Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
FAZAL BHAI DHALA
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
CUSTODIAN-GENERAL OF EVACUEEPROPERTY, DELHI
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
21/03/1961
BENCH:
GUPTA, K.C. DAS
BENCH:
GUPTA, K.C. DAS
SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ)
DAS, S.K.
SARKAR, A.K.
AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA
CITATION:
1961 AIR 1397 1962 SCR (1) 456
ACT:
Evacuee Property-Meaning of-Malafide transfer-Effect of
-Custodian-Interference with questions not before him in
appeal-Revisional Jurisdiction-Notice, if essential before
exercising jurisdiction--Non-issue of notice, when fatal-
Partnership at will--Dissolution of--Assets, if and when
vest in Custodian-Indian Partnership Act, 1932 (IX of 1932),
s. 43-Government of India Ordinance No. XXVII of 1949, s.
7(1)-Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 (XXXI of
1950), ss. 2(f), 26, 40.
HEADNOTE:
F, the appellant, and A his brother, were partners in a
business of hides and skins. On August 10, 1949, A executed
a deed of sale in respect of some immoveable properties in
Orissa and Madras in favour of F. A deed of dissolution of
the partnership was also executed on August 12, 1949,
wherein it was inter alia stated that the partners bad
agreed that the said partnership shall stand dissolved as
from November 2, 1948.
On receipt of information that A had migrated to Pakistan
after transferring his properties to his brother F, the
Assistant Custodian of Evacuee Property, issued a notice to
F under S. 7(1) of the Ordinance 27 of 1949 in respect of
immoveable properties in Orissa including the properties
covered by the sale deed and the business in hides and skins
and certain immoveable properties standing in the name of
the firm.
In reply F contended that he had become the sole proprietor
of the business with all assets and liabilities, with effect
from November 2, 1948, when the partnership was dissolved
457
and that while some of the immoveable properties as
mentioned in the notice had been conveyed to him by a deed
of sale by A, the rest being assets of the firm, had vested
in him after the dissolution of partnership.
The Assistant Custodian held that though the transfer of the
properties mentioned in the sale deed was for adequate and
valuable consideration it was not at all bona fide; as
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regards other properties and the hides and skins business
itself, A had no interest as the partnership had been
dissolved on November 2, 1948.
Against this decision F appealed to the Custodian, who held
that these properties were rightly declared as evacuee
properties and that as regards the transfer of other
properties, the same amount of mala fides was present and as
such these should also be included in the list of evacuee
properties.
The appeal to Custodian-General was rejected and the
appellant moved the Supreme Court by special leave. Four
contentions were urged by the appellant:-
Firstly, that the Custodian-General should have held that
the Custodian acted without jurisdiction in interfering with
the order passed by the Assistant Custodian that the hides
business and the properties mentioned in Sch. A III of the
notice were not evacuee properties and should be released.
Secondly, that as against the Assistant Custodian’s order in
respect of the hides business and the immoveable properties
in Sch. A III the Custodian Department had not preferred
any appeal, so that the Custodian could not interfere with
it, in exercise of his appellate jurisdiction. The
Custodian’s order in respect of these properties could not
have been passed, in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction
conferred on him by S. 27 of the Administration of Evacuee
Property Act as no notice of such intention to examine the
records in revision had been issued to F.
Thirdly, once the partnership business was dissolved, there
could be no question of declaring the dissolved partnership
as an evacuee property, in view of s. 43 of the Indian
Partnership Act.
Fourthly, the transaction evidenced by the two deeds, viz.,
the sale deed and the dissolution were merely in furtherance
of the winding up of the affairs of the dissolved
partnership and therefore in determining the validity or
otherwise of the transactions, F could not resist the claim
of the other partner to wind up.
Held, that where the Custodian had made an order against
that portion of the order of the Assistant Custodian which
was not before him in appeal it must be taken to have been
passed in the exercise of the Custodian’s revisional
jurisdiction and the mere fact that this was riot expressly
stated in the order could 58
458
be no ground for holding that he was not exercising his
revisional jurisdiction. It was quite another matter
whether in the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction, he
proceeded in accordance with law.
