.
Leave granted.
2. This appeal arises out of order dated 03.03.2025 passed by
the High Court for the State of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in WPCR
No.117/2025 dismissing the Writ Petition filed under Article 226
of Constitution of India preferred by the accused-appellant herein
and thereby refusing to quash the proceedings arising out of the
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
RADHA SHARMA
Date: 2026.02.05
15:11:24 IST
Reason:
FIR No.213/2025 dated 06.02.2025 registered at Sarkanda Police
1
Station, District Bilaspur under Section 376(2)(n) of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860 (for short, “IPC”) that was registered by the
complainant-respondent No.3.
3. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the complainant-
respondent No.3, an Advocate by profession, solemnized marriage
with one Mitendra Kumar Dhirde on 02.06.2011 and subsequently
gave birth to a boy named Ojash on 12.04.2012. Thereafter, owing
to matrimonial discord between the couple, the husband sought
divorce by filing the divorce petition Civil Case No.F/232A/2018
against the complainant-respondent No.3 on 10.12.2018 under
Section 13(1)(ia) of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 before the Family
Court, Raigarh, Chhattisgarh. The contentions and grievances of
the parties in the said divorce petition are not germane to the facts
of the present case and hence are not dealt with herein. Suffice it
to say that the said divorce petition was dismissed by the Family
Court on 27.11.2024 and an appeal No.FA(MAT)/11/2025 against
the said order was preferred by the husband of the complainant-
respondent No.3 on 10.01.2025 which is currently pending
adjudication before the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur.
2
Therefore, at the time of disposal of the present petition, the
complainant-respondent No.3 is married and has a son.
4. It is stated that on 18.09.2022, the complainant-respondent
No.3 had come into contact with the accused-appellant who is also
an Advocate by profession, at a social event wherein both developed
a mutual liking and fondness for each other and thereafter stayed
in contact with each other.
5. On 06.02.2025, the complainant-respondent No.3 lodged an
FIR No.213/2025 dated 06.02.2025 at Police Station Sarkanda at
District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh under Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC
against the accused-appellant alleging that he had raped her on a
false promise of marriage. The allegations against the accused-
appellant contained in the said FIR can be crystallised as
hereunder:
i. That the complainant-respondent No.3 got acquainted
with the accused-appellant during a social event wherein
both the parties developed a cordial relationship based on
their similar profession. The accused-appellant thereafter,
on a regular basis, used to pick up and drop the
complainant-respondent No.3 to and from her house.
3
That, the accused-appellant was told by the complainant-
respondent No.3 that there were divorce proceedings
pending before the Family Court between her and her
husband.
ii. On 18.09.2022, while going to a Mahan Bada Jarhabhata
meeting, the accused-appellant took the complainant-
respondent No.3 to his friend’s house in Geetanjali Phase-
02, Sarkanda on the pretext of picking up some of his
essential documents from the said location.
iii. Thereafter, in the guise of seeking help from the
complainant-respondent No.3, the accused-appellant
raped her. Upon protest and threat of lodgement of police
complaint, the accused-appellant told the complainant-
respondent No.3 that he likes her and wants to marry her
and thereafter he proceeded to apply vermilion on her
head.
iv. Subsequently, on different occasions the accused-
appellant indulged in physical relations with the
complainant-respondent No.3 whilst he kept verbally
4
assuring her that he will marry her and meet and talk to
her family about the same.
v. Thereafter, the complainant-respondent No.3 informed the
accused-appellant that she was pregnant with his child.
Upon hearing the said information, he became evasive
about the topic of marriage and said that he was neither
ready for a social marriage nor for a child and
consequently forced her to consume tablets for abortion.
vi. On 27.01.2025, the complainant-respondent No.3 visited
the residence of the accused-appellant to confront him and
his family about the said situation and was received with
hostility by the members of the family of the accused-
appellant who proceeded to assault and threaten the
complainant-respondent No.3 with dire consequences and
threw her out of the house.
6. Thereafter, alleging harassment and blackmail on behalf of
the complainant-respondent No.3, the accused-appellant lodged a
complaint before Superintendent of Police, District Bilaspur on
06.02.2025 wherein he alleged that the complainant-respondent
5
No.3 had been harassing him and his family with demand of
marriage whilst threatening to commit suicide if the said demands
of marriage were not met. It has further been alleged by the
accused-appellant in the said complaint that he had never thought
about marrying her but instead always saw her as a good friend
and a colleague with whom he shared workspace.
7. Apprehending arrest in connection with the FIR No.213/2025 ,
the accused-appellant preferred Anticipatory Bail Application
under Section 482 of BNSS in MCRCA No.285/2025 before the
High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur. The said Anticipatory Bail
Application was allowed by the High Court by its order dated
03.03.2025. While allowing the said Anticipatory Bail Application,
the High Court observed that upon perusal of the statement made
by the complainant-respondent No.3 under Section 183 of BNSS,
it appeared that she was married and had a 10-11 years old son
and had indulged in a consensual relationship with the accused-
appellant. Pursuant thereto, the accused-appellant was formally
arrested on 28.03.2025 and thereafter released on bail.
