YADAIAH vs. THE STATE OF TELANGANA

2023 INSC 664 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.4835 OF 2023 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.2523 of 2022] Yadaiah and Anr. .… Appellants VERSUS State of Telangana and others      …. Respondents WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO.4836 OF 2023 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.2060 of 2022] WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO.4837 OF 2023 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.2350 of 2022] WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO.4838 OF 2023 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.2110 of 2022] Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by satish kumar yadav Date: 2023.11.11 12:09:14 IST Reason: C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  1  of  97 WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO.4839 OF 2023 [ Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.2185 of 2022] WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO.4840 OF 2023 out [Arising   of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.6714 of 2022] JUDGMENT Surya Kant, J. Leave granted. 1. These   appeals   are   directed   against   the 2. common judgment dated 31.12.2021 passed by a Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   of   Telengana whereby   the   intra­court   appeal   preferred   by   the State of Telengana and its revenue authorities has been allowed, reversing the decision of the learned Single Judge. Consequently, the resumption order dated   27.01.2007,   which   forms   the   core   of   the present   disputes   concerning   the   assignment   of non­occupied   land   in   the   1960s   to   landless C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  2  of  97 Scheduled   Caste/Scheduled   Tribe   persons [ Hereinafter,   ‘Assignees’ ]  for   the   purpose   of cultivation, has been confirmed.  3. Since these appeals arise out of a long­drawn saga wherein multiple rounds of litigation occurred between the parties before various forums, including this Court, it would be appropriate to discuss the same at length before delving into the issues of law raised before us concerning   , nature of res judicata assignment   and   violation   of   conditions   of assignment.   It   may   also   be   mentioned   before embarking into the factual matrix that this Court vide   order   dated   06.09.2022   had   impleaded   the Greyhounds   Commando   Force   through   the Additional   Director   General   of   Police   as   a   Party­ Respondent for effective adjudication since the land in dispute has been statedly allotted and is being used for training its forces.        A.     F   ACTS     4. The   genesis   of   these   disputes   began   on 28.10.1953 when the Revenue Department of the then   undivided   State   of   Andhra   Pradesh   took   a policy   decision   and   communicated   the   sanction C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  3  of  97 1 granted for the assignment of ‘Astabl Kanchi’  land measuring 200 Acres comprising the revenue estate of Manchirevula village situated in the Ranga Reddy District to the  Assignees. The relevant part of the said policy decision stated that:– “……I   am   directed   to   communicate Government sanction for the assignment of  culturable   area   to   the   extent   of   200 acres   out   of   Astabl   Kanchi   situated   in Manchirral village to the landless Harijans under   special   laoni   Rules   after   regular phodi   work   by   the   land   Record   and Settlement   Department.   The   remaining area of the Kancha may be kept in fact and auctioned every year….”   (sic) 5. The   Collector   after   this   communication,   vide letter dated 07.11.1959, finally submitted a report of eligible individuals and directed that ‘phodi’ or sub­ division of the Subject Land be conducted before its assignment.   However,   after   further   inspection   by revenue   authorities,   the   Collector   noted   in   a subsequent   letter   dated   04.06.1960   that   land measuring   142   Acres   39   Guntas   was   fit   for cultivation instead of the initially proposed area of 200   Acres.   Accordingly,   the   Revenue   Divisional Officer vide his letter dated 16.08.1960, directed the 1  ‘Kancha’ is the term employed for land which absolutely vests in favour  of the government. C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  4  of  97 concerned   Tehsildar   to   initiate   assignment proceedings   for   land   measuring   142   Acres   39 Guntas in Survey No. 393 of Village Manchirevula [ Hereinafter,   ‘Subject   Land’ ]   and   directed   that 2 process be initiated for grant of special Laoni  Patta to the eligible persons.   6. It is to be noted that before any kind of patta could be granted, the State Government issued an order dated 29.06.1961 [ Hereinafter, ‘GOM 1122’ ] overriding   all   previous   orders   which   governed assignment and alienation. The said order provided exhaustive guidelines for assignment and alienation of Government lands, the relevant part whereof as applicable to the Subject Land reads as follows:– “ 5. The Government further direct that no vacant land in the Greater Hyderabad city or within a belt of 10 miles around the city   should   be   assigned   or   otherwise disposed   of   until   Government   have assessed   the   requirements   of   various Department   for  building   accommodation in the city. ” 7. It was only after GOM 1122 was brought into effect, that the State Government issued temporary pattas dated 21.10.1961 [ Hereinafter, ‘Temporary 2   During the course of hearing, it has been brought into our attention that term ‘Laoni’ loosely means to ‘bring into cultivation’.  C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  5  of  97 Pattas’ ] to each of the selected Assignees. It would be appropriate for proper analysis of the controversy to reproduce the contents of one such Temporary Patta   dated   21.10.1961   granted   to   an   Assignee which is as follows:– “FORM­G (Under Rule  9  (g) Written permission to occupy land (to be given by the Tahsildar under Loani Rules) Temporary   patta   is   granted   to   Shri Mylarapu Pedda Gandaiah S/o. Venkaiah, resident   of   Manchirevula   village,   Tahsil Hyderabad   West,   Hyderabad   District,   to occupy the following land and to cultivate the   same,   till   the   phodi   work   is completed. 1. Village Name  : Manchirevula 2. Taluk                             :  Hyderabad West 3. Sy. No.                           : 393 4. Total extent                   : 326.28 5. Extent given under patta: Ac. 7.06 gts. 6. Cess                                : Rs. 7.15 7. Nature of land                 : Kancha 8. Classification                  : Dry Sri Mylarapu Pedda Gandaiah has to pay Rs. 7.15 per year from 1961­1962 for the   land   granted   for   occupation   under this permit as assessment. After   the   podhi   is   completed,   the area and assessment are both fixed by the C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  6  of  97 Dept.   of   Land   Records   (Survey   and Settlement). The Pattadar is bound to pay the assessment so fixed, but this change will   take   effect   only   form   the   year following in which such change has been made   as   a   result   of   the   compk1jon   of phodi work by the Dept. of land Record.  (In the case of land granted as not Transferable) The   Grantee   is   not   empowered   ∙to transfer   the   occupancy   without   the sanction   previously   obtained   from   the Collector. This permission to occupy shall not confer the right to mine on the land or collect minerals therefrom. The right on   the   toddy   trees   will   vest   with   the Government. Sd/­Tehsildar 24.10.1961 Hyderabad West ”  (sic) (Emphasis Applied) There are some other policy decisions also that have   brought   in   restrictions   regarding   transfer   of Subject Land which we would deal in the later part of this judgement. However, it is pertinent to note that afterwards, permanent pattas were granted to the Assignees within a few years of the issuance of Temporary Pattas. The Appellants are now claiming devolution   of   interest   and   ownership   rights   over C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  7  of  97 different parcels of the Subject Land through the original Assignees.  8. After the grant of these pattas, the situation remained   dormant   for   almost   three   decades. Meanwhile,   with   the   passage   of   time,   the   city   of Hyderabad, like all other capital cities across the nation, flourished on account of rapid urbanisation and   swift   economic   development,   making   land   a scarce   and   valuable   resource.   Consequently,   the Subject Land also rose in value. On 14.08.1991, all the Assignees are stated to have executed a general power of attorney  [ Hereinafter, ‘GPA’ ]  in favour of one   M.A.   Baksh.   The   GPA   gave   M.A.   Baksh   the following   amongst   other   powers   in  respect  of   the Subject Land:– “5. To negotiate,  enter  into agreements for   and/or   let   lease   or   licence   the   said property or any portion thereof to such person(s)   or   body   and   for   such consideration and  upon  such  terms and conditions and for such purpose(s) as my said   attorney   may   in   his   absolute discretion deem fit. 6.   To  negotiate   and   agree   to   and/or   to enter   into   agreement,   to sell/develop/lease/   mortgage   the   said property   or   to   sell,   convey,   lease, mortgage, assign or to otherwise transfer C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  8  of  97 the said property or any portion thereof to   such   person(s)   or   body   and   for   such consideration arid upon such terms and conditions and for such purpose(s) as the said   attorney   may   in   his   absolute discretion   deem   fit   and   to   collect   and receive the considerations thereof and to give a valid receipts therefor.  7. To enter into  agreement(s)  to develop the   said   property   by   laying  roads, drainage,   water   connections,   Electricity connection   etc.   and   or   erecting individual/   multistoreyed,   residential/ commercial   buildings   thereon   with   any person(s), firms, company/ companies or society/   societies   upon   such   terms   and conditions as my said attorney may in his absolute discretion deem fit.” (Emphasis Applied) 9. Thereafter,   acting   upon   the   abovementioned GPA, M.A. Baksh sold a part of the Subject Land to private individuals between the period of January 1992 to October 1992 as brought to our notice by the parties through sale deeds placed on record. On perusal   of   these   sale   deeds,   one   crucial   feature which is to be noted is that M.A. Baksh envisaged to divide the Subject Land into smaller plots akin to a residential   colony   as   each   sale   deed   has   been C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  9  of  97 allotted   a   unique   plot   number   along   with   roads earmarked in the site plans attached thereto. 10. It   seems   that   at   the   time   M.A.   Baksh   was carrying out the process of the sale of the Subject Land as a residential colony, he came across the provisions   of   Andhra   Pradesh   Assigned   Lands (Prohibition of Transfers) Act of 1977 [ Hereinafter, ]  which   prohibited   transfer   of   land ‘1977   Act’ assigned   to   landless   poor   by   the   Government. Realizing   the   potential   pitfall   in   carrying   out   the sales, he applied for clarification through a letter dated 18.09.1992 to the concerned Mandal Revenue Officer and enquired about the applicability of the 1977 Act. The Mandal Revenue Officer vide a memo dated 23.09.1992, responded to M.A. Baksh’s query saying that:– “The   petitioner   Sri   M.A.   Baksh,   G.P.A. Holder   of   Mr.   Mylaram   Jangaiah   and others   is   informed   that   as   per   written permission   issued   by   the   Tahsildar, Hyderabad  West   vide   reference No.A6/8524/80   to   occupy   an   extent   of 143­00   acres   out   of   Sy.   No.   393   of Manchirevulu   village   in   form   (G)   under rule   9(g)   of   Laouni   rules,   1950   to   Sri Mylaram   Jangaiah   and   (19)   others, Harijans of same village. Subsequently in C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  10  of  97 1965   the   said   land   was   made   Laouni patta.in   the   name   of   the   above   20 persons, and subdivided as Sy. No. 393/1 to 393/20 Ac.7­06gts., each individual. As per rule 9(g) of the Laouni rules 1950 the   written   permission   in   form   (G)   is issued only after confirmation of sale; The sale   of   such   lands   is   not   hit   by   the provision   of   A.P.   Assignment   lands (Prohibition of Transfer) Act 1977.”  (sic) (Emphasis Applied) 11. Notwithstanding   this   clarification   by   the Mandal   Revenue   Officer,   some   of   the   Assignees cancelled the GPA executed in favor of M.A. Baksh in   October   1992,   probably   fearing   that   the   state authorities   would   cancel   the   allotment   of   the Subject   Land.   They   also   issued   a   public   notice wherein they declared that any sale entered into by M.A. Baksh on their behalf was not binding.  Fast   forward   a   year   and   somewhere   in 12. November   1993,   the   Police   Department   sent   a requisition for land in Manchirevula village to set up operational headquarters and training centres for its special   forces,   now   known   as   ‘Greyhounds Commando  Force’. It was only  when the  revenue authorities   analysed   their   records   that   their attention was drawn towards the Subject Land and C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  11  of  97 the legal infirmities associated with it, starting the saga of present legal tussle between the parties. 13. After   that   the   office   of   the   Collector,   Ranga Reddy   District   issued   a  show   cause   notice   dated 28.03.1994 [ ] proposing to Hereinafter, ‘First SCN’ cancel the assignment of Subject Land. The relevant extracts of the First SCN containing the grounds of cancellation are to the following effect:– “ The issue was  examined  in details with reference   in   rule   position   and   other aspect   and   found   that   the   alleged assignment is irregular, illegal and liable to be cancelled on the basis of following grounds: (i) The   Form­G   Certificate   issued   are for   temporary   occupation   and   thereby implementation in Falsalpatti 1961­62 is illegal. (ii) The   alleged   assignment   ought   to have   been   processed   under   Assignment Rule, 1958 instead of Laoni Rules, 1950. (iii)   The   alleged   assignment   is   in contravention   of   the   ban   order   of assignment issued in G.O. Ms. No. 1222, dated 29.06.1961. (iv)  After issue of Form­G Certificate for temporary   occupation   there   is   no   Sub­ Division   took   place   and   supplementary Sethwar   issued,   therefore   the   alleged assignment   is   not   final   and   temporary C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  12  of  97 occupation certificates cannot be treated assignment pattas. (v) That the land is unfit for cultivation and   thereby   the   alleged   assignment   is irregular and indicate malafide intention.   (vi)          The alleged assignees have not put the land for cultivation and kept in fallow and   thereby   they   have   violated   the condition laid down in Rule 19 of Laoni Rules, 1950. (vii) The alleged assignees while violating the   condition   of   assignment   have executed   a  G.P.A.   in   favour   of   Sri   M.A.   Baksh authorizing him to sell the land.   ” (Emphasis Applied) 14. The   Assignees   fearing   consequential dispossession,   approached   the   High   Court   which vide its order dated 03.05.1994, held that the writ petition was premature and directed them to file an explanation   within   one   week,   but  protected   them from   dispossession   in   light   of   the   pending   show cause proceedings. The Assignees in turn filed their explanation   before   the   Collector   wherein   they submitted   that   assignment   was   valid   as   per   the applicable law and that there was no bar on sale of the Subject Land.  15. Strangely,   instead   of   the   District   Collector, proceedings were entrusted to the District Revenue C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  13  of  97 Officer who vide his order dated 15.09.1994 held that the First SCN was unsustainable. On account of this development, the District Collector through an order dated 03.01.1995, exercised his   suo motu revisionary   powers   under   Section   166­B   of   the Telangana   Land   Revenue   Act   of   1317   Fasli [ ] and suspended the Hereinafter, ‘1317 Fasli Act’ order   dated   15.09.1994   passed   by   the  District Revenue   Officer   pending   further examination/orders. Thereafter, the Collector sent a letter   to   the   Secretary,   Revenue   Department   for ratification of the order dated 03.01.1995, but since no notice was given to Assignees as required under Section 166­B of 1317 Fasli Act, the Government declined   the   request   for   ratification   of   the   said order.   Ultimately,   notices   were   issued   to   the Assignees and the Government vide its memo dated 24.01.1996 ratified the order dated 03.01.1995. It further   directed   that   final   orders   be   passed   after completion of the inquiry.   16. The   Assignees   filed   separate   writ   petitions against the Collector’s order dated 03.01.1995 as well as the memo dated 24.01.1996, both of which C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  14  of  97 were decided vide a common order of the Learned Single Judge dated 01.09.1997 wherein the court set aside the orders on the ground that the initiation of   revisional   power   under   Section   166­B   of   1317 Fasli   Act   was   an unreasonable   and   arbitrary attempt to invalidate the assignment after an undue delay of more than 34 years. It must be noted that the   intra­court   appeal   against   the   order   dated 01.09.1997 was also dismissed by a Division Bench of   the   High   Court   through   its   order   dated 14.09.1998. 17. The State Government assailed the High Court order dated 14.09.1998 before this Court and vide judgement dated 28.04.2000 reported as   Govt. of 3 A.P.   v.   Gudepu   Sailoo ,  the   State’s   appeal   was allowed   to   the   extent   that   the   proceedings conducted before the District Revenue Officer which culminated into the order dated 15.09.1994, were held to be unsustainable. It was further held that the proceedings should have taken place before the Collector, particularly in view of the directions given by the High Court in its order dated 03.05.1994. 3   Govt. of A.P. v. Gudepu Sailoo  (2000) 4 SCC 625. C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  15  of  97 Hence, the Collector was directed to complete the proceedings   initiated   vide   his   order   dated 03.01.1995 which was later on ratified by the memo dated   24.01.1996.   The   relevant   part   of   the judgement dated 28.04.2000 of this Court reads as follows:– “ We  cannot  subscribe   to   the   view expressed by the High Court in so far as the order passed by the District Revenue Officer is concerned.  Since a mandamus was issued to the Collector, Rangareddy District,   to   hear   and   dispose   of   the explanation,   which   was   required   to   be submitted by the respondents in reply to the show cause notice issued to them, the District   Revenue   Officer   had   no jurisdiction   to   consider   the   matter   in violation   of   the   direction   of   the   High Court.  As   a   matter   of   fact,   the explanation to the show cause notice had to be submitted before the Collector and the Collector alone had to consider and take a final decision in the matter.  The action initiated by the Collector and the ratification∙of   his   order   by   the   State Government   are   matters   which   should have   been   allowed   to   take   final   shape instead   of   being   challenged   at   the interlocutory   stage   by   the   respondents. That   being   so,   there   is   no   necessity   of going into the merits of the submissions made   by   the   learned   counsel   for   the C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  16  of  97 parties with regard  to  the provisions of Section 166­B and 166­C of the Andhra Pradesh   (Telangana   Area)   Land   Revenue Act, 1317 Fasli.  We,  therefore,   dispose   of   this   appeal finally with the direction to the Collector to complete the proceedings, initiated by him by his order dated 3rd of January, 1995   as   ratified   by   the   Government   by its,order dated 24th of January, 1996, at an early date in accordance with law .” (Emphasis Applied) 18. Consequently,   proceedings   pursuant   to   the First SCN were initiated afresh by the Collector by issuing notice dated 17.08.2001 to the Assignees, many among whom were now represented by the Appellants, informing that the proceedings would be taken up by the Joint Collector in exercise of powers delegated by the Collector. The Appellants furnished fresh   explanation(s)   on   27.08.2001   and consequently the office of the Joint Collector passed a resumption order dated 22.12.2001 in favour of the State noticing that:– “In view of the circumstances explained above and since the assignment itself is irregular and the assignees sold the land in   conttavention   of   the   conditions   of assignment   and   also   the   assigned   land has   become   urbanized   and   no   longer C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  17  of  97 subserves   the   purpose   of   cultivation,   I find no reason either to upheld the orders of   the   District   Revenue   Officer,   Ranga Reddy   passed   in   Procds.No.   D1/275/94 Dated:15.9.1994   or   to   revert   back   the land   in  Sy.No.393/   1   to   393/20   totally measuring   an   extent   of   Ac.142∙39   of Mancllerevula   village   of   Rajendranagar Mandal to the assignees. The land should be   remained   as   Government   land. Acoordingly the case is disposed off duly setting   aside   the   orders   of   District Revenue   Oflicer,   Ranga   Reddy   District passed   in   proceedings   No.   Dl/275/94 Dated:l5­9­1994.”  ( sic ) (Emphasis Applied) 19. The Joint Collector’s order dated 22.12.2001 came to be challenged before the High Court, which vide its order dated 04.04.2002 opined that in view 4 of this Court’s judgement in   , the Gudepu Sailoo Joint Collector had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the First   SCN   and   directed   the   District   Collector   to conduct   the   proceedings   and   pass   appropriate orders   after   notice   to   all   parties.   Resultantly, proceedings   were   conducted   before   the   District Collector   wherein   again   resumption   order   dated 15.03.2003 was passed in favour of  the  State. It must be noted that the reasoning provided in the 4 ibid.  C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  18  of  97 resumption   orders   dated   22.12.2001   and 15.03.2003 is more or less identical. 20. The   Appellants   laid   a   challenge   to   the resumption   order   dated   15.03.2003   and   vide   its order dated 21.04.2006, the High Court set aside the same as well the First SCN, primarily for the reasons   as   are   summed   up   in   the   following paragraphs of its judgment:– “ 14. The principal  ground on which the assignments   soμght   to   be   cancelled   by invoking the review powers under section 166­B of the Act is execution of GPA by the assignees in favour of the predecessor in interest. As on this day, the GPA holder is   not   alive   and   even   if   any   power   of attorney exists, it ceases with his death. Therefore,   no   cause   survives   for   the District Revenue Officer to take  suo motu review. The other question is whether the assignments   made   in   favour   of   the petitioners and their predecessor interest is contrary to the Rules then in existence. That issue is into requircd to be examined after a lapse of nearly 40 years. The Laoni patta   certificates   came   to   be   issued   in accordance with the provisions of Laoni, Rules, 1950. Merely because those rules came to be amended by substituting some other rules cannot be a ground to exercise suo mo to review by the District Revenue C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  19  of  97 Officer   or   the   District   Collector   under Sec. 166­B of the Act. 15. In view of the above discussion, I find that the show cause notice issued by the District Revenue Officer, R.R. District is not legal dnd proper. When once the show cause   notice   is   set   aside,   the   basis   for passing the order impugned in the writ∙ petitions by the Joint Collector canriot be said   to   be   well   founded.  Before   parting the case, I deem it appropriate to observe that If there Is any contravention of the conditions   imposed   in   the   assignment order, the Government is always at liberty to   cancel   the   same   In   accordance   with ”  (sic) the provisions of law. (Emphasis Applied) 21. Taking   note   of   the   above­reproduced   liberty granted by the High Court, the Deputy Collector­ cum­Mandal Revenue Officer issued a fresh show cause   notice   dated   11.12.2006  [ Hereinafter, ‘Second SCN’ ] wherein the factum of the sale deeds entered by M.A. Baksh in the capacity of GPA holder of   the   Assignees   was   duly   noticed   and   it   was asserted   that   the   Subject   Land   was   liable   to   be resumed under the 1977 Act. The relevant part of the Second SCN is as follows:– “The   Sale   transaction   above   shown   are impermissible   and   void   as   same   are   in C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  20  of  97 contravention   of   the   provision   of   sub­ section   (2)   of   section­3   of   the   Andhra Pradesh   assigned   land   (Prohibition   of Transfer)   Act,   1977.   As   per   the prohibitions   of   the   said   Act   there   is prohibition   to   sell   the   land   assigned   to you   and   hence   sale   transaction   above referred are invalid. As per the Section 4 of A.P. assigned land   (Prohibition  of   transfer)   Act,  1977, satisfied   that   the   assignees   are contravened   the   provision   of   Sub­sectio (1)   of   section   3   in   respect   of   assigned lands bearing Sy. No. 393/l to 393/20 of Manchirevula   Village.   Hence   you   are hereby   show   cause   as   to   why   the scheduled   land   should   not   be   resumed into Govt. Possession as in such manner as prescribed by law.”  (sic) Post   the   issuance   of   Second   SCN,   the Appellants   tendered   explanation   and   proceedings took place pursuant thereto.  22. Eventually,  the  Second   SCN  culminated  into the resumption order dated 27.01.2007, wherein it was noted that the Assignees had alienated the land to M.A. Baksh through GPA, who in turn sold the land   to   subsequent   purchasers   in   the   form   of smaller plots. These transaction(s) were held to be in contravention of Section 3(1), 3(2), 3(3) and 3(4) of C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  21  of  97 the 1977 Act and accordingly, the Subject Land was ordered to be resumed under Section 4 thereof. It would   also   be   relevant   to   mention   that   the resumption   order   dated   27.01.2007   also   noticed that most of the Subject Land was still fallow and unsuitable for cultivation as it was covered by large boulders/rocks. 23. The Appellants assailed the resumption order dated 27.01.2007 before the High Court in a writ petition which came to be decided in their favour by a   learned   Single   Judge   vide   judgment   dated 05.02.2010 primarily on two grounds –   firstly   that the Second SCN and the  resumption order  dated 27.01.2007 raised the identical issues in respect of Subject Land which stood already decided by the High Court vide its order dated 21.04.2006. Hence, proceedings emanating from the Second SCN were barred by the principle of  res judicata  and an abuse of   process   of   law;   that   the   assignments secondly   were governed by the Laoni Rules of 1950 instead by the   subsequent   GOM   1122,   as   possession   stood granted way back in 1940 much earlier than the date GOM 1122 came into force. It is also useful to C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  22  of  97 mention   that   accordingly   to   the   learned   Single Judge,   the   liberty   granted   in   the   previous   High Court   order   dated   21.04.2006   regarding cancellation   of   Subject   Land   was   only   concerned with   `future   contravention’   of   the   assignment conditions.   Being piqued on account of the order of the 24. learned Single Judge, the State preferred an intra­ court appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court. The said writ appeal has been allowed in the Respondents’   favour   via   the   impugned   judgement whereby   the   resumption   order   dated   27.01.2007 stands upheld for the following reasons: –  The proceedings under the Second SCN were a) not   hit   by   the   doctrine   of   res   judicata   or constructive   res   judicata ,   as   the   same concerned   the   sale   deeds   executed   by   M.A. Baksh and the consequent action under the 1977 Act, which was not an issue decided by the High Court vide its order dated 21.04.2006 whereby the First SCN was set aside. b) The   learned   Single   Judge   had   erroneously construed   the   liberty   granted   in   the   order dated   21.04.2006   in   respect   of   fresh C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  23  of  97 cancellation proceedings to be only for future violation of assignment conditions as no such inference could be drawn from the wording of the   said   order.   It   was   also   held   that   this interpretation virtually amounted to re­writing the order dated 21.04.2006, especially in view of the fact that the review petition against the same,   seeking   to   delete   the   relevant   part granting liberty was specifically dismissed by the High Court. c) The   Subject   Land   was   not   alienable   either under the Laoni Rules of 1950 or under the revised   land   assignment   rules   of   1958   and hence   it   comes   under   the   definition   of ‘assigned land’ as provided in the 1977 Act. The issue of applicability of regulatory regime on   the   assigned   land   stood   settled   by   this 5 Court’s judgement in   Gudepu Sailoo   whose relevant part in this context reads as follows:– “….Thus,   under   the   original   Laoni Rules, 1950 as also under the Revised Policy   published   in   1958,   the alienation   of   the   assigned   land   was prohibited.   While   under   the   Laoni Rules,   1950,   the   alienation   or 5 Gudepu Sailoo  (n 3). C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  24  of  97 transfer   without   the   previous sanction   of   the   Collector   was prohibited, under the Revised Policy, it   was clearly   provided   that   though the assigned lands would be heritable, they would not be transferred… ” d) The   Division   Bench   also   distinguished   the decision   of   a   co­ordinate   bench   of   the   High Court   in   Letter   sent   from   Plot   No.338, Parvant Nagar v. the Collector and District 6 wherein   it   was   held   that   land Magistrate   assigned under Rule 9 of Laoni Rules of 1950 by way of market value collection would not be hit   by   the   provisions   of   the   1977   Act whereunder   alienation   of   assigned   land   was prohibited. It was  specifically noted  that the Subject Land was granted free of cost to the Assignees   without   any   action   or   payment   of market value as envisaged under Form 9(G) of the Laoni Rules of 1950 which was relied upon by   the   Appellants.   