Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2049 OF 2013
| UNION OF INDIA & ANR | .....APPELLANT(S) |
|---|---|
| VERSUS | |
| S. NARASIMHULU NAIDU (DEAD) THROUGH<br>LRS. AND ORS | .....RESPONDENT(S) |
W I T H
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 13 OF 2012
J U D G M E N T
HEMANT GUPTA, J.
1. The present appeals are directed against an order passed by the
High Court of Judicature at Andhra Pradesh on 25.4.2011
1
whereby an order passed by the Special Court, Hyderabad
under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act,
2
1982 on 19.9.2008 was not interfered with.
2. Brief facts leading to the present appeals are that the
1 For short, the ‘Tribunal’
2 For short, the ‘Act’
1
3
respondent Nos. 1 to 6 being legal heirs of Late Sri S.V.
Srinivasulu Naidu filed an application under Section 8 of the Act
before the Tribunal alleging that the land measuring 7128.5 sq.
yards in Survey No. 299/2 (old Survey No. 403/1), Ward No. 8,
Block-3, Shaikpet Village, Hyderabad, is the land grabbed by
the Union of India. It was pleaded that a notification is required
under Section 8(6) of the Act, which was published in the extra
ordinary Gazette of Andhra Pradesh on 22.1.2004 but no
objections against the same were received. The applicants
alleged that their father had purchased 2 acres 27 guntas of
land in Survey No. 299/2 from one Shri Shaik Ahmed under two
registered sale deeds dated 12.12.1959 (Exhs. A1 and A2). The
purchaser, i.e., the father of the applicants was put in
possession thereof. Out of the total land purchased by the
father of the applicants, 7 guntas of land was taken over for the
purpose of widening of road and remaining part i.e. 2 acres 20
guntas (12100 sq. yards) was held by him. It was further
alleged by the applicants that their father sold the land
measuring 4971.5 sq. yards out of 12100 sq. yards in Survey
No. 299/2 with specific boundaries via registered sale deed
dated 20.3.1964 (Ex.A3). The remaining part of the land i.e.,
7128.5 sq. yards was however retained by their father.
3. It was alleged that the Military Contract Committee started
constructing sheds on the land sold by the father of the
3 Hereinafter referred to as the ‘applicants’
2
4
applicants. As a result, the purchasers filed original suit on or
about 14.4.1965 against the Union of India, State of Andhra
Pradesh and the father of the applicants, which was later
assigned as suit OS No. 175 of 1970 (Old No. 72 of 1965). The
Plaintiff claimed that his vendor Shaik Ahmed and then the
father of the applicants was the owner in possession of the
property since purchase of the property on 20.3.1964, but the
contractors of the first defendant, the appellant herein,
trespassed into the schedule property on 12.7.1964. The Plaintiff
thus sought possession of the land purchased or in the
alternative, recovery of sale consideration paid to the father of
the applicants. It was inter-alia pleaded as under:-
“4. Under these circumstances, Sri Shaik Ahmed sold
the entire Ac.2-27 guntas of the said property to Sri S.V.
Srinivasulu Naidu, I.P.S., Superintendent of Police, Crime
rd
Branch (C.I.D.), Hyderabad, the 3 defendant herein by
means of two sale deeds dated 12-12-1959 and put the
latter in possession of the same. While in possession
and enjoyment of the same, and paying taxes thereon,
the said Sri S.V. Srinivasulu Naidu (the third defendant
herein) sold 4971 ½ square yards of site out of the said
S.No.299/2, of Shaikpet village more fully described in
the schedule given below and herein after called the
schedule property to the plaintiffs herein by means of a
sale deed dated 20-3-1964 for a consideration of Rs.
28,000/-. Ever since the date of sale, the plaintiffs
herein have been in undisputed possession and
enjoyment of the schedule property. Thus the plaintiffs
are the absolute owners of the schedule property
enjoying the same with absolute rights."
4. The schedule property was the property purchased by the
plaintiff. In the written statement filed by the father of the
4 Hereinafter referred to as the ‘first suit’
3
applicants, it was stated that the said defendant had perfect
right and legal title to the land when he effected sale in favour
of the Plaintiffs. The said defendant asserted that he had no
objection to the Plaintiff suit being decreed. It is pertinent to
mention that the said defendant had not filed any counter claim
of possession of the remaining land after selling the land to the
Plaintiff. The parties went to trial on the following issues:
“1. Whether the plaintiffs and their predecessor in
interest had title to and possession over the suit land
within 12 years prior to the suit?
2. Whether the suit land belonged to Ex-Hyderabad
State Army and whether it was subsequently handed
over to defendant No.1 in 1958?
3. Whether the patta and the settlement relied upon
by the plaintiff were cancelled and if so, whether the
cancellation is legal and valid?
4. Whether the suit land was auctioned by defendant
No.1 for grazing and grass cutting?
5. To what damage if any, are the plaintiffs entitled
rd
against the 3 defendant alternatively?
6. To what relief, if any are the plaintiffs entitle?”
5. The Learned Trial Court decided Issue No. 1, whereby the
following findings were recorded: -
“19. Another piece of evidence available from the
material on record is Ex.B.22. It is a letter from the
Tahsildar (West) to the commissioner of the Municipality
wherein it is clearly mentioned that No.299/2 is the patta
land of Shaik Ahmed and that Abdul Gani named
mentioned has no concern with it. Third one is the order
of the land record officer B.21 wherein it is clearly
mentioned that S.No.129/(ld) and 403 (new) measuring
(7) acres was granted as patta to Shaik Ahmed this
material is quite sufficient to conclude that Shaik Ahmed
4
has his possession over the suit land since 1339 Fasli.”
20. Next point to be considered is whether Shaik
Ahmed sold the suit land to the third defendant. His
totally manifest by the two agreement of sale B.2 and
B.3 and the two subsequent register sale deeds Ex.B.4
and B.5. In this matter B.7 entered witness box. Shaik
Ahmed is stated to have died few years ago. DW-2 has
testified this matter. Third defendant as DW.1 stated that
he purchased the land in 1959 and shortly after one
Heeralal filed a suit against him claiming the suit land.
That suit ultimately ended in a compromise. Ex.B.26 and
B.27 are the two receipts of Heeralal in
acknowledgement of the receipt of money and also
about compromising the matter.
21. Ex.B.28 to show that Chintal Basti Samshan
Committee member objected and alleged that a portion
of the suit land was the grade land and therefore, the
third defendant cannot occupy it. In that connection, the
third defendant made a compromise by giving some land
as well as some cash amount to the said committee
members and ended that matter. According to D.3 he did
not find time to construct his proposed house on account
of the above mentioned dispute. Meanwhile the plaintiffs
approached him and he sold the suit land to them. The
Sale Deed executed by him i.e. within four months the
alleged encroachments was made. In this brief period
the plaintiffs were not expected to do any thing in
exercising of their rights as purchasers. These facts
coupled with the documents stated above, are quite
sufficient to conclude that the plaintiff and their
predecessors in title and undoubted by their possession
over the suit land within twelve years prior to the
alleged trespass. In other words, the plaintiffs have
successfully, discharged the onus placed on them under
issue No.1, therefore find this issue in the affirmative.
(Emphasis Supplied)
27………………………Thus viewed from any perspective
there is no material to believe that the suit belonged to
the Ex Hyderabad State Army and that is was
subsequently handed over by the Second defendant to
the first defendant. I therefore, find this issue in the
negative.”
6. The suit was thus decreed on 13.8.1970 declaring the plaintiffs
5
as title holders of the suit property. An appeal was filed by the
Union of India before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh but the
said appeal was dismissed on 31.3.1975. Thereafter, the
plaintiffs in the suit filed execution petition in which the
applicants had chosen not to participate. The father of the
applicants died on 17.6.1993. Thereafter, the applicants
invoked the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
7. The applicants asserted before the Tribunal that they are
original owners of the land in question and the Government had
no right or title over the property. While relying upon
proceedings initiated by the Plaintiffs, the applicants asserted
as follows:-
“………………..The said suit as contested and the Hon’ble
th
4 Addl. Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad had decided
the issues of title and possession along with other issues
vide judgment and decree dated 13.08.1970. It is
submitted that the Hon’ble IV Additional Judge had held
that our father is the owner and was in possession of the
property since more than twelve years.”