The Custodian in exercising his revisional jurisdiction must
give the party concerned a reasonable opportunity of being
heard before any order prejudicial to him is made in
revision. If this reasonable opportunity of being heard
cannot be given without the service of notice, a notice
must be served for otherwise the omission to serve the
notice would be fatal, even though s. 26 of the
Administration of Evacuee Property Act did not specifically
provide for service of notice by the Custodian. But in
cases where the party affected is before the Custodian and
has knowledge of the proceedings before him and is heard,
the failure to issue a formal notice is immaterial or does
not vitiate the order passed.
Once the fact of dissolution is accepted, the declaration as
regards the business must necessarily be construed as a
declaration that the property that remained in the evacuee
on the dissolution of the firm was evacuee property.
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Held, further, that where a deed of transfer by an ’evacuee’
was without good faith, S. 40 of the Administration of
Evacuee Property Act would come into operation, making the
transfer of no effect and in the case of a firm its property
on dissolution would become an evacuee property from the
date of the execution of the deed of dissolution of the
partnership and vest in the Custodian with all the rights
under the provisions of the Partnership Act and the
Custodian was not bound by the statements made in the deed
of dissolution as regards the settlement of account.
In the present case the Custodian did not act without juris-
diction or exercise his jurisdiction irregularly.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:. Civil Appeals Nos. 194 of
1956 and 353 of 1958.
Appeals by special leave from the judgment and orders dated
December 26, 1953 and April 30, 1957, of the Custodian-
General and Deputy Custodian-General of Evacuee Property in
Revision Nos. 5055R/Judl/ 1953 and. 1161/R/Judl/1954
respectively.
Achhru Ram and T. R. V. Sastri, for the appellants.
N. S. Bindra and D. Gupta, for respondents.
1961. March 21. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
459
DAS, GUPTA, J.-Of these two appeals, one (Civil Appeal No.
194 of 1956) is against the order of the Custodian-General
of India, declining to interfere with’ the order of the
Custodian of Evacuee Property, Orissa, in respect of certain
properties claimed by the appellant as his; and the other
appeal (Civil Appeal No. 353 of 1958) is against the order
of the Deputy Custodian-General of India, declining to
interfere with the order of the Custodian of Evacuee
Property, Madras, in respect of properties situate in
Madras, claimed by the same appellant as belonging to him.
Though most of the considerations that arise in the two
appeals are identical, it will be convenient to take them up
one after the other so as not to confuse a clear understand-
ing of the facts on which these considerations which are all
based on question of law arise.
The appellant Fazal Bhai Dbala and his brother Abdulla Dhala
were partners in a business of hides and skins. A deed of
partnership was executed on January 1, 1941, and the firm
was registered in the Register of Firms, Cuttack, under s.
59 of the Indian Partnership Act. On August 10, 1949,
Abdulla Bhai Dhala executed a deed of sale in respect of
some immovable properties at Jharsuguda in Orissa, and also
certain properties, at Madras, in favour of Fazal Bhai
Dhala. The consideration in the document was mentioned as
Rs. 85,000 of which Rs. 50,000 was mentioned as the value of
the Madras properties and Rs. 35,000 as the value of the
Orissa properties. The sum of Rs. 85,000 appears to have
been paid in the presence of the Registrar by Fazal Bhai to
Abdulla Bhai on August 11, 1949. A deed of dissolution of
the partnership was also executed on the following day-the
12th August, 1949. It was stated therein that the two
partners had agreed "that the said partnership shall stand
dissolved as and from 2-11-48 and it has further been agreed
that as from that day, 2-11-1948, the said business of
Fazalbhoy Dhala & Co shall belong to and be continued and
carried on by Fazalbhoy Dliala." It was also stated that in
view of the fact that "accounts of the said partnership have
not yet been taken or settled and cannot be taken or
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460
settled without much delay and trouble it has further been
agreed that Fazal Bhai Dhala shall pay to Abdulla Dhala a
sum of Rs. 40,000 in full settlement and satisfaction of all
the claims, as partner of Abdulla Bhai Dhala against the
partnership, its assets, goodwill etc., in respect of his
share therein". A receipt of the sum of Rs. 40,000 was also
acknowledged in this deed. On receipt of information that
Abdulla Dhala had migrated to Pakistan after transferring
his properties to his brother Fazal Bhai Dhala, the
Assistant Custodian of Evacuee Property, Sambalpur (Orissa),
issued a notice under s. 7(1) of the Ordinance XXVII of 1949
to Fazal Bhai Dhala on December 30, 1949, in respect of im-
movable properties at Jharsuguda including the properties
covered by the sale deed of August 10, 1949, and the
