Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 927 of 2007
PETITIONER:
P. Mohanan Pillai
RESPONDENT:
State of Kerala & Ors
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 23/02/2007
BENCH:
S.B. Sinha & Markandey Katju
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
[Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 5064 of 2006]
S.B. SINHA, J :
Leave granted.
Oil Palm India Limited is a Government Company (for short, ’the
Company). The Union of India and the State of Kerala are its shareholders.
It is indisputably a ’State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the
Constitution of India. Appellant herein was appointed as a worker in the
services of the Company in the year 1982. 12 posts of
Watchman/Messenger/Attender fell vacant. Recruitment to the said post is
not governed by any statutory rules. Admittedly, all the workmen who were
in service of the Company were to be considered therefor. Applications
having been invited for filling up of the said 12 posts, 253 persons applied
therefor. A written test was conducted on 18.01.2001. Appellant herein
stood first in the written examination. The said written examination was
conducted by the Kerala State Productivity Council in terms of the
resolution of the Board of Directors of the Company dated 13.06.2000. It is
not in dispute that the written test was conducted for eliminating those who
had failed to secure the minimum qualifying marks in the written test. It has
also not been disputed that out of 253 applicants, only 197 appeared therein.
However, keeping in view the total number of posts which were required to
be filled up, only 36 candidates who got the highest marks were called for
interview, appellant being one of them. It is furthermore not in dispute that
after a policy decision was taken to call only those candidates who had come
within the zone of three times of the number of posts, the minimum
qualification was reduced to 46 marks and 11 more persons were permitted
to appear at the interview. It has furthermore not been disputed that 100
marks were fixed both for written test as well as viva-voce.
Appellant, having not been selected, filed a writ petition, on the
premise that Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 were appointed by the company,
although not eligible therefor. It had categorically been stated that they were
called for interview only one day prior to the holding thereof. It was alleged
that the top officers of the Company personally went to the houses of
Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 and handed over the appointment orders on
22.05.2001, which was a Sunday. It was also contended that the list of the
selected candidates had not been published.
The Writ Petition of the appellant was dismissed by a learned Single
Judge of the High Court by a judgment and order dated 22.12.2005,
holding :
"\005From the counter affidavit and also from the lists
furnished by the petitioners themselves it is clear that of
the 11 included in the additional list only two were
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appointed and they are serial Nos. 6 and 8 in the
additional list. It is also stated in the counter affidavit
that 50% marks were given to the written test and 50%
marks for the interview. That will not vitiate the
selection as held by the Supreme Court in Subash
Chandra Verma v. State of Bihar 1995 Supp. (12) SCC
325. Selection is a matter of policy and if the Selection
Committee thought it fit to have the ratio of 1:4 for the
purpose of selection, it cannot be said that the selection is
vitiated on that only ground. It is now settled law that it
is for the party who alleges vitiating factors like
favouritism, malafides etc. to plead and prove the
same\005"
A Writ Appeal preferred thereagainst by the appellant was also
dismissed by a Division Bench of the High Court, opining :
"7. We find hardly any substance in the arguments as
above. Interview was a mandatory step to be followed.
In the matter of selection to the post of Watchman, we
feel it is more appropriate to set apart 50% marks for the
interview. Physical fitness and personality are essential
requirements for a watchman; Resourcefulness, aptitude
and initiative are qualities essential for a Messenger and
Attender, apart from the bookish knowledge. The above
qualities are best assessable by an interview."
Dr. K.P. Kylasanatha Pillay, the learned counsel appearing on behalf
of the appellant, assailed the judgment of the learned Single Judge as also
the Division Bench of the High Court, contending :
1) The High Court committed a manifest error in passing the impugned
judgment in so far as it failed to take into consideration the fact that the zone
of consideration cannot be enlarged arbitrarily.
2) Having regard to the nature of the duties required to be performed by
the Watchman/Messenger/Attender, 100 marks could not have been fixed
for oral interview.
Mr. C.N. Sree Kumar, the learned counsel appearing for the company
and Mr. G. Prakash, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent
No. 5, on the other hand, would support the judgment.
Selection of the candidates was to be made from amongst the workers
who had been working in the Company for a long time. Although there may
not have been any statutory rules governing recruitment to the posts in
question, evidently a practice therefor was prevailing. Rule of the game for
the said purpose was fixed, namely, 36 persons would be called for
interview from amongst those who were successfully competed the written
examination. The fact that the appellant obtained more than 73% marks in
the written examination and topped the list is not in dispute. The fact that he
was eligible for consideration for appointment in the post is also not in
dispute. It has furthermore not been in dispute that the minimum qualifying
marks in the written test was fixed. It is, however, not known whether the
same was 50% or not, but then it was admittedly higher than 46%. The
Managing Director of the Company in his counter affidavit categorically
stated :
"Since the number of posts that were available
to be filled up was 12, initially it was decided to call
36 candidates who had scored the highest marks in
the written test and these candidates were called to
appear for an interview on 22.3.2001. However, it
was then decided by the Company to enlarge the
zone of consideration to 1:4 and on the basis of this
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decision, call letters were again issued to the next 11
candidates, fixing a cut off mark of 46 out of 100.