8. The appellant herein filed a written statement, inter alia,
pleading that the application is not maintainable as it does not
disclose the facts relating to the alleged land grabbing. It was
also pleaded that the facts narrated by the applicants
themselves show that they have lost their possession long ago
and after being dispossessed, the applicants had failed to take
any steps to get the land restored to them. The filing of the suit
and dismissal of appeal was accepted. It was also pleaded that
in execution of the previous decree, the decree holder and the
6
applicants had entered into a written compromise which was
filed in execution application No. 220/95 seeking recording of
satisfaction of the decree. In such proceedings, the Union
proposed for exchange of the defence land with the decretal
land in response to a letter dated 19.8.1995. In terms of such
compromise, possession of the land measuring 4971.5 sq. yards
was delivered to the decree holder on 14.12.1995. It was
stated that the schedule land is a defence land and appellant is
not a land grabber. It was further asserted that the Tribunal was
not competent to decide the title of the appellant for it being
defence land. Still further, it was stated that the land
measuring 2 acres 20 guntas was in possession of the
applicants since 1.4.1958 when it was handed over to the
Government of India, Ministry of Defence by the Collector,
Hyderabad. The stand of the appellant in the written statement
inter-alia is as under:-
“7………………………. Therefore, the Statement of the
applicant that since the construction was started in the
land belonging to the subsequent purchasers, they filed
the suit is appears to be absolutely ridiculous because
the whole extent of the land measuring 2 acres 20
guntas was under the possession of the defence and the
applicant had not claimed the suit schedule land at any
point of time before 16.01.1996. So it could be clearly
seen that the suit schedule land was under the
possession of the defence more than 30 years before
claiming by the applicant. The contention of the
applicant that IV Additional Judge, City Civil Court,
Hyderabad held that his father is the owner and was in
possession of the property since more than 12 years is
wrong. The Hon’ble Judge in issue No. 6 had stated that
the “Vendor”, the third defendant has satisfactorily
proved by adducing oral as well as documentary
7
evidence that he as well as his predecessors-in-title,
Shaik Ahmed were in possession of the suit land i.e. only
4971 sq. yards whereas the applicant is claiming the
remaining extent of land msg 7128.5 sq. yards.
8……………………. To settle the matter, the Government
of India, Ministry of Defence vide post copy of telegram
No. 31/27/L/L&C/64 dated 11.08.1995 conveyed
approval for exchange of the defence land with that of
decretal land within Pension Paymaster’s Office.
Accordingly the Counsel for the decree holders have
accepted the said exchange proposal on 19.08.1995. On
receipt of the acceptance, joint survey was conducted to
mark the decretal land measuring 4971.5 sq. yards.
Accordingly a plan showing the total extent of the
defence land, the land already decreed by the lower
court in OS No. 175/1970. Accordingly an extent of land
admeasuring 4971.5 sq. yards handed over the decree
holders by a proceedings dated 14.12.1995 of the
Advocate Commissioner and the Contempt Case No.
411/1995 was finally closed on 15.12.1995, since land
was handed over to the parties as per the compromise
Memo.
xxxx xxxx
10 ………………………………The above land is under the
possession of the Union of India for the last several years
which is more than 30 years. Shri S.V. Srinivasulu Naidu
so called owner of the subject land did not filed any suit
of claiming the property which is under the occupation of
the Union of India for the last more than 30 years. The
said S.V. Srinivasulu Naidu was only Defendant No.3 in
the above suit and appeal and as such by virtue of the
decree passed in the said cases do not create a right in
favour of Sri S.V. Narsimhulu Naidu to claim any land
which is under the occupation of Union of India on the
basis of below grounds:-
xxxx xxxx
13. With regard to unnumbered para 14 to 16 of the
petition, it is submitted that the contention of the
applicant in this para is that they are the owners of the
schedules land is hereby denied. Land admeasuring 2
acres 20 guntas situated at Shaikpet Village, Golconda
Mandal Hyderabad which was the property of Nizam
forces and used as “Minature Rifle Range” was handed
8
over to the Government of India, Ministry of Defence on
01.04.1958 vide Board proceedings dated 19.03.1958 by
the Collector and the same is vested with the
Government of India under Article 295 (i) of the
Constitution of India. Being a defence land, the
department is not the land grabber. For the defence land
enactment of the Parliament is applicable whereas Land
Grabbing Court is having jurisdiction only on the State
Land.
It is submitted that on the basis of uninterrupted
possession of the defence over the schedule property
from more than last 30 years and as the Land Grabbing
Court is having the jurisdiction only on the State Land
the above case is not maintainable before this Hon’ble
Court….”.
9.
The learned Tribunal framed the following issues on the basis of
pleadings of the parties:
“(1) Whether the applicants are the owners of the
application schedule property?
(2) Whether the rival title set up by the respondents is
true, valid and binding on the applicants?
(3) Whether the respondents are land grabbers within
the meaning of the Act XII of 1982?
(4) Whether the respondents prescribed title by
adverse possession?
(5) To what relief?”
10. The appellants had never asserted their possession as adverse
or hostile to the knowledge of true owner. The plea of the
appellant was that they are in possession of the said property
as owners for the last 30 years. Therefore, issues were not
correctly framed. Accordingly, Issue Nos. 1 and 2 were decided
together.
9
11. In evidence, the applicants examined PW 1 - S. Janardhan who
had produced sale deeds by which their father had purchased
the land but the patta said to be executed in favour of Shaik
Ahmed was not produced. A perusal of the two sale deeds Ex A1
and A2 executed by the said Shaik Ahmed also does not
disclose the date of any patta. Thus, in the present proceedings,
neither the sale deeds have mentioned about the patta nor
such patta had been produced or proved on record. In fact, the
entire claim is based upon the judgment in the first suit, which
is evident from the statement of PW 1, when he said that “a
Division Bench of the Hon’ble High Court reported in 1990 has
categorically held that once the Hon’ble Court upheld the title
and possession in earlier proceedings, it is not open for any one
of the authorities to deny the same taking untenable pleases.
Once the source of title is common, any party taking a different
plea in subsequent proceedings is barred by res judicata".
12. The Tribunal inter-alia returned the following findings:
“52. Srinivasulu Naidu purchased the land under Exs.A-
1 and A-2 in the year 1959. There is a finding in that suit
that 12 years prior to filing of the suit, Shaik Ahmed and
Srinivasulu Naidu had been in possession of the land. So
the land has been in their continuous possession since
1949-50. Delivery of Acs.2.27 guntas of land to the
Defence by the State Government is only a paper
delivery as per Ex.B14 proceedings. So it can be inferred
that actual delivery of land of Acs. 2.27 guntas was not
made and it is only a paper delivery. This land alone was
not alleged to have been delivered as per Ex.B14
proceedings dt. 19-3-58. About Acs.1500-24 guntas of
land in four different plots in different areas was ordered
to be delivered by the State Government to the Union of
10
India. According to the Union of India, Acs.2.27 guntas is
part of Asfanagar lines which is shown as item No. V in
Ex.B-14 at page No.2.
xx xx xx
57. The contention of the Advocate for the
respondents is that when the Union of India claimed that
it is in possession since 1958 in the suit OS 175/70, title
to the balance land is to be decided elsewhere. It is
further contended that Exs. A1 and A2 sale deeds are
valid and title passed to the applicants but to show
whether Shaik Ahmed had title or not for the remaining
land, suit is not filed by the applicants. Therefore, the
applicants waived their right and their claim is time
barred. When a finding is given in the suit that State
Government which gave land to Union of India has no
title and that Srinivasulu Naidu and his vendor had title,
there is no need for Srinivasulu Naidu to file another suit
for declaration of his title.
xx xx xx
59. If the land which was delivered to R-1 herein and
to the other decree holders in execution proceedings, in
exchange of suit schedule land owned by Srinivasulu
Naidu, the exchange itself is illegal. Without establishing
title to the remaining land by the Union of India the
Union of India has entered into the compromise for
exchange of the Application schedule land. A
Compromise can be made between the decree holders
and judgment debtors with regard to the decree
schedule land only but it should not be in respect of
some other land not covered by the decree. For retaining
the decreetal schedule property by Judgment Debtors,
some other land which is not subject matter of the suit
was given to the decree holders. Union of India was
aware that this land which was delivered to decree
holders in exchange was mentioned as boundary to the
decreetal schedule property belonged to Srinivasulu
Naidu. Srinivasulu Naidu was a party to the suit. Even
though no relief is granted against Srinivasulu Naidu in
the said suit, at-least notice should be given to
Srinivasulu Naidu or Srinivasulu Naidu should be made
party to the compromise, when he claimed title and
possession to that land which was given to the decree
holders in exchange.