business in hides and skins under the name of Fazalbhoy
Dhala & Co., and certain immovable properties standing in
the name of that firm. In reply to the notice, Fazal Bhai
contended that Abdulla Bhai was not an evacuee; and that in
any case, he, Fazal Bhai, had become the sole proprietor of
the business, with all assets and liabilities, with effect
from November 2, 1948, when the partnership was dissolved
and that while some of the immovable properties as mentioned
in the notice had been conveyed to him by a deed of sale by
Abdulla Bhai, the rest being assets of the firm of Fazal
Bhai Dhala, had vested in him after the dissolution of
partnership, he prayed that his "title" in the assets of the
firm, and in the immovable properties, mentioned in the
notice should be confirmed. The Assistant Custodian held
after consideration of the evidence that though the transfer
of the properties mentioned in the sale deed was for
adequate and valuable consideration it was not at all bona
fide: as regards the other properties’ and the hides and
skins business itself the Assistant Custodian held that
Abdulla Bhai had no interest as the partnership had been
dissolved on November 2, 1948. Against this decision Fazal
Bhai appealed to the Custodian and prayed that the order of
the Assistant Custodian as regards the properties mentioned
in Schedule "A" (1) and (II) mentioned in the notice under
sub-section 1 of s. 7 of the Government of India Ordinance
461
No. XXVII of 1949 should be sot aside. The Custodian agreed
with the Assistant Custodian, in respect of these
properties, and held that these had been rightly declared as
evacuee properties. He went further and held that there was
no justification for the Assistant Custodian taking a
different view as regards the other properties. His
conclusion was that "in fact, with regard to these
properties also the same amount of mala fides was present
and as such these should also be included in the list of
evacuee properties"; and that "it is but proper that the
entire 8 annas share of the properties mentioned in
Schedules A and B of the evacuee Abdulla should be treated
as evacuee properties". The Custodian finally ordered: "in
consequence of my above decision according to s. 6 of the
Evacuee Interest Separation Act, the entire properties in
Schedules A and B should now be treated as evacuee pro-
perties and revised action should be taken to notify as
,such under s. 7(3) of the Administration of Evacuee
Property Act and the appellant be directed to get his 8
annas share in the properties separated in the Court of the
Competent Officer".
Fazal Bhai moved the Custodian-General of India for revision
of this order of the Custodian, Orissa. The Custodian-
General, however, refused to interfere.
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It is proper to mention at the outset that it is no longer
disputed that Abdulla Bhai is an evacuee, though the exact
date from which he became such an evacuee does not clearly
appear from the record, and that all the immovable
properties, which are the subject-matter of the appeal, were
the assets of the firm Fazalbhai Dhala & Co.
Four contentions were urged in support of the appeal. The
first contention, and the one to which Mr. Achhru Ram
devoted a considerable portion of his argument, was that the
Custodian-General should have held that the Custodian acted
without jurisdiction, and at any rate, irregularly in the
exercise of his jurisdiction, if he had any, in interfering
with the order passed by the Assistant Custodian that the
immovable property and the hides business and the properties
mentioned in Sell. A III, that is the properties
462
other than those covered by the sale deed, were not evacuee
properties and should be released. Mr. Achhru Ram has
pointed out that against the Assistant Custodian’s order in
respect of these two items of properties the hides business
and the immovable properties in Sch. A III mentioned in the
notice, the Custodian’s department had not preferred any
appeal, so that the Custodian could not interfere with it,
in exercise of his appellate jurisdiction. Learned Counsel
then contends that the Custodian’s order in respect of these
properties-the hides business and the Jharsuguda properties
in Sch. A III-could not have been passed, in exercise of
the revisional jurisdiction conferred on him by s. 26 of the
Administration of Evacuee Property Act (Act No. XXXI of
1950), as no notice of such intention to examine the records
in revision, had been issued to Fazal Bhai. While it is
true that the order does not clearly mention that in respect
of the hides business and the Sch. A III properties it was
being made in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, it is
clear that the only jurisdiction the Custodian could
exercise, in the absence of any appeal against that portion
of the Assistant Custodian’s order would be his revisional
jurisdiction under s. 26. When we find that the Custodian
has made the order it is proper and reasonable to hold that
he passed it in the exercise of the only jurisdiction he
had-viz., the revisional jurisdiction and the fact that this
was not clearly stated in the order can be no ground for
holding that he was not exercising revisional jurisdiction.
