Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
ANWAR
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
IST ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE,BBULANDSHAHR & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT11/08/1986
BENCH:
VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J)
BENCH:
VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J)
MISRA RANGNATH
CITATION:
1986 AIR 1785 1986 SCR (3) 540
1986 SCC (4) 21 JT 1986 111
1986 SCALE (2)249
ACT:
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939:S.68-D(-)Civil suit for
injunction restraining proceedings before Hearing Authority-
Whether maintainable.
HEADNOTE:
Section 68-C, occurring in Chapter IVA of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1939 provides for publication of the scheme
where any State Transport Undertaking is of opinion that it
is necessary in the public interest that road transport
services in relation to any area or route be run and
operated by such undertaking. Section 68-D(l) provides for
filing of objections to the scheme before the State
Government, s. 68-D(2) for approval or modification of the
scheme by the State Government after giving a hearing to
objectors, while s.68-D(3) states that the approved or
modified scheme when published shall become final.
Before the Hearing Authority could give its approval,
the petitioner in the Special Leave Petition, a stage
carriage permit holder, who had earlier filed objections to
the scheme published under s. 68-C, filed a civil suit for
declaration that the said scheme was illegal, void and ultra
vires and for an injunction. It was contended by the
defendants-respondents that the suit was not maintainable
since the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in such matters
was impliedly barred. During the pendency of that suit the
petitioner filed an application before the Civil Court for
staying the hearing of the suit till the disposal of a
special leave petition before the Supreme Court in which
question relating to the maintainability of suits of similar
nature was involved. The Court declined to grant the request
and fixed the suit for arguments. The revision to the
District Judge and the writ petition to the High Court
preferred by the petitioner were dismissed.
In the special leave petition to the Court on the
question: Whether a suit is maintainable in a Civil Court
for an injunction restraining the Hearing Authority under s.
68-D of the Motor Vehicles Act from pro-
541
ceeding with the hearing and approving the scheme.
Dismissing the special leave petition,
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^
HELD: The Civil Judge was right in declining to stay
further proceedings in the suit. This is a suit which should
have been rejected at the threshold under order 7 rule 11 of
the Code of Civil Procedure on the ground that it did not
disclose a cause of action. [546F-G]
The Jurisdiction conferred on the hearing authority
under s.68D of the Motor Vehicles Act is exclusive in
character and it is not open to a civil court to issue an
order of injunction restraining the said authority from
proceeding with the hearing of the case and exercising its
statutory functions. [545H; 546A]
Whenever a statute uses the expression that a decision
of an authority shall be final, the jurisdiction of a civil
court to go into the correctness or otherwise of the
decision is taken away. The civil courts then have
jurisdiction only to examine whether the provisions of the
statute have not been complied with or the tribunal had or
had not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles
of judicial procedure. Their jurisdiction is barred insofar
as merits of the case is concerned. [546B;D-E]
In the instant case the scheme had been duly published
under s 68-C by an authority which had the power to publish
it and the authority which was hearing the case under s.68-D
had the power to do so. All the contentions urged in the
plaint related to the merits of the scheme and the
desirability of bringing the scheme into force and these can
be raised by an aggrieved person before the Hearing
Authority under s. 68-D of the Act. It is for the Hearing
Authority to consider the objections and to pass appropriate
orders thereon. [546B-D]
Parliament has created a special machinery by the
provisions contained in Chapter IVA of the Act for bringing
into force an approved or modified scheme which would have
the effect of excluding completely or partially other
persons from operating motor service vehicles on any route
or in any area. The very object of enacting that Chapter can
be frustrated by interested parties by resorting to a civil
court with the sole purpose of delaying the implementation
of a scheme if suits as in the instant case are allowed to
be entertained. [545C-D: 546E-F]
H.C. Narayanappa and Ors. v. The State of Mysore &
Ors., [19601 3 S.C.R. 742 referred to.
542
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition
(Civil) No. 8001 of 1986
From the Judgment and order dated 8.7.1986 of the
Allahabad High Court in W.P. No. 9664 of 1986.
U.R. Lalit and T. Sridharan for the Petitioner.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
MISRA, J. The short question which arises for
consideration in this case is whether a suit is maintainable
in a civil court for an injunction restraining the Hearing
Authority appointed under section 68-D of the Motor Vehicles
Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as ’the Act’) from
proceedings with the hearing of matters under that provision
and from approving a scheme published under section 68-C of
the Act either with or without any modification.
