Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1678 OF 2002
State of Himachal Pradesh ...Appellant(s)
- Versus -
Narain Singh ...Respondent(s)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1679 OF 2002
J U D G M E N T
GANGULY, J.
1. These appeals are directed against the
judgment dated 17.4.2000 of the High Court of
Himachal Pradesh at Shimla whereby the Division
Bench of the High Court disposed of C.W.P.
1
No.851/96 alongwith C.W.P. No.1192/96, as common
questions of law and facts arose in those cases.
C.W.P. No. 851/96 was filed by Narain Singh while
C.W.P. No.1192/96 was filed by three persons namely
Shri Surat Singh, Shiv Singh Tegta and Murki Lal
and in both the writ petitions, the respondents
were the same
2. In both these cases, the constitutional
validity of the Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue
(Amendment and Validation) Act, 1996 (hereinafter
called ‘the amendment Act’) was challenged as being
in conflict with the original provisions of the
various sections of the Himachal Pradesh Land
Revenue Act, 1953 (Act No.6 of 1954) (hereinafter
called ‘the Principal Act’).
3. It was also contended in the writ petition
that the amendment is violative of the basic
structure of the Constitution.
2
4. The petitioners of C.W.P. No. 1192/96 and
six other land owners of Tehsil Rohru and Chirgaon,
District Shimla had earlier filed a C.W.P. No.206
of 1998 titled as Thakur Gyan Singh and others Vs.
State of Himachal Pradesh and others wherein the
petitioners sought the following relief:-
“(i) complete the on going land revenue
settlement operations as second
Revised Settlement strictly in
accordance with the intent of the two
notifications one pertaining to the
special revision of the existing
records of right under Section 33 of
the H.P. Land Revenue Act, 1953 and
the other for general assessment of
land revenue under Section 53 of the
said Act;
ii)
withdraw Instruction Nos. 2, 4 and
supplementary instruction Nos. 2, 23 and
32 of Compendium of Instructions, issued by
the 4th respondent (Settlement Officer);
iii)
bring up-to-date at re-settlement the
field map of the previous settlement without
recourse to re-measurement and preparation
of the record of rights including wazib-
ul-urs etc. strictly in, accordance with
Instructions contained in Para 222 of the
Settlement Manual read with Appendix XXI
thereunder and consequently directing the
deletion of Naksha Bartan illegally
prepared and not to convert the
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Classification of the government waste land
recorded in the revenue records as also in
occupation of the estate-right holders
into various lands and directing the
modification of the government policy with
respect to regularisation of encroachment
detected during the settlement proceedings;
and
iv)
direct the respondents not to hand
over/deliver the revenue records to the
revenue mohal staff till the completion of
the settlement including assessment of land
revenue, incorporated in the jamabandies."
5. The said writ petition was disposed of by
a reasoned and detailed judgment of the Division
Bench of the High Court on 13/01/1994. While
accepting the writ petition, the Division Bench
issued the following directions:-
“1. The respondents are directed to
complete the on going land revenue
settlement operations in the area in
question as "second revised
settlement” in accordance with the
instructions contained in Paragraph
222 and Appendix XXI of the Punjab
Settlement Manual.
2. The compendium of instructions (P-
21) be amended in consonance with and
4
pertaining to the procedure
applicable to special revision of
record-of-rights. Resultantly,
instructions continuing to be
contained in P-21, contrary to letter
June, 1986 (P-22) are ordered to be
deleted.
3. The new record-of-rights pertaining to
the areas in question, prepared in the
current settlement in relation to
'Mohal-Bandi', 'Naksha Bartan',
`Wazib-ul-urs', classification of
land, proposed DPFs and UPFs etc., be
ignored and re-settlement be started
subsequent to the stage of Forecast
Report.”
6. Aggrieved by the abovementioned judgment
dated 13/01/1994 of the Division Bench in C.W.P.
No.206/1988, the State filed a Special Leave
Petition before this Court. Leave was granted and
the Civil Appeal No. 6025 of 1994 was admitted for
hearing by this Court. This Court while granting
the leave ordered a stay on the judgment of the
High Court dated 13/01/1994.