It is quite another matter whether in the exercise of that
jurisdiction, he proceeded in accordance with law.
Mr. Aehhru Ram contended that under the law, the Custodian
was required to issue a notice to the parties concerned
before exercising his, revisional jurisdiction. Admittedly,
no such notice was issued; and this omission to issue a
notice was put by the appellant in the forefront of his
grievances both in his petition for revision before the
Custodian-General and in the application for special leave
to appeal to this Court. Turning however to s. 26 we find
that there is no
463
provision for service of any notice. The section runs
thus:-
"26. Powers of review or revision of
Custodian etc. (1) The Custodian, Additional
Custodian, or( Authorised Deputy Custodian may
at any time, either on his own motion or on
application made to him in this behalf, call
for the record of any proceeding under this
Act which is pending before, or has been
disposed of by, an officer subordinate to him
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for the purpose of satisfying himself as to
the legality or propriety of any orders passed
in the said proceeding, and may pass such
order in relation thereto as he thinks fit:
Provided that the Custodian, Additional
Custodian or Authorised Deputy Custodian shall
not pass an order under this sub-section
revising or modifying any order prejudicial to
any person without giving such person a
reasonable opportunity of being heard:
Provided further that if one of the officers
aforesaid takes action under this sub-section,
it shall not be competent for any other
officer to do so.............
The proviso secures the requirements of the principles of
natural justice when it says that any order prejudicial to
any person shall not be passed without giving such person a
reasonable opportunity of being heard. No specific
provision for service of notice in order that such a
reasonable opportunity of being heard be given has however
been made by any rule. It goes without saying that in the
large majority of cases, the Custodian "will, in order to
give the party concerned a reasonable opportunity of being
beard, first give him a notice of his intention to examine
the records to satisfy himself as to the legality or the
propriety of any order passed by the subordinate officer and
require such person to show cause if any why the order
should not be revised or modified, and then if and when the
party appears before him in response to the notice, the
Custodian has also to allow him, either personally or
through counsel, a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
In suitable cases it may be proper and necessary for the
Custodian to allow
464
the party concerned even to adduce evidence. There may be
cases however where the party concerned is already before
the Custodian, so that all that is necessary for the
Custodian to do is to inform such party of his intention to
examine the records to satisfy him,self whether a particular
order should be revised, and then to give him a reasonable
opportunity of being heard. There would be no necessity in
such a case to serve a formal notice on the party who is
already before the Custodian and the omission to serve the
notice can be of no consequence. What the law requires is
that the person concerned should be given a reasonable
opportunity of being heard before any order prejudicial to
him is made in revision. If this reasonable opportunity of
being heard cannot be given without the service of the
notice the omission to serve the notice would be fatal;
where however proper hearing can be given without service of
notice, it does not matter at all, and all that has to be
seen is whether even though no notice was given a reasonable
opportunity of being heard was given.
A perusal of the Custodian’s judgment makes it reasonably
clear that he informed the counsel who appeared on Fazal
Bhai. Dhala’s behalf, that he proposed to consider whether
the order made by the Custodian in respect of the hides
business and the Sch. A III properties had been rightly
made and to revise the same, if necessary, after giving a
reasonable opportunity of being heard to Fazal Bhai on this
point. It is equally clear that the appellant’s advocate
was fully heard in the matter.
We have no doubt therefore that the requirements of law as
embodied in the proviso to s. 26(1) of the Act were fully
satisfied. The contention that the Custodian acted without
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jurisdiction or irregularly exercised his jurisdiction must
therefore fail.
The next contention raised in the appeal is-to use the
learned counsel’s own words-that in view of s. 43 of the
-Indian Partnership Act the partnership stood dissolved from
November 2, 1948 and the Custodian had no jurisdiction to
declare the "business" to be an evacuee property. It does
not appear to have been
465
disputed either before the Assistant Custodian or the
Custodian that the partnership of Fazalbhai Dhala & Co., was
a partnership-at-will. The deed of dissolution’ was dated
August 1.2, 1949 and it has been found by the Custodian that
the deed of dissolution was purposely concluded to provide a
common safeguard for properties to remain in the hands of
the brothers. The mention of the date November 2,1948 as
the date of dissolution cannot therefore be accepted. The
firm must however be held to have been dissolved on August
12, 1949 on which date the deed of dissolution was executed.