11
xx xx xx
90. In the case on hand the title to the application
schedule land is not in issue in the earlier suit. The issue
was with regard to the title for the suit schedule land
which was purchased by the plaintiffs from Srinivasulu
Naidu. Exs.A1 and A2 are the sale deeds which were
relied on by the plaintiffs to establish their title for 4971
sq. yards. For the remaining land there was no issue. No
finding is given with regard to the title for the remaining
land of Srinivasulu Naidu. The remaining land of
Srinivasulu Naidu’s is shown as boundary on three sides
of the suit land purchased by the plaintiffs from
Srinivasulu Naidu. A finding is given in the suit that the
land purchased by Srinivasulu Naidu under Ex.A1 and A2
is patta land of Shaik Ahmed. To decide the title of the
plaintiffs in 4971 sq. yards title of Srinivasulu Naidu
covered by Exs.A1 and A2 was also considered.
Therefore, there is identity of title in OS 175/70 and in
this land grabbing case. Hence, the finding in the suit
binds the respondents.
91. The findings in the suit binds the Union of India as
the title in the two litigations is one and the same. The
State Government did not prefer the appeal against the
Judgment and decree in OS 175/70. The Union of India
claims title through the State Government. In the suit, a
finding is given that the land is a patta land of Shaik
Ahmed and not the State Government land. Therefore,
that finding became final and binds both the
Governments and other parties to the suit. The appeal
CCCA No-30/1972 preferred by the Union of India against
the judgment and decree passed in suit OS 175/70 was
dismissed by the Hon’ble High Court. A finding was given
by the High Court that the land covered by Exs.B-38
marked in the i.e. the land covered by Ex.B25 herein was
not correlated to the suit land. The suit land is part of the
land covered by Exs.A1 and A2 sale deeds herein. The
Union of India contends that the entire land of Acs.2.20
guntas was delivered as per Ex.B38 proceedings. In the
letter dt. 25-4-1960 which was addressed by the
Tahsildar, Hyderabad to the Collector Hyderabad District
it is mentioned that the tounch map available in this
office shows that Sy.No. 299/2 is the same place where
the rifle range is shown in the map of I.S.F lands,
Mallepally. Neither the tounch map nor the map of ISF
lands has been produced. The letter therefore loses all
its importance. The letter however, shows that patta was
12
sanctioned to Shaik Ahmed prior to the preparation of
the maps.” (Emphasis supplied)
13. The High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution affirmed the order of the Tribunal and held as
under:
“17. Originally, the land to an extent of Acs.2.27 gts in
Sy.No. 299/2 was purchased by S.V. Srinivasulu Naidu,
the father of the applicants under Exs.A1 and A2 sale
deeds. After Ac.0.07 gts of land was affected in road
widening, the remaining extent of land is Acs.2.20 gts
equivalent to 12,100 sq. yards, out of which, 4,971 sq.
yards was sold by the father of the applicants to one V.
Krishna Murthy and others under Ex.A3. Now, the
disputed land is 7,128.5 sq. yards. The possession of
land to an extent of Acs.2.20 gts by Srinivasulu Naidu
from 1959 to 1964 was established in O.S. No. 175 of
1970 wherein the dispute with regard to the land to an
extent of 4,971.5 sq. yards out of Acs.2.27 gts between
V. Krishna Murthy and others/plaintiffs with the Union of
India/respondent has been decided through the
judgment and decree dated 13.08.1970. The delivery of
the land to an extent of Acs.2.27 gts to the Union of
India by the State Government was negatived in that
suit. The possession of Srinivasulu Naidu in the land on
three sides of the decretal land is admitted by R.W.2 as
per the contents of Ex.B21. Since the said judgment and
decree in O.S. No. 175 of 1990 had attained finality in
view of the dismissal of appeal being CCCA No. 30 of
1972 filed by the Union of India, the plaintiffs have
proceeded for its execution. Therefore, the father of the
applicants had got title and possession over the part of
the land sold by him.
18. The contention of the Union of India that the entire
land to an extent of Acs.2.20 gts was delivered to the
Central Government as per Ex.B28 proceedings cannot
be accepted as the land to an extent of Acs.2.20 gts was
shown as Minature Rifle Range at Mallepally village area
as per Ex.B14 and not in Shaikpet village and as such,
the Special Court held that the land to an extent of
Acs.2.20 gts covered by Exs.A1 and A2 belongs to
Srinivasulu Naidu and they are valid documents.
13
19. When the execution proceedings are pending,
respondent No.1 claimed 1/3rd share in the entire land
covered by the decree in O.S. No.175 of 1990 as
assignee from one of the decree holders i.e., V. Krishna
Murthy under assignment deed dated 18.03.1992, which
admittedly has not been produced before the Court. To
avoid demolition of the Pension Payment Office and to
avoid the contempt proceedings, the Union of India
made exchange offer to five equal extent of vacant land
lying adjacent to the decree schedule property though it
is not its property. The Special Court observed that after
exchange, an extent of 2627.87 sq. yards covered by
decree shown as ‘B’ portion is delivered to R1 and also
observed that respondent No.1 got possession of the
land of Srinivasulu Naidu after exchange, his possession
is illegal and unlawful.”
14.
The order passed by the Tribunal and that of the High Court was
based on the decree in OS No. 175/1970 though the said suit
was only in respect of 4971.5 sq. yards comprising in Survey
No. 299/2. The plaintiffs in the aforesaid suit had pleaded that
the applicants had purchased 2 acres 27 guntas of land vide
two sale deeds and that the plaintiffs are purchasers of 4971.5
sq. yards.
15.
Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the subject
matter of the first suit was only 4971.5 sq. yards which was
purchased by the plaintiffs. The issue was in respect of title of
the plaintiffs over the said land alone. Though there was an
issue as to whether the land belongs to Hyderabad State Army
and that it has been handed over to the Union in 1958, but such
issue was decided against the appellants. However, the finding
on such issue would be restricted to the land which is subject
14
matter of the suit and not the entire land which was handed
over to the Union by the State of Andhra Pradesh.
16. The transfer of land by the State of Andhra Pradesh to the Union
was not required to be registered by a registered instrument in
view of Section 17(2)(vii) of the Registration Act, 1908, which
reads as under:
“ 17. Documents of which registration is
compulsory.