5
7. It was contended by the respondents herein
while the said special leave petition was pending
before this Court, the State, in order to nullify
the judgment of the High Court, dated 13/01/1994,
enacted the amendment Act of 1996, whereby Sections
4, 16, 32, 33, 34, 36, 38, 47, 117 and 171 of the
Principal Act were amended. The specific challenge
to the amendment Act of 1996 is that by amending
the Sections 32, 33, 34, 36, 38 and 47 contained in
Chapter IV of the Principal Act, the whole scheme
of Chapter IV of the Principal Act has been
disturbed and arbitrary powers have been conferred
on the Collector (Revenue). Such conferment of
arbitrary power, it is alleged, is
unconstitutional.
8. Thus, those provisions of the Act of 1996,
introduced by way of amendment in the Principal
Act, were challenged as being ultra vires the
Constitution of India and mala fide and also as a
6
piece of colourable legislation on the following
grounds:-
“(a) That the impugned legislation has been
intended to nullify the judgment of
this Court in C.W.P. No. 206 of 1988
dated 13.1.1994. In support of this
ground, it has been stated that the
apex Court has held that a legislature
has no power to render ineffective
earlier judicial decision by making a
law. Such powers if exercised would
not be legislative power but a judicial
power exercised by it, which
encroaches upon the judicial powers
of the State exclusively vested in
Courts. (See: case reported in 1995
(5) S.C.C. 96).
(b) That the impugned legislation
apparently seeks to validate the
record of rights prepared after 1976,
which is opposed to rule of law and
natural Justice. This ground is
purported to be supported by stating
that in the earlier writ petition,
there was a challenge to the errors in
the field maps and jamabandies
prepared during the settlement, which
cannot be validated as has been done
by the impugned legislation, this
amounts to denial of opportunity and
equal protection of law under Article
14 of the Constitution of India.
According to the petitioners, if the
impugned legislation stands, the land
owners will be rendered without any
remedy to redress their grievances,
hence the same is against the rule of
7
law.
(c) That by making the impugned
legislation i.e. Act of 1996 effective
retrospectively from 1976, the same is
liable to be struck down as
unreasonable and arbitrary. Moreover,
it has been stated that the said
validation is bad in law inasmuch as
the executive instructions earlier
issued by the Settlement Officer,
Shimla and Kinnaur Districts,
respondent No.4, were held to be
without any authority of law by this
Court in its earlier decision because
the same were inconsistent with the
provisions of the Principal Act.
(d) That the Act of 1996 being
retrospective in its application
adversely affects the rights of estate
right holders of Rohru and Chirgaon,
which is unconstitutional. It has
also been highlighted in this ground
that the retrospective effect given to
the Act of 1996 is from the year 1976,
being for a period of about 20 years,
which itself is illegal.
(e) That there are inherent conflicts
between the original Sections of the
Principal Act and the amended
Sections of the Act of 1996.
Moreover, the same suffer from the
vice of excessive delegation and is
against the Scheme of the Principal
Act. This is sought to be shown by
giving the example that prior to the
amendment, only the State Government
and Financial Commissioner had the
rule making powers under the
8
Principal Act, whereas now by virtue
of Sections 4(5), 34-A and 47-A the
respondent-State has descended down
by one step whereby the Collector has
been empowered to issue executive
instructions, which are in the nature
of the delegated legislation. This
delegation of powers to the Collector
has been challenged as being against
the basic Scheme of the Principal Act.
It has also been stated that the
powers so delegated to the Collector
are unfettered and unguided and are
capable of being abused.
(f) That by virtue of the amendments made
by the Act of 1996, the sub-division of
estates styled as 'Upmahal' are sought
to be regularised and validated, which
has been questioned as being an act of
illegal splitting ab initio, making
the same illegal.
(g) Despite the directions of this Court
in the earlier case that fresh
measurement should be carried out, the
earlier incorrect measurement and
assessment of land revenue, which was
held to be so by this Court, have
been declared as having been validly
prepared the Act of 1996. It has by
been stated that the petitioners
have apprehensions that respondent
No.4. Settlement Officer, will go
ahead with the assessment of the land
revenue of this area on the basis of
invalid records and complete the
settlement operations. This will
result in irreparable injury to the
rights of the petitioners.
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(h) That the Act of 1996 takes away the
remedy of review under Section 16 of
the Principal Act, thus debarring the
Financial Commissioner to review the
order passed by him in revision. In
this manner, the impugned amendment in
Section 16 of the Principal Act has
deprived the public at large from one
channel from remedy of review, and on
the other hand, the highest authority
under the Principal Act has been
debarred from reviewing the order
passed in revision. The amendment in
question is against the principle of
natural justice besides being against
the basic structure of the
Constitution of India and the
Principal Act, as per the petitioners.
