Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 300 OF 2009
Suresh & Ors. .... Appellant(s)
Versus
State of Madhya Pradesh .... Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Sathasivam,J. P.
1) This appeal is directed against the final judgment and
order dated 23.08.2007 passed by the High Court of Madhya
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Pradesh, Bench at Gwalior in Criminal Appeal Nos. 738 and
772 of 2000 whereby the High Court dismissed the appeals
filed by the appellants herein and confirmed the order of
conviction and sentence dated 04.10.2000 passed by the
Special Judge, Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substances Act,
Guna (M.P.) in Special Case No. 7 of 1998 by which they were
convicted under Section 8 read with Section 18 of the Narcotic
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Drugs & Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter
referred to as “the NDPS Act”) and sentenced to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for ten years with a fine of
| ault stip | ulation. |
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2) Brief facts :
(a) On 30.07.1998, at about 1.30 p.m., Som Singh
Raghuvanshi, SHO, Police Station Kumbhraj, along with the
police party went from the police station to search for the
accused in connection with Crime No. 151 of 1998 registered
under Sections 302 and 201 of IPC. In the process of
searching, when they came to Khatkya Tiraha, they saw that
one Maruti Car was coming from the side of Beenaganj. When
they tried to stop that car, the driver tried to run away but
they stopped the car and found three persons sitting in it. On
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being asked about their names, they informed their names as
Pramod, Suresh and Dinesh @ Pappu.
(b) Under suspicious circumstances, Panchas Shri Lal and
Rup Singh were called from the ‘Tiraha’ and consent of all
those persons was sought for their personal search and they
gave their consent. After conducting the search, Panchnama
was prepared. During search, they found that each of the
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appellants was having polythene bag in their possession which
contained white colour substance and on its physical test, it
was found “opium”. The SDO (P), Radhogarh was informed
| On weigh | ing, all |
|---|
Samples of 25 gms were taken separately from each of the
packets and the contents were sealed. Thereafter, the vehicle
was also searched and inside the front mudguard, six packets
of polythene bag containing ‘opium’ were also recovered
weighing 810 gms, 820 gms, 690 gms, 820 gms, 800 gms and
615 gms respectively. Sample of 25 gms. from each of them
were also taken and sealed. Thus, a total of 7 kg. Opium
valued at Rs.1,03,575/- was seized from the appellants and
they were arrested.
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(c) Thereafter, along with the appellants and seized articles,
the police party came to Kumbhraj Police Station and FIR
being Crime Case No. 165/1998 was registered against them
under Section 8 read with Section 18 of the NDPS Act. After
investigation, the police filed charge sheet against the accused
persons and the Special Judge, NDPS Act, Guna framed
charges under Section 8 read with Section 18 of the Act. After
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trial, the Special Judge, by order dated 04.10.2000, convicted
all the three accused persons and sentenced them to undergo
RI for ten years along with fine of Rs.1,00,000/- each, in
| f fine, | each wo |
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additional RI.
(d) Against the said order of conviction and sentence, Suresh
and Pramod preferred appeal being Criminal Appeal No. 738 of
2000 and Dinesh preferred Criminal Appeal No. 772 of 2000
before the High Court. By common impugned judgment dated
23.08.2007, the High Court dismissed both the appeals.
(e) Aggrieved by the said judgment, the appellants have filed
this appeal by way of special leave.
3) Heard Dr. J.N. Dubey, learned senior counsel for the
appellants and Mr. C.D. Singh, learned counsel for the
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respondent-State.
4) The only point urged before us is about the non-
compliance of Section 50 of the NDPS Act. According to Dr.
J.N. Dubey, learned senior counsel for the appellant,
considering the mandates provided under Section 50 of the
NDPS Act as interpreted by two Constitution Benches of this
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Court, viz., State of Punjab vs. Baldev Singh , (1999) 6 SCC
172 and Vijaysinh Chandubha Jadeja vs. State of Gujarat
(2011) 1 SCC 609, the prosecuting authorities failed to apprise
| t provide | d under |
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the other hand, Mr. C.D. Singh, learned counsel for the State
by pointing out the Panchnama regarding consent for personal
search submitted that the conditions prescribed in Section 50
as explained in Baldev Singh’s case (supra) have been fully
complied with and prayed for dismissal of the appeal.