The argument of the learned counsel appears to be that once
the partnership-business, was dissolved there could be no
question of declaring the dissolved partnership as an
evacuee property. Once the fact of dissolution is accepted
the declaration as regards the business must necessarily be
construed as a declaration that the property that remained
in Abdulla Bhai on the dissolution of the firm was an
evacuee property. It seems to us clear that that was really
what is intended to be meant by the order made by the
Custodian.
A further contention of the appellant is that the
transactions evidenced by the two deeds, viz., the sale deed
and the dissolution were merely in furtherance of the
winding up of the affairs of the dissolved partnership and
therefore in determining the validity or otherwise of the
transactions it has to be borne in mind that Fazal Bhai
could not resist the claim of the other partners to wind up.
The story that the dissolution of partnership had taken
place earlier and the two deeds were excited later on has
not been accepted by the Custodian and we can see no reason
to interfere with his conclusion. The deeds of sale were
executed prior to the actual dissolution which was effected
by the deed of dissolution there is no scope therefore for
saying that the sale deed was in the course of the winching
up of the affairs of the dissolution of partnership. As
regards the deed of dissolution itself it is wholly beside
the point whether Abdulla Bhai could have resisted the claim
to wind
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466
up; for the declaration merely is that Abdulla Bhai’s share
in the dissolved partnership as it stood on the date of
dissolution is an evacuee property. The validity of the
dissolution is not touched. It is hardly necessary to add
that the dissolution of the partnership did not by itself
mean that Abdulla’s share stood transferred to Fazal Bhai
any more than that Fazal Bhai’s share stood transferred to
Abdulla Bhai. A purported transfer of Abdulla’s share was
made by the deed itself. But this having been held to be
without good faith, had in view of s. 40 of the Evacuee
Property Act, no effect. It has to be made clear that the
Custodian would not be bound by the statements made in the
deed of dissolution as regards the settlement of the
accounts of the firm and that the Custodian, in whom the
evacuee properties vest will have in respect of the
dissolved business all the rights which Abdulla had under
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sections 37, 46, 47, 48 and other sections of the
Partnership Act.
There remains for consideration the appellant’s contention
that in any case the Custodian acted illegally in the
exercise of his jurisdiction in ordering that "the entire
properties in Schs. A and B should now be treated as
evacuee properties". It appears that the order by the
Custodian was made in these terms even though his conclusion
was that "the entire 8 annas share of the properties
mentioned in Schs. A and B of the evacuee Abdulla should be
treated as evacuee properties", in view of the fact that
under the original definition of evacuee property in s. 2(f)
of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act (Act XXXI of
1950) it meant "any property in which any evacuee has any
right or interest". This definition has however since been
amended and now evacuee property means "any property of an
evacuee" instead of "any property in which an evacuee has
any right or interest". The legal position after the
amendment therefore is that it is only the 8 annas share of
Abdulla set out in the Schedule in the Assistant Custodian’s
order dated the 28th January, 1950, which is evacuee
property. It is therefore necessary to state in
clarification of the position that instead of the
467
entire Schedules A and B properties being treated as evacuee
property only 8 annas share of these properties which
belonged to the evacuee Abdulla should be treated as evacuee
properties.