(i) Lastly, that the impugned amendments
by way of the Act of 1996 are in
direct conflict with the relevant
provisions of the Principal Act, if
they are allowed to stand, it will
result in changing the basic structure
of the Principal Act.”
9. Thus, the writ petition prayed before the
High Court for:-
“(i) Issuance of an order, writ or
direction declaring the Act of 1996
as ultra vires the law and as also
being violative of the basic
structure of the Constitution of
India.
10
(ii)
For issuing a writ of mandamus directing
the respondents/State not to give
effect to Sections 2-B, 2-C, 3 to 6,
9, 10, 12 and 13 of the Act of 1996.
(iii) To declare the aforesaid Sections as
bad, in law, they being in direct
conflict with the original
Sections/provisions of Sections 4,
16, 32 to 35, 38 and 47 of the
Principal Act and as also being
against the basic Scheme of the said
Act.”
10. Same relief was also prayed for in the
other connected writ petition, namely, C.W.P.
No.851/1996.
11. In the impugned judgment, the Division
Bench of the High Court did not uphold all the
contentions mentioned above but came to a finding
that the Amendment Act of 1996 is ultra vires to
the extent that it has sought to nullify the
earlier decision of this court rendered in CWP
No.206/1988 dated 13.01.1994 between Thakur Gian
Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.
11
12. It may be noted that in the impugned
judgment there is no finding that the amendment Act
enacted suffers from lack of legislative competence
of the State.
13. It is nobody’s case that the State
legislature is incompetent to enact the said
amended Act. There is also no finding in the
impugned judgment that the amendment Act in any way
infringes or abridges any fundamental right of the
petitioner.
14. Normally the restrain on the sovereign
power of legislation of a State legislature is
limited. The legislature has to exercise its
legislative power, which is otherwise plenary, in
accordance with the distribution of legislative
power under Chapter Part XI Chapter I of the
Constitution and it has also to exercise such power
consistent with the mandate of Part III of the
12
Constitution and other Constitutional limitations.
15. Learned High Court did not find that the
impugned amendment Act transgresses either of these
limitations in any way. But the High Count found
that the impugned amendment Act is ultra vires the
Constitution as it seeks to nullify the previous
judgment.
16. This Court is not called upon to pronounce
on the correctness or otherwise of the previous
judgment rendered by the Division Bench of the High
Court dated 13.01.1994. The appeal from the said
judgment, being Civil Appeal 6025 of 1994, came to
be heard by this Court and was disposed of by a
judgment and order dated 16.07.1996 to the
following effect:-
“Learned counsel for the appellant
submits that the Himachal Pradesh Land
Revenue (Amendment and Validation) Act,
13
1996 (Act No.3 of 1996) has further
amended the Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue
Act, 1954 and validated certain actions
taken in relation to the making or special
revision of record-of-rights in the State.
Learned counsel adds that the revision of
record-of-rights in the State is,
therefore, to be made in accordance with
the law so amended with retrospective
effect; and the directions to the contrary
in the impugned judgment of the High Court
rendered prior to enactment of Act No. 3
of 1996 have become infructuous. Learned
counsel also submits that no specific
relief has been granted to any individual
by the impugned judgment which merely
gives some directions regarding the
general revision of record-of-rights. For
this reason, learned counsel submits that
it is not necessary for the State
Government to pursue this appeal.
Learned counsel for the respondents,
while conceding that the effect of the
aforesaid Act No. 3 of 1996 is to 'amend
the law relating to revision of record-of-
rights, further submits that the effect
thereof is not to render infructuous all
the directions given in the impugned
judgment. According to learned counsel for
the respondents, some part of these
directions remains effective even after
the enactment of Act No. 3 of 1996. He
also states that the validity of Act No. 3
of 1996 has also been challenged by a
separate writ petition in the High Court
of Himachal Pradesh.