5) Since the only question pertains to compliance of Section
50 of the NDPS Act, it is useful to refer the same:
“50. Conditions under which search of persons shall
be conducted .— (1) When any officer duly authorised under
Section 42 is about to search any person under the
provisions of Section 41, Section 42 or Section 43, he shall,
if such person so requires, take such person without
unnecessary delay to the nearest gazetted officer of any of
the departments mentioned in Section 42 or to the nearest
Magistrate.
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(2) If such requisition is made, the officer may detain the
person until he can bring him before the gazetted officer or
the Magistrate referred to in sub-section (1).
(3) The gazetted officer or the Magistrate before whom any
such person is brought shall, if he sees no reasonable
ground for search, forthwith discharge the person but
otherwise shall direct that search be made.
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(4) No female shall be searched by anyone excepting a
female.
| ity of the<br>f any na<br>olled subs | person to<br>rcotic dr<br>tance or |
|---|
(6) After a search is conducted under sub-section (5), the
officer shall record the reasons for such belief which
necessitated such search and within seventy-two hours send
a copy thereof to his immediate official superior.”
After noticing divergence of opinion between different Benches
of this Court with regard to the ambit and scope of Section 50
of the NDPS Act and, in particular with regard to the
admissibility of the evidence collected by an investigating
officer during search and seizure conducted in violation of the
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provisions of Section 50, the issue was referred to the
Constitution Bench. These provisions have been interpreted
by the Constitution Bench in Baldev Singh’s case (supra) .
After considering the mandate of the law as provided under
Section 50 of the NDPS Act and various earlier decisions, the
Constitution Bench has concluded as under:
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“ 57. On the basis of the reasoning and discussion above,
the following conclusions arise:
| ht under s<br>nearest g<br>aking th | ub-section<br>azetted of<br>e search |
|---|
( 2 ) That failure to inform the person concerned about the
existence of his right to be searched before a gazetted officer
or a Magistrate would cause prejudice to an accused.
( 3 ) That a search made by an empowered officer, on prior
information, without informing the person of his right that if
he so requires, he shall be taken before a gazetted officer or
a Magistrate for search and in case he so opts, failure to
conduct his search before a gazetted officer or a Magistrate,
may not vitiate the trial but would render the recovery of the
illicit article suspect and vitiate the conviction and sentence
of an accused, where the conviction has been recorded only
on the basis of the possession of the illicit article, recovered
from his person, during a search conducted in violation of
the provisions of Section 50 of the Act.
( 4 ) That there is indeed need to protect society from
criminals. The societal intent in safety will suffer if persons
who commit crimes are let off because the evidence against
them is to be treated as if it does not exist. The answer,
therefore, is that the investigating agency must follow the
procedure as envisaged by the statute scrupulously and the
failure to do so must be viewed by the higher authorities
seriously inviting action against the official concerned so
that the laxity on the part of the investigating authority is
curbed. In every case the end result is important but the
means to achieve it must remain above board. The remedy
cannot be worse than the disease itself. The legitimacy of the
judicial process may come under a cloud if the court is seen
to condone acts of lawlessness conducted by the
investigating agency during search operations and may also
undermine respect for the law and may have the effect of
unconscionably compromising the administration of justice.
That cannot be permitted. An accused is entitled to a fair
trial. A conviction resulting from an unfair trial is contrary to
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our concept of justice. The use of evidence collected in
breach of the safeguards provided by Section 50 at the trial,
would render the trial unfair.
| ourt on th<br>that issue<br>ding an or | e basis of<br>, one way<br>der of co |
|---|
( 6 ) That in the context in which the protection has been
incorporated in Section 50 for the benefit of the person
intended to be searched, we do not express any opinion
whether the provisions of Section 50 are mandatory or
directory, but hold that failure to inform the person
concerned of his right as emanating from sub-section (1) of
Section 50, may render the recovery of the contraband
suspect and the conviction and sentence of an accused bad
and unsustainable in law.