(1) The following documents shall be registered, if the
property to which they relate is situate in a district
in which, and if they have been executed on or
after the date on which, Act XVI of 1864, or the
Indian Registration Act, 1866, or the Indian
Registration Act, 1871, or the Indian Registration
Act, 1877, or this Act came or comes into force,
namely,
(a) instruments of gift of immovable property;
(b) other non-testamentary instruments which
purport or operate to create, declare, assign, limit
or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any
right, title or interest, whether vested or
contingent, of the value of one hundred rupees
and upwards, to or in immovable property;
(c) non-testamentary instruments which
acknowledge the receipt or payment of any
consideration on account of the creation,
declaration, assignment, limitation or extinction of
any such right, title or interest; and
xx xx xx
(2) Nothing in clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1)
applies to –
xx xx xx
(vii) any grant of immovable property by Government;”
15
17. Section 2 of the Government Grants Act, 1895 provides that the
Transfer of Property Act shall not be applicable to Government
grants. Therefore, the condition in Section 54 of the Transfer of
Property Act that immovable property of the value of one
hundred rupees and upwards can be transferred only by a
registered instrument is also not applicable to the Government
Land. Section 2 reads as under:
| Government grants. - | Nothing in the Transfer of Property | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Act, 1882, contained shall apply or be deemed ever to | ||||||
| have applied to any grant or other transfer of land or of | ||||||
| any interest therein heretofore made or hereafter to be | ||||||
| made | by or on behalf of the | Government to, or in favour | ||||
| of any person whomsoever; but every such grant and | ||||||
| transfer shall be construed and take efef ct as if the said | ||||||
| Act had not been passed.” |
18. It was argued that the land was transferred to the Union vide
letter dated 10.10.1956 when 1650 acres and 2 guntas of land
including 378 acres and 16 guntas of land of Asafnagar lines
were transferred to the Government of India. Subsequently, on
24.8.1957, land measuring 150 acres 8 guntas attached to
Chandrayangutta lines was excluded and the Collector was
requested to make early arrangements of handing over of the
land measuring 1500 acres 24 guntas to the Military Estate
Officer. In pursuance of such communication, the possession of
land measuring 1500 acres 24 guntas was handed over to the
Union of India in the proceedings dated 19.3.1958.
19. In the communication dated 10.10.1956, as mentioned above,
16
the State of Andhra Pradesh had transferred 1650 acres 2
guntas of land. However, later on 24.8.1957, the land
measuring 150 acres and 8 guntas situated in Chandrayangutta
Lines was excluded. The communication dated 10.10.1956
reads as thus:
“From:
The Chief Secretary to Government
General Administration Department
Hyderabad Deccan.
To
The Secretary to Govt. of India
Ministry of Defence,
New Delhi.
Subject:- ALLOCATION OF OLD HYDERABAD
CANTONMENT LANDS BETWEEN THE DEFENCE MINISTRY
AND THE STATE GOVERNMENT
Sir,
I am directed to refer to this Govt. Letter No. 1065 CAD
th
Army dated the 9 July, 1952 addressed to the Ministry
of States (Now Home Affairs Ministry) New Delhi (Copy
enclosed for ready reference) and to say that as stated
therein agreement was reached between the
Government of India and the Hyderabad Govt. in regard
to the allocation of the late Hyderabad Army buildings
and according to the agreement the following lines in the
Hyderabad proper have been treated as ISF lines
property of the Govt. of India.
1) Mohammadi Lines.
2) Ibrahim Bagh Lines.
3) Makai Darwaza Lines.
4) Asafnagar Lines
5) Masab Lines.
6) Chandrayangutto Lines
Similarly agreement was reached regarding the following
17
Hyderabad Army line and building in the Hyderabad
proper being treated as non-ISF lines property of the
Hyderabad Govt.
1) Fateh Darwaza Lines.
2) Mallapalli Lines.
3) A.C. Guards (Saifabad) Lines.
4) Nampally Lines.
5) Central Military Hospital Building (New Sarojini
Devi Hospital)
6) Banjara Darwaza Lines.
7) Band lines Fath Maidan.
8) Mysaram Lines.
As stated in the above cited letter the question of
allocating the Hyderabad Cantonment lands between the
two Govts has been engaging the attention of this Govt.
for some time past and in order to reach an agreement
between the Centre and the State for the allocation of
these lands this Govt. had proposed in the letter referred
to above that all lands in the vicinity of the ISF buildings
or meant for the use of occupants of ISF Buildings should
be treated as ISF or Central Govt. property and the rest
as non-ISF property falling to the share of Hyderabad
State. It was also made known to the Govt. of India, in
our above letter and DO No. 661/GAD Army 54 dated the
th th
27 /28 Aug 54 addressed to you that this Govt. had
asked their survey to carry out the survey and the
demarcation of the ISF and non-ISF lands. That work has
since been completed.
The State Government having examined the entire
question of the demarcation of appurtenant lands
carefully suggest for the acceptance of the Govt. of India
the allocations as indicated in a set of maps (five in
number) forwarded herewith. The appurtenant lands
attached to ISF Lines are shown in green colour while the
lands appurtenant to non-ISF lines are indicated in blue
colour.
The recommendation of the State Govt. briefly envisages
the allocation of lands as under:
| ISF Lines | Acres | Guntas | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Mohammadi Lines | 361 | 20 |
18
| 2 | Ibrahimbagh Lines etd., | 484 | 02 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | Makai Darwaza Lines etc., | 244 | 08 |
| 4 | Banjara Darwaza Lines | 32 | 18 |
According to the agreement reached between the two
Govt. Banjara Darwaza Lines. Property of the State is
being exchanged for Masab lines. Property of the Centre
is being exchanged vide this Govt’s endorsement No.
th
197 GAD 21 Army 56 dated 26 June 56. Hence Masab
Lines are omitted here and shown under non-ISF Lines
below - Banjara Darwaza Lines are shown as ISF instead.
| Acres | Guntas | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 5 | Asafnagar Lines | 378 | 16 |
| 6 | Chandrayangutta Lines | 150 | 08 |
| Total | 1650 | 32 |
| Non-ISF Lines | Acres | Guntas | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Fateh Darwaza Lines,<br>(Dhanka Kotah and<br>Naurangi Maidan) | 42 | 04 |
| 2 | Malapalli Lines | ||
| 3 | A.C. Guards (Saifabad)<br>Lines | 450 | 12 |
| 4 | Nampalli Lines | ||
| 5 | Central Military<br>Hospital Building (now<br>Sarojini Devi Hospital) | ||
| 6 | Masab Lines | ||
| 7 | Mysaram Lines | 463 | 10 |
| 8 | Band Lines Fateh<br>Maidan | 18 | 18 |
| Total | 974 | 4 |
“From the above it will be seen that 1650 acres 32
guntas will go to the Centre and 974 acres 04 guntas fall
to the share of the State.
I am to request you to kindly to communicate early
concurrence of the Govt. of India to the above allocation
of the ex Hyderabad Cantonment lands to the Centre
and the State so that the lands falling to the share of the
Govt. of India may be hand over to the local Military
authorities.
19
An early reply will be very much appreciated.
Yours faithfully
sd/-
BHARAT CHAND DHANNA
Deputy Secretary to the Govt.