In view of the common ground emerging
from the above submissions, it appears to
us that it is needless to consider the
merits of the points raised in the appeal
14
since even according to the appellant
-State of Himachal Pradesh the directions
given in the impugned judgment are no
longer effective having been rendered
infructuous by the subsequently enacted
Act No. 3 of 1996. Moreover, there is no
relief granted to any specific individual
and the directions relate to the general
revision of record-of-rights in the state
which obviously has to be governed by the
existing law applicable at the time of
performance of the exercise. If any
grievance is made of non-compliance of any
of the al1eged surviving directions by the
State Government before the High Court, it
would be open to the State Government to
show that the same have become infructuous
for the reason given by them and in that
situation it would be for the High Court
to decide the contention on merits.
In view of the statement made on
behalf of the appellants that the
directions given in the impugned judgment
have become infructuous, the appeal is
disposed of accordingly, without deciding
any point on merits.”
17. The said order was passed after hearing
learned counsel for both the parties. From a
perusal of the aforesaid order, it is clear that
the appeal was disposed of as it was contended
before this Court by the learned counsel for the
State that in view of the subsequent amendment of
15
the law, the contentions of the appellant have
become infructuous. This court recorded the said
submissions and disposed of the said appeal as
such.
18. Therefore, the only question which
survives in this case is whether the State can in
exercise of its sovereign legislative power enact
an amendment Act seeking to remove and cure the
defects in the previous law despite there being a
judgment on the previous law.
19. In the instant case before we examine
these questions it would be appropriate to consider
the statement of objects and reasons for enacting
the amendment act. The statement is as under:-
“The volume of land records in each
16
revenue estate has considerably increased
due to the increase in number of holdings
partially on account of increase in
population and partially on account of
decrease of extent of land holdings under
the agrarian reforms, to bring the volume
of the land records maintained in each
revenue estate within manageable size, it
has become essential to create more
estates or sub-estates. Apart from this,
with the enactment the Standards of
Weights and Measures Act, 1976, it is now
mandatory to convert the non-metric
measurements into metric measurements.
Due to different scales of measurements
prevalent in various parts of the State,
the conversion to metric system involves
the complete remeasurements of all the
revenue estates in the State. There is no
provision either in the Himachal Pradesh
Land Revenue Act, 1954 or in the Punjab
Settlement Manual, as applicable to
Himachal Pradesh, for the creation of
estates/sub-estates by the Collectors or
for the complete remeasurements of the
estates. In the absence of these
statutory provisions of the creation of
more estates or sub divisions of estates
and the complete remeasurement of the
estates for conversion into metric
measurements and the instructions/
directions given by the Collectors, during
the settlement operations are not
sustainable in the eyes of law.
Consequently the settlement operations
already carried out in various parts of
the State are likely to become infructuous
and resettlement operations are likely to
cause great public inconvenience and loss
to the State Exchequer. Besides this
certain other minor amendments in the Act
17
are essential in the changed
circumstances. It is also essential to
validate the action of the Collector
already taken by him during the special
revision of record-of-rights in relation
to the creation of estates/sub-division of
estates, complete remeasurement of all
estates based upon metric system, giving
directions/issuing instructions to carry
out the settlement operations and for the
effective implementation of the provisions
of the Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue Act,
1954.
This Bill seeks to achieve the
aforesaid objectives.”
20. From a perusal of the aforesaid statement
of objects and reasons it is clear that the
amendment has been necessitated in view of certain
factors which are predominantly in public interest
and the said amendment has been made in view of the
interest of land revenue, land settlement and for
the purpose of updating the same.
21. In fact the amendments have been made for
18
an effective implementation of the provisions of
the Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue Act, 1954.
22. It is provided in sub-section (2) of
section 1 of the amendment Act that the said
amendment shall come into force at once except
section 2 (b), 5, 6 and 10 which shall be deemed to
rd
have come into force on the 23 of September 1976.
Section 13 of the said act provides for validation.
The said section runs as follows:-
”13. Notwithstanding anything contained
in the Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue Act,
1954 and rules, instructions,
notifications made or issued thereunder,
or in any law for the time being in force
or in any judgment, decree or order of any
court or other authority, where at any
rd
time after the 23 day of September, 1976
and before the commencement of the
Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue (Amendment
and Validation) Act, 1996, if any record-
of-rights or special revision of record-
of-rights has been made in respect of the
lands, situated in the State of Himachal
Pradesh, such making or special revision
of record-of-rights shall, and shall be
19
deemed always to have been valid and shall
not be questioned on the ground that the
amendments made vide sections 2 (b), 5, 6
and 10 of this Act were not in force at
that time when such record-of-rights were
made or specially revised.”