( 7 ) That an illicit article seized from the person of an
accused during search conducted in violation of the
safeguards provided in Section 50 of the Act cannot be used
as evidence of proof of unlawful possession of the
contraband on the accused though any other material
recovered during that search may be relied upon by the
prosecution, in other proceedings, against an accused,
notwithstanding the recovery of that material during an
illegal search.
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( 8 ) A presumption under Section 54 of the Act can only be
raised after the prosecution has established that the accused
was found to be in possession of the contraband in a search
conducted in accordance with the mandate of Section 50. An
illegal search cannot entitle the prosecution to raise a
presumption under Section 54 of the Act.
( 9 ) xxx xxxx
( 10 ) xxx xxxx”
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6) After the decision in Baldev Singh’s case (supra) , a
Bench of three Judges of this Court in Joseph Fernandez vs.
| n 50 of | the NDP |
|---|
observed as under:
“Even then the searching officer informed him that “if you
wish you may be searched in the presence of a gazetted
officer or a Magistrate”. This according to us is in
‘substantial compliance’ with the requirement of Section 50.
We do not agree with the contention that there was non-
compliance with the mandatory provision contained in
Section 50 of the Act.”
By saying so, after finding no reason to interfere with the
conviction and sentence passed on the appellant therein,
dismissed his appeal.
7) In Prabha Shankar Dubey vs. State of M.P. , (2004) 2
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SCC 56, a two Judge Bench of this Court again considered the
object of Section 50 of the NDPS Act. The Bench also extracted
the conclusion arrived at in Baldev Singh’s case (supra) .
After adverting to those conclusions and relying on the
expression “substantial compliance” as stated in Joseph
Fernandez’s case (supra) rejected the plea that there was
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non-compliance with the requirement of Section 50 of the
NDPS Act and consequently dismissed the appeal.
8) After the decision in Joseph Fernandez’s case and
| ubey’s c | ase, on |
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Krishna Kanwar (Smt.) @ Thakuraeen vs. State of
Rajasthan , (2004) 2 SCC 608 on the other, again the
interpretation relating to Section 50 was considered by the
Constitution Bench in Vijaysinh Chandubha Jadeja’s
case(supra). The question that was posed before this
Constitution Bench was whether Section 50 of the NDPS Act
casts a duty on the empowered officer to “ inform ” the suspect
of his right to be searched in the presence of a gazetted officer
or a Magistrate, if he so desires or whether a mere enquiry by
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the said officer as to whether the suspect would like to be
searched in the presence of a Magistrate or a gazetted officer
can be said to be due compliance within the mandate of the
Section 50? Before going into the ultimate conclusion arrived
at by the Constitution Bench, the following details mentioned
in paragraph 2 are also relevant which are as under:
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| rticular re<br>search, th | garding t<br>e police |
|---|
In order to set the controversy raised, the Constitution Bench,
at the foremost, recapitulated the decision arrived at by the
Constitution Bench in Baldev Singh’s case (supra) . After
considering all the earlier decisions, the latter Constitution
Bench arrived at the following conclusions:
“24. Although the Constitution Bench in Baldev Singh
case did not decide in absolute terms the question whether
or not Section 50 of the NDPS Act was directory or
mandatory yet it was held that provisions of sub-section (1)
Section of 50 make it imperative for the empowered officer to
“ inform ” the person concerned (suspect) about the existence
his of right that if he so requires, he shall be searched before
a gazetted officer or a Magistrate; failure to “inform” the
suspect about the existence of his said right would cause
prejudice to him, and in case he so opts, failure to conduct
his search before a gazetted officer or a Magistrate, may not
vitiate the trial but would render the recovery of the illicit
article suspect and vitiate the conviction and sentence of an
accused, where the conviction has been recorded only on the
basis of the possession of the illicit article, recovered from
the person during a search conducted in violation of the
provisions of Section 50 of the NDPS Act. The Court also
noted that it was not necessary that the information required
to be given under Section 50 should be in a prescribed form
or in writing but it was mandatory that the suspect was
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made aware of the existence of his right to be searched
before a gazetted officer or a Magistrate, if so required by
him. We respectfully concur with these conclusions. Any
other interpretation of the provision would make the
valuable right conferred on the suspect illusory and a farce.