10.10.1956
ISF AND NON-ISF LANDS-HYDERABAD
| I. | Langar Houz | Area | Planimeter Area | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Indian Govt. | 1. Bit excl. Polo<br>Ground (after<br>completion of<br>survey from M47 to<br>M52 submerged<br>area | 361 | 20 | |
| State Govt. | III Bit of Dhanka<br>Lotha | 20 | 08 | |
| State Govt. | II Bit Naurangi<br>Maidan (after<br>alternation at Stn.<br>No.9 and excl. the<br>boundary South of<br>road as marked in<br>Collector’s office<br>Plan | 21 | 36 | |
| II. | Golconda<br>Area<br>Indian Govt. | I Ibrahimbagh<br>Barracks etc. | 467 | 28 |
| Septic Tank | 9 | 02 | ||
| Kitchen Garden | 7 | 12 | ||
| II. Makai Darwaza<br>Lines excl.<br>encroachment 2 and<br>4 as marked in the<br>plan) | 139 | 00 | ||
| III Area East of<br>Golconda Tombs | 104 | 26 | ||
| 728 | 10 | |||
| Indian Govt. | Banzara Darwaza<br>Lines | 30 | 14 | |
| Stables | 2 | 04 | ||
| 32 | 18 | |||
| III | Mallapally | I Rifel Range and | 372 | 16 |
20
| Area | Parade Ground etc.<br>as marked on the<br>plan | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| II Military Grave Yard | 3 | 20 | ||
| III Miniature Rifel<br>Range | 2 | 20 | ||
| 378 | 16 | |||
| State Govt. | I Whole of eastern<br>area as marked in<br>the plan excl.<br>Niloufer Hospital<br>etc. area | 449 | 36 | |
| II Old Hospital area<br>near Band lines | 0 | 16 | ||
| 450 | 12 | |||
| IV | Chandrayang<br>utta area | |||
| Indian Govt. | I Rifel Range | 150 | 08 | |
| II Maisaram Lines<br>etc Excl. Harizans<br>Colony and<br>Sharifuddin<br>encroachment | 445 | 24 | ||
| III Dispute area 64<br>to 65 | 0 | 38 | ||
| IV Grave Yard | 7 | 11 | ||
| V Barood Khana | 9 | 17 | ||
| V | Band Lines<br>Fateh Madian<br>State Govt. | 18 | 18 |
.Sd/-
10/10/56”
20. The ISF lines are the Indian Security Forces lines whereas the
non-ISF lines refer to the non-Indian Security Forces lines such
as that of State of Hyderabad. The Asafnagar lines measuring
378 acres and 16 guntas is a part of ISF line. In the appendix
attached to the said communication, the Asafnagar lines are
21
shown as Mallapally area measuring 378 acres and 16 guntas.
The land described as Miniature Rifle Range measuring 2 acres
20 guntas is the subject matter of the land in the present
appeals. Mallapalli lines are mentioned as non-ISF lines but
measures about 450 acres and 12 guntas. Thus, it is argued
that in the appendix, Mallapally area is distinct from Mallapalli
lines. The Mallapally area is either synonymous with Asafnagar
lines or on account of mistake but has equivalent
measurements with Asafnagar lines.
21. The proceedings of the Board of the Appellant with the Collector
of Hyderabad in respect of delivery of possession of 1500 acres
and 24 guntas as recorded in the letter dated 19.3.1958 (Ex B-
14) read as thus:
“PROCEEDINGS of a Board of officers
assembled at the OFFICE OF THE
GARRISON
ENGINEER,
SECUNDERABAD
th
On the 19 March 1958 at 1000 hours.
by order of STATION HEADQUARTERS
LETTER NO. 17729
TH
DATED 15 Jan, 1958
for the purpose of TAKING OVER OF EX-
STATE FORCES LANDS IN
HYDERABAD ACCRUING
TO THE SHARE OF THE
ARMY
PRESIDING OFFICER
Brigadier G.S. BAL - Station Commander
MEMBERS
1. Major W.S. Rasalam - DAA & QMG HQ
22
SECUNDERABAD Station
2. Shri H.S. GUNDAPPA Rep. M.E.S. Garrison
Engineer
3. Shri D.D. ANAND Rep. ML & C MEO
SECUNDERABAD
4. SHRI RAMASWAMY NAIDU Rep. of the Collector of
HYDERABAD
The Board having assembled pursuant to order,
proceeded to ascertain from the Land Records, the
details of the Property to be taken over and its location
and boundary. The Collector’s Representative Mr.
Ramaswamy Naidu furnished the followed information
regarding this from the Land Records, though the extent
of the land to be taken over by the Central Government
is not finalized.
(a) According to the Government of India letter No.
70732/Q3(Plg)VOL-II/18-S/Q/D(QTD) & LHD
th
dated 11 March 1957 to the Secretary to the
Government of Andhra Pradesh General
Administration (Military Department)
Hyderabad, 1650 acres and 32 guntas of lands
appurtenant to Asaf Nagar Lines, Mohammadi
Lines, Ibrahim Bagh Lines, Makkai Darwaza
Lines, Banzara Darwaza Lines as per Annexure
“A” are to be taken over by the Army
authorities. The details of the above area is
contained in the enclosures to the State
rd
Government letter No. 392 GAD 23 Army 56
th
dated 10 Oct 56 which is enclosed as
Annexure “B”.
(b) Subsequently vide GAD Memorandum
th
No.2733/57-2 dated 24 Aug 57 addressed to
the Collector and copies to the Military Estates
Officer, Administrative Commandant, Station
Headquarters, Secunderabad and the Board of
Revenue appended as Annexure “C” an extent
of lands measuring 150 acres and 8 guntas
appurtenant to Chandrayan Gutta Lines should
be deducted from 1650 acres 32 guntas and
the rest of the land i.e. 1500 acres and 24
guntas alone are to be handed over to the
Military authorities. This is to be confirmed by
Army Headquarters. In pursuance of this, the
following areas are to be taken over by the
military authorities:-
23
Acres Guntas
1) Mohamadi Lines
measuring 361 20
2) Ibhahimbagh Lines
measuring 484 2
3) Makkai Darwaza Lines
measuring 244 8
4) Banjara Darwaza Lines
measuring 32 18
5) Asafnagar Lines
measuring 378 16
Total 1500 24
2. The Plans for the above are enclosed as Annexure
“D”, “E”, “F”. The areas have been traversed by
the State Settlement Department and stone pillars
have also been fixed on the ground. Those have
been physically verified by the Board at the sites.
At present the boundary stones are marked with
tar temporarily. Those are to be permanently
engraved.
3. The Board observed during its physical
verifications on the ground that there are several
encroachments in all the Lines, which are taken
over. These encroachments are as furnished by
the Collector ‘Land’ Acquisition Hyderabad in his
th
letter No. RC-CIO/1522/Hyd/58 dated 9 May, 58.
Vide annexure. The Board observed that the
encroachments are in the nature of both built up
areas (permanent and temporary) and cultivated
areas. The board was informed by the Collector’s
Representative that some areas of land falling
within the boundary limits of the lands being taken
over by the Army authorities have been leased out
by the Civil authorities for agriculture, grazing and
other commercial purposes. A list of such leases
with details and terms of those leases, as
furnished by the Collector’s Representative is
attached as Annexure “H”.
4. Though the buildings in Banjara Darwaza Lines,
have not yet been handed over by the State P.W.D,
being still in occupation by the H.S.R.P. units, the
24
lands appurtenant thereto, as per the above
schedule is taken over.
5. During the physical verification and taking over of
lands at site, the Board observed the following:-
(a) Asafnagar Lines
i) The demarcation line between Sarojini
Devi Hospital and Asafnagar Line requires
to be re-marked by fixing additional
boundary stones from boundary pillars
No.46 to 113 by the State authorities.
Action is in hand.
ii) The State’s Government representative
Shri. Ramaswamy Naidu stated that an
enclave between pillars 76 to 100
including Asafnagar pumping station
and building known as Hussain Gulshan
and adjoining cultivated area,
comprising of a total acreage of 44 is
not now to be handed over and
incorrectly computed in the area of 378
acres and 16 guntas, mentioned at item
(b) of para 1 above, as this comprises of
State Government property (Asafnagar
Water Works) and private property.
(b) xxx xxx
(c)
(d)
(e) Ibrahimbagh Lines
The boundary pillars exist as per the plan.
6. Regarding the recommendation of the areas for
the active use of the Army (units in occupation),
their future use and surplus land is being
ascertained from the user units with a view to
determine the surpluses for handing over to the
Military Estates Officer.
Presiding Officer -Sd/-
Members 1. Sd/-
2. Sd/-
3. Sd/-
4. Sd/-
22. It is further argued that such land is recorded in possession of
25
the appellant in the military land register and general land
register which are public documents within the meaning of
Section 74 of the Evidence Act, 1872. Still further, the Court
may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks is likely
to have happened, regard being given to the common course of
natural events, human conduct and public and private business,
in their relation to the facts of the particular case such as (e)
that the judicial and official acts have been regularly performed
and (f) that the common course of business has been followed
in particular cases. Thus, the documents maintained in the
course of official duty would carry the presumption of
correctness on the basis of which the Union cannot be said to
be land grabber, which has entitled the applicants to invoke the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The Union has unequivocal title over
the land in question. Though, in the first suit, the Union was
unsuccessful but the findings in the said suit would be restricted
to land which is subject matter of the said suit and not to the
entire land.