8. On the same day i.e. 03.03.2025 when the accused-appellant
was allowed the relief of anticipatory bail by the High Court of
6
Chhattisgarh in MCRCA No.285/2025, the WPCR No.117/2025
filed by him seeking relief of quashment of the FIR No.213/2025
and all consequential proceedings thereto was dismissed. While
dismissing the said Writ Petition, the High Court observed that the
complainant-respondent No.3 has made vivid allegations against
the accused-appellant that on the pretext of marriage, she was
induced into sexual intercourse after which, ultimately, he refused
to marry her. On the point of quality of consent, it was observed
that the misconception of fact or pretext of marriage are questions
of fact which require proper investigation and therefore, at the
nascent stage of investigation, it cannot be said with a certainty
that the allegations levelled by the complainant-respondent No.3
are false and no prima facie offence has been made out and
therefore the High Court, in its wisdom, found no ground to
interfere with the proceedings emanating from the said FIR.
9. In the interregnum, the Investigating Officer submitted Final
Report No.269/2025 under Section 192 of Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter ‘BNSS’ for short) on
02.04.2025 against the accused-appellant alleging commission of
offence u/s 376(2)(n) of the IPC and in pursuance thereto, Sessions
7
Case No.89/2025 has been instituted before the Court of District
and Sessions Judge, Bilaspur to try the accused-appellant for the
aforesaid offence.
10. We have heard the learned counsel for the accused-appellant
and learned counsel for respondent No.1-State as well as the
complainant-respondent No.3. We have perused the material on
record.
11. Learned counsel for the accused-appellant submitted that
the alleged victim is a thirty-three years old married lady and an
advocate by profession with a son aged 10-11 years old and
therefore has knowledge of her well-being and hence by any stretch
of imagination, it cannot be said that she was duped on the pretext
of marriage considering her marital status and her occupation. It
was further submitted that she voluntarily developed physical
relationship with the accused-appellant which continued up to
January 2025 which in itself goes on to show that she was a
consenting party with the accused-appellant and hence no offence
of rape is made out even from the contents of the FIR itself. Further,
it has been alleged that the accused-appellant himself was the
victim of the act of the complainant-respondent No.3 as she had
8
been blackmailing him for which the he had filed a complaint to
the Superintendent of Police on 06.02.2025 and therefore, in the
absence of any prima facie ingredients to constitute the offence of
rape, he cannot be prosecuted for the same. He further submitted
that the accused-appellant had also applied for grant of
anticipatory bail registered as MCRCA No.285/2025 before the
High Court of Chhattisgarh which was allowed vide the order dated
03.03.2025. Therefore, in view of the facts and circumstances of
the case, the petition may be allowed and the impugned FIR may
be quashed.
12. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent No.1-State
contended that the facts of the present case are not only heinous
but also grave in nature for which the accused-appellant, if found
guilty, would be liable to be punished. Furthermore, it has also
been contended that through the investigation, there has been a
recovery of WhatsApp conversation exchanged between the
accused-appellant and the complainant-respondent No.3
wherefrom it is apparent that the accused-appellant was aware
that the complainant-respondent No.3 was having a matrimonial
dispute with her husband and therefore in a pre-planned manner
9
induced her into a physical relationship for satisfying his lust
under the false pretext of marriage and thereafter impregnated her
without having any actual intention to honour his promise.
Therefore, it was argued that any argument on the consent of the
prosecutrix stands vitiated at the very threshold by fraud and
misconception induced by the accused-appellant.
13. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the complainant-
respondent No.3 has contended that the police officials after due
investigation found that offence has been made out against the
accused-appellant and consequently Chargesheet No.269/2025
has been filed on 02.04.2025 under section 376(2)(n) of the IPC
and Sessions Case No.89/2025 has been instituted. It was further
contended that the accused-appellant, being an advocate himself,
knows the implications of law and has committed the sexual
offence with intention and full knowledge. That apart, it was
contended by the counsel that the accused-appellant is not
appearing before the Sessions Judge and therefore is delaying the
trial and he has an alternative remedy of arguing the case before
the Sessions Judge on the point of discharge instead of pursuing
the remedy of quashing the FIR before this Court. It has been
10
pointed out by the learned counsel that only fourteen witnesses
have been listed in the chargesheet for examination and hence
there is no scope for delay of trial and the same may be concluded
within six months and therefore all the questions regarding the
consent of the complainant-respondent No.3 and its quality can be
decided at the stage of trial itself.
14. We have given our thorough consideration to the arguments
advanced at the Bar and the material on record.
15. In the instant case the allegations in the FIR are under
Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC. An offence of rape, if established in
terms of Section 375 of the IPC, is punishable under Section 376
of the IPC. In the present case, the second description of Section
376 is relevant which is set out below: :
“376. Punishment for rape. — (1). Whoever, except in the
cases provided for in sub-section (2), commits rape, shall
be punished with rigorous imprisonment of either
description for a term which shall not be less than ten
years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and
shall also be liable to fine.
2. Whoever, -
xxx
(n) commits rape repeatedly on the same woman,
shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term
which shall not be less than ten years, but which may
11
extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean
imprisonment for the remainder of that person's natural
life, and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation.— For the purposes of this sub-section,—
(a) “armed forces” means the naval, military and air
forces and includes any member of the Armed Forces
constituted under any law for the time being in force,
including the paramilitary forces and any auxiliary forces
that are under the control of the Central Government or
the State Government;
(b) “hospital” means the precincts of the hospital and
includes the precincts of any institution for the reception
and treatment of persons during convalescence or of
persons requiring medical attention or rehabilitation;
(c) “police officer” shall have the same meaning as
assigned to the expression “police” under the Police Act,
1861 (5 of 1861);
(d) “women's or children's institution” means an
institution, whether called an orphanage or a home for
neglected women or children or a widow's home or an
institution called by any other name, which is established
and maintained for the reception and care of women or
children.”
16. Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC provides for enhanced
punishment in cases where rape is committed repeatedly on the
same woman. It mandates rigorous imprisonment for a term of not
less than ten years which may extend to life imprisonment for the
remainder of the person's natural life. The object of this provision
is to address aggravated instances of sexual assault where the
12
offence is not a single incident but has occurred repeatedly on the
same victim. The expression “repeatedly” employed in the provision
is of significance. It contemplates more than one act of sexual
assault, committed at different points in time on the same victim.
Courts have consistently interpreted this phrase to mean a series
of acts that are separate in nature and not a continuation of a
single transaction. In genuine cases under Section 376(2)(n) of the
IPC, the pattern is usually unmistakable; it is an initial act of
sexual assault, followed by multiple acts under fear, pressure,
captivity, or continued deceit, often when the woman is rendered
vulnerable and unable to escape the situation.
17. At the outset, we refer to the ratio in the case of Naim
Ahamed vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 15 SCC 385 whereby
this Court had decided a similar matter, wherein allegedly, the
prosecutrix had also given her consent for a sexual relationship
with the accused-appellant therein, upon an assurance to marry.
The prosecutrix, who was herself a married woman having three
children, had continued to have such a relationship with the
accused-appellant, at least for about five years till she gave the
13
complaint. In the conspectus of such facts and circumstances, this
Court had observed as under:
“21. The bone of contention raised on behalf of the
respondents is that the prosecutrix had given her consent
for sexual relationship under the misconception of fact, as
the accused had given a false promise to marry her and
subsequently he did not marry, and therefore such
consent was no consent in the eye of the law and the case
fell under Clause Secondly of Section 375 IPC. In this
regard, it is pertinent to note that there is a difference
between giving a false promise and committing breach of
promise by the accused. In case of false promise, the
accused right from the beginning would not have any
intention to marry the prosecutrix and would have cheated
or deceived the prosecutrix by giving a false promise to
marry her only with a view to satisfy his lust, whereas in
case of breach of promise, one cannot deny a possibility
that the accused might have given a promise with all
seriousness to marry her, and subsequently might have
encountered certain circumstances unforeseen by him or
the circumstances beyond his control, which prevented
him to fulfil his promise. So, it would be a folly to treat
each breach of promise to marry as a false promise and to
prosecute a person for the offence under Section 376. As
stated earlier, each case would depend upon its proved
facts before the court.”
18. It has been time and again settled by this Court, that the
mere fact that the parties indulged in physical relations pursuant
to a promise to marry will not amount to a rape in every case. An
offence under Section 375 of the IPC could only be made out, if
promise of marriage was made by the accused solely with a view to
obtain consent for sexual relations without having any intent of
14
fulfilling said promise from the very beginning and that such false
promise of marriage had a direct bearing on the prosecutrix giving
her consent for sexual relations. The issue for consideration is
whether, given the facts and circumstances of the case and after
examining the FIR, the High Court was correct in refusing to quash
the ongoing criminal proceedings against the accused-appellant
arising out of FIR No.213/2025 dated 06.02.2025 and the
Chargesheet No.269/2025.
19. Upon a careful consideration of the record in the present case,
we are unable to discern any material that would warrant the
invocation of Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC. The facts of the present
case unmistakably indicate towards a classic case of a consensual
relationship turning acrimonious. Upon perusal of the records of
the case, it is evident that the complainant-respondent No.3 is a
married lady with a ten years old child. The said marriage was
solemnized on 02.06.2011 and although divorce proceedings are
currently pending adjudication between her and her husband, by
no stretch of imagination can it be held that the complainant-
respondent No.3 was eligible for being married with the accused-
appellant on 18.09.2022, the date on which the first of the multiple
15
instances of acts of rape on the false pretext of marriage has been
committed by the accused-appellant are alleged. Therefore, even
for the sake of argument, if the contention of the respondent No.1
- State and the complainant-respondent No.3 is accepted that there
indeed was a false promise of marriage based on which the
accused-appellant indulged in sexual activities, such a promise
would not be legally enforceable or even capable of being acted
upon as the victim herself was not eligible for marriage, neither on
the date of the first alleged act of offence i.e. 18.09.2022 nor on any
subsequent dates wherein the parties indulged in the sexual
activities, till the point of the date of registration of FIR i.e.
06.02.2025. The said embargo arises from sub-clause (i) of Section
5 of the Hindu Marriage Act,1955 which categorically prohibits
marriage between two individuals if either of them have a living
spouse. The said position of law has been reiterated under sub-
clause (i) of Section 4 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954.
20. In other words, the law prohibits bigamous unions and
therefore disallows parties from entering into a second marriage
during the subsistence of their first marriage. It is, therefore,
difficult to accept the view that the complainant-respondent No.3,
16
who herself is an advocate, was oblivious to the said settled
position of law and hence was duped and induced by the accused-
appellant into having sexual relations with him on different
occasions on the pretext of marriage especially when both the
parties were cognizant of the marital status of the complainant-
respondent No.3.
21. At this juncture, it is also pertinent to mention that the
complainant-respondent No.3 is a thirty-three years old woman
and an advocate by profession and not a naïve or gullible woman
incapable of taking decisions for herself. It would be remiss not to
mention, at the cost of repetition, that the complainant-
respondent No.3 is herself an advocate and therefore she should
have exercised her prudence and discretion before engaging the
already burdened State machinery into a roving criminal litigation.