| deal with | the two d |
|---|
“ 11 . … What the officer concerned is required to do is to
convey about the choice the accused has. The accused
(suspect) has to be told in a way that he becomes aware that
the choice is his and not of the officer concerned, even
though there is no specific form. The use of the word ‘right’
at relevant places in the decision of Baldev Singh case seems
to be to lay effective emphasis that it is not by the grace of
the officer the choice has to be given but more by way of a
right in the ‘suspect’ at that stage to be given such a choice
and the inevitable consequences that have to follow by
transgressing it.”
However, while gauging whether or not the stated
requirements of Section 50 had been met on facts of that
case, finding similarity in the nature of evidence on this
aspect between the case at hand and Joseph Fernandez the
Court chose to follow the views echoed in the latter case,
wherein it was held that the searching officer's information
to the suspect to the effect that “if you wish you may be
searched in the presence of a gazetted officer or a
Magistrate” was in substantial compliance with the
requirement of Section 50 of the NDPS Act. Nevertheless, the
Court indicated the reason for use of expression “substantial
compliance” in the following words: ( Prabha Shankar Dubey
case , SCC p. 64, para 12)
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“ 12 . The use of the expression ‘substantial compliance’
was made in the background that the searching officer had
Section 50 in mind and it was unaided by the interpretation
placed on it by the Constitution Bench in Baldev Singh
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case . A line or a word in a judgment cannot be read in
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isolation or as if interpreting a statutory provision, to impute
a different meaning to the observations.”
It is manifest from the afore-extracted paragraph that
Joseph Fernandez does not notice the ratio of Baldev Singh
and in Prabha Shankar Dubey , Joseph Fernandez is followed
ignoring the dictum laid down in Baldev Singh case .
| foregoing<br>ject with | discussio<br>which the |
|---|
30. As observed in Presidential Poll, In re : (SCC p. 49, para
13)
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“ 13 . … It is the duty of the courts to get at the real
intention of the legislature by carefully attending [to] the
whole scope of the provision to be construed. ‘The key to the
opening of every law is the reason and spirit of the law, it is
the animus imponentis , the intention of the law maker
expressed in the law itself, taken as a whole.’ ”
31. We are of the opinion that the concept of “substantial
compliance” with the requirement of Section 50 of the NDPS
Act introduced and read into the mandate of the said section
in Joseph Fernandez and Prabha Shankar Dubey is neither
borne out from the language of sub-section (1) of Section 50
nor it is in consonance with the dictum laid down in Baldev
Singh case . Needless to add that the question whether or not
the procedure prescribed has been followed and the
requirement of Section 50 had been met, is a matter of trial.
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It would neither be possible nor feasible to lay down any
absolute formula in that behalf.”
9) From the above, it is clear that the Constitution Bench
| concept | of “subs |
|---|
Shankar Dubey (supra) . Keeping the above principles, as laid
down in Vijaysinh Chandubha Jadeja’s case (supra) which
considered all the earlier decisions including the decision in
Baldev Singh , in mind, let us consider whether the mandates
of Section 50 as interpreted have been fully complied with or
not?
10) Since the main question roving only to “right to inform”
about his choice, it is relevant to refer the Panchnama
regarding consent for personal search which is as under:
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“Panchnama regarding consent for personal search
P.S. Kumbhraj, District Guna
Crime Case No. 0/98
Section 8/18 of N.D.P.S. Act
Place : A.B. Road, Khatakya Tiraha
Dated: 30.7.98 at 09.30 O’ Clock
Names of witnesses:
1. Sri Lal s/o Sri Narain by caste Dhobi aged 26 years 2/o Tapra
Colony, Kumbhraj.
2. Bhup Singh s/o Ramnarain by caste Meena aged 25 years, r/o
Kanakherhi P.S. Kumbhraj.