23. On the other hand, Mr. Rao argued that the land in question is
Sarf-e-Khas land i.e. crown land of the State of Hyderabad
belonging to Nizam family. Shaik Ahmed, the seller of the land
to the predecessor of the applicants was the holder of Patta
under the Nizam. Such Patta is a document of title and
therefore, a valid title was passed on to the predecessor of the
applicants vide registered sale deed dated 12.12.1959. It was
26
also argued that the decree in the first suit is in respect of entire
property purchased by predecessor of the applicants, though
the claim of plaintiffs was restricted to the land purchased by
him. Therefore, such decree would operate as res judicata.
Reliance was placed upon a judgment reported as K. Ethirajan
5
(Dead) by LRs. v. Lakshmi & Ors. wherein it has been held
that where the issues directly and substantially involved
between the same parties in the previous and subsequent suit
are same, though in the previous suit, only part of the property
was involved while in the subsequent suit, the whole of the
property was the subject matter, the principle of res judicata
would be applicable. It was also argued that the act of any
person of land grabbing falls within the scope of the Act and the
appellants are also persons within the meaning of Section 2(g)
of the Act. Therefore, the proceedings initiated before the
Tribunal were valid and have been rightly decided.
24. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. The following
questions are required to be decided in the present appeals.
(i) whether the order passed in the first suit filed by the
plaintiffs as affirmed by the High Court operates as
res judicata?
(ii) whether the appellants have proved their title over
the land in question?
(iii) whether the appellant is a land grabber within the
meaning of Section 2(d) of the Act?
5 (2003) 10 SCC 578
27
25. The applicants have claimed possession from the appellants
primarily on the ground that in the suit filed by the plaintiffs on
14.4.1965, the basis of the suit was purchase of land by the
plaintiffs from the father of the applicants. Since the plaintiffs
have been found to be the owners on the basis of purchase of
land from the father of the applicants, therefore, the issue of
title decided in the said suit would operate as res judicata.
Therefore, the appellants herein are land grabbers having no
title over the land in question. It may be reiterated that the
plaintiffs had purchased land measuring 4971.5 sq. yards from
the father of the applicants whereas the remaining land
measuring 7128.5 sq. yards was retained by the applicants.
Therefore, the decree in the first suit was only in respect of the
schedule property in the first suit i.e. 4971.5 sq. yards. The
patta, the basis of title of the applicants had not been produced
in evidence before the Tribunal. Thus, the basic document of
title had not been produced.
26. In the first suit, the father of the applicants had not filed any
counter claim to assert title or possession over the land in
question. The land admeasuring 4971.5 sq. yards was a
schedule property and the subject matter of the first suit. The
issue no. 1 in the first suit was in respect of the possession of
the plaintiffs and their predecessor-in-interest over the ‘suit
land’ within 12 years prior to the suit. Therefore, the rights of
the plaintiffs were examined in respect of such suit land
28
measuring 4971.5 sq. yards alone, although, to return the
finding on possession and title, possession of the father of the
applicants over the land purchased by the Plaintiff was clubbed
together on the basis of patta claimed to be granted to Shaik
Ahmed, though not produced or proved on record.
27. In the second suit filed by the applicants, the entire basis of suit
was the findings returned in the first suit. There is no
independent evidence produced in respect of purchase of land
by Shaik Ahmed and the legality or validity of Patta issued to
him. Although, applicants have asserted that they have been
visiting the land in question to verify their possession but apart
from such plea, there is no evidence that there was any covert
and overt act on the part of the plaintiffs to assert possession
over the land in question.
28. In fact, the appellants had entered into a settlement with the
plaintiffs by which some of the land in possession was given to
the decree holder in execution with the leave of the Court on
19.8.1995. Such action would show the assertion of title by the
appellants so as to enter into exchange of land in satisfaction of
the decree. The father of the applicants was party in the
execution proceedings but has not objected to the exchange. It
necessarily leads to an inference that the father of the
applicants was not in possession and has not asserted the title
or possession over the remaining land measuring 7128.5 sq.
yards. On the other hand, the appellants have categorically
29
asserted that they are in possession of the land from the date of
transfer in the year 1958 when the Collector of Hyderabad
handed over the possession to them. The appellants continued
to be in unhanded possession over the last 30 years.
29. To examine the arguments that the decree in the previous suit
would operate as res judicata, Section 11 CPC may be extracted:
“11. Res Judicata. – No Court shall try any suit or issue in
which the matter directly and substantially in issue has
been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit
between the same parties, or between parties under
whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the
same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent
suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently
raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such
Court.
Explanation I.—The expression “former suit” shall denote
a suit which has been decided prior to the suit in question
whether or not it was instituted prior thereto.
Explanation II.—For the purposes of this section, the
competence of a Court shall be determined irrespective of
any provisions as to a right of appeal from the decision of
such Court.
Explanation III.—The matter above referred to must in the
former suit have been alleged by one party and either
denied or admitted, expressly or impliedly, by the other.
Explanation IV.—Any matter which might and ought to
have been made ground of defence or attack in such
former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter
directly and substantially in issue in such suit.”
30. The plea of res judicata is generally raised against the plaintiffs
who would be the applicants before the Tribunal. This Court in a
6
judgment reported as Alka Gupta v. Narender Kumar Gupta
held that the plea of res judicata is a restraint on the right of a
plaintiff to have an adjudication of his claim. This Court has
culled down the essential requirements to be fulfilled to apply
the bar of res judicata to any suit or issue. It has been observed
6 (2010) 10 SCC 141
30
| “20. | Plea of res judicata is a restraint on the right of a |
| plaintiff to have an adjudication of his claim. The plea | |
| must be clearly established, more particularly where the | |
| bar sought is on the basis of constructive res judicata. The | |
| plaintiff who is sought to be prevented by the bar of | |
| constructive res judicata should have notice about the | |
| plea and have an opportunity to put forth his contentions | |
| against the same. In this case, there was no plea of | |
| constructive res judicata, nor had the appellant-plaintiff an | |
| opportunity to meet the case based on such plea. | |
| 21. |
“11. Res judicata.— xxxx xxxx
22. Section 11 of the Code, on an analysis requires the
following essential requirements to be fulfilled, to apply
the bar of res judicata to any suit or issue:
(i) The matter must be directly and substantially in issue
in the former suit and in the later suit.
(ii) The prior suit should be between the same parties or
persons claiming under them.
(iii) Parties should have litigated under the same title in
the earlier suit.
(iv) The matter in issue in the subsequent suit must have
been heard and finally decided in the first suit.
(v) The court trying the former suit must have been
competent to try the particular issue in question.”
31. The rule of res judicata is founded on considerations of public
policy that the finality should be attached to the binding
decisions pronounced by the Courts of competent jurisdiction.