The petitioner is the holder of a permit issued under
Chapter IV of the Act to ply a stage carriage on
Bulandshahr-Siana-Garh-Bugrasi-Brijghat-Bhasians-Shambhaoli-
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Babugarh-Jadol-Jahangirabad route in the State of Uttar
Pradesh. The State Transport Undertaking of the State of
Uttar Pradesh published a scheme dated March 7, 1975 in the
U.P. Gazette dated April 5, 1975 under section 68-C of the
Act pro posing to operate its stage carriages to the
exclusion of all private operators on the route referred to
above. The petitioner filed his objections to the said
scheme along with several others. After a number of
adjournments the Hearing Authority empowered under section
68 of the Act was able to conclude the proceedings by April
26, 1979 and it is alleged that the Authority in the course
of the hearing ob served that it would finalise and approve
the scheme by 21.5.1979. Before the Hearing Authority could
give its approval to the scheme under section 68-D of Act,
the petitioner filed original Suit No. 145 of 1979 on the
file of the Civil Judge, Bulandshahr for a declaration that
the above scheme published under section 68-C of the Act was
illegal, void and ultra vires and for an injunction
restraining the defendants in the suit from finalising and
approving the scheme and acting upon it after it was
published. The State Transport Undertaking, i.e., the Uttar
Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, the State of Uttar
Pradesh and the Regional Transport Authority, Meerut were
impleaded as the defendents in the suit. The defendants
contested the suit. L one of the pleas raised in their
written statement was that the suit was
543
not maintainable in a civil court for the reliefs prayed for
by the petitioner. During the pendency of the suit the
petitioner filed an application before the Civil Court for
staying the hearing of the suit till the disposal of a
special leave petition before this Court since the question
relating to the maintainability of suits of similar nature
was involved in the said special leave petition. The learned
Civil Judge declined to grant the request of the petitioner
and fixed the suit for arguments on November 8, 1985.
Aggrieved by the order of the Civil Judge, the petitioner
filed a revision petition before the Additional District
Judge, Bulandshahr. That revision petition was dismissed.
Against the order of Additional District Judge, the
petitioner filed a writ petition. On the file of the High
Court of Allahabad. That petition was also dismissed. This
special leave petition is filed against the order of the
High Court of Allahabad.
We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner in
this case on the question of maintainability of the suit out
of which this petition arises.
The question for consideration in this case is, as
mentioned above, whether a suit is maintainable in a civil
court for an injunction restraining the Hearing Authority
under section 68-L) of the Act from proceeding with the
hearing and approving the scheme either with or without
modification. The contention of the respondents before the
trial court was that the suit was not maintainable for the
reliefs prayed for by the petitioner since the jurisdiction
of the civil courts in such matters was impliedly barred.
Chapter IVA of the Act was introduced into the Act by
Act 100 of 1956. Section 68-D of the Act provides that the
provisions of the Chapter IVA and the rules and orders made
thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything
inconsistent therewith contained in Chapter IV of the Act or
any other law for the time being in force or in any
instrument having effect by virtue of any such law. Chapter
IVA contains certain special provisions relating to the
State Transport Undertakings. A ’State Transport
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Undertaking’ is defined by section 68-A(b) of the Act as any
Undertaking providing road transport J service where such
undertaking is carried on by (i) the Central Government or a
State Government; (ii) any Road Transport Corporation,
established under section 3 of the Road Transport
Corporations Act, 1950; and (iii) any municipality or any
corporation or company owned or controlled by the Central
Government or one or more State
544
Governments, or by the Central Government and one or more
State Governments. Chapter IVA of the Act provides for the
preparation and approval of a scheme enabling the State
Transport Undertaking to operate road transport services to
the exclusion complete or partial of other persons. The
procedure laid down for the preparation of the scheme is
contained in sections 68-C and 68-D of the Act. Section 68-C
of the Act provides that where any State Transport
Undertaking is of opinion that for the purpose of providing
an efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinated
road transport service, it is necessary in the public
interest that road transport services in general or any
particular class of such service in relation to any area or
route or portion thereof should be run and operated by the
State Transport Undertaking, whether to the exclusion,
complete or partial, of other persons or other vise, the
State Transport Undertaking may prepare a scheme giving
particulars of the nature of the service proposed to be
rendered, the area or route proposed to be covered and such
other particulars respecting thereto as may be prescribed,
and shall cause every such scheme to be published in the
official Gazettee and also in such manner as the State
Government may direct. Section 68-D of the Act provides that
on the publication of any scheme in the official Gazette any
person already providing transport facilities by any means
along or near the area or route proposed to be covered by
the scheme, any association representing persons interested
in the provision of road transport facilities recognised in
this behalf by the State Government and any local authority
or police authority within whose jurisdiction any part of
the area or route proposed to be covered by the scheme lies,
may within thirty days from the date of its publication in
the official Gazette file objections to it before the State
Government. The State Government may, after considering the
objections and after giving an opportunity to the objector
or his representatives and the representatives of the State
Transport Undertaking to be heard in the matter if they so
desire, approve or modify the scheme. The scheme as approved
or modified as stated above shall then be published in the
official Gazette by the State Government and the same shall
thereupon become final and shall be called the approved
scheme and the area or route to which it relates shall be
called the notified area or notified route. Under section
68-I of the Act the State Government is authorised to make
rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions
of this Chapter. The rules which are promulgated provide for
the details relating to the manner in which objections or
representations can be filed under section 68-D(i) and the
procedure to be followed at the hearing of persons who have
filed such objections
545
and/or representations and the representatives of the State
Transport Undertaking. The rules also provide for the
particulars to be incorporated in the scheme published under
section 68-C of the Act. From the above provisions it is
clear that on the publication of the scheme under section
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68-C of the Act any person who is aggrieved by the proposed
introduction of the scheme is entitled to file his
representations and objections and to appear before the
Hearing Authority under section 68-D of the Act and make his
submissions in support of his objections or representations.