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In the presence of aforementioned ‘panchas’, I, the P.S. In-charge,
asked the driver of Maruti Car No. D.N.C./7211 namely, Pramod
Kumar s/o Raghuvir Singh by caste Gadariya, aged 20 years, r/o
Chitbhawan, P.S. Ekdil, District Etawah, Suresh, s/o Rambabu
Khatik, aged 18 years, r/o Village Chitbhawan, sitting with him in
the case and Dinesh @ Pappu s/o Jagannath by caste Dube, aged
25 years, r/o Tikri presently at village Ballapur, P.S. Ajitmal,
District Etawah, sitting on the rear seat, regarding their personal
search asking them as to whether they would offer their personal
search to me or to Gazetted Officer – S.D.O.P. Sahib . At this, all
the three suspects gave their consent for their personal search by
me, the P.S. In-charge, and they also agreed for search of the car
by me. Panchnama regarding consent for search has been
prepared in the presence of the ‘Panchas’.
[Emphasis supplied]
Sd/- Signature of suspects
Sri Lal Sd/- Suresh
Sd/- Pramod Kumar
T.I. of Bhup Singh Sd/- Dinesh Kumar @
Pappu
Seen Sd/- (Illegible) 30.7.98”
11) The above Panchnama indicates that the appellants were
merely asked to give their consent for search by the police
party and not apprised of their legal right provided under
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Section 50 of the NDPS Act to refuse/to allow the police party
to take their search and opt for being searched before the
Gazetted officer or by the Magistrate. In other words, a
reading of the Panchnama makes it clear that the appellants
were not apprised about their right to be searched before a
gazetted officer or a Magistrate but consent was sought for
their personal search. Merely asking them as to whether they
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would offer their personal search to him, i.e., the police officer
or to gazetted officer may not satisfy the protection afforded
under Section 50 of the NDPS Act as interpreted in Baldev
| r a readi | ng of the |
|---|
Panchas, the SHO merely asked all the three appellants for
their search by him and they simply agreed. This is reflected
in the Panchnama. Though in Baldev Singh’s case , this
Court has not expressed any opinion as to whether the
provisions of Section 50 are mandatory or directory but
“ failure to inform ” the person concerned of his right as
emanating from sub-section (1) of Section 50 may render the
recovery of the contraband suspect and the conviction and
sentence of an accused bad and unsustainable in law. In
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Vijaysinh Chandubha Jadeja’s case (supra) , recently the
Constitution Bench has explained the mandate provided under
sub-section (1) of Section 50 and concluded that it is
mandatory and requires strict compliance . The Bench also
held that failure to comply with the provision would render the
recovery of the illicit article suspect and vitiate the conviction if
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the same is recorded only on the basis of the recovery of the
illicit article from the person of the accused during such
search. The concept of substantial compliance as noted in
| upra) a | nd Prab |
|---|
Vijaysinh Chandubha Jadeja, accordingly, in view of the
language as evident from the panchnama which we have
quoted earlier, we hold that, in the case on hand, the search
and seizure of the suspect from the person of the appellants is
bad and conviction is unsustainable in law.
12) We reiterate that sub-section (1) of Section 50 makes it
imperative for the empowered officer to “inform” the person
concerned about the existence of his right that if he so
requires, he shall be searched before a gazetted officer or a
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Magistrate, failure to do so vitiate the conviction and sentence
of an accused where the conviction has been recorded only on
the basis of possession of the contraband. We also reiterate
that the said provision is mandatory and requires strict
compliance.
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13) Though a portion of the contraband (opium) was
recovered from the vehicle for which Section 50 is not
applicable, if we exclude the quantity recovered from the
| would n | ot come |
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sentence. Taking note of length of period in prison and
continuing as on date and in view of non-compliance of sub-
section (1) of Section 50 in respect of recovery of contraband
from the appellants, we set aside the conviction and sentence
imposed on them by the trial Court and confirmed by the High
Court.
14) As a result, the appeal is allowed and the appellants are
ordered to be released forthwith, if they are not required in any
other case.
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………….…………………………J.
(P. SATHASIVAM)
………….…………………………J.
(RANJAN GOGOI)
NEW DELHI;
NOVEMBER 22, 2012.
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