7
This Court in Daryao & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors. held as
| “9. … | Now, the rule of res judicata as indicated in Section |
| 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure has no doubt some | |
| technical aspects, for instance the rule of constructive res | |
| judicata may be said to be technical; but the basis on | |
| which the said rule rests is founded on considerations of | |
| public policy. It is in the interest of the public at large that | |
| a fni ality should attach to the binding decisions | |
| pronounced by Courts of competent jurisdiction, and it is |
7 AIR 1961 SC 1457
31
| also in the public interest that individuals should not be | |
|---|---|
| vexed twice over with the same kind of litigation. If these | |
| two principles form the foundation of the general rule of | |
| res judicata they cannot be treated as irrelevant or | |
| inadmissible even in dealing with fundamental rights in | |
| petitions fli ed under Article 32.” |
32. In a judgment reported as State of Karnataka & Anr. v. All
8
India Manufacturers Organisation & Ors. , this Court has
considered Explanations III & IV of Section 11 CPC. It was held
| “32. | Res judicata | is a doctrine based on the larger public | |||||||||||||||||||||||
| interest and is founded on two grounds: one being the | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| maxim | nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa | (no | |||||||||||||||||||||||
| one ought to be twice vexed for one and the same cause [ | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| P. Ramanatha Aiyer: | Advanced Law Lexicon | , (Vol. 3, 3rd | |||||||||||||||||||||||
| Edn., 2005) at p. 3170] ) and second, public policy that | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| there ought to be an end to the same litigation | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| [ Mulla: | Code of Civil Procedure | , (Vol. 1, 15th Edn., 1995) | |||||||||||||||||||||||
| at p. 94] . It is well settled that Section 11 of the Civil | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Procedure Code, 1908 (hereinafter “CPC”) is not the | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| foundation of the principle of | res judicata | , but merely | |||||||||||||||||||||||
| statutory recognition thereof and hence, the section is not | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| to be considered exhaustive of the general principle of law | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| [ | See Kalipada De | v. | Dwijapada Das | , (1929-1930) 57 IA 24 : | |||||||||||||||||||||
| AIR 1930 PC 22 at p. 23] . The main purpose of the | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| doctrine is that once a matter has been determined in a | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| former proceeding, it should not be open to parties to | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| reagitate the matter again and again. Section 11 CPC | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| recognises this principle and forbids a court from trying | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| any suit or issue, which is | res judicata | , recognising both | |||||||||||||||||||||||
| “cause of action estoppel” and “issue estoppel”. There are | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| two issues that we need to consider, one, whether the | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| doctrine of | res judicata | , as a matter of principle, can be | |||||||||||||||||||||||
| applied to public interest litigations and second, whether | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| the issues and fni dings in | Somashekar Reddy | [(1999) 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||
| KLD 500 : (2000) 1 Kant LJ 224 (DB)] constitute | res | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| judicata | for the present litigation. |
xx xx xx
36. We will presently consider whether the issues and
findings in Somashekar Reddy [(1999) 1 KLD 500 : (2000)
1 Kant LJ 224 (DB)] actually constitute res judicata for the
present litigation. Section 11 CPC undoubtedly provides
8 (2006) 4 SCC 683
32
that only those matters that were “directly and
substantially in issue” in the previous proceeding will
constitute res judicata in the subsequent proceeding.
Explanation III to Section 11 provides that for an issue to
be res judicata it should have been raised by one party
and expressly denied by the other:
xx xx xx
| 41. | With these legal principles in mind, the question, | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| therefore, arises as to what exactly was sought | ||||||||||
| in | Somashekar Reddy | [(1999) 1 KLD 500 : (2000) 1 Kant LJ | ||||||||
| 224 (DB)] , how it was decided by the High Court in the | ||||||||||
| fri st round of litigation, and what has been sought in the | ||||||||||
| present litigation arising at the instance of Mr J.C. | ||||||||||
| Madhuswamy and others. In order to show that the issue | ||||||||||
| of excess land was “directly and substantially in issue” | ||||||||||
| in | Somashekar Reddy | [(1999) 1 KLD 500 : (2000) 1 Kant LJ | ||||||||
| 224 (DB)] we will fri st examine the prayers of the parties, | ||||||||||
| the cause of action, the averments of parties and the | ||||||||||
| fni dings of the High Court in | Somashekar Reddy | [(1999) 1 | ||||||||
| KLD 500 : (2000) 1 Kant LJ 224 (DB)] .” |
33. The issue can be examined from another angle as to whether
the plea of res judicata can be raised by the applicants against
their co-defendant in the first suit. In the first suit, the defendant
had the opportunity to raise a claim in respect of land
measuring 7128.5 sq. yards. However, no such claim was raised.
In view of Section 11, Explanation IV CPC, the applicants might
and ought to have made grounds of defence in the former suit
to claim possession of the land measuring 7128.5 sq. yards.
The consequence would be that failure to raise such defence or
counter claim would be deemed to be constructive res judicata
in terms of Explanation IV of Section 11 CPC. Reference may be
made to judgment of this Court reported as Ramadhar Shrivas
33
9
v. Bhagwandas . This court was examining a situation where in
a suit for possession, the defendant Bhagwandas was found to
be the tenant of the original owner Hiralal and after a
subsequent purchase, he had become tenant of Ramadhar. The
first suit was dismissed on the ground that suit for possession
was not maintainable against Bhagwandas being tenant. In
another suit filed by the purchaser, the defendant denied the
title of plaintiff, though such was not the plea in the first suit. In
these circumstances, the Court held as under:
“23. In the case on hand, it is clear that in the earlier
suit, the court had recorded a clear finding that the
defendant Bhagwandas was neither the owner of the
property nor could he show any right as to how he was
occupying such property except as a tenant of Hiralal. If
Bhagwandas was claiming to be in lawful possession in
any capacity other than a tenant, he ought to have put
forward such claim as a ground of defence in those
proceedings. He ought to have put forward such claim
under Explanation IV to Section 11 of the Code but he
had failed to do so. The doctrine of constructive res
judicata engrafted in Explanation IV to Section 11 of the
Code thus applies to the facts of the case and the
defendant in the present suit cannot take a contention
which ought to have been taken by him in the previous
suit and was not taken by him. Explanation IV to
Section 11 of the Code is clearly attracted and the
defendant Bhagwandas can be prevented from taking
such contention in the present proceedings.”
34. The issue as to whether there can be res judicata between co-
defendants was first examined by the Privy Council in a
judgment reported as Munni Bibi (since deceased) & Anr. v.
10
Tirloki Nath & Ors. . The three principles of res judicata as
between co-defendants were delineated as: (1) There must be a
9 (2005) 13 SCC 1
10 AIR 1931 PC 114
34
conflict of interest between the defendants; (2) it must be
necessary to decide this conflict in order to give the plaintiff the
relief he claims; (3) the question between the defendants must
have been finally decided. This test too is not satisfied as in
order to grant relief of possession to the plaintiffs in the first suit,
it was not necessary to decide the issue of the remaining land
between the father of the applicants and the appellants. The
said principle was reiterated by this Court in a judgment
11
reported as Mahboob Sahab v. Syed Ismail and Others
wherein it has been held as under:
“8. Under these circumstances the question emerges
whether the High Court was right in reversing the
appellate decree on the doctrine of res judicata. At this
juncture it may be relevant to mention that the trial
court negatived the plea of res judicata as a preliminary
issue. Though it was open to sustain the trial court
decree on the basis of the doctrine of res judicata, it was
not argued before the appellate court on its basis.
Thereby the findings of the trial court that the decree in
OS No. 3/1/1951 does not operate as res judicata
became final. The question then is whether the doctrine
of res judicata stands attracted to the facts in this case.
It is true that under Section 11 CPC when the matter has
been directly or substantially in issue in a former suit
between the same parties or between parties under
whom they or any of them claimed, litigating under the
same title, the decree in the former suit would be res
judicata between the plaintiff and the defendant or as
between the co-plaintiffs or co-defendants…”
35. In a recent judgment reported as Govindammal (Dead) by
12
LRs & Ors. v. Vaidiyanathan & Ors. , the applicability of res
judicata between co-defendants was examined. The applicants
were the defendants in the first suit and so were the appellants.