22. The Courts have to be extremely careful and cautious in
identifying the genuine cases filed under Section 376(2)(n) of the
IPC by identifying the essential ingredients to constitute the said
offence i.e. there should be a promise of marriage made by the
accused solely with a view to obtain consent for sexual relations
and without having any intent of fulfilling said promise from the
17
very beginning, and that such false promise of marriage had a
direct bearing on the prosecutrix giving her consent for sexual
relations. Such genuine cases that deserve prosecution of the
accused must be clearly demarcated from the litigation that arises
from the cases of consensual relationships between consenting
adults going acrimonious on account of dispute and disagreement
or a future change of mind. In view of the aforesaid settled position
of law, the respondent No.1-State and the complainant-respondent
No.3 has failed to place any material on record to show how the
accused-appellant on the subsequent meetings managed to
repeatedly coax and dupe the complainant-respondent No.3 into
having physical relations with him on the false pretext of marriage
considering the fact that within initial meetings, both parties were
aware about the marital status of the victim and therefore it cannot
be, by any stretch imagination said that the consent of the
complainant-respondent No.3 has been vitiated or obtained on
fraud and misrepresentation made by the accused-appellant.
23. At this stage, it is material to refer to the decision of this Court
in Mahesh Damu Khare vs. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 11
SCC 398 , wherein the following observations were made:
18
“29. It must also be clear that for a promise to be a false
promise to amount to misconception of fact within the
meaning of Section 90 IPC, it must have been made from
the very beginning with an intention to deceive the woman
to persuade her to have a physical relationship. Therefore,
if it is established that such consent was given under a
misconception of fact, the said consent is vitiated and not
a valid consent. …”
24. On a perusal of the allegations made in the present case, it is
an admitted fact that the complainant-respondent No.3, within the
first initial meetings told the accused-appellant that she was a
married woman with divorce proceedings pending before the
Family Court. Therefore, in the same breath, she cannot be
allowed to claim and allege that she was also coaxed by the
accused-appellant into having a physical relationship with him on
the false pretext of marriage as the two facts cannot stand together
on the same plane and simultaneously as both are antagonistic
and antithetical to each other. In our opinion, the facts of the
present case clearly indicate a consensual relationship gone sour
whereas both the parties should have exercised restraint and
should have refrained from involving the State into their personal
relationship turning rancour.
19
25. At this juncture, it is important to place reliance upon the
observations in Prashant vs. State of NCT of Delhi, (2025) 5 SCC
764 , wherein this Court speaking through one of us (Nagarathna,
J.) observed that a mere break-up of a relationship between a
consenting couple cannot result in the initiation of criminal
proceedings. What was a consensual relationship between the
parties at the initial stages cannot be given a colour of criminality
when the said relationship does not fructify into a marriage.
Furthermore, this Court in Samadhan vs. State of
Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2528 through one of us
(Nagarathna, J.) observed that this Court has, on numerous
occasions, taken note of the disquieting tendency wherein failed or
broken relationships are given the colour of criminality. The offence
of rape, being of the gravest kind, must be invoked only in cases
where there exists genuine sexual violence, coercion, or absence of
free consent. To convert every soured relationship into an offence
of rape not only trivialises the seriousness of the offence but also
inflicts upon the accused indelible stigma and grave injustice. Such
instances transcend the realm of mere personal discord. The
misuse of the criminal justice machinery in this regard is a matter
20
of profound concern for the judiciary already facing a heavy load
and calls for condemnation.
26. In this regard, it would be apposite to rely on the judgment in
the case of State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Suppl (1)
SCC 335 (“Bhajan Lal”) with particular reference to paragraph
102 therein, where this Court observed thus:
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various
relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of
the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series
of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary
power Under Article 226 or the inherent powers under
Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and
reproduced above, we have given the following categories
of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could
be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any
court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it
may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly
defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible
guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list
of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be
exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face
value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a case against the
Accused.
xxx
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the
FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of
the same do not disclose the commission of any offence
and make out a case against the Accused.
21
xxx
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any
of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under
which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution
and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is
a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act,
providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the
aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance
on the Accused and with a view to spite him due to private
and personal grudge.”
27. On a careful consideration of the aforementioned judicial
dictum, we find that the offence alleged against the accused-
appellant herein is not made out at all. In fact, we find that the
allegation of rape on false pretext of marriage even when taken on
its face value, does not amount to an offence of rape and hence not
liable for punishment under Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC in the
instant case and therefore, the judgment of this Court in the case
of Bhajan Lal squarely apply to the facts of these cases. Therefore,
it is neither expedient nor in the interest of justice to permit the
present prosecution emanating from the FIR and consequent
Sessions Case No.89/2025 to continue.
22
28. In view of the aforesaid discussion and keeping the judicial
dicta laid down by this Court in mind we set aside the impugned
order dated 03.03.2025 of the High Court and consequently, FIR
No.213/2025 dated 06.02.2025 registered with Sarkanda Police
Station at district Bilaspur and the Chargesheet No.269/2025, and
the consequent proceedings arising out of the said proceedings in
Sessions Case No.89/2025 are quashed.
The appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms.
…………………………………..J.
(B.V. NAGARATHNA)
…………………………………..J.
(UJJAL BHUYAN)
NEW DELHI;
FEBRUARY 05, 2026.