The   Division   Bench, therefore, upheld the condition mentioned in 6   Letter sent from Plot No.338, Parvant Nagar v. the Collector and District Magistrate  2008 SCC OnLine AP 477. C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  25  of  97 the   assignment   itself   which   barred   transfer without the consent of the Collector.  e) It was noted that the 1977 Act was in force when   the   GPA   in   favor   of   M.A.   Baksh   was executed   by   the   Assignees   as   well   as   when M.A. Baksh executed the sale deeds in favour of subsequent purchasers for the small plots of land.   Furthermore,   it   was   held   that subsequent cancellation of the GPA in favor of M.A.   Baksh   by   some   of   the   Assignees   was immaterial as the sale deeds executed by him by   then   already   constituted   violation   of   the assignment condition. The aggrieved Appellants are now before this 25. Court.        B.     C   ONTENTIONS     26. We   have   heard   an   array   of   learned   senior counsels representing different parties and perused the documents produced on record. Their written submissions have also been duly considered. 27. Leading   the   arguments   on   behalf   of   the Appellants,   Mr.   Jaideep   Gupta,   learned   senior counsel made the following contentions­   First,   that the Single Judge Order was correct in concluding C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  26  of  97 that the Second SCN was barred by the doctrine of . He argued that the substratum of both res judicata the   First   SCN   and   Second   SCN   is   essentially identical, i.e. violation in respect of the bar on the alienability   of   Subject   Land.   Secondly ,   he   argued that when unoccupied land is permanently granted or assigned under Section 54 of the 1317 Fasli Act as done in the present case, then Section 58 of the said   Act   expressly   provided   that   the   resultant occupancy right shall be ‘deemed to be heritable and transferable’. Even otherwise, he contended that for any   restriction   on   the   transfer   of   Subject   Land under the Special Laoni Rules to be applicable, a separate   notification   under   Section   58­A   of   1317 Fasli Act was a necessary prerequisite as mentioned in the rules itself. For ease of analysis, the relevant provisions   of   the   1317   Fasli   Act   are   reproduced below:– “54.       for Procedure    acquiring unoccupied   land   :  (1) When any person is desirous of taking unoccupied   land   he   shall   before occupying the land submit a petition to the Tahsildar and obtain his permission in writing.  C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  27  of  97 (2) On such petition being submitted, the Tahsildar   may,   in   accordance   with   the rules   made   by   the   Government   in   this behalf from time to time, give permission in writing for occupation. 58.   Occupancy   right   is   heritable   and transferable : An occupancy right to land shall   be   deemed   to   be   heritable   and transferable. 58­A. Sanction  of Collector for transfer of occupied   land   compulsory   in   certain cases :  (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the   preceding   section   the   Government may by Official Gazette notify in respect of any village or tract of the area to which this   Act   extends   that   the   right   of occupation of any land under section 54 given   after   the   date   of   the   notification shall   not   be   transferable   without obtaining   the   previous   sanction   of   the Collector.  (2)   The   Government   may   also   at   its discretion   from   time   to   time   notify   by Official Gazette, that any part or person or class of persons of such village or tract of the area to which this Act extends to which   the   provisions   of   sub­section   (1) have   been   made   applicable   shall   be exempt from the said provisions.” C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  28  of  97 Similarly,   we   may   also   refer   to   the   relevant rules regarding ‘Special Laoni’ as mentioned in the Laoni Rules of 1950 which are as follows:– “                     Special Laoni 15. No lands in the special area notified under   Section   58­Aof   A.P.   (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act, shall be assigned except   in   accordance   the   the   following rules:­  (a) The object of the special  laoni is to make   land   available   in   certain   areas   to such landless persons of agricultural and backward classes as may be notified from time to time, and who have not sufficient means   to   purchase   land   either   at   the ordinary laoni auctions or otherwise. The selection of the most deserving applicant should   be   made   by   Tahsildar   after   due publicity   in   the   village   or   at   the   place fixed for the allotment proceedings.  (b)   Special   laoni,   proceedings   may ordinarily take place twice a year in the months of April and September, and may also take place at other times when the Tahsildar is visiting the locality. 16. In making selection for special laoni preference shall be given to persons who reside in the village, but do not possess any patta or shikmi rights in any land in the   village   or   elsewhere   or   who   have insufficient land but possess bullocks and agricultural implements. Persons who are C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  29  of  97 already cultivating lands are "asamis" or "bataidars" shall be given preference over other labourers. x­x­x­x 19. The allottee of the land shall prepare the land for cultivation within three years of   being   placed   in   possession   and commerce   cultivation   of   the   land thereafter. The pattadar may be rejected by the order of the Collector for breach of any of the above conditions: Provided that he has been served with a notice calling upon him to comply with the conditions which he has violated and he   fails   to   comply   with   it   within   three months of the date of service thereof. If lands   has   been   transferred   in contravention,   the   conditions,   the Collector may eject the transferee.” Thirdly,   Mr.   Gupta,   learned   senior   counsel 28. drew   our   attention   to  this   Court’s   judgement   in 7 Gudepu Sailoo   which we have already reproduced at   Para 17   above, to contend that the impugned decision erroneously   concuded  that this Court had already   decided   the   issue   of   alienability.   He strenuously   argued   that   the   decision   was   not   on merit   as   this   Court   held   that   the   challenge   was premature and remanded the dispute back to the 7 Gudepu Sailoo  (n 3). C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  30  of  97 District   Collector.   Fourthly,   by   relying   on   the decision of the High Court in  G.V.K. Rama Rao vs 8 ,   it   was Bakelite   Hylam   Employees   Co­Op. contended that since the Subject Land was governed by   Laoni   Rules   of   1950,   which   stipulated   no condition   regarding   non­alienability,   the   same would  not  come  under  the definition  of ‘assigned land’ as given under the 1977 Act. In other words, it was submitted that the 1977 Act has no application over   the   Subject   Land.   Fifthly,   it  was   urged   that evoking  suo motu  revisionary powers by the revenue authorities as done in the present case is illegal as the   same   must   be   exercised   within   a   reasonable time or else it would render the exercise of such power arbitrary. Reliance in this regard was placed on   another   decision   of   the   High   Court   in   S. 9 , pointing out that the Santhanam v State of A.P.   Special Leave Petition against the aforecited decision was   rejected   by   this   court   vide   order   dated 19.08.2011 passed in SLP (C) No. 16545 of 2006. Finally,  Mr. Gupta submitted that the Subject Land 8   G.V.K. Rama Rao vs Bakelite Hylam Employees Co­Op. 1997 SCC OnLine AP 200, para 18. 9   S. Santhanam v State of A.P.  2006 SCC OnLine AP 145. C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  31  of  97 has   been   in   possession   with   the   Assignees   from 1953   as   noted   in   the   High   Court’s   order   dated 21.04.2006 as well as the documents which have been brought on record and therefore even if the Temporary Pattas were given in 1961, the applicable law vis­à­vis the assignment should relate back to 1953 itself.  29. Turning up next for the Appellants was learned senior   counsel,   Mr.   Huzefa   Ahmadi   who   while reiterating the arguments made by Mr. Gupta, made the following additional submissions –   Firstly   that requirements for application of Section 58­A of the 1317 Fasli Act were not met, which are as follows – (a) there must be a notification in the official gazette; (b) the said notification must be in respect of ‘any village  or tract’  to which  the  1317 Fasli Act was extended and (c) such land can be transferred with the   permission   of   the   Collector.   Hence,   it   was contended that for any bar in respect of alienability to   be   applicable   through   any   policy,   the requirements   of   Section   58­A   are   sine   qua   non . Secondly,  he argued that even the policies which are stated   to   have   prohibited   alienation   are   not C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  32  of  97 applicable   independently.   With   reference   to   the Circular   dated   08.11.1954   [ Hereinafter   1954 Circular],   it was submitted that the same was not retrospectively   applicable   and   in   any   event,   it referred   to   Section   58­A   only   in   respect   of   lands which   were   granted   for   ‘Eksala’   ( one   year ) cultivation or to lands which have been set apart as provided   in  Paragraph   8   of   the   1954   Circular.   It would thus be appropriate to reproduce the relevant contents   of   the   1954   Circular   which   are   to   the following effect:– “…..The following Circulars regarding the assignment   and   grant   of   Patta   of unoccupied   Government   Lands   to   the Harijans, Backward Classes and Landless poor persons have been issued from time to time. x­x­x­x As   the   orders   issued   through   various circulars were creating confusion in their proper   implementation,   the   following consolidated   orders   are   hereby   issued after   reconsidering   the   various   orders issued  through the aforesaid circulars. x­x­x­x A. Lands under Cultivation on the Basis of Permission for Eksala Cultivation 1. In case of occupation by the Harijans, Scheduled   Castes,   Backward   Classes,   of C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  33  of  97 poor landless persons, patta shall, subject to the provisions contained in Section 58­ A   of   the   A.P.   (Telangana   Area)   Land Revenue Act, be granted free of cost to the extent of one family holding inclusive of the land already owned by occupants and where the land is in excess thereof, they shall be evicted from the excess area x­x­x­x 8.   Village­wise   statements   of   all Porampoke, Gut, Kharjkata, Gairan lands excluding ten percent, fit for grazing and lands   excised   from   forest,   shall   be prepared and all such lands shall first be set   apart   as   are   required   for   public   or Government purposes or on which, there arc Sendhi, Toddy or Gulmohwa trees or which are required to be to be set apart for such purposes or on which there is a Kancha, the grass of which is auctioned every year. The remaining lands including those   from   which   occupants   have   been evicted under para 3 shall under special Laoni   be   assigned   on   patta   to   the Scheduled   Castes,   Harijans,   Backward Classes and poor landless persons who are bonafide agriculturists at the rate of one family holding per family, subject to the provisions  contained   in  Section  58­A  of the A.P. (Telangana  Area) Land Revenue Act. As far as possible each family shall be entitled   to   patta   shall   primarily   be assigned   lands   which   were   being cultivated by them…..” C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  34  of  97 In the same breadth, Mr. Ahmadi contended that all remaining policies regarding assignments, namely, G.O. dated 25.07.1958 [ Hereinafter, ‘1958 Circular’]  which was subsequently clarified by G.O. dated   26.08.1958   [ Hereinafter,   ‘1958 Clarification’]   would   not   be   attracted,   for   the assignment being of 1953 itself, these policies would have no retrospective effect and/or these circulars themselves excluded the Subject Land. The relevant extracts of the 1958 Circular are as follows:– “6.  Terms and conditions of assignment  – (i) The assignment of lands shall be free of market value;  (ii) Land   assigned   shall  be heritable   but not alienable;  (iii) Lands assigned shall be brought under cultivation within three years; (iv) No land tax shall be collected for the first three years except for the extent, if any,   which   has   already   been   brought under   cultivation.   Water   rate   shall, however,   be   charged   if   the   lands   are irrigated with Government water; and  (v) Cultivation should be by the assignee or   the   members   of   his   family   or   with hired   labour   under   the   supervision   of himself or a member of his family. x­x­x­x C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  35  of  97   15.       All assignment :­    Pending assignments   proceedings now pending or arising here after shall be disposed of in accordance with these rules.” (Emphasis Applied) Similarly,   the   relevant   part   of   the   1958 Clarification is to the following effect:­ “7.  Pending cases :­  (a) lands to which Circular No. 14, dated 8th   November,   1954   issued   by   the erstwhile Hyderabad Government and the other Circulars issued in clarification of it were   applicable   should   be   dealt   with under those circulars but not under the new   rules   of   assignment   Issued   in   G.O. th Ms. No. 1406, Rev, Dt. 25  July, 1958: Provided that the extent of land to be   assigned   in   all   such   cases   shall   not exceed the limits of 6 acres of dry or 2­ 1/2 acres of wet land inclusive of the land already passed (b) Cases in which the right of patta was given   to   the   occupants   according   to Circular No. 14, and other circulars issued in clarification of it and cases in respect to which there is evidence in Government Records   either   of   application   presented by the encroacher for grant of patta or of his possession of the lands should not be treated   as   pending   cases   but   should   be decided under Circular No. 14 and other circulars issued in clarification of it.”  C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  36  of  97 (Emphasis Applied) It was, thus, submitted that provisions of 1958 Circular   introducing   the twin conditions in respect of   alienation   and   cultivation,   would   not   be applicable to the Subject Land on account of the 1958   Clarification   which   purportedly   brought   the Subject   Land   within   the   purview   of   the   1954 Circular. 30. Thirdly,   Mr. Ahmadi argued that Section 4 of the 1977 Act provided for re­assignment of the land in case of contravention of Section 3 of the 1977 Act instead   of   resumption   as   was   ordered   by   the revenue   authorities   in   this   case.   Fourthly,   it   was submitted   that   evocation   of   suo   motu   revisionary powers   through   the   Second   SCN   was   not permissible as the sale deeds were of 1992 while Second SCN was of 2006, which would violate the temporal   aspects   as   argued   by   Mr.   Gupta,   and, thus, the action was  ex facie  illegal. 31. Learned   senior   counsel,   Mr.   Niranjan   Reddy assisted   by   learned   counsel   Mr.   Krishna   Dev Jagarlamudi   also   appeared   on   behalf   of   the Appellants.   