The candidates who were thus called for the
interview were interviewed on 22.3.2001 by a panel
consisting of the Company’s Chairman, Managing
Director, Under Secretary to the Department of
Agriculture, Government of Kerala and an outside
expert member from the Kerala State Productivity
Council, Kalamassery\005"
Why such a decision had been taken after the publication of the result
of the written examination and after calling 36 candidates for interview is
not known. Why the Company intended to enlarge the zone of consideration
from 1 : 3 to 1 : 4 has also not been disclosed. Why the cut-off mark was
also lowered remained a mystery.
It may be that in a given situation, a decision of the State may be
changed, but therefor good and sufficient reasons must be assigned. The
Company failed to do so. The decision taken in this behalf smacks of
arbitrariness. It prejudiced the candidates like the appellant.
It is now well-settled that ordinarily rules which were prevailing at the
time, when the vacancies arose would be adhered to. The qualification must
be fixed at that time. The eligibility criteria as also the procedures as was
prevailing on the date of vacancy should ordinarily be followed.
In Pitta Naveen Kumar & Ors. v. Raja Narasaiah Zangiti & Ors. [2006
(9) SCALE 298], a rule framed by the State of Andhra Pradesh reducing the
cut-off mark was struck down by this Court, holding :
"55. The question, however, remains as to whether the
State could reduce the cut-off marks. If the cut-off mark
specified by the State is arbitrary, Article 14 would be
attracted. The Tribunal did not have any jurisdiction to
pass an interim order directing reduction in the cut-off
mark. The cut-off mark at 66% was fixed having regard
to the ratio of the candidates eligible for sitting at the
written examination at 1:50. An interim order as is well-
known is issued for a limited purpose. By reason thereof,
the Tribunal had jurisdiction to grant a final relief.
56. Moreover, the Tribunal could not have directed the
Commission to do something which was contrary to
rules. An interim order is subject to variation or
modification. An interim order would ordinarily not
survive when the main matter is dismissed. The
Commission also did not intend to abide by the said
directions. It wanted the State to pass an appropriate
order. It was, pursuant to or in furtherance of the said
desire of the Commission as also the direction of the
Tribunal as contained in its interim order dated 6.1.2005,
GOMs 200 was issued. The said Government Order was,
thus, not issued by the State of its own. There was no
independent application of mind. The statutory
requirements for passing an government order
independent of the interim directions issued by the
Tribunal were wholly absent."
Reliance placed my Mr. Sree Kumar on Vijay Syal and Another v.
State of Punjab & Others [(2003) 9 SCC 401] runs counter to the submission
of the learned counsel. Therein, the appellants secured less marks than those
whose appointments were in question. In that situation it was held that they
were to be denied appointments on the ground that they were called for in
the interview in the second list, the position of the appellant could not
improve. Allegedly, when those candidates who belonged to Scheduled
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Caste and had secured higher marks and in that view of the matter, the
appellant therein could not be selected in the general category.
In the said decision, however, the Bench categorically opined that the
marks allocated for the viva voce should not normally exceed 12.5%
noticing the decisions of this Court in Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of
Haryana [(1985) 4 SCC 417], All India State Bank Officers’ Federation v.
Union of India [(1997) 9 SCC 151] as also Jasvinder Singh v. State of J&K
[(2003) 2 SCC 132]. The question as to how much marks should be
allocated for interview would depend upon the post and nature of duties to
be performed. The nature of duties to be performed on the post of
Watchman/Messenger/Attender is not such which requires a high intellectual
ability or any particular trait of the candidates which is required to be judged
by an expert. [See e.g. I.I.T., Kanpur v. Umesh Chandra and Others \026 (2006)
5 SCC 664]
We may notice that in Inder Parkash Gupta v. State of J&K and
Others [(2004) 6 SCC 786], a three-Judge Bench opined :
"34. It is true that for allocation of marks for viva voce
test, no hard-and-fast rule of universal application which
would meet the requirements of all cases can be laid
down. However, when allocation of such marks is made
with an intention which is capable of being abused or
misused in its exercise, it is liable to be struck down as
ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
\005 \005 \005
36. We would proceed on the assumption that the
Commission was entitled to not only ask the candidates
to appear before it for the purpose of verification of
records, certificates of the candidates and other
documents as regards qualification, experience, etc. but
could also take viva voce test. But marks allotted therefor
should indisputably be within a reasonable limit. Having
regard to Rule 8 of the 1979 Rules higher marks for viva
voce test could not have been allotted as has rightly been
observed by the High Court. The Rules must, therefore,
be suitably recast."
In this case allocation of marks for interview was in fact misused. It
not only contravened the ratio laid down by this Court in Ashok Kumar
Yadav (supra) and subsequent cases, but in the facts and circumstances of
the case, it is reasonable to draw an inference of favouritism. The power in
this case has been used by the Appointing Authority for unauthorized
purpose. When a power is exercised for an unauthorized purpose, the same
would amount to malice in law [ See The Manager, Govt. Branch Press and
Another v. D.B. Belliappa - AIR 1979 SC 429, Punjab State Electricity
Board v. Zora Singh and Others \026 (2005) 6 SCC 776 and K.K. Bhalla v.
State of M.P. and Others \026 (2006) 3 SCC 581].
For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgments cannot be
sustained, which are set aside accordingly. Selection of Respondent Nos. 4
and 5 is set aside. The company is directed to appoint the appellant. The
appeal is allowed with cost. Counsel’s fee assessed at Rs. 10,000/-.