23
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2026
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.4452 of 2025)
PRAMOD KUMAR NAVRATNA …APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE OF CHHATTISGARH & OTHERS …RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
NAGARATHNA, J.
Leave granted.
2. This appeal arises out of order dated 03.03.2025 passed by
the High Court for the State of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in WPCR
No.117/2025 dismissing the Writ Petition filed under Article 226
of Constitution of India preferred by the accused-appellant herein
and thereby refusing to quash the proceedings arising out of the
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
RADHA SHARMA
Date: 2026.02.05
15:11:24 IST
Reason:
FIR No.213/2025 dated 06.02.2025 registered at Sarkanda Police
1
Station, District Bilaspur under Section 376(2)(n) of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860 (for short, “IPC”) that was registered by the
complainant-respondent No.3.
3. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the complainant-
respondent No.3, an Advocate by profession, solemnized marriage
with one Mitendra Kumar Dhirde on 02.06.2011 and subsequently
gave birth to a boy named Ojash on 12.04.2012. Thereafter, owing
to matrimonial discord between the couple, the husband sought
divorce by filing the divorce petition Civil Case No.F/232A/2018
against the complainant-respondent No.3 on 10.12.2018 under
Section 13(1)(ia) of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 before the Family
Court, Raigarh, Chhattisgarh. The contentions and grievances of
the parties in the said divorce petition are not germane to the facts
of the present case and hence are not dealt with herein. Suffice it
to say that the said divorce petition was dismissed by the Family
Court on 27.11.2024 and an appeal No.FA(MAT)/11/2025 against
the said order was preferred by the husband of the complainant-
respondent No.3 on 10.01.2025 which is currently pending
adjudication before the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur.
2
Therefore, at the time of disposal of the present petition, the
complainant-respondent No.3 is married and has a son.
4. It is stated that on 18.09.2022, the complainant-respondent
No.3 had come into contact with the accused-appellant who is also
an Advocate by profession, at a social event wherein both developed
a mutual liking and fondness for each other and thereafter stayed
in contact with each other.
5. On 06.02.2025, the complainant-respondent No.3 lodged an
FIR No.213/2025 dated 06.02.2025 at Police Station Sarkanda at
District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh under Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC
against the accused-appellant alleging that he had raped her on a
false promise of marriage. The allegations against the accused-
appellant contained in the said FIR can be crystallised as
hereunder:
i. That the complainant-respondent No.3 got acquainted
with the accused-appellant during a social event wherein
both the parties developed a cordial relationship based on
their similar profession. The accused-appellant thereafter,
on a regular basis, used to pick up and drop the
complainant-respondent No.3 to and from her house.
3
That, the accused-appellant was told by the complainant-
respondent No.3 that there were divorce proceedings
pending before the Family Court between her and her
husband.
ii. On 18.09.2022, while going to a Mahan Bada Jarhabhata
meeting, the accused-appellant took the complainant-
respondent No.3 to his friend’s house in Geetanjali Phase-
02, Sarkanda on the pretext of picking up some of his
essential documents from the said location.
iii. Thereafter, in the guise of seeking help from the
complainant-respondent No.3, the accused-appellant
raped her. Upon protest and threat of lodgement of police
complaint, the accused-appellant told the complainant-
respondent No.3 that he likes her and wants to marry her
and thereafter he proceeded to apply vermilion on her
head.
iv. Subsequently, on different occasions the accused-
appellant indulged in physical relations with the
complainant-respondent No.3 whilst he kept verbally
4
assuring her that he will marry her and meet and talk to
her family about the same.
v. Thereafter, the complainant-respondent No.3 informed the
accused-appellant that she was pregnant with his child.
Upon hearing the said information, he became evasive
about the topic of marriage and said that he was neither
ready for a social marriage nor for a child and
consequently forced her to consume tablets for abortion.
vi. On 27.01.2025, the complainant-respondent No.3 visited
the residence of the accused-appellant to confront him and
his family about the said situation and was received with
hostility by the members of the family of the accused-
appellant who proceeded to assault and threaten the
complainant-respondent No.3 with dire consequences and
threw her out of the house.
6. Thereafter, alleging harassment and blackmail on behalf of
the complainant-respondent No.3, the accused-appellant lodged a
complaint before Superintendent of Police, District Bilaspur on
06.02.2025 wherein he alleged that the complainant-respondent
5
No.3 had been harassing him and his family with demand of
marriage whilst threatening to commit suicide if the said demands
of marriage were not met. It has further been alleged by the
accused-appellant in the said complaint that he had never thought
about marrying her but instead always saw her as a good friend
and a colleague with whom he shared workspace.
7. Apprehending arrest in connection with the FIR No.213/2025 ,
the accused-appellant preferred Anticipatory Bail Application
under Section 482 of BNSS in MCRCA No.285/2025 before the
High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur. The said Anticipatory Bail
Application was allowed by the High Court by its order dated
03.03.2025. While allowing the said Anticipatory Bail Application,
the High Court observed that upon perusal of the statement made
by the complainant-respondent No.3 under Section 183 of BNSS,
it appeared that she was married and had a 10-11 years old son
and had indulged in a consensual relationship with the accused-
appellant. Pursuant thereto, the accused-appellant was formally
arrested on 28.03.2025 and thereafter released on bail.