While   lending   his   support   to   the abovementioned arguments, he made the following C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  37  of  97 submissions –   Firstly , that the issue of applicable law over the Subject Land can no longer be opened in light of the High Court’s order dated 21.04.2006 wherein   it   was   categorically   held   that   the   State could   not   agitate   over   the   applicability   of   correct regulatory   regime   after   a   gap   of   30   years   post assignment. According to him, the Laoni Rules of 1950 were held to be applicable over the Subject Land.   In  support   of   this,   he   also   referred   to   the Mandal   Revenue   Officer’s   clarification   vide   his memo dated 23.09.1992.  Secondly,  he took pains to go through the entirety of sale deeds   executed by M.A. Baksh to point out that out of the originally assigned area measuring 142 Acres 39 Guntas, only about 10 Acres land was sold through these sale deeds.   In   other   words,   the   contravention   of provisions of 1977 Act was limited to this area and an order of resumption could not have been passed in   respect   of   the   entire   Subject   Land.   Lastly,   he submitted that even if the Subject Land is resumed, the Appellants are entitled to compensation as per the Seven­Judge bench decision of the High Court in  LAO cum Revenue Divisional Officer, Chevella C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  38  of  97 10 Division v Mekala Pandu , read with the right to property duly protected under Article 300A of the Constitution. Supplementing   the   Appellants,   Mr.   Ranjit 32. Kumar, learned senior counsel raised the following contentions –   Firstly,   that in the counter affidavit filed by the impleaded Respondent, i.e. Greyhounds, a   plea   has   been   taken   that   they   have   taken possession of the Subject Land in 2003 itself. If this was the case, then where was the need to issue the Second   SCN   in   2006   and   to   take   this   contrary stance by them.  he contended that in all Secondly,  the   sale  deeds   entered   by  M.A.  Baksh as   a  GPA holder,   he   is   mentioned   as   the   vendee   which showcases   that   the   Appellants   were   unaware   or were not actively involved in carrying out sale of the Subject Land. 33. In the end, Mr. Tripurari Ray learned counsel appearing   on   behalf   of   the   Appellants   raised   a contention for the first time at this stage by relying on the decision of this Court in  Yeshwant Deorao 10   LAO cum Revenue Divisional Officer, Chevella Division v Mekala Pandu 2004 SCC OnLine AP 217. C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  39  of  97 11 Deshmukh v Walchand Ramchand Kothari . He contended that the Laoni Rules of 1950 created an artificial classification among two classes – namely those who were granted regular patta under Rule 2 to 14 of these Rules through the bidding process which was alienable and the landless or poor people who were granted special patta under Rule 15 to 24 of Laoni Rules of 1950 with a bar on the alienability and obligation of an Assignee to cultivate the land. He   contended   that   this   amounted   to   ‘class legislation’   which   discriminated   against   the Assignees   and   violated   their   fundamental   rights under Article 14 of the Constitution. 34. Repelling the combined submissions made on behalf   of   the   Appellants,   Mr.   K.K.   Venugopal, learned   senior   counsel   for   the   Respondent­ Greyhounds, has raised the following contentions – Firstly,   that the Temporary Pattas granted only a limited occupancy right to the Assignees in the form of a temporary license to occupy and, it was not a permanent assignment  per se .  Secondly,  the claim of the Appellants that they were cultivating the land is 11   Yeshwant Deorao Deshmukh v Walchand Ramchand Kothari  1950 SCC 766. C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  40  of  97 baseless   as   they   were   never   interested   in   even holding the possession over the Subject Land itself. In   this   respect,   he   referred   to   the   Panchnama conducted by the revenue officials in the years 2003 and 2007 wherein it was noted that no cultivation was   going   on   at   the   Subject   Land.   Thirdly,   he contended that under the regular assignment as per Laoni Rules of 1950, an auction mechanism was in place, and it was only through this process that an alienable right could be granted in respect of the assigned land. In this regard, he relied upon Form 9(G) under which the Subject Land was granted to Assignees and invited our attention to the relevant part indicative of the auction mechanism. He further submitted that the grant of Subject Land was under the   Special   Loani,   which   included   the   valid condition of non­alienability.  Fourthly,  he submitted that   the   finding   of   possession   as   well   as   the Appellants’ claim that applicable rules in respect of assignment should  be  that   of  1953  is  completely unsustainable. Learned senior counsel has taken us through the documents on record to showcase that the assignment only happened on  21.10.1961, i.e., C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  41  of  97 when  Temporary   Pattas  were   granted.   He   further maintained that all other documents only discussed the grant of sanction of the Subject Land and the procedure pending before any kind of assignment could   take   place.   Fifthly,   he   submitted   that   Mr. Reddy’s argument concerning limited contravention of the 1977 Act is factually incorrect in light of the language employed in the GPA executed in favour of M.A. Baksh, which categorically noted that the said GPA was in respect of the entirety of Subject Land. he argued that the Subject Land is resumed Finally,  for   a   ‘public   purpose’,   i.e.   training   of   the   elite commando force, which has been instrumental in suppressing the Naxalite movement in the region. He also submitted that the Assignees were hand in glove with the  land  mafia as well  as the  corrupt revenue  officers, who had  set their sights  on the Subject Land. 35. Mr. C.S. Vaidyanathan, learned senior counsel appearing   on   behalf   of   Respondent   State   of Telangana, supported the contentions made by Mr. Venugopal   and   has   supplemented   the   same   by highlighting the following additional points –  Firstly C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  42  of  97 that the High Court order dated 21.04.2006 only discusses   the   issue   of   raising   the   objection   of irregularity   in   assignment   and   doesn’t   decide   the issue of applicable law per se. To say it differently, it only bars the government from resuming the land after thirty years on the ground that the Subject Land was assigned under an incorrect law, but it nowhere resolves the legal regime under which the conditions applicable on the assignment are to be governed.   He supported the reasoning assigned in the impugned judgment of the Division Bench that the   doctrine   of   res   judicata   or   constructive   res judicata   does   not   bar   the   Second   SCN   and   the consequent proceedings.   Secondly , he argued that the assignment of Subject Land was still governed by the twin condition of non­alienability as well as the obligation of cultivation by the Assignees. 36. Mr. V. Giri, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the State of Telangana, has wrapped the arguments by reiterating the stance taken by both Mr. Venugopal and Mr. Vaidyanathan. Before noting his submissions, it would be pertinent to note that Mr. Giri has taken a contrary stance in respect of C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  43  of  97 Mr.   Venugopal’s   submission   that   only   temporary occupancy right had been created in favour of the Assignees.   Mr.   Giri   has   fairly   admitted   that   the pattas   issued   in   1961   were   in   furtherance   of   an assignment only. Thereafter, he has argued ­  Firstly that  the Subject Land  was governed  by  the  G.O. dated 25.07.1958 as well as the GOM 1122, which barred alienation by the Assignees as noted above. He submitted that even otherwise, the assignment was in the nature of Special Laoni and was governed by the condition of bar on sale without Collector’s permission as well as cultivation of the land. Both these   conditions   were   incorporated   in   the Temporary Pattas  issued under Form 9(G), which also   reproduced   Rule   19   as   applicable  to   Special Laoni. He submitted that even though the applicable law changed, the format under which assignments were granted to landless individuals remained the same, i.e. Form 9(G). In other words, he argued that though the Temporary Pattas granted in the present case to the Assignees erroneously mentioned that the form was issued under Laoni Rules of 1950, the pattas were in fact, governed by the revised legal C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  44  of  97 regime.   Secondly,   he urged that the prohibition on alienability   as   introduced   by   the   1977   Act   was retroactive in effect, and the same has been upheld in   a   full   bench   decision   of   the   High   Court   in 12 Dharma   Reddy   v   Sub­Collector,   Bodhan . building on the arguments of Mr. Venugopal Finally,  in   respect   of   the   involvement   of   the   alleged   land mafia,   he   referred   to   a   Memorandum   of Understanding   entered   into   between   some   of   the Appellants and a private real estate company for the sale of the Subject Land and also informed that a First Investigation Report has also been filed on this behalf   by   the   revenue   authorities   against   the accused which include some of the Appellants. During rebuttals, Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, 37. learned senior counsel on behalf of the Appellants reiterated the arguments made in respect of Section 58­A   of   the   1317   Fasli   Act.   He   furthermore submitted that even if there is a restriction on the transfer of land independent of Section 58­A of the 1317   Fasli   Act,   as   contained   in   the  Temporary Pattas regarding need of permission of the Collector, then such restriction indicates a permissive regime 12     Dharama Reddy v Sub­Collector, Bodhan 1986 SCC OnLine AP 141. C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  45  of  97 instead of a prohibitory regime which is a necessary corollary for invoking the provisions of 1977 Act. He vehemently reiterated that the Subject  Land doesn’t come under the ambit of the term ‘assigned land’ as defined under the 1977 Act.        C.     A   NALYSIS     38. Before we analyse the rival contentions raised by the parties, it would be appropriate to broadly highlight   the   issues   which   arise   for   our consideration:–  a) Whether the proceedings emanating out of the Second SCN are barred by the doctrine of  res  or constructive  ? judicata res judicata Whether the exercise of   suo motu   revisionary b) powers while issuing the Second SCN is bad in law? c) What is the law governing the assignment of the   Subject   Land   and   whether   the   same contained any bar in respect of alienation?  Whether   the   assignment   of   Subject   Land d) comes under the purview of 1977 Act?  If   question   No.(d)   is   answered   in   positive, e) would the entirety of Subject Land or only a part thereof be considered to have violated the C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  46  of  97 1977 Act in light of the sale deeds executed by M.A. Baksh as the GPA holder? f) Whether   the   Appellants   are   entitled   to   any compensation   on   account   of   the   resumption order dated 27.01.2007?   C.1    T   HE   A PPLICATION   OF   D OCTRINE   OF        R ES     JUDICATA        39. At the outset, we would like to highlight that since   the   Second   SCN   doesn’t   speak   about   the violation   of   assignment   condition   regarding cultivation, it would not be expedient to adjudicate or comment on the same. Coming back to the issue of   res   judicata   based   upon   the   allegation   of alienability and its legal consequences, it would be prudent to reproduce the reasoning contained in the impugned judgement which is as follows:–  “17.   In   the   considered   opinion   of   this Court,   the   issues   involved   in W.P.Nos.13165   and   23639   of   2003   and the proceedings involved in the present writ   petition   are   different.   In W.P.Nos.13165 and  L.3639 of 2003, the issues   raised   therein   pertained   to   the legality of the assignment orders issued in   favour   of   the   respondents/assignees C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  47  of  97 and the execution of the GPA in favour of one M.A.Baksh to transfer the lands and consequent   violation   of   the   assignment orders. The proceedings in the aforesaid cases were by way of   revision suo motu   under Section 166­B of the Land Revenue Act,   1317F   and   the   High   Court   has answered   that   the   legality   of   the assignment orders need not be gone into after forty years and the cause of action regarding the execution of GPA does not survive since the GPA holder is∙ not alive. On the contrary, the issue involved in the present   writ   petition   deals   with   the proceedings   issued   by   the   Mandal Revenue   Officer   (W.P.No.3634   of   2007) relates to the execution of sale deeds by GPA holder in favour of. several persons and the action taken under Act No.9 of 1977.   As   many   as   71   sale   deeds   were executed   in   respect   of   the   assigned lands…..  x­x­x­x 18.   Meaning   thereby   in   respect   of assigned lands, sale deeds were executed which   were   impermissible   in   law.   The aforesaid   issue   was   never   the   subject matter of earlier litigation and therefore, by   no   stretch   of   imagination,   it   could have   been   held   by   the   learned   Single Judge   that   the   proceedings   dated 27.01.2007 are hit by  res judicata. ” C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  48  of  97 40. The reasoning assigned by the Division Bench of the High Court is, thus, founded on the premise that   the   cause   of   action   in   the   Second   SCN   is different   from   the   First   SCN.   In   response   to   the same,   Appellants  have   extensively   referred   to   the resumption   order   dated   10.05.2003   which   was passed in furtherance of the proceedings conducted in   First   SCN   to   state   that   the   same   actively considered the issue of the sale deeds executed by M.A. Baksh as well the contravention of 1977 Act. It was urged that since the First SCN was set aside by the High Court through its order dated 21.04.2006, the   observations   in   the   resumption   order   dated 10.05.2003 would effectively merge with the findings of   the   High   Court   order   dated   21.04.2006   and therefore   the   Second   SCN   alleging   identical violations   should   be   held   to   be   barred   by   the doctrine of  res judicata .  41. However,   we   do   not   find   ourselves   in agreement with this line of thought for the precise reason   that   the   High   Court   in   its   order   dated 21.04.2006   had   emphatically   held   that   the   First SCN   was   issued   without   jurisdiction   and   set   the C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  49  of  97 same   aside,   instead   of   dealing   with   resumption order   dated   10.05.2003   on   merits.   In   effect,   the resumption order dated 10.05.2003 was held to be a nullity.   Therefore   in   light   of   the   settled   law   as expounded by this Court in   A. Jithendernath v. 13 Jubilee   Hills   Coop.   House   Building   Society , doctrine of   res judicata   would not be applicable as an order being a nullity never existed in the eyes of the law. Coming   to   the   issue   of   the   finding   in   High 42. Court’s order dated 21.04.2006 with respect to the demise of M.A. Baksh making the GPA redundant, it is   may   be   noticed   that   the   same   is   materially different from the violations as alleged in the Second SCN   and   held   in   the   impugned   order.   