Sub-section (ii) of section 68-D of the Act authorises the
Hearing Authority to approve the scheme either with or
without modification. By necessary implication it can also
reject a scheme if it feels that it is not necessary to
introduce the scheme. When the scheme is approved or
modified under section 68-D of the Act, such approved or
modified scheme is required to be published in the official
Gazette and on such publication it becomes final. It is thus
seen that Parliament has created a special machinery by the
provisions contained in Chapter IVA of the Act for bringing
jnto force an approved or modified scheme which would have
the effect of excluding completely or partially other
persons from operating motor service vehicles on any route
or in any area. After the scheme become final, as provided
in sub-section (iii) of section 68-D of Act, the transport
authorities concerned can issue permits only in accordance
with the scheme and the other provisions contained in
Chapter IVA of the Act . This Court in H. C. Narayanappa and
Ors. v. The State of Mysore and Ors., [1960] 3 S.C.R. 742 at
page 753 has observed that the scheme approved or modified
and published under section 68-D of the Act may properly be
regarded as ’law’, within the meaning of Article 19(6) of
the Constitution, made by the State excluding private
operators from notified routes or notified areas, and immune
from the attack that it infringes the fundamental right
guaranteed by Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.
Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 provides
that the courts (subject to the provisions contained
therein) have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature
excepting suits of which their cognizance is either
expressly or impliedly barred. It is no doubt true that
there is no express provision in the Act taking away the
jurisdiction of the civil courts to try a suit in which the
validity of the proceedings under Chapter IVA of the Act is
called in question. But we are of opinion that the
jurisdiction of the civil courts is impliedly barred from
entertaining suits of the present nature. The jurisdiction
of the State Government (the Hearing Authority under section
68-D of the Act) is exclusive in character and it is not
open to a civil court to issue an order of injunction
restraining the Hearing Authority from proceeding
546
with the hearing of the case and exercising its statutory
functions. Whenever statute uses the expression that a
decision of an authority shall be final, the jurisdiction of
a civil court to go into the correctness or otherwise of the
decision is taken away. We have gone through the plaint
presented in this case. It is not disputed that the scheme
had been duly published under section 68-C of the Act by an
authority which had the power to publish it and that the
authority which was hearing the case under section 68-D of
the Act had the power to do so. All the contentions urged in
the plaint relate to the merits of the scheme and the
desirability of bringing the scheme into force. All such
objections relating to the merits of a scheme or the
desirability of bringing such scheme can be raised by an
aggrieved person before the Hearing Authority under section
68-D of the Act and it is for the Hearing Authority to
consider such objections and representations and to pass
appropriate orders thereon. Where the Statute gives finality
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to the orders of a special tribunal the civil courts
jurisdiction must be held to be excluded insofar as the
merits to the case is concerned. If jurisdiction is so
excluded, the civil courts have jurisdiction only to examine
whether the provisions of the Statute have not been complied
with or the tribunal had or had not acted in conformity with
the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. In cases
of the present nature where invariably reliance is placed by
the private operators on Article 19(1)(g) of the
Constitution, a writ petition lies before the High Court. In
such cases a suit is hardly the remedy which can be availed
by them. If suits of this nature are allowed to be
entertained, the very object of the several provisions of
Chapter IVA of the Act can be frustrated by interested
parties by resorting to a civil court with the sole object
of delaying the implementation of a scheme. Such attempts
should be curbed at the earliest opportunity. The learned
Civil Judge was right in declining to stay the further
proceedings in the suit. This is a suit which should have
been rejected at the threshold under order 7 rule 11 of the
Code of Civil Procedure on the ground that it did not
disclose a cause of action. We, therefore, do not find any
ground to interfere with the orders of the High Court, the
District Judge and the Civil Judge. The Civil Judge is
directed to dispose of the suit in the light of the observa-
tions made in this order. The petition fails and is
dismissed.
P.S.S Petition dismissed.
547