8. On the same day i.e. 03.03.2025 when the accused-appellant
was allowed the relief of anticipatory bail by the High Court of
6
Chhattisgarh in MCRCA No.285/2025, the WPCR No.117/2025
filed by him seeking relief of quashment of the FIR No.213/2025
and all consequential proceedings thereto was dismissed. While
dismissing the said Writ Petition, the High Court observed that the
complainant-respondent No.3 has made vivid allegations against
the accused-appellant that on the pretext of marriage, she was
induced into sexual intercourse after which, ultimately, he refused
to marry her. On the point of quality of consent, it was observed
that the misconception of fact or pretext of marriage are questions
of fact which require proper investigation and therefore, at the
nascent stage of investigation, it cannot be said with a certainty
that the allegations levelled by the complainant-respondent No.3
are false and no prima facie offence has been made out and
therefore the High Court, in its wisdom, found no ground to
interfere with the proceedings emanating from the said FIR.
9. In the interregnum, the Investigating Officer submitted Final
Report No.269/2025 under Section 192 of Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter ‘BNSS’ for short) on
02.04.2025 against the accused-appellant alleging commission of
offence u/s 376(2)(n) of the IPC and in pursuance thereto, Sessions
7
Case No.89/2025 has been instituted before the Court of District
and Sessions Judge, Bilaspur to try the accused-appellant for the
aforesaid offence.
10. We have heard the learned counsel for the accused-appellant
and learned counsel for respondent No.1-State as well as the
complainant-respondent No.3. We have perused the material on
record.
11. Learned counsel for the accused-appellant submitted that
the alleged victim is a thirty-three years old married lady and an
advocate by profession with a son aged 10-11 years old and
therefore has knowledge of her well-being and hence by any stretch
of imagination, it cannot be said that she was duped on the pretext
of marriage considering her marital status and her occupation. It
was further submitted that she voluntarily developed physical
relationship with the accused-appellant which continued up to
January 2025 which in itself goes on to show that she was a
consenting party with the accused-appellant and hence no offence
of rape is made out even from the contents of the FIR itself. Further,
it has been alleged that the accused-appellant himself was the
victim of the act of the complainant-respondent No.3 as she had
8
been blackmailing him for which the he had filed a complaint to
the Superintendent of Police on 06.02.2025 and therefore, in the
absence of any prima facie ingredients to constitute the offence of
rape, he cannot be prosecuted for the same. He further submitted
that the accused-appellant had also applied for grant of
anticipatory bail registered as MCRCA No.285/2025 before the
High Court of Chhattisgarh which was allowed vide the order dated
03.03.2025. Therefore, in view of the facts and circumstances of
the case, the petition may be allowed and the impugned FIR may
be quashed.
12. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent No.1-State
contended that the facts of the present case are not only heinous
but also grave in nature for which the accused-appellant, if found
guilty, would be liable to be punished. Furthermore, it has also
been contended that through the investigation, there has been a
recovery of WhatsApp conversation exchanged between the
accused-appellant and the complainant-respondent No.3
wherefrom it is apparent that the accused-appellant was aware
that the complainant-respondent No.3 was having a matrimonial
dispute with her husband and therefore in a pre-planned manner
9
induced her into a physical relationship for satisfying his lust
under the false pretext of marriage and thereafter impregnated her
without having any actual intention to honour his promise.
Therefore, it was argued that any argument on the consent of the
prosecutrix stands vitiated at the very threshold by fraud and
misconception induced by the accused-appellant.
13. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the complainant-
respondent No.3 has contended that the police officials after due
investigation found that offence has been made out against the
accused-appellant and consequently Chargesheet No.269/2025
has been filed on 02.04.2025 under section 376(2)(n) of the IPC
and Sessions Case No.89/2025 has been instituted. It was further
contended that the accused-appellant, being an advocate himself,
knows the implications of law and has committed the sexual
offence with intention and full knowledge. That apart, it was
contended by the counsel that the accused-appellant is not
appearing before the Sessions Judge and therefore is delaying the
trial and he has an alternative remedy of arguing the case before
the Sessions Judge on the point of discharge instead of pursuing
the remedy of quashing the FIR before this Court. It has been
10
pointed out by the learned counsel that only fourteen witnesses
have been listed in the chargesheet for examination and hence
there is no scope for delay of trial and the same may be concluded
within six months and therefore all the questions regarding the
consent of the complainant-respondent No.3 and its quality can be
decided at the stage of trial itself.
14. We have given our thorough consideration to the arguments
advanced at the Bar and the material on record.
15. In the instant case the allegations in the FIR are under
Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC. An offence of rape, if established in
terms of Section 375 of the IPC, is punishable under Section 376
of the IPC. In the present case, the second description of Section
376 is relevant which is set out below: :
“376. Punishment for rape. — (1). Whoever, except in the
cases provided for in sub-section (2), commits rape, shall
be punished with rigorous imprisonment of either
description for a term which shall not be less than ten
years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and
shall also be liable to fine.
2. Whoever, -
xxx
(n) commits rape repeatedly on the same woman,
shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term
which shall not be less than ten years, but which may
11
extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean
imprisonment for the remainder of that person's natural
life, and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation.— For the purposes of this sub-section,—
(a) “armed forces” means the naval, military and air
forces and includes any member of the Armed Forces
constituted under any law for the time being in force,
including the paramilitary forces and any auxiliary forces
that are under the control of the Central Government or
the State Government;
(b) “hospital” means the precincts of the hospital and
includes the precincts of any institution for the reception
and treatment of persons during convalescence or of
persons requiring medical attention or rehabilitation;
(c) “police officer” shall have the same meaning as
assigned to the expression “police” under the Police Act,
1861 (5 of 1861);
(d) “women's or children's institution” means an
institution, whether called an orphanage or a home for
neglected women or children or a widow's home or an
institution called by any other name, which is established
and maintained for the reception and care of women or
children.”
16. Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC provides for enhanced
punishment in cases where rape is committed repeatedly on the
same woman. It mandates rigorous imprisonment for a term of not
less than ten years which may extend to life imprisonment for the
remainder of the person's natural life. The object of this provision
is to address aggravated instances of sexual assault where the
12
offence is not a single incident but has occurred repeatedly on the
same victim. The expression “repeatedly” employed in the provision
is of significance. It contemplates more than one act of sexual
assault, committed at different points in time on the same victim.
Courts have consistently interpreted this phrase to mean a series
of acts that are separate in nature and not a continuation of a
single transaction. In genuine cases under Section 376(2)(n) of the
IPC, the pattern is usually unmistakable; it is an initial act of
sexual assault, followed by multiple acts under fear, pressure,
captivity, or continued deceit, often when the woman is rendered
vulnerable and unable to escape the situation.
17. At the outset, we refer to the ratio in the case of Naim
Ahamed vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 15 SCC 385 whereby
this Court had decided a similar matter, wherein allegedly, the
prosecutrix had also given her consent for a sexual relationship
with the accused-appellant therein, upon an assurance to marry.
The prosecutrix, who was herself a married woman having three
children, had continued to have such a relationship with the
accused-appellant, at least for about five years till she gave the
13
complaint. In the conspectus of such facts and circumstances, this
Court had observed as under:
“21. The bone of contention raised on behalf of the
respondents is that the prosecutrix had given her consent
for sexual relationship under the misconception of fact, as
the accused had given a false promise to marry her and
subsequently he did not marry, and therefore such
consent was no consent in the eye of the law and the case
fell under Clause Secondly of Section 375 IPC. In this
regard, it is pertinent to note that there is a difference
between giving a false promise and committing breach of
promise by the accused. In case of false promise, the
accused right from the beginning would not have any
intention to marry the prosecutrix and would have cheated
or deceived the prosecutrix by giving a false promise to
marry her only with a view to satisfy his lust, whereas in
case of breach of promise, one cannot deny a possibility
that the accused might have given a promise with all
seriousness to marry her, and subsequently might have
encountered certain circumstances unforeseen by him or
the circumstances beyond his control, which prevented
him to fulfil his promise. So, it would be a folly to treat
each breach of promise to marry as a false promise and to
prosecute a person for the offence under Section 376. As
stated earlier, each case would depend upon its proved
facts before the court.”
18. It has been time and again settled by this Court, that the
mere fact that the parties indulged in physical relations pursuant
to a promise to marry will not amount to a rape in every case. An
offence under Section 375 of the IPC could only be made out, if
promise of marriage was made by the accused solely with a view to
obtain consent for sexual relations without having any intent of
14
fulfilling said promise from the very beginning and that such false
promise of marriage had a direct bearing on the prosecutrix giving
her consent for sexual relations. The issue for consideration is
whether, given the facts and circumstances of the case and after
examining the FIR, the High Court was correct in refusing to quash
the ongoing criminal proceedings against the accused-appellant
arising out of FIR No.213/2025 dated 06.02.2025 and the
Chargesheet No.269/2025.
19. Upon a careful consideration of the record in the present case,
we are unable to discern any material that would warrant the
invocation of Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC. The facts of the present
case unmistakably indicate towards a classic case of a consensual
relationship turning acrimonious. Upon perusal of the records of
the case, it is evident that the complainant-respondent No.3 is a
married lady with a ten years old child. The said marriage was
solemnized on 02.06.2011 and although divorce proceedings are
currently pending adjudication between her and her husband, by
no stretch of imagination can it be held that the complainant-
respondent No.3 was eligible for being married with the accused-
appellant on 18.09.2022, the date on which the first of the multiple
15
instances of acts of rape on the false pretext of marriage has been
committed by the accused-appellant are alleged. Therefore, even
for the sake of argument, if the contention of the respondent No.1
- State and the complainant-respondent No.3 is accepted that there
indeed was a false promise of marriage based on which the
accused-appellant indulged in sexual activities, such a promise
would not be legally enforceable or even capable of being acted
upon as the victim herself was not eligible for marriage, neither on
the date of the first alleged act of offence i.e. 18.09.2022 nor on any
subsequent dates wherein the parties indulged in the sexual
activities, till the point of the date of registration of FIR i.e.
06.02.2025. The said embargo arises from sub-clause (i) of Section
5 of the Hindu Marriage Act,1955 which categorically prohibits
marriage between two individuals if either of them have a living
spouse. The said position of law has been reiterated under sub-
clause (i) of Section 4 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954.
20. In other words, the law prohibits bigamous unions and
therefore disallows parties from entering into a second marriage
during the subsistence of their first marriage. It is, therefore,
difficult to accept the view that the complainant-respondent No.3,
16
who herself is an advocate, was oblivious to the said settled
position of law and hence was duped and induced by the accused-
appellant into having sexual relations with him on different
occasions on the pretext of marriage especially when both the
parties were cognizant of the marital status of the complainant-
respondent No.3.
21. At this juncture, it is also pertinent to mention that the
complainant-respondent No.3 is a thirty-three years old woman
and an advocate by profession and not a naïve or gullible woman
incapable of taking decisions for herself. It would be remiss not to
mention, at the cost of repetition, that the complainant-
respondent No.3 is herself an advocate and therefore she should
have exercised her prudence and discretion before engaging the
already burdened State machinery into a roving criminal litigation.