On   closer scrutiny,   we   may   point   out   that   the   aforesaid observation regarding the GPA executed in favour of M.A. Baksh was not a fundamental determination but only a collateral determination. In this context, the   decision   of   this   Court   in   Pawan   Kumar 13   A. Jithendernath v. Jubilee Hills Coop. House Building Society  (2006) 10 SCC 96. C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  50  of  97 14 Gupta  v.  Rochi   Ram  Nag  Deo   may   be  usefully cited which observes that:– “16. The rule of   incorporated res judicata in   section   11   of   the   Code   of   Civil Procedure (CPC) prohibits the Court from trying an issue which “has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties”, and has been heard and finally decided by that Court. It is   the   decision   on   an   issue,   and   not   a mere finding on any Incidental question to reach such decision, which operates as res judicata ….” (Emphasis Applied) 43. By   now   it’s   a   globally   settled   principle   of common law jurisprudence that only determinations which   are   fundamental   would   result   in   the 15 application   of   the   doctrine   of   res  judicata .   Only those   findings,   without   which   the   Court   cannot adjudicate a dispute and also form the vital cog in the reasoning of a definite conclusion on an issue on merits, constitute  res judicata  between the same set of parties in subsequent proceedings.   However, in the process of arriving at a final conclusion, if the Court makes any incidental, supplemental or non­ essential observations which are not foundational to 14    (1999) 4 SCC 243. Pawan Kumar Gupta v. Rochi Ram Nag Deo 15  Justice KR Handley,  Spencer Bower, Turner and Handley: The Doctrine   of Res judicata  (3rd edn, LexisNexis Butterworths, 1996) pages 103­107. C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  51  of  97 the   final   determination,   the   same   would   not   tie down the hands of courts in future. 44. The   principle   in   respect   of   fundamental determination has been explicitly discussed by this Court in   Sajjadanashin Sayed Md. B.E. Edr. v. 16 through   the   following Musa   Dadabhai   Ummer   paragraph:– “16.   Spencer   Bower   and   Turner   on   The Doctrine of   (2nd Edn., 1969, Res judicata p. 181) refer to the English and Australian experience   and   quote   Dixon,   J.   of   the Australian High Court in Blair v. Curran [(1939) 62 CLR 464, 553 (Aus HC)] CLR at p. 553 to say: “The   difficulty   in   the   actual application   of   these conceptions   is   to   distinguish the   matters   fundamental   or cardinal   to   the   prior   decision on   judgment,   or   necessarily involved   in   it   as   its   legal justification   or   foundation, from   matters   which,   even though   actually   raised   and decided   as   being   in   the circumstances   of   the   case   the determining considerations, yet are   not   in   point   of   law   the 16   Sajjadanashin Sayed Md. B.E. Edr. v. Musa Dadabhai Ummer  (2000) 3  SCC 350. C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  52  of  97 essential   foundation   of   a groundwork of the judgment.” The   authors   say   that   in   order   to understand this essential distinction, one has   always   to   inquire   with   unrelenting severity   —   is   the   determination   upon which it is sought to find an estoppel so fundamental to the substantive decision that the latter cannot stand without the former. Nothing less than this will do. It is suggested by Dixon, J. that even where this   inquiry   is   answered   satisfactorily, there   is   still   another   test   to   pass:   viz. whether   the   determination   is   the “immediate   foundation”   of   the   decision as   opposed   to   merely   “a   proposition collateral or subsidiary only, i.e. not more than part of the reasoning supporting the conclusion”.   It   is   well   settled,   say   the above   authors,   “that   a   mere   step   in reasoning is insufficient. What is required is no less than the determination of law, or   fact   or   both,   fundamental   to   the substantive decision”. (Emphasis Applied) 45. The   effective   test   to   distinguish   between   a fundamental   or   collateral  determination   is  hinged on   the   inquiry   of   whether   the   concerned determination   was   so   vital   to   the   decision   that without   which   the   decision   itself   cannot   stand independently.   Any   determination,   despite   being C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  53  of  97 deliberate or formal, cannot give rise to application of   the   doctrine   of     if   they   are   not res   judicata fundamental in nature. On a plain reading of the High Court’s order dated 21.04.2006 in conjugation with the application of the test formulated above, we find that the observation in respect of GPA in the said order was indeed a mere collateral finding. We say   so   for   the   reason   that   the   order   dated 21.04.2006 primarily dealt with the evocation of  suo motu  revisionary powers under Section 166­B of the 1317 Fasli Act for issuing the First SCN and not the allegations   regarding   violation   of   assignment conditions. In fact, the First SCN was held to be bad in   law   and   without   jurisdiction   because   it   was primarily   issued   on   the   ground   of   irregularity   by stating   that   the   Subject   Land   was   erroneously assigned under the old rules and that it sought to disturb the assignment after a period of more than thirty years. This was held to be in contravention to the   settled   law   for   evoking   suo   motu   revisionary powers under Section 166­B of the 1317 Fasli Act which is the sole fundamental determination by the High   Court   in   its   order   dated   21.04.2006. C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  54  of  97 Resultantly, the finding that the GPA was rendered redundant on account of the demise of M.A. Baksh was only collateral in nature and is not hit by the doctrine of  res judicata .  46. The other aspect which needs our attention is whether the second SCN would be barred by the extended doctrine of constructive   . The res judicata said doctrine has been formulated over the time by courts as a part of public policy to prevent abuse of process of courts and to bring finality to the judicial pronouncements.   This   court   in   State   of   UP   v. 17 Nawab   Hussain   eloquently   explained   this principle:– “3. The   principle   of   estoppel per   rem judicatam is   a   rule   of   evidence.   As   has been   stated   in Marginson v. Blackburn Borough Council [(1939) 2 KB 426 at p. 437] , it may be said to be “the broader rule   of   evidence   which   prohibits   the reassertion   of   a   cause   of   action”.  This doctrine is based on two theories: (i) the finality   and   conclusiveness   of   judicial decisions   for   the   final   termination   of disputes   in   the   general   interest   of   the community as a matter of public policy, and (ii) the interest of the individual that he   should   be   protected   from 17   State of UP v. Nawab Hussain  (1977) 2 SCC 806. C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  55  of  97 multiplication   of   litigation.   It   therefore serves not only a public but also a private purpose by obstructing the reopening of matters   which   have   once   been adjudicated   upon.   It   is   thus   not permissible to obtain a second judgment for the same civil relief on the same cause of   action,   for   otherwise   the   spirit   of contentiousness   may   give   rise   to conflicting judgments of equal authority, lead to multiplicity of actions and bring the   administration   of   justice   into disrepute. It is the cause of action which gives rise to an action, and that is why it is necessary for the courts to recognise that a cause of action which results in a judgment   must   lose   its   identity   and vitality and merge in the judgment when pronounced.   It   cannot   therefore   survive the   judgment,   or   give   rise   to   another cause of action on the same facts. This is what is known as the general principle of . res judicata 4. But it may be that the same set of facts may give rise to two or more causes of action.  If   in   such   a   case   a   person   is allowed to choose and sue upon one cause of action at one time and to reserve the other   for   subsequent   litigation,   that would aggravate the burden of litigation. Courts   have   therefore   treated   such   a course of action as an abuse of its process and   Somervell,   L.J.,   has   answered   it   as C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  56  of  97 follows   in   v.   [(1947) Greenhalgh Mallard All ER 255 at p. 257] :  “I   think   that   on   the authorities   to   which   I   will refer it would  be accurate to say that  res judicata  for this purpose is not confined to the issues   which   the   court   is actually asked to decide, but that  it covers  issues or facts which   are   so   clearly   part   of the   subject­matter   of   the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the   court   to   allow   a   new proceeding   to   be   started   in respect of them.” This is therefore another and an equally necessary   and   efficacious   aspect   of   the same principle, for it helps in raising the bar of  res judicata  by suitably construing the   general   principle   of   subduing   a cantankerous   litigant.   That   is   why   this other rule has some times been referred to as constructive   which, in res judicata reality,   is   an   aspect   or   amplification   of the general principle.” (Emphasis Applied) 47. The doctrine of constructive   res judicata   will not be applicable in the present case for the simple reason that the issues raised in the Second SCN C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  57  of  97 were never adjudicated upon in the first place as explained   above.   The   plea   that   the   same   should have   been   raised   in   the   earlier   proceedings,   is irrelevant in light of the liberty granted by the High Court in its  order  dated  21.04.2006  whereby  the Revenue   authorities   were   expressly   permitted   to initiate fresh proceedings for violation of assignment conditions. The Division Bench of the High Court is therefore right in holding that this liberty was not for ‘future contraventions only’ as perceived by the Single Judge in his order dated 05.02.2010, for it would   render   the   liberty   granted   in   order   dated 21.04.2006 as obsolete. We thus hold that in light of the   liberty   granted   by   the   High   Court   vide   order dated 21.04.2006, the Second SCN would neither constitute   an   abuse   of   process   of   court   nor   will attract the doctrine of constructive  res judicata . 48. In   light   of   the   above   discussion   and observations,   we   hold   that   the   proceedings emanating out of the Second SCN are not barred by the doctrine of  res judicata  or the extended doctrine of constructive  res judicata . C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  58  of  97   C.2    T   HE   E XERCISE   OF       S UO   M OTU       R EVISIONARY       P OWERS      The   Appellants   have   strenuously   contended 49. that   evocating   suo   motu   revisionary   powers   and issuing the Second SCN was bad in law as the same was  initiated  after  more than  45 years when the Subject Land was initially assigned and about more than 15 years after the sale deeds were executed. At this   stage,   we   firstly   refer   to   the   following observations   made   by   this   Court   in Ibrahimpatnam   Taluk   Vyavasaya   Coolie 18 Sangham  v.  K.   Suresh   Reddy   in   respect   of exercise of  suo motu  revisionary powers:– “9.  ……  Exercise   of         suo   motu     power depended on facts and circumstances of each case. In cases of fraud, this power could   be   exercised   within   a   reasonable time   from   the   date   of   detection   or discovery of fraud. While exercising such power, several factors need to be kept in mind such as effect on the rights of the third parties over the immovable property due   to   passage   of   considerable   time, change of hands by subsequent bona fide transfers,   the   orders   attaining   finality under the provisions of other Acts (such 18   Ibrahimpatnam Taluk Vyavasaya Coolie Sangham  v.  K. Suresh Reddy (2003) 7 SCC 667. C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  59  of  97 as   the   Land   Ceiling   Act).  Hence,   it appears   that   without   stating   from   what date the period of limitation starts and within what period the  suo motu  power is to   be   exercised,   in   sub­section   (4)   of Section 50­B of the Act, the words “at any time”   are   used   so   that   the   suo   motu power   could   be   exercised   within reasonable   period   from   the   date   of discovery of fraud depending on facts and circumstances of each case in the context of the statute and nature of rights of the parties. Use of the words “at any time” in sub­section (4) of Section 50­B of the Act cannot be rigidly read letter by letter. It must be read and construed contextually and   reasonably.  If   one   has   to   simply proceed   on   the   basis   of   the   dictionary meaning of the words “at any time”, the   power under sub­section (4) of   suo motu   Section 50­B of the Act could be exercised even after decades and then it would lead to   anomalous   position   leading   to uncertainty   and   complications   seriously affecting   the   rights   of   the   parties,   that too,   over   immovable   properties.   Orders attaining   finality   and   certainty   of   the rights of the parties accrued in the light of the orders passed must have sanctity.   Exercise of      suo motu    power “at any time” only means that no specific period such   as   days,   months   or   years   are   not   (       sic ) prescribed   reckoning   from   a   particular date. But that does not mean that “at any C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  60  of  97 time” should be unguided and arbitrary. In   this   view,   “at   any   time”   must   be understood   as   within   a   reasonable   time depending on the facts and circumstances of each case in the absence of prescribed period of limitation.” (Emphasis Applied) 50. It is a matter of record that the Second SCN pertains   to   alleged   violation   of   assignment conditions   by   transferring   the   ownership   rights through   sale   deeds   executed   in   the   year   1992. However,   the   period   till   2006,   in   our   considered opinion, could not be counted because the parties were engaged in litigation pursuant to the First SCN and it was only after the liberty was accorded by the High Court in its order dated 21.04.2006 that the Second   SCN   could   be   issued.   We   have   already discussed   in   great   detail   the   reasons   behind   the grant   of   said   liberty   and   the   same   need   not   be reiterated. In the facts and circumstances of this case and taking note of the chronological events, we are   satisfied   that   the   exercise   of   suo   motu revisionary power while issuing the Second SCN was not   vitiated   on   account   of   inordinate   delay   as claimed by the Appellants.  C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  61  of  97   C.3    T   HE  A PPLICABLE  L AW   ON  A SSIGNED  L ANDS   51. Once we have determined the validity of the Second SCN in affirmative, the next question that falls for  our consideration is  whether the  subject land was  assigned  in the year 1953 as claimed by the   Appellants   or   in   1961   when   the   Temporary Pattas were issued. However, before examining the said point, we express our inability to accept the contention made by Mr. Venugopal, learned senior counsel in respect of the nature of occupancy rights granted to the Assignees. On a plain reading of the recitals   contained   in   the   relevant   documents, particularly the Temporary Pattas, First and Second SCNs and also the stand taken by Mr. Giri, we have no reason to doubt that the grant of Subject Land was in the nature of an assignment and not in any form of limited occupancy right. 