Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI & ANOTHER
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
SHRI NARESH KUMAR AND OTHERS
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/03/1997
BENCH:
B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, K.S. PARIPOORNAN
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J.
Leave granted.
This appeal involves the interpretation of clause (c)
of sub-section (4) of Section 115 of the Delhi Municipal
Corporation Act, 1957. Sub-Section (4) levies, what is
called, a "General Tax" on "all lands and buildings’ in
Delhi except "(C) agricultural lands and buildings (other
than dwelling houses)". The question is whether the farm
houses within in the Delhi Municipal Corporation area are
exigible to general tax as "dwelling houses".
The respondent owns an extent of about 13 bighas in the
Revenue estate of village Bijwasan, Tehsil Mehrauli, New
Delhi. According to him, he carries on agricultural
operations thereon. He constricted building on the said
land, which, according to him, is occupied for purposes
connected with agricultural operations on the said land and
wherein the respondent and his family members stay whenever
they visit the farm. According to the respondent, further
the building is not occupied on a permanent basis farm. The
contention of the respondent before the High Court was that
since the said building is connected with the agriculture
being carried on over the said extent of 13 bighas, it is
exempt from tax under Section 115 (4)(c) notwithstanding the
fact that it is a "dwelling house". On the other hand, the
case of the Corporation was that since the said building is
a "dwelling house" within the meaning of Section 115(4)(c),
it is subject to general tax. According to the corporation,
it is immaterial whether the dwelling house is occupied on a
permanent basis or only occasionally. It is equally
immaterial says the corporation, whether the dwelling house
is occupied for the purpose of agriculture being carried on
over the adjacent lands or otherwise. it is enough that it
is a dwelling unit, says the corporation. It is taxable. The
High Court has not accepted the contention urged by the
corporation. The High Court has opined that a dwelling unit
is exempted from general tax if it is mainly or pre-
dominantly occupied or use for agricultural purposes. This
is what the High Court said:
"We are therefore of the view that
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so far as the exemption provision
in Section 115(4)(c) is concerned,
the test is not whether buildings
or Farm houses are used ’solely’ in
connection with agricultural
operations. In Our view, the said
exemption, In our view, the said
exemption applies to ’buildings’ or
farm houses used "substantially",
if not solely, for agricultural
purposes. If this test is
satisfied, the building or farm
house falls outside the tax-net. So
far as the exclusionary words
’other than dwelling houses ’ are
concerned, we are again of the view
that the buildings or farm houses
must be solely or substantially
used for ’dwelling purposes, that
is to say, with a degree to
continuity and permanency, and not
solely or substantially for
agricultural purpose, then such
buildings will fall inside the tax
net. We do not visualise any third
category of ’buildings’ or farm
houses which do not fall into one
or other categories above stated.
Assuming however that any such
intermediate category arises, we
are of the view that the person
claiming the exemption will not be
entitled to exemption from property
tax unless he proves that the
building is solely or substantially
used for ’agricultural purpose’.
Whether a given building is used
substantially for agricultural
purpose, is a question depending
upon the facts and circumstances of
each case and on what, according to
general principles of law could be
said to be the meaning of the words
’agricultural purpose’."
With respect we are unable to agree with the High
Court. Clause (c) exempts "agricultural lands and buildings"
form the levy imposed by Section 115(4). Clause (c),
however, contains an exception within itself. The "dwelling
houses" are excluded from the purview of agricultural lands
and buildings. In other words, once it is a "dwelling house"
it is outside the purview of exempted category. The very
context in which the expression "dwelling houses" occurs
shows that even the dwelling houses situated on, over or in
the midst of agricultural lands were sought to be excluded
from the exempted category of "agricultural lands and
buildings". An agricultural building may be a godown where
the agricultural produce is stored, it ay be warehouse or it
may be a building housing the machinery used for purpose of
agriculture. A dwelling house can also be occupied by
persons carrying on the agriculture i.e., to carry on or
supervise the agricultural operation. But according to
Section 115(4) (c), the "dwelling houses" as such are
excluded from the category of agricultural buildings. In
other words, even if it possible to say that a dwelling
house is an "agricultural building", yet it is excluded
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specifically by the statute from the fold of agricultural
buildings. Applying the test evolved by the High Court would
remove the distinction between "agricultural buildings" and
"dwelling houses" which are mentioned together in clause
(c). an agricultural building is a building used mainly or
pre-dominantly for the purpose of agricultural. If the same
test is applied to dwelling houses than the very purpose and
object behind excluding dwelling houses from the purview of
agricultural buildings would disappear. We, therefore, agree
with the Corporation that once a building is a dwelling
house, no further enquiry need be made whether it is used
mainly or pre-dominantly for agricultural purpose or not.
It is enough that it is a dwelling house. It becomes
exigible to general tax. This would be so even if the
dwelling house is situated in the midst of a farm or is a
part of the farm or it may be, what is called, a "farm
house".
So far as the argument of occasional (as contrasted
with regular) occupation is concerned, we may refer to the
decision of this court in the Tata engineering And
Locomotive Company Limited v. The Gram Panchayat,
Pimpri Waghere [ 1976 (4) S.C.C. 177]. In Para 18, the
following statement occurs: It may be stated generally that
the wood "house" is a structure of a permanent character. It
is structurally severed from other tenements. It is
structurally severed from other tenements. It is not
necessary that a house if adapted for residential purposes
should be actually dwelt in (see Daniel v. Coulsting -
(1845) 14 LJ CP 70: 135 ER 53). A building in Covent Garden
had formerly been a dwelling house but was converted into a
fruitstore warehouse and office in which no one slept and
was held to be a ’house’ as regards assessment to the
rector’s rate within the provisions of the relevant statue."
The next question is - if a "dwelling house" is
exigible to levy of general tax, how much of the adjacent
land should be treated as an integral part of the dwelling
house. IN other words, the question is whether the entire
land surrounding or abutting the dwelling house. The answer
to this question is: a dwelling house includes within its
ambit such appurtenant land as is necessary for a proper and
convenient enjoyment of the dwelling house. The extent of
such appurtenant land is naturally a question of fact to be
decided in each case. We have only stated the test. It is
for the appropriate assessing authority to determine the
extent of land which can be called appurtenant land to a
given dwelling house.
The third question urged before us is as to the meaning
of the expression "agricultural land". This question has not
been really gone into by the High Court. When can a land be
called an agricultural land has been the subject matter of
good amount of debate under various enactments including the
Income Tax Act and the Wealth Tax Act. Whether a land is an
agricultural land or not is a mixed question of fact and
law, which has to be decided in the facts and circumstances
of the each case. We are not prepared to go into details, to
determine whether the land involved in this appeal is
"agricultural land", since that question has not been gone
into by the High Court. The three issues set out by the High
Court do not take in this issue. It is enough to say for
the purpose of this appeal that a dwelling house situated on
an agricultural land is not exempt from general tax and that
a dwelling house exempt from general tax and that a dwelling
house includes within its ambit such appurtenant land as is
necessary for a proper and convenient land as is necessary
for a proper and convenient enjoyment of the dwelling house.
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No more can be said, or need be said, in this appeal.
The appeal is allowed in the manner indicated above.
The matter should go back to the Assessing Authority for
appropriate orders in the light of the law laid down herein.
No order as to costs.