With this clarification of the Custodian’s order the appeal
is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Pi The
other appeal-C. A. No. 353 of 1958 is in respect of
properties in Madras. Fazal Bhai made an application on
July 21, 1950 purporting to be under s. 40 of the
Administration of Evacuee Property Act (Act XXXI of 1950) in
reply to a notice which had been issued on him under s. 7 of
the Act. His case, as in respect of the Orissa properties
mentioned earlier, was that the dissolution of the firm took
place in November, 1948 and that the final transaction and
settlement of accounts was brought about by a deed of sale
dated August 11, 1949 in respect of Orissa and Madras pro-
perties and a deed of dissolution dated August 12, 1949 for
a consideration of Rs. 40,000 making in all the entire
amount of Rs. 1,25,000 which in this final settlement had
been agreed to be paid to Abdulla. He prayed for a
declaration that the properties mentioned in the notice be
held to have been legally and properly passed to him, and
that the transfer in his favour may be confirmed. The
Assistant Custodian of Evacuee Property, Madras, accepted
Fazal Bhai’s case that the transfer was only a step in the
apportionment of the assets of the firm and not a transfer
outside the partition of the assets of the firm. He held
that the transfer was bona fide and made an order in these
terms:-
"I therefore accept the dissolution of the
firm of Fazalbhai Dhala and Company covered by
the dissolution deed dated 12-8-49 and confirm
the transfer of the immoveable properties
covered by the deed dated 10-8-49 under
section 40(5) of the Administration of Evacuee
Property Act, 1950."
When this matter came to the notice of the Custodian-General
of Evacuee Property in the course of the proceedings before
him in respect of the Orissa property, he observed:-
"As for the Madras properties, I notice that Mr.
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Rathanam’s order was allowed to go unchallenged by the
department and as it is not before me, therefore, I am not
called upon to express my opinion."
This was on December 26, 1953. It appears that the
Custodian-General also made a suggestion to the Custodian,
Madras, that he might examine the propriety of the order
passed by the Assistant Custodian., Madras. Accordingly,
the Custodian, Madras, examined the records and issued
notice to interested parties including Fazal Bhai Dhala to
show cause why the Assistant Custodian’s order should not be
set aside in revision. Cause was shown by Fazal Bhai Dhala
and thereafter after hearing arguments on his behalf by his
Advocate, Mr. T. S. Raghavachari, the Custodian held that
"the transactions covered by the sale deed dated August 10,
1949 and the deed of dissolution dated the 12th August, 1949
were not bona, fide". Accordingly, he set aside the order
of the Assistant Custodian which confirmed the transfer of
properties covered by these two deeds. He directed the
Assistant Custodian, Madras, to take steps under the Evacuee
Property Act in respect of these evacuee properties
consequent on the cancellation of the confirmation of
transfer. Fazal Bhai’s application to the Custodian-General
of Evacuee Property, India, for revision of the Custodian’s
order was heard by the Deputy Custodian-General of Evacuee
Property, India, and was rejected.
The only additional ground urged by Mr. Achhru Ram in
support of this appeal is that the notice issued on Fazal
Bhai to show cause why the Assistant Custodian’s order
should not be revised did not say anything as regards the
Assistant Custodian’s order in respect of the business and
so the Custodian had no jurisdiction to interfere with the
Assistant Custodian’s order in so far as that order was in
respect of the business’
Turning now to the Assistant Custodian’s order we find that
in addition to confirming the transfer of immovable
properties covered by the deed of August 10, ’1949 he also
said:-"’I therefore, accept the dissolution of the firm of
Fazal Bhai Dhala & Company.,
469
covered by the dissolution deed dated August 12, 1949. The
Custodian in his order dated July 5, 1954, has held that the
transaction covered by the deed of’ dissolution also was not
bona fide. It has to be borne in mind that the purported
dissolution of the firm in November, 1948, the settlement of
accounts recorded in the deed of August, 1949 and the
transfer of properties effected were all integral and
indivisible parts of the same transaction. While it is true
that the notice issued to Fazal Bhai made no reference to
the deed of dissolution, it is clear from Fazal Bhai’s own
statement filed in response to this notice that he clearly
understood that the revising authority would be considering
the question of bona fides in respect of the numerous
statements about the settlement of accounts in connection
with the dissolution of business made in the deed of
dissolution.
We are satisfied, therefore., that the appellant Fazal Bhai
had reasonable opportunity of being heard as regards the
bona fides of the transactions mentioned in the deed of
dissolution. As we have already mentioned in connection
with the other appeal, the fact that the firm stood
dissolved with effect from the date on which the deed of
dissolution was executed can no longer be disputed. The
effect of the Custodian’s order in regard to the deed of
dissolution merely is that the transactions mentioned in
that deed on the purported basis of an earlier dissolution
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has been declared to be not bona fide and confirmation was
refused of whatever transfers of properties were purported
to have been effected by that deed.
This appeal, is, therefore,, dismissed with costs.
Appeals dismissed.
470