52.   Coming   now   to   the   issue   of   the   date   of assignment, we agree entirely with the Respondent’s stance that the actual assignment took place only at the time of issuance of Temporary Pattas and not at any   point   prior   thereto.   On   perusal   of   the documents   brought   on   record,   which   are   merely C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  62  of  97 collection   of   inter­departmental   correspondence before the  issuance  of Temporary Pattas, we find that the assignment process was still underway. The Appellant’s   reliance   on   the   document   dated 28.10.1953   is   unfounded   as   the   same   only communicated   the   sanction   by   the   executive   and nothing   else.  In  fact,  the   letter   dated  04.06.1960 brings out the fact that the area of the sanctioned land was to be reduced to 142 Acres and 39 Guntas and then only was to be assigned. In this regard, this   Court   has   repeatedly   held   and   recently 19 reiterated again in   that:– Mahadeo v. Sovan Devi “14.     It   is   well   settled   that   inter­ departmental communications are in the process   of  consideration   for   appropriate decision and cannot be relied upon as a basis   to   claim   any   right.  This   Court examined the said question in a judgment reported   as Omkar   Sinha v. Sahadat 3 Khan . Reliance was placed on Bachhittar 4 Singh v. State   of   Punjab  to   hold   that merely writing something on the file does not amount to an order. Before something amounts   to   an   order   of   the   State Government,   two   things   are   necessary. First, the order has to be expressed in the name   of   the   Governor   as   required   by clause (1) of  Article  166  and  second,  it 19   Mahadeo v. Sovan Devi  2022 SCC OnLine SC 1118. C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  63  of  97 has   to   be   communicated.   As   already indicated, no formal order modifying the decision   of   the   Revenue   Secretary   was ever made. Until such an order is drawn up, the State Government cannot, in our opinion,   be   regarded   as   bound   by   what was stated in the file.” Similarly,   the   decision   of   this   Court   in 20 which   is Bachhittar   Singh v. State   of   Punjab   cited in the above reproduced paragraph notes:– “ 9. The question, therefore, is whether he did in fact make such an order.  Merely writing   something   on   the   file   does   not amount   to   an   order.   Before   something amounts   to   an   order   of   the   State Government   two   things   are   necessary. The   order   has   to   be   expressed   in   the name   of   the   Governor   as   required   by clause (1) of Article 166 and then it has to be   communicated.   As   already   indicated, no formal order modifying the decision of the   Revenue   Secretary   was   ever   made. Until such an order is drawn up the State Government   cannot,   in   our   opinion,   be regarded as bound by what was stated in the file. As long as the matter rested with him   the   Revenue   Minister   could   well score out his remarks or minutes on the file and write fresh ones. ” 53. We, therefore, have no reason to doubt that the assignment   took   place   only   on  21.10.1961,   i.e. 20   Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab  AIR 1963 SC 395. C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  64  of  97 when the Temporary Pattas were issued. We also wish to highlight that the observation in the High Court order dated 21.04.2006, that the Assignees were in possession since 1953 is an ex­facie mistake of fact in light of the documents brought on record as none of them supports this stance, including the explanations   submitted   in   response   to   the   SCNs wherein the Assignees themselves have stated that possession was given to them in 1960. However, we hasten to add that since the assignment would be governed   by   the   legal   regime   as   applicable   on 21.10.1961, the aforementioned factually incorrect observation made by the High Court in respect of the date of taking possession of the Subject Land by Assignees is inconsequential. 54. Once   it   is   determined   that   the   regulatory regime which was in vogue and held the field as on 21.10.1961 will govern the assignments, then it also stands crystalised that the 1958 Circular as well as GOM 1122 being in force at that time, are clearly applicable   to   the   Subject   Land.   The   1958 Clarification   which   discounts   the   application   of 1958 Circular is not attracted in view of proviso to C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  65  of  97 Rule 7(a) as each of the Assignees in the present case was granted around 7 Acres 6 Guntas of land for cultivation which is much is more than the limit of “ 6 acres of dry or 2­1/2 acres of wet land ” being the   perquisite   for   application   of   the   1958 Clarification. As a necessary corollary, we hold that there   was   a   conditional   bar   on   alienation   of   the Subject Land as provided in the 1958 Circular and the   GOM   1122.   The   question   whether   the   lands were assigned under ‘regular’ or ‘special laoni’ under the   Laoni   Rules   of   1950   consequently   becomes academic   and   we   do   not   deem   it   necessary   to express our opinion in relation thereto. 55. Finally,   attention   must   be   paid   to   the Appellant’s   argument   concerning   non­compliance with the mandatory requirement of notification as contemplated under Section 58­A of 1317 Fasli Act for invoking any condition in respect of alienability. Heavy reliance in this regard has been placed on the following   paragraph   of   Letter   sent   from   Plot 21   stating   inter­alia   that   no   notification No.338 , 21   Letter sent from Plot No.338  (n 6). C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  66  of  97 under Section 58­A was published for the district in which the Subject Land lies:– “45. Section 58­A of the Telangana Area Land Revenue Act puts a restriction for transfer   of   occupied   land   notified   in respect of any village or tract of the area to   which   Act   extends   that   the  right  of occupation   of   any   land   under   Sec.   54 given   after   the   date   of   the   notification shall   not   be   transferable   without obtaining   the   previous   sanction   of   the Collector.  The   Advocate   General representing   the   State   Government admitted that no notification by the State Government   under   Sec.   58­A   was published   prohibiting   transfer   of   the occupied   land   granted   patta   under   Sec. 54.  The same has been recorded by this court in WP No. 144/75 dt. 6­12­1976. x­x­x­x 55. For  the  aforesaid   reasons,   we   are inclined   to   hold   that   though   the Government framed rules and notified the same cannot be treated as notification as contemplated   under   Sec.   58­A   of   the Telangana Area Land Revenue Act where State   Government   has   to   notify   any village or tract of the area, to which this Act   extends,   for   obtaining   previous sanction of the Collector. Therefore, Rule VI (ii) of the Revised Assignment Policy issued in G.O.Ms. No. 1406 dt. 25­7­1958 C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  67  of  97 cannot   be   given   effect   to   until   such notification is issued.” (Emphasis Applied) 56. However, it is pertinent to mention here that 22 the decision in   Letter sent from Plot No.338   in its later part clarifies the application of compliance with Section 58­A when it says that:­  “56. Even   if   the   rules   are   framed   in exercise   of   rule   making   power   unless notification   is   issued   as   contemplated under Sec. 58­A notifying any village or tract of the area where  sanction of the Collector for transfer of land is necessary, rules   cannot   be   enforced.   As   already observed,   the condition,  if any  imposed for sale of unoccupied land on payment of market value under Form­G is till the sale is   confirmed   by   the   Collector,   but   not otherwise,   as  Sec.   58­A   itself   envisages sanction   of   right   of   occupation   of   land under Sec. 54 given after the date of the notification, but the same does not cover the occupancy rights granted under Sec. 58 of the Telangana Land  Revenue  Act. Point No. 1 is answered accordingly.” (Emphasis Applied) The   abovementioned   decision   thus   envisages 57. the application of Section 58­A of the 1317 Fasli Act only in cases where the assignment is within the ambit of Section 54 of the 1317 Fasli Act. In other 22   Letter sent from Plot No.338  (n 6). C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  68  of  97 words, Assignments such as those under Section 58 of   the   1317   Fasli   Act   are   free   from   the   rigours specified under Section 58­A of the 1317 Fasli Act. It goes without saying that the assignment of the Subject Land was not under Section 54 of the 1317 Fasli Act as may be seen from the contents of the 1958   Circular   which   draws   a   clear   distinction between­ (a) Land assigned on payment of market value after making an application to the Collector and (b) Land Assigned to the Landless poor persons. The former is the case of assignment under Section 54 of the 1317 Fasli Act and the latter is covered within the ambit of Section 58 of the 1317 Fasli Act. The instant case unambiguously falls in the latter category, i.e. ‘Land Assigned to the Landless poor persons’. 58. Additionally, Section 58 of the 1317 Fasli Act is a deeming provision wherein an occupancy right is presumed to be heritable as well as transferable, until an indication to the contrary is proved. In this regard, 1958 Circular issued in exercise of the rule­ making   power   vested   under   Section   172   of   1317 Fasli Act, read with an independent statutory bar C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  69  of  97 created under Section 3 of the 1977 Act, portrays an explicit   legislative   intention   to   curtail   the   legal fiction created under Section 58 of the 1317 Fasli Act. This is the precise reason because of which the 23 decision   in   Letter   sent   from   Plot   No.338 concludes that 1977 Act was applicable in respect of the land assigned to landless individuals and the same   was   governed   by   the   conditions   of   non­ alienability   as   incorporated   in   the   1958   Circular. The precise part of the decision in  Letter sent from 24 as relied upon by the Division Bench Plot No.338   of the High Court in the impugned decision, states that:–  “60. We are of the view that provisions of Act No. 9 of 1977 will not be applicable to the cases where assignments were made on   collection   of   market   value   or   under Circular 14 except it were granted to the landless   poor   persons   free   of   market value.   Point   No.   2   is   answered accordingly.” 59. We have, therefore, no doubt in our mind that the Subject Land was governed by the provision of the 1958 Circular which included the condition of non­alienability. We, however, clarify that since the 23   Letter sent from Plot No.338  (n 6). 24   Letter sent from Plot No.338  (n 6). C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  70  of  97 Laoni   Rules   of   1950   were   inapplicable   on   the Subject   Land,   the   contention   raised   by   Mr.   Ray regarding violation of Article 14 in respect of ‘regular assignment’ and ‘special laoni assignment’ becomes irrelevant and out of context and the same need not be gone into by us. HE CT XTENT OF PPLICATION AND   C.4    T    1977 A : E    A         C ONSEQUENCES   60. The   next   issue   that   arises   for   consideration hovers around the applicability of the 1977 Act and its consequences in the event of violations of the assignment conditions. In this respect, it would be apposite to first note the definition of ‘assigned land’ which is to the following effect:­  “2.   Definitions   ­In   this   Act,   unless   the context otherwise requires,­  (1) “assigned lands” means lands or house sites  assigned  by the Government to the landless or homeless poor persons  under the   rules   for   the   time   being   in   force, subject to condition of non­alienation and includes lands allotted or transferred to landless or homeless poor persons under the   relevant   law   for   the   time   being   in force   relating   to   land   ceilings;   and   the word   “assigned”   shall   be   construed accordingly” C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  71  of  97 (Emphasis Applied) We  have already concluded that  the Subject Land was governed by the law which existed on the date   of   issuance   of   Temporary   Pattas,   i.e. 21.10.1961.   It   has   also   been   held   that   the applicable   law   at   the   relevant   time   included   the 1958   Circular   as   well   as   GOM   1122.   Since   both these   regulatory   measures   incorporated   the condition of non­alienability, there can be no escape but to further hold  that the  Subject Land comes under the definition of ‘assigned land’ as provided under Section 2(1) of the 1977 Act. Resultantly, the provisions   of   the   1977   Act   are   fully   attracted   to regulating the said land. 61. The   other   issue   that   comes   up   for determination   is   whether   the   entirety   of   Subject Land would fall within the contravention of Section 3 of the 1977 Act which, inter alia, provides that:­  “Section   3   –   Prohibition   of   transfer   of assigned land  –  (1)   Where,   before   or   after   the commencement of this Act any land has been   assigned   by   the   Government   to   a landless   poor   person   for   purposes   of cultivation   or   as   a   house­site   then, notwithstanding anything to the contrary C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  72  of  97 in   any   other   law   for   the   time   being   in force or in the deed of transfer or other document relating to such land, it shall not  be  transferred  and  shall  be   deemed never   to   have   been   transferred;   and accordingly   no   right   or   title   in   such assigned   land   shall   vest   in   any   person acquiring the land by such transfer. (2) No landless poor person shall transfer any   assigned   land,   and   no   person   shall acquire   any   assigned   land,   either   by purchase, gift, Lease (except in the case of   Lease   to   the   Andhra   Pradesh   Green Energy   Corporation   Ltd.,   for   use   as deemed fit and including for usage of non­ agriculture purpose), mortgage, exchange or otherwise. (2A)   No   assignee   shall   transfer   any assigned house site, and no person shall acquire any assigned house site, either by purchase, gift, Lease (except in the case of   Lease   to   the   Andhra   Pradesh   Green Energy   Corporation   Ltd.,   for   use   as deemed fit and including for usage of non­ agriculture purpose), mortgage, exchange or otherwise, till completion of the period of 20 years from the date of assignment. (2B) Where the assigned House site was alienated by the assignee as on the date of commencement of this Act, such house site shall be regularized in favour of the alienee as a one­time measure. C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  73  of  97 (3) Any transfer or acquisition made in contravention   of   the   provision   of   sub­ section   (1)   or   sub­section   (2)   or   sub­ section (2A) shall  be deemed  to be null and void. (4) The Provisions of this section shall apply   to   any   transaction   of   the   nature referred to in sub­section (2) in execution of a decree or order of a civil court or of any award or order of any other authority. (5) Nothing in this section shall apply to an assigned land which was purchased by a landless poor person in good faith and for   valuable   consideration   from   the original assignee or his transferee prior to the commencement of this Act and which is   in  the   possession   of   such   person   for purposes of cultivation or as a house­site on the date of such commencement.” (Emphasis Applied) 62. In   order   to   appreciate   sub­Section   (2)   of Section 3 of the 1977 Act in its correct perspective, the expression ‘landless poor person’ and ‘transfer’ also   become   important,   which   are   defined   in   the 1977 Act as follows:– “Section   2(3)   –   “landless   poor   person” means  a person who owns an extent of land   not   more   than   1.011715   hectares (two   and   half   acres)   of   wet   land   or 2.023430 hectares (five acres) of dry land C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  74  of  97 or such other extent of land as has been or may be specified by the Government in this behalf from time to time and who has no other means of livelihood. Explanation:   ­   For   the   purposes   of computing the extent of land under this clause,   0.404686   hectares   (one   acre)   of wet   land   shall   be   equal   to   0.809372 hectares (two acres) of dry land; x­x­x­x Section 2(6) – “Transfer” means any     sale, gift, exchange, mortgage with or without   possession  ,  lease  (except  in   the   case   of Lease   to   the   Andhra   Pradesh   Green Energy   Corporation   Ltd.,   for   use   as deemed fit and including for usage of non­ agriculture   purpose)  or   any   other transaction with assigned lands, not being a testamentary disposition and includes a charge   on   such   property   or   a   contract relating   to   assigned   lands   in   respect   of such sale, gift, exchange, mortgage, Lease (except in the case of Lease to the Andhra Pradesh   Green   Energy   Coproration   Ltd., for use as deemed  fit and  including  for usage of non­agriculture purpose) or other transaction.” (Emphasis Applied) 63. On   a   conjoint   reading   of   these   statutory expressions,   particularly   pertaining   to   the   term ‘transfer’, the question that falls on us to answer is whether the GPA executed in favour of M.A. Baksh C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  75  of  97 by the Assignees would result in contravention of Section 3(2) of the 1977 Act. The contention made by   learned   senior   counsel   Mr.   Reddy   that   the contravention could only be limited to the sale deeds executed in respect of about 10 Acres of the Subject Land seems to be built on the decision of this Court in  Suraj Lamp and Industries Private Limited v. 25 State of Haryana   where the practice of GPA sales was deprecated and it was noted that the same did not   constitute   ‘sale’   or   ‘transfer’   as   contemplated under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. 64. However, we must note that the term ‘transfer’ as   defined   under   the   1977   Act   is   much   more inclusive than the one employed in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The definition under the 1977 Act uses the phrase ‘any other transaction’, which, in our considered opinion, necessarily includes the GPA   executed   as   an   instrument   to   surrender ownership and possessory rights in favour of M.A. Baksh. The intent of `transfer’ through the said GPA by the Assignees authorizing the attorney holder to sell   or   transfer   the   subject   Property   without   any 25   Suraj Lamp and Industries Private Limited v. State of Haryana  (2012) 1 SCC 656. C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  76  of  97 restriction   as   is   evident   from   its   recitals   and   for which they admittedly received consideration from M.A. Baksh, is beyond any doubt. This was precisely the   kind   of   practice   deprecated   by  this   Court   in 26 Suraj Lamp and Industries Private Limited .  We have thus no hesitation in holding that the said GPA falls   within   the   ambit   of   the   term   ‘transfer’, especially in view of the objective of the 1977 Act, which was manifestly intended to save the landless poor persons from the clutches of the rich and the resourceful, who deprived them of the precious title assigned   to   them   by   the   Government   for   their occupation and the source of livelihood.  65. Our   observations   are   in   continuity   with   the view   previously   taken   by   this   Court   in   Dharma 27 Naika v. Rama Naika   wherein an ‘agreement to sale’ was held to be included within the definition of ‘transfer’   as   provided   under   the   Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978. Its pertinent to   mention  that   the  definition   of   ‘transfer’   in  the 26  ibid. 27   Dharma Naika v. Rama Naika  (2008) 14 SCC 517. C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  77  of  97 aforesaid   statute   is   somewhat   similar   to   the   one employed by the 1977 Act. This Court noted that:– “12. A bare reading of the definition of “transfer” as defined in Section 3(1)(e) of the Act would show that an “agreement for sale” of any “granted land” is included within   the   meaning   of   “transfer”.   That being the position, the word “transfer” as defined   under   the   Act   is   an   inclusive definition.   That   is   to   say,   it   includes “sale”   as   well   as   “agreement   for   sale”, although an agreement for sale under the Transfer of Property Act is not a transfer and the right, title or interest in the land does   not   pass   until   the   sale   deed   is executed and registered. “Sale” has been defined in Section 54 of the Transfer of Property   Act   which   means   “transfer   of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part­paid and part­promised”. As noted herein earlier, an agreement to sell does not by itself create any interest of the proposed vendee in the immovable property but only creates an enforceable right   in   the   parties.   (See   Rambhau Namdeo   Gajre   v. Narayan  Bapuji  Dhotra [(2004) 8 SCC 614].) Therefore, it is clear that under the general law, that is, under the   Transfer   of   Property   Act,   an “agreement for sale” is not the same as “sale” and in the case of an agreement for sale, the title of the property agreed to be sold still remains with the vendor but in the case of “sale”, title of the property is C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  78  of  97 vested   with   the   vendee.   Therefore,   an agreement   for   sale   is   an   executory contract   whereas   sale   is   an   executed contract. x­x­x­x 22. As noted hereinearlier, it is true that in this case, admittedly, the parties had entered   into   an   agreement   for   sale   in respect   of   the   granted   land   before   the commencement of the Act.  It is also an admitted   position   that   the   respondents belong/belonged  to the Scheduled  Caste community.   As   already   noted hereinearlier, for the purposes of this Act, “transfer” has been defined to include an “agreement for sale” although under the general law, an “agreement for sale” will not   by   itself   transfer   the   granted   land automatically to the appellant purchaser. From   an   overall   consideration   of   the objects   and   reasons   for   which   this   Act was introduced viz. to protect the right and interest of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled   Tribes   in   respect   of   the granted lands and the relevant provisions of   the   Act,   it   is   pellucid   that   the definition of “transfer” under Section 3(1) (e) of the Act includes an agreement for sale   also   and   “transfer”   has   been   so defined   to   protect   the   right,   title   and interest   of   the   Scheduled   Castes   and Scheduled   Tribes   so   that   possession   of the lands could be restored to them even C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  79  of  97 if they had entered into an agreement for sale.” (Emphasis Applied) We, therefore, hold that the GPA executed in favour of M.A. Baksh in the instant case constitutes a ‘transfer’ under the 1977 Act and consequently would also result in violation of Section 3 of the 1977 Act. 66.    This leads us to further consider the penal consequences in case of the violation of Section 3 of the 1977 Act, as is provided in Section 4 of the 1977 Act.   The   relevant   part   of   the   said   provision,   as amended from time to time, reads as follows:– “Section   4   –       Consequence   of   breach   of Section 3  –  (1) If in any case, the District Collector or any other officer not below the rank of a Mandal   Revenue   Officer,   authorised   by him in this behalf;  is satisfied that the provisions of sub­section (1) of section 3, have been contravened in respect of any assigned land, he may, by order­ (a) take possession of the  assigned land  after   evicting   the   person   in possession   after   such   written   notice   as the Collector or Mandal Revenue Officer may   deem   reasonable   and   any   crop   or other produce raised on such land shall be C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  80  of  97 liable   to   forfeiture   and   any   building   or other   construction   erected   or   anything deposited, thereon shall also be forfeited, if not removed by him, after such notice, as the Collector or the Mandal Revenue Officer may direct Forfeitures under this section shall be adjudged by the Collector or   Mandal   Revenue   Officer   and   any property forfeited shall be disposed of as the Collector or Mandal Revenue Officer may direct; and; (b)(i) reassign the said resumed land, other than those lands/areas as may be notified by the Government from time to time   in   public   interest   and   for   public purpose, to the transferee who purchased the   land   in   good   faith   and   for   valuable consideration on or before 29th January, 2007,   subject   to   the   condition   that he/she is landless poor person, and is in occupation of the land by using the said land for agriculture or as house site, as on the date of taking possession by eviction: Provided   that   the   reassignment   in case of transferee shall be limited to only such an extent that the total holding of the  reassignee   including   any  other   land held   by   him/her   does   not   exceed   5.00 Acres dry land or 2 ½ Acres wet land: Provided   further   that   where   the transferee   who   has   purchased   the   land and  got reassignment  of it, or his legal heir,   transfers   the   reassigned   land,   the C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  81  of  97 land shall be resumed for assignment to the other eligible landless poor: (ii)   restore   the   said   assigned   land, other than those lands/areas as may be notified by the Government from time to time   in   public   interest   and   for   public purpose, to the original assignee, subject to the condition that he or she is landless poor person as on the date of restoration for one time; or (iii)   assign   to   other   eligible   landless poor person: Provided that the restoration of land shall be limited to only such an extent   that   the   total   holding   including any other land held by him/her does not exceed 5.00 Acres dry land or 2 ½ Acres wet land: Provided   further   that   where   the original  assignee  or his  legal   heir,  after first   restoration   transfers   the   assigned land,   the   land   shall   be   resumed   for assignment to the other eligible landless poor: Provided   also   that   if   no   eligible landless poor persons are available in the village/area,   the   resumed   land   will   be utilised for public purpose. Explanation:   For   the   purpose   of   this clause   “Public   Interest”   and   “Public Purpose”   shall   mean   and   include,   the Weaker   Section   Housing,   Public   Utility, Infrastructure Development, promotion of industries and Tourism or for any other public purpose; C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  82  of  97 (c) In the areas which may be notified by Government from time to time, time, lands   resumed   under   clause   4(a)   above, shall be utilized for public purpose. x­x­x­x (5) For the purposes of this section, where any   assigned   land  is  in  possession   of  a person, other than the original assignee or   his   legal   heir,   it   shall   be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that there is a contravention of the provisions of sub­ section (1) of section 3.”   (Emphasis Applied) 67. The Appellants have argued that Section 4 of the   1977   Act   as   it   stood   on   the   date   when   the resumption   orders   were   passed,   i.e.   27.01.2007, only stipulated that a breach under Section 3 would result in possession of the land being taken over from   the   third   party   to   whom   the   land   was transferred   and   restored   back   to   the   original assignees. In other words, the Appellants contend that the Subject Land should be re­assigned to them as they are the legal heirs of the Assignees. We   have   thoughtfully   considered   the 68. submission. It is important at this to draw attention to the provisions of The Andhra Pradesh Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfers) (Amendment) Act, C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  83  of  97 2007   [Hereinafter,   ‘2007   Amendment’]   through which   Section   4(1)(c)   was   introduced.   The   2007 Amendment Act in its Section 1(3) expressly states that:– “Section   1   ­   Short   title,   extent   and commencement – x­x­x­x (3)     Section 2 shall be deemed to have come into force with effect on and from 21st,   January,   1977  and   the   remaining provisions shall come into force from the date   as   the   Government   may,   by notification, appoint.”   (Emphasis Applied) It is significant to note that Section 4(1)(c) was introduced   through   Section   2   of   the   2007 Amendment   Act.   The   legislature   explicitly   gave   it retrospective   effect   and   even   introduced   an Ordinance   on   similar   lines   prior   to   the   said amendment. The legislative intention can be further illuminated from the relevant part of the Statement of Object and Reasons in the Bill which introduced the   2007   Amendment   and   the   same     reads   as follows:– “x­x­x­x On   account   of   rapid   urbanization   in certain   areas   i.e.,   Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam,   Ranga   Reddy   Districts C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  84  of  97 etc., most of the assigned lands have been alienated   by   the   original   assignees   and the   lands   were   converted   to   non­ agricultural use. It is found not possible to reassign these lands after resumption, either to the original assignee or his/her legal   heir.   It   is   also   practically   not possible   to   assign   these   lands   to   other landless poor persons, since the nature of these lands  has  been  changed  and  they are not useful for agriculture purpose. Keeping   in   view   of   the   above   said position,   Government   have   decided   to amend   clause   (b)   of   sub­section   (1)   of Section 4 of the said Act empowering the Government to notify certain areas where the Government can resume the assigned lands and utilize them for public purposes such as Weaker Sections Housing, Public Utilities,   Infrastructure   Development   or for any other public purpose in such areas as may be notified by it. The amendment also proposes that in the areas other than those notified, the land can be restored once to the original assignee   or  it  can  be   assigned   to   other eligible   persons.   