22. The Courts have to be extremely careful and cautious in
identifying the genuine cases filed under Section 376(2)(n) of the
IPC by identifying the essential ingredients to constitute the said
offence i.e. there should be a promise of marriage made by the
accused solely with a view to obtain consent for sexual relations
and without having any intent of fulfilling said promise from the
17
very beginning, and that such false promise of marriage had a
direct bearing on the prosecutrix giving her consent for sexual
relations. Such genuine cases that deserve prosecution of the
accused must be clearly demarcated from the litigation that arises
from the cases of consensual relationships between consenting
adults going acrimonious on account of dispute and disagreement
or a future change of mind. In view of the aforesaid settled position
of law, the respondent No.1-State and the complainant-respondent
No.3 has failed to place any material on record to show how the
accused-appellant on the subsequent meetings managed to
repeatedly coax and dupe the complainant-respondent No.3 into
having physical relations with him on the false pretext of marriage
considering the fact that within initial meetings, both parties were
aware about the marital status of the victim and therefore it cannot
be, by any stretch imagination said that the consent of the
complainant-respondent No.3 has been vitiated or obtained on
fraud and misrepresentation made by the accused-appellant.
23. At this stage, it is material to refer to the decision of this Court
in Mahesh Damu Khare vs. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 11
SCC 398 , wherein the following observations were made:
18
“29. It must also be clear that for a promise to be a false
promise to amount to misconception of fact within the
meaning of Section 90 IPC, it must have been made from
the very beginning with an intention to deceive the woman
to persuade her to have a physical relationship. Therefore,
if it is established that such consent was given under a
misconception of fact, the said consent is vitiated and not
a valid consent. …”
24. On a perusal of the allegations made in the present case, it is
an admitted fact that the complainant-respondent No.3, within the
first initial meetings told the accused-appellant that she was a
married woman with divorce proceedings pending before the
Family Court. Therefore, in the same breath, she cannot be
allowed to claim and allege that she was also coaxed by the
accused-appellant into having a physical relationship with him on
the false pretext of marriage as the two facts cannot stand together
on the same plane and simultaneously as both are antagonistic
and antithetical to each other. In our opinion, the facts of the
present case clearly indicate a consensual relationship gone sour
whereas both the parties should have exercised restraint and
should have refrained from involving the State into their personal
relationship turning rancour.
19
25. At this juncture, it is important to place reliance upon the
observations in Prashant vs. State of NCT of Delhi, (2025) 5 SCC
764 , wherein this Court speaking through one of us (Nagarathna,
J.) observed that a mere break-up of a relationship between a
consenting couple cannot result in the initiation of criminal
proceedings. What was a consensual relationship between the
parties at the initial stages cannot be given a colour of criminality
when the said relationship does not fructify into a marriage.
Furthermore, this Court in Samadhan vs. State of
Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2528 through one of us
(Nagarathna, J.) observed that this Court has, on numerous
occasions, taken note of the disquieting tendency wherein failed or
broken relationships are given the colour of criminality. The offence
of rape, being of the gravest kind, must be invoked only in cases
where there exists genuine sexual violence, coercion, or absence of
free consent. To convert every soured relationship into an offence
of rape not only trivialises the seriousness of the offence but also
inflicts upon the accused indelible stigma and grave injustice. Such
instances transcend the realm of mere personal discord. The
misuse of the criminal justice machinery in this regard is a matter
20
of profound concern for the judiciary already facing a heavy load
and calls for condemnation.
26. In this regard, it would be apposite to rely on the judgment in
the case of State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Suppl (1)
SCC 335 (“Bhajan Lal”) with particular reference to paragraph
102 therein, where this Court observed thus:
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various
relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of
the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series
of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary
power Under Article 226 or the inherent powers under
Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and
reproduced above, we have given the following categories
of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could
be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any
court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it
may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly
defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible
guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list
of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be
exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face
value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a case against the
Accused.
xxx
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the
FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of
the same do not disclose the commission of any offence
and make out a case against the Accused.
21
xxx
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any
of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under
which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution
and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is
a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act,
providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the
aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance
on the Accused and with a view to spite him due to private
and personal grudge.”
27. On a careful consideration of the aforementioned judicial
dictum, we find that the offence alleged against the accused-
appellant herein is not made out at all. In fact, we find that the
allegation of rape on false pretext of marriage even when taken on
its face value, does not amount to an offence of rape and hence not
liable for punishment under Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC in the
instant case and therefore, the judgment of this Court in the case
of Bhajan Lal squarely apply to the facts of these cases. Therefore,
it is neither expedient nor in the interest of justice to permit the
present prosecution emanating from the FIR and consequent
Sessions Case No.89/2025 to continue.
22
28. In view of the aforesaid discussion and keeping the judicial
dicta laid down by this Court in mind we set aside the impugned
order dated 03.03.2025 of the High Court and consequently, FIR
No.213/2025 dated 06.02.2025 registered with Sarkanda Police
Station at district Bilaspur and the Chargesheet No.269/2025, and
the consequent proceedings arising out of the said proceedings in
Sessions Case No.89/2025 are quashed.
The appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms.
…………………………………..J.
(B.V. NAGARATHNA)
…………………………………..J.
(UJJAL BHUYAN)
NEW DELHI;
FEBRUARY 05, 2026.
23