23. An argument was, however, made before the
High Court that the aforesaid amendment is actuated
by a mala fide motive and is a piece of colourable
legislation. The aforesaid contention was,
however, not accepted by the High Court in the
impugned judgment. In fact such contention is not
tenable on principle.
24. Reference in this connection be made to a
decision of this Court in the case of K. Nagaraj &
others Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and another –
1985 1 SCC 523, wherein Chief Justice Chandrachud,
speaking for a three-Judge Bench said that the
legislature, as a body, cannot be accused of having
passed a law for an extraneous purpose. Learned
20
Chief Justice held that the concept of “transferred
malice” is unknown in the field of legislation
provided the legislature enacts the law within its
powers.
25. The aforesaid principle in K. Nagaraj
(supra) has been accepted by this Court in many
cases and a reference in this connection may be
made to a decision of this Court in G.C. Kanungo
Vs. State of Orissa – (1995) 5 SCC 96.
26. The power of the Sovereign legislature to
legislate within its field, both prospectively and
retrospectively cannot be questioned. This position
has been settled in many judgments of this Court.
Some of them may be considered below.
27. In Bhubaneshwar Singh & another Vs. Union
of India & others - (1994) 6 SCC 77, the Court
21
expressly approved the aforesaid position in Para 9
at page 82-83. In so far as validating Acts are
concerned, this Court in Bhubaneshwar Singh (supra)
also considered the question in para 11 and held
that the Court has the powers by virtue of such
validating legislation, to “wipe out” judicial
pronouncements of the High Court and the Supreme
Court by removing the defects in the statute
retrospectively when such statutes had been
declared ultra vires by Courts in view of its
defects. This Court has held that such legislative
exercise will not amount to encroachment on the
judicial power. This Court has accepted that such
legislative device which removes the vice in
previous legislation is not considered an
encroachment on judicial power. In support of the
aforesaid proposition, this Court in Bhubaneshwar
Singh (supra) relied on the proposition laid down
by the Chief Justice Hidayatullah, speaking for the
Constitution Bench in Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills
Ltd. and another Vs. Broach Borough Municipality
22
and others -(1969) 2 SCC 283.
28. Again in the case of Indian Aluminium
Company etc. etc. Vs. State of Kerala and others
-AIR 1996 SC 1431, this Court while summarizing the
principle held that a legislature cannot directly
overrule a judicial decision but it has the power
to make the decision ineffective by removing the
basis on which the decision is rendered, while at
the same time adhering to the constitutional
imperatives and the legislature is competent to do
so [See para 59 sub-para (9) at page 1446.]
29. In the case of Comorin Match Industries
(Pvt.) Limited Vs. State of Tamil Nadu – AIR 1996
SC 1916, the facts were that the assessment orders
passed under Central Sales Tax Act were set aside
by the High Court and the State was directed to
refund the amount to the assessee. As the State
failed to carry it out, contempt petitions were
filed but the assessment orders were validated by
23
passing the amendment Act of 1969 with
retrospective effect and the Court held that the
tax demanded became valid and enforceable. The
Court held that in such a situation the State will
not be precluded from realizing the tax due as
subsequently the assessment order was validated by
the amending Act of 1969 and the order passed in
the contempt proceeding will not have the effect of
the writing off the debt which is statutorily owed
by the assessee to the State. The learned Judges
held that the effect of the amending Act is
retrospective validation of the assessment orders
which were struck down by the High Court.
Therefore, the assessment order is legislatively
valid and the tax demands are also enforceable.
[See paras 33 and 35 at page 1925]
30. It is therefore clear where there is a
competent legislative provision which
retrospectively removes the substratum of
foundation of a judgment, the said exercise is a
24
valid legislative exercise provided it does not
transgress any other constitutional limitation.
Therefore, this Court cannot uphold the reasoning
in the High Court judgment that the impugned
amendment is invalid just because it nullifies some
provisions of the earlier Act.