However,   if   either   the original   assignee   or   no   eligible   landless poor are available in the village, then it gets   restored   to   the   Government   for public purpose. As the Legislative Assembly was not then in session and it has been decided to give   effect   to   the   above   decision C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  85  of  97 immediately,   the   Andhra   Pradesh Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfers) (Amendment)   Ordinance,   2006   has   been promulgated by the Governor on the 5th November, 2006.”   (Emphasis Applied) 69. It deserves to be mentioned that in the Andhra Pradesh Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfers) (Amendment) Ordinance, 2006  [Hereinafter, ‘2006 also, a similar provision for resumption Ordinance’]  for   certain   notified   lands   akin   to   what   has   been provided   in   the   2007   Amendment   Act,   was incorporated.     The   intention   of   the   legislature   in respect of retrospective application of Section 4(1)(c) is   thus   crystal   clear   from   the   very   inception. Furthermore, at the time of rebuttal arguments, the Respondents   have   produced   a   Notification   dated 11.12.2006   whereby   the   village   comprising   the Subject Land has been notified as the area liable for resumption for violation of Section 3 of 1977 Act. Though the notification was purportedly issued for implementation of the 2006 Ordinance, but the said Ordinance   having   been   substituted   by   the amendment in Section 4(1)(c) of the 1977 Act with more or less identical expressions, the Notification, C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  86  of  97 referred   to   above,   caters   the   legal   necessity   of requirement of a Notification under the Act. Hence, resumption of the Subject Land and re­transfer of its ownership rights to the State, does not suffer from any legal infirmity. 70. It may  also be  relevant to  mention   that the 28 High Court in  Dharma Reddy  has already upheld the retrospective application of Section 4(1)(c) of the 1977   Act.   Pertinently,   this   Court   too   in 29 Manchegowda v. State of Karnataka   upheld the constitutional   validity   of   retrospective   application given   to   Karnataka   Scheduled   Castes   and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands)   Act   of   1978   which   is   a   statute   whose , scheme   is   akin   to   1977   Act .   These   amended provisions are thus deemed to be in force at the time of   violation   of   assignment   conditions   in   the   year 1992. The only irresistible conclusion would thus be that the resumption order  dated  27.01.2007 does not suffer from any legal infirmity.   C.5    C   OMPENSATION  F OR  R ESUMPTION   28   Dharma Reddy  (n 12). 29 Manchegowda v. State of Karnataka  (1984) 3 SCC 301. C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  87  of  97 71. Finally,   we   consider   the   aspect   of compensation in respect of the Subject Land, which has been pressed into aid by learned senior counsel Mr. Reddy by relying on the decision of the High   30  Court in   to contend that in case Mekala Pandu any assigned land is resumed for public purpose as sought to be done in the instant case, then market value   of   the   said   land   must   be   paid   as compensation. The relevant paragraphs of the cited decision are extensively reproduced as follows:– “80.     The   question   that   falls   for consideration   is   whether   the   terms   of grant   or   patta   enabling   the   State   to resume   the   assigned   lands   for   a   public purpose   without   paying   compensation equivalent to the market value of the land to the assignees are valid in law? Whether such restrictive conditions or covenants suffer from any constitutional infirmity? 81. The   State   while   directing   no compensation  be  paid equivalent   to the market value of the assigned lands never took   into   consideration   and   had   any regard to the length of time the land held by   the   grantee   or   assignee,   the   social objectives for which the assignment had been made by the State in discharge of its constitutional   obligation   of   providing public assistance to the weaker sections 30   Mekala Pandu  (n 10). C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  88  of  97 of   the   society,   the   improvements   or developments upon the land made by the assignees   on  any   legitimate   expectation of   continuance   of   the   assignment, heritable   nature   of   the   right   under   the grant, etc. 82. The   question   is   whether   the   ‘no compensation   clause’   imposed   in   the grant   of   assignment,   in   effect,   requires the   assignee   to   relinquish   some constitutional   right?   Whether   the conditions   imposed   at   the   time   of assignment   are   “unconstitutional conditions”? 83. The   assignees   are   constitutional claimants.   The   constitutional   claim cannot   be   subjected   to   governmental restrictions or sanctions except pursuant to the constitutionally valid rule or law. There   is   no   legislation   enacted   by   the State compelling it to assign the lands to the weaker sections of the society. The State   obviously   assigned   and   granted pattas as a measure of providing public assistance to the weaker sections of the society.   The   proposition   is   that   as   a general rule the State may grant privilege upon   such   conditions   as   it   sees   fit   to impose; but the power of the State in that regard is not unlimited, and one of the limitations   that   it   may   not   impose conditions   which   require   the relinquishment   of   constitutional   rights. That whenever State is required to make C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  89  of  97 laws, regulations or policies, it must do so consistently with the directive principles with   a   view   to   securing   social   and economic   freedom   so   essential   for establishment   of   an   egalitarian   society. The   Directive   Principles   of   State   Policy reflect   the   hopes   and   aspirations   of people of this great country. The fact that they are not enforceable by any Court in no   manner   reduces   their   importance. They are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country and the State is   under   obligation   to   apply   them   in making   laws   and   framing   its   policies particularly   concerning   the   weaker sections of the society. x­x­x­x 92.   ‘No   compensation’   clause   which virtually   enables   the   State   to   withdraw the privilege granted without payment of just compensation is an “unconstitutional condition”   imposed   by   the   State adversely affects the life, liberty, equality and   dignity   guaranteed   by   the Constitution. The assignment of lands to the exploited and vulnerable sections of the   society   is   neither   a   formality   nor a  gratis . The privilege granted is with a view to ensure and protect the rights of the   exploited   sections   of   the   people   to live   with   human   dignity   free   from exploitation.   The   privilege   or   largesse once granted acquires the status of vested interest.   The   policy   to   assign   the C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  90  of  97 government   land   by   the   State   was obviously designed to protect the socio­ economic status of a vulnerable citizenry; its   deprivation   would   be   universally perceived as a misfortune. x­x­x­x 100. The   deprivation   of   the   assignee's right   to   payment   of   just   compensation equivalent   to   the   market   value   of   the assigned land may amount to deprivation of   right   to   livelihood.   The   denial   of constitutional   claim   to   receive   just compensation   after   depriving   the assignee   of   his   land   is   impermissible except   pursuant   to   a   constitutionally valid rule or law. x­x­x­x 110. In   the   result,   we   hold   that   ‘no compensation’   clause,   restricting   the right   of   the   assignees   to   claim   full compensation   in   respect   of   the   land resumed equivalent to the market value of the land, is unconstitutional. The ‘no compensation   clause’   infringes   the fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 14 and 31­A of the Constitution. We are conscious that Article 21 essentially deals with personal liberty. But in cases where deprivation   of   property   would   lead   to deprivation of life or liberty or livelihood, Article   21   springs   into   action   and   any such deprivation without just payment of compensation amounts to infringement of the   right   guaranteed   thereunder.   The C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  91  of  97 doctrine of ‘unconstitutional  conditions’ applies in all its force. 111. In the circumstances, we hold that the assignees of the government lands are entitled   to   payment   of   compensation equivalent to the full market value of the land and other benefits on par with full owners of the land even in cases where the assigned lands are taken possession of by the State in accordance with the terms of grant or patta, though such resumption is for a public purpose. We further hold that even in cases where the State does not invoke the covenant of the grant or patta to resume the land for such public purpose and resorts to acquisition of the land   under   the   provisions   of   the   Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the assignees shall be entitled to compensation as owners of the land and for all other consequential benefits under the provisions of the Land Acquisition   Act,   1894.   No   condition incorporated in patta/deed of assignment shall   operate   as   a   clog   putting   any restriction on the right of the assignee to claim full compensation as owner of the land. 112. In such view of ours, the view taken by   this   Court   in   (2 Bondapalli   Sanyasi supra)   that   whenever   the   land   is   taken possession of by the State invoking the terms   of   the   grant,   the   right   of   an assignee to any compensation may have to be determined in accordance with the C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  92  of  97 conditions in patta itself is unsustainable. With due respect, we are unable to agree with the view taken in this regard. We are also unable to agree with the view taken that   the   assignee   shall   be   entitled   to compensation   in   terms   of   the   Land Acquisition Act not as owner but as an interested person for the interest he held in the property.” (Emphasis Applied) 72. A perusal of the above extracts reveals that the real issue in those cases pertained to ‘no compensation’   clauses   in   the   assignment   and not   the   non­payment   of   compensation   for violating conditions regarding non­alienability as involved in the case in hand. That apart, the High   Court’s   observation   in   respect   of   a constitutional   right   to   compensation   were disapproved by this Court while dismissing the Civil Appeals/Special Leave Petitions, including 31 against the decision in   Mekala Pandu   as is 32 discernible from the following order : – “1.   Having   regard  to   the  peculiar  facts and  circumstances of the case. noted in 31   Mekala Pandu  (n 10). 32   A.P. Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Ltd v Ramesh Singh  and other connected appeals   (Civil Appeal No. 7904­7912 of 2012, 4 August 2014). C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  93  of  97 the   impugned  judgment(s),   we   are satisfied that these are not  fit cases for exercise of our jurisdiction under  Article 136 of the Constitution of India. 2. Civil Appeals and Special Leave Petition are, accordingly, dismissed. 3. No costs. 4.   Certain   observations   made   in   the impugned   order(s)   about   the   status   of claimants as 'constitutional claimants' are kept open to be considered in appropriate case, if necessary.” (Emphasis Applied) 73. Importantly,   we   must   be   cautious   of   the difference   between   the   terms   ‘acquisition’   and ‘resumption’ in the context of property laws. While both   terms   indicate   deprivation   of   a   right,   there exists a significant distinction in their actual legal connotation. Acquisition denotes a positive act on behalf   of   the   State   to   deprive   an   individual’s enjoyment of a pre­existing right in a property in furtherance   of   its   policy   whereas   resumption denotes a punitive action by the State to take back the  right or an interest  in a  property which was granted   by   it   in   the   first   place.   The   term ‘resumption’ must not therefore be conflated with C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  94  of  97 the   term   ‘acquisition’   as   employed   within   the meaning of Article 300­A of the Constitution so as to create a right to compensation. Keeping this mark distinction   in   view,   it   is   not   necessary   for   us   to determine whether an expropriated owner has an impeachable   constitutional   right   to   compensation under Article 300A of the Constitution in lieu of his acquired property.  74. It   is   also   pertinent   to   note   that   serious allegations prevail against the Appellants for being involved with the land mafia to usurp the Subject Land   for   private   interests   which   was   the   precise reason for the Government to introduce legislation in the nature of the 1977 Act. Resultantly, in the facts and circumstances of this case, we hold that the Appellants are not entitled to any compensation under the existing constitutional framework.    D.          C   ONCLUSION     75. In light of the abovementioned discussion, we conclude that the proceedings emanating out of the Second SCN were valid; the Subject Land was non­ alienable and hence was subject to the provisions of the 1977 Act. We further hold that the Appellants C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  95  of  97 had transferred the Subject Land in contravention to   the   provisions   of   1977   Act   and   therefore,   the resultant   resumption   order   dated   27.01.2007   is valid. The Appellants are also not entitled to any compensation on account of the resumption of the assigned land. We are not oblivious to the fact that the parties 76. have   been   litigating   since   the   year   1994.   During these   decades,   the   Subject   Land   has   acquired enormous value. Some of the documents on record do indicate that land mafia has already ousted the gullible Assignees and now have vulture’s eyes on the   land.   Additionally,   a   security   agency   of paramount national importance currently occupies the Subject Land in public interest. We, therefore, deem   it   appropriate   to   invoke   our   powers   under Article   142   of   the   Constitution   to   do   complete justice to the parties and issue the following further directions/declarations:­  a) The Subject Land in its entirety is declared to have   vested   in   the   State   Government.   On further   allotment,   its   ownership   and possessory rights, free from all encumbrances, stand transferred in favour of the Greyhounds; C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  96  of  97 b) No Civil Court or High Court shall entertain any   claim   whatsoever   on   behalf   of   any Assignee, their legal representative, GPA holder or any other claimant under any Agreement to sell  or   other   instruments,   claiming   direct  or indirect interests in the Subject Land; and There   shall   be   a   final   quietus   of   title   and c) possessory dispute over the Subject Land in favour   of   the   Respondent­State   and/or   the agency   to   whom   the   said   land   has   been allotted.  77. Consequently, these appeals stand dismissed along with any pending applications in the above terms. No order as to costs. ………..………………… J. (SURYA KANT) ………………………….. J. (J.K. MAHESHWARI) NEW DELHI DATED: 01.08.2023 C.A. No.___of 2023 @ SLP (C) NO. 2523 OF 2022 ETC. ETC.             Page  97  of  97