Full Judgment Text
2025 INSC 634
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). ……………….. OF 2025
(@ SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1891 OF 2024)
HARJINDER SINGH …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. …RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
VIKRAM NATH, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The present appeal, preferred by the
complainant-father (“the appellant”) of the deceased
Dharminder Singh, assails the judgment
dated 21 November 2023 of the High Court of
Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh (“the
High Court”) allowing Criminal Miscellaneous
Petition No. 31120 of 2022 under Section 482 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”). By the
impugned judgment the High Court set aside an
order dated 04 July 2022 passed by the Additional
Signature Not Verified
Sessions Judge, Sangrur (“the Trial Court”)
Digitally signed by
NEETU KHAJURIA
Date: 2025.05.06
17:33:39 IST
Reason:
SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1891 OF 2024 Page 1 of 17
summoning Varinder Singh (hereinafter
“respondent no. 2”) to face trial under Section 306
read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
(“IPC”) in First Information Report No. 51 of 2016
registered at Police Station Amargarh,
District Sangrur, Punjab.
3. The facts giving rise to the present appeal are as
follows:
3.1 On 13 March 2016 an acid attack was allegedly
committed upon Dharminder Singh by ten
persons. That occurrence was recorded as
FIR No. 30 of 2016 under Sections 323, 324, 341,
506, 148, 149 and 326-A IPC; respondent no.2
was not named therein.
3.2 On 10 May 2016 at around 8.30 am in the
morning, Dharminder Singh and his paternal
uncle Jagdev Singh were standing near their
abadi land on Jagowal Road when
Gurmail Singh, respondent no. 2, Santokh Singh
and Iqbal Singh, accompanied by an unidentified
person, allegedly stopped their white car and
taunted the deceased, stating that he and his
family “should die of shame” for not having taken
action against the acid-attack assailants.
3.3 The deceased returned home in distress, locked
himself in a room, and left the house alone at
SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1891 OF 2024 Page 2 of 17
about 04:00 p.m. When he did not return by
evening, a search party found his bicycle, clothing
and footwear near the Hussainpur canal.
On 13 May 2016 his body was recovered from the
canal head at village Salar. The appellant lodged
a complaint the same day; FIR No. 51 of 2016
(“the FIR in question”) was registered under
Sections 306/34 IPC, naming, inter alia,
respondent no. 2.
3.4 During investigation the police accepted the plea
of alibi advanced by respondent no. 2, who
produced, among other things, a parking-lot slip,
outpatient records, a medicine bill and CCTV
footage from PGI Chandigarh timed 06:30 a.m.
onward on 10 May 2016. Endorsing these
materials, the investigating officer filed a report
under Section 173 (2) CrPC on 02 August 2016
classifying respondent no. 2 as “innocent”.
Consequently, only the remaining accused were
committed to the Court of Session.
3.5 On an application by the Public Prosecutor the
Trial Court, by order dated 20 January 2017,
summoned respondent no. 2 under Section 193
of CrPC. Therefore, Respondent no. 2
successfully challenged that order before the
High Court. By the impugned order
SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1891 OF 2024 Page 3 of 17
dated 24 November 2021 the High Court
quashed the summoning on the ground that
there had been no committal order qua
respondent no. 2, while granting liberty to invoke
Section 319 CrPC if credible evidence emerged
during trial.
3.6 During the trial, on 08 March 2022 the appellant
testified as PW-1, narrating the confrontation
th
of 10 May 2016 and hence attributing direct
participation to respondent no. 2. The Public
Prosecutor relying on the statement of PW-1 as
well as on the statement of Jagdev Singh recorded
under Section 161 CrPC moved an application
under Section 319 CrPC to summon
respondent no. 2.
3.7 By order dated 04 July 2022 the Trial Court
allowed the application, observing that PW-1’s
sworn testimony, corroborated by Jagdev Singh’s
statement, disclosed a prima-facie case and that
the plea of alibi was a matter for trial.
Respondent no. 2 was directed to appear
on 02 August 2022 to stand trial alongside the
existing accused for the offence under
Section 306 IPC.
3.8 Respondent no. 2 approached the High Court
under Section 482 CrPC, asserting that the Trial
SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1891 OF 2024 Page 4 of 17
Court had disregarded what he described as
“scientific and documentary proof” of his
whereabouts in Chandigarh at the relevant time
and insisting that only substantially stronger
evidence could justify his addition to the array of
accused. The High Court, persuaded with the
submission, was of the view that the Trial Court
ought to have weighed the investigation record,
including the parking slip, CCTV footage and
associated inquiries, set aside the summoning
order on 21 November 2023, concluding that the
material adduced fell short of the rigor demanded
for invoking Section 319 CrPC.