11 (1995) 3 SCC 693
12 (2019) 17 SCC 433
35
In the aforesaid case, the suit was filed by the respondents
claiming title over A Schedule property or in the alternative for
partition of half share in B Schedule property. The Court
considered the principle of res judicata within the co-defendants
| “14. | However, there exist certain situations in which | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| the principles of res judicata may apply as between co- | |||||||
| defendants. This has been recognised by the English | |||||||
| courts as well as our courts for more than a century. | |||||||
| The requisite conditions to apply the principle of res | |||||||
| judicata as between co-defendants are that ( | a | ) there | |||||
| must be confil ct of interest between the defendants | |||||||
| concerned, ( | b | ) it must be necessary to decide this | |||||
| confil ct in order to give the plaintiff the relief he claims, | |||||||
| and ( | c | ) the question between the defendants must have | |||||
| been fni ally decided. All the three requisite conditions | |||||||
| are absent in the matter on hand. Firstly, there was no | |||||||
| confil ct of interest between the defendants in the suits | |||||||
| fli ed by the temple and the school. Secondly, since | |||||||
| there was no confil ct, it was not necessary to decide | |||||||
| any confil ct between the defendants in those suits in | |||||||
| order to give relief to the temple or the school, which | |||||||
| were the plaintiffs. On the other hand, the father of the | |||||||
| plaintiffs and the father of the defendant were colluding | |||||||
| in those suits fli ed by temple and school. Both of them | |||||||
| unitedly opposed those suits. In view of the same, the | |||||||
| principles of res judicata would not apply.” |
36. The applicants have not claimed any title to the land which is
claimed to be in their possession and the subject matter of the
first suit was only 4971.5 sq. yards. Hence, the decree in the
said suit is binding qua the land in suit only.
37. Though the first suit is between the same parties, but the
subject matter is not the same. For res judicata to apply, the
matter in the former suit must have been alleged by one party
and either denied or admitted, expressly or impliedly by the
other. Since the issue in the suit was restricted to 4971.5 sq.
36
yards, the decree would be binding qua to that extent only. The
issue cannot be said to be barred by constructive res judicata as
per Explanation IV as it applies to the plaintiff in a later suit.
The appellants have denied the claim of the plaintiffs in the first
suit to the extent that it was the subject matter of that suit
alone. Therefore, the decree in the first suit will not operate as
res judicata in the subsequent matters.
38. The reliance of Mr. Rao on the judgment of this Court in K.
Ethirajan is not tenable. In fact, such judgment has been made
the basis of the impugned orders as well. The reliance is on
para 20 of the judgment, which reads as under:
“20. The argument that principle of res judicata cannot
apply because in the previous suit only a part of the
property was involved when in the subsequent suit the
whole property is the subject-matter cannot be
accepted. The principle of res judicata under Section
11 of the Civil Procedure Code is attracted where
issues directly and substantially involved between the
same parties in the previous and subsequent suit are
the same - may be - in the previous suit only a part of
the property was involved when in the subsequent
suit, the whole property is the subject-matter.”
39. The said paragraph cannot be read in isolation. The facts on the
basis of which judgment is given are required to be kept in view
to have an understanding of the background in which such
observation has been recorded. One line or paragraph cannot
be picked up without going through the facts and the nature of
suit. In the first suit, deceased- M. Gurunathan sought eviction
of deceased-K. Ethirajan, (plaintiff in the second suit), from a
portion of the suit property by claiming exclusive title. The trial
37
court in the said suit held that the deceased-K. Ethirajan cannot
be held to be in possession of the suit property as a mere
licensee of the deceased-M. Gurunathan. He was held to be in
possession of the suit property as owner since 1940 as
evidenced by various documents of possession filed by him and
the joint patta granted by the authorities under the Act of 1948.
The trial court also held that deceased-K. Ethirajan having
remained in continuous possession of the suit property as
owner had perfected his title by remaining in adverse
possession for more than the statutory period of 12 years.
40. K. Ethirajan (plaintiff in the second suit), claimed partition of the
land based on joint patta granted to the Plaintiff and the
deceased-defendant M. Gurunathan. It is on the basis of this
joint patta, the suit for partition filed by the plaintiff was
decreed by the trial court as well as by the First Appellate Court.
This Court found that the issue directly and substantially
involved in the first suit was to claim exclusive ownership of
deceased-M. Gurunathan to the whole property left behind by
deceased-Gangammal, although eviction was sought of the
defendant from a particular portion of the land on which he had
built a hut for residence. The claim of ownership over the entire
property was specially raised in the first suit. The findings in
para 20 were returned in these circumstances. It was thus in
this background, this Court held that the principle of res
judicata would apply as in the previous suit, the assertion was in
38
respect of whole property but possession was sought from a
smaller area. The judgment is clearly not applicable in the
present case as the title over the land in question before the
Tribunal is distinct from the land which was the subject matter
in the first suit. The first suit was only in respect of the land
purchased by the Plaintiff and not the entire land, though his
claim was based on sale by the father of the applicants.
41. Now, the second question as to whether the appellants have
proved their title over the land in question is examined. The
appellants claim title over the land in question. Since the land
is transferred from the State, document of title is not required
to be registered in terms of Section 17 of the Registration Act,
1908 and/or in terms of Government Grants Act, 1895. The
area of Asafnagar lines is 378 acres 16 guntas. In the appendix
to the letter dated 10.10.1956, the details of the land
comprising in the area measuring 378 acres 16 guntas is
mentioned, which includes 2 acres 20 guntas of Miniature Rifle
Range. Such land is reflected as in a Mallapally Area. The total
area of Mallapally area and Asafnagar Lines is 378 acres and 16
guntas. The Mallapalli Lines is non-ISF Lines measuring 450
acres and 12 guntas which is distinct from Asafnagar Lines
falling in ISF area measuring 378 acres and 16 guntas. Thus,
Mallapally area and Mallapalli Lines are two different parcels of
the land. The land in question herein is part of Asafnagar Lines
39
handed over to the appellants as ISF Lines. The letter dated
19.3.1958 completes the transfer when the possession of land
measuring 1500 acres and 24 guntas was handed over to the
Union.
42. The appellants claim to be in possession over the land
measuring 1500 acres and 24 guntas from the year 1958.
Although, the appellants have lost claim in respect of land
measuring 4971.5 sq. yards which is falling as part of 2 acres
and 20 guntas of land, but that would not lead to losing of the
title of the appellants over the entire land measuring 2 acres
and 20 guntas.
43. Therefore, by virtue of the provisions of Government Grants Act,
1895 read with Section 17(2)(vii) of the Registration Act, 1908,
transfer of land to the appellant is complete. The appellant is
the owner of the aforesaid land. The applicants have not
produced any document regarding the patta in favour of Shaik
Ahmed. They have not proved the title of their vendor so as to
claim a rightful title over the land in question. Further, no patta
could be granted to the applicants as the land was transferred
by the State in their favour on 19.3.1958 and possession was
claimed on the strength of sale deeds executed on 12.12.1959.
44. Apart from the fact that the transfer of title in favour of the
Union is complete when the possession was delivered, but even
thereafter, the military land register and general land register
produced by the appellants show the possession of the
40
appellants over such land. The military land register and
general land register are public documents within the meaning
of Section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (Evidence Act)
containing the records of the acts of the sovereign authority i.e.,
the Union as well as official body. Still further, Section 114 of
the Evidence Act grants presumption of correctness being an
official act having been regularly performed. Therefore, in the
absence of any evidence to show that such records were not
maintained properly, the official record containing entries of
ownership and possession would carry the presumption of
correctness. In view of the transfer of land on 10.10.1956
followed by delivery of possession on 19.3.1958 and continuous
assertion of possession thereof, it leads to the unequivocal
finding that appellants are owners and in possession of the suit
land.
45. The third question is to examine whether the appellants are land
grabbers and the Tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain a petition
under the Act. The objection of the appellants that they are not
land grabbers and that the State Legislature will have no
jurisdiction over the property of the Union need not to be
examined in view of the finding that the appellants are in fact
owners of the land in question.
46. Thus, Civil Appeal No. 2049 of 2013 is allowed and the
application filed by the applicants before the Tribunal is hereby
dismissed. In view thereof, Civil Appeal No. 13 of 2012 is
41
rendered infructuous and accordingly dismissed.
.............................................J.
(SANJAY KISHAN KAUL)
.............................................J.
(HEMANT GUPTA)
NEW DELHI;
AUGUST 27, 2021.
42