31. The aforesaid principles have been
reiterated by a three-Judge Bench in Meerut
Development Authority etc. Vs. Satbir Singh and
others – AIR 1997 SC 1467, Justice Ramaswamy
speaking for the Court summed up the position in
para 10 as follows:-
“10. It is well settled by catena of
decisions of this Court that when this
Court in exercise of power of judicial
review, has declared a particular statute
to be invalid, the Legislature has no
power to overrule the judgment; however,
it has the power to suitably amend the law
by use of appropriate phraseology removing
the defects pointed out by the Court and
by amending the law inconsistent with the
law declared by the Court so that the
defects which were pointed out were never
on statute for effective enforcement of
25
the law. This Court has considered in
extenso the case law in a recent judgment
in Indian Aluminium Co. V. State of Kerala
(1996) 2 JT (SC) 85: (1996 AIR SCW 1051)
had held that such an exercise of power to
amend a statute is not an incursion on the
judicial power of the Court but is a
statutory exercise of the constituent
power to suitably amend the law and to
validate the actions which have been
declared to be invalid…”
32. A Constitution Bench of this Court in the
case of State of Tamil Nadu Vs. M/s. Arooran Sugars
Limited – AIR 1997 SC 1815, reiterated the same
principle after analyzing several cases on the
point. The Court has summed up the position as
follows:-
“16. ...It is open to the legislature to
remove the defect pointed out by the court
or to amend the definition or any other
provision of the Act in question
retrospectively. In this process it cannot
be said that there has been an
encroachment by the legislature over the
power of the judiciary. A court's
directive must always bind unless the
conditions on which it is based are so
fundamentally altered that under altered
circumstances such decisions could not
26
have been given. This will include removal
of the defect in a statute pointed out in
the judgment in question, as well as
alteration or substitution of provisions
of the enactment on which such judgment is
based, with retrospective effect...”
33. In Indra Sawhney Vs. Union of India – AIR
2000 SC 498, Justice Jagannadha Rao speaking for a
three-Judge Bench explained the position by saying
that it would be permissible for the legislature to
remove the defect which is the cause for
discrimination and which defect was pointed out by
the Court. The learned Judge made it very clear
that this defect can be removed both
retrospectively and prospectively by legislative
action and the previous actions can be validated.
But where there is a mere validation without the
defect being legislatively removed the legislative
action will amount to overruling the judgment by a
legislative fiat and that will be invalid. In the
instant case the amendment Act has removed the
defect of the previous law and therefore, the
27
validation exercise is perfectly sound and cannot
be faulted with.
34. In Rai Ramkrishna and others etc. Vs.
State of Bihar – AIR 1963 SC 1667, a Constitution
Bench of this Court speaking through Justice
Gajendragadkar, as His Lordship then was, explained
the principle with characteristic clarity, which is
reproduced hereinbelow:-
“10. The other point on which there
is no dispute before us is that the
legislative power conferred on the
appropriate Legislatures to enact law in
respect of topics covered by the several
entries in the three Lists can be exercised
both prospectively and retrospectively.
Where the Legislature can make a valid law,
it may provide not only for the prospective
operation of the material provisions of the
said law but it can also provide for the
retrospective operation of the said
provisions. Similarly, there is no doubt
that the legislative power in question
includes the subsidiary or the auxiliary
power to validate laws which have been
found to be invalid. If a law passed by a
legislature is struck down by the Courts as
being invalid for one infirmity or another,
it would be competent to the appropriate
Legislature to cure the said infirmity and
28
pass a validating law so as to make the
provisions of the said earlier law
effective from the date when it was passed.
This position is treated as firmly
established since the decision of the
Federal Court in the case of United
Provinces v. Mst. Atiqa Begum, 1940 FCR
110: (AIR 1941 FC 16).”
35. See the decision of this Court in Satnam
Overseas (Export) and others Vs. State of Haryana
and another – (2003) 1 SCC 561, para 52 where
reference was made to the ratio in Rai Ramkrishna
(supra).
36. Recently in the case of State of Bihar and
others Vs. State Pensioners Samaj – (2006) 5 SCC
65, this Court reiterated the same position in
paragraph 16 at page 71, which is reproduced
below:-
”16. ……It is always open to the
legislature to alter the law
retrospectively as long as the very
premise on which the earlier judgment
declared a certain action as invalid is
removed. The situation would be one of a
fundamental change in the circumstances
29
and such a validating Act was not open to
challenge on the ground that it amounted
to usurpation of judicial powers.
37. For the reasons aforesaid, this Court
finds that in the instant case the amending Act
read with its validation clause correctly passed
the tests laid down by this Court. The appeals are
allowed. The judgment of the High Court is thus
set aside with no orders as to costs.
.................J.
(MARKANDEY KATJU)
.................J.
New Delhi (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY)
July 8, 2009
30