4. The appellant has approached this Court
contending, inter alia, that the High Court
misapplied the threshold for exercise of power under
Section 319 CrPC, prematurely evaluated an
untested alibi and disregarded direct eyewitness
evidence. It is in these circumstances that the
matter now engages our consideration.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant has advanced the
following submissions:
5.1 The police, while filing the final report under
Section 173 (2) CrPC, conflated two distinct
occurrences: the acid ‑ attack of 13 March 2016
(FIR 30/2016), in which respondent no. 2 was
SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1891 OF 2024 Page 5 of 17
not named, and the incident of 10 May 2016 that
forms the gravamen of the present FIR.
Respondent no. 2’s alibi materials relate only to
10 March 2016 and were erroneously treated as
exonerating him for the later incident.
5.2 Respondent no. 2 has furnished no cogent alibi
for 10 May 2016. The documents he now relies
on, parking ticket, OPD card, CCTV clip and
supporting statements, were never exhibited
before the Trial Court nor tested in
cross ‑ examination; their veracity can be
adjudicated only at trial.
5.3 The eye ‑ witness Jagdev Singh, whose
Section 161 statement specifically attributes the
fatal taunts to respondent no. 2, corroborates the
sworn testimony of PW ‑ 1. Taken together, this
constitutes prima ‑ facie “evidence” arising in the
course of trial, satisfying the threshold for
exercise of power under Section 319 CrPC.
5.4 The High Court characterised the confrontation
of 10 May 2016 as mere “teasing” and
concentrated on the previous acid ‑ attack, thereby
undervaluing an independent offence of abetment
to suicide that was proximate in time and
casually linked to the deceased’s death.
SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1891 OF 2024 Page 6 of 17
5.5 By resting its decision on investigation ‑ stage
material concerning 10 March 2016, the High
Court prematurely evaluated an unproven alibi
and overlooked the settled principle that the
burden of establishing such a defence lies
squarely on the accused and must be discharged
through evidence at trial.
5.6 Section 319 CrPC is intended to prevent the real
perpetrator from escaping trial; once ocular
testimony discloses a direct role, the Court is
obliged to summon the person concerned. The
Trial Court’s order of 04 July 2022 correctly
applied this standard, whereas the High Court’s
interference under Section 482 CrPC amounts to
a pre ‑ trial acquittal on disputed facts.
6. Learned counsel for the respondents, respondent
no.1 (State of Punjab) and respondent no.2, have
submitted the following arguments:
6.1 The police investigation, supported by a
parking-slip timed 06.30 a.m., OPD
documentation, medical-store bill, CCTV footage
and mobile-tower records, indicate that
respondent no. 2 was at PGI Chandigarh
on 10 May 2016. Moreover statements of the
parking-attendant and chemist, as well as a
village-level inquiry, corroborate this. These
SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1891 OF 2024 Page 7 of 17
materials were scrutinised up the chain of
command and the final report under
Section 173(2) CrPC recorded respondent no. 2’s
innocence, which the prosecution never
challenged.
6.2 Section 319 CrPC demands evidence stronger
than that required even for framing a charge. The
testimony of PW-1 merely reiterates the FIR
narrative, while Jagdev Singh’s version remains a
Section 161 statement, inadmissible until he
enters the witness box. No fresh or compelling
material emerged after the High Court had earlier
(24 November 2021) quashed the Section 193
summons; the prosecution is essentially seeking
a second bite on the same record.
6.3 The time-distance matrix reinforces the alibi:
village Jagowal is about 90 km from Chandigarh,
and the CCTV still shows respondent no. 2 at PGI
at 12:09 p.m., making his presence at the village
confrontation improbable.
6.4 The Trial Court, in summoning respondent no. 2,
ignored the “scientific and documentary”
evidence and treated the untested alibi as a
matter for trial, thereby reversing the
investigative conclusion without any stronger
contra-proof. The High Court correctly intervened
SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1891 OF 2024 Page 8 of 17
under Section 482 CrPC, holding that the Trial
Court was required to weigh the entire record,
including the investigation dossier, before
exercising an extraordinary power meant to be
sparingly used.
6.5 Finally, respondents contend that conflating the
acid-attack FIR of 13 March 2016 (in which
respondent no. 2 was never named) with the
present FIR has led to misplaced suspicion;
repeated attempts to summon him, despite a
consistent exoneration, amount to harassment
rather than pursuit of justice.
7. Having considered the arguments and submissions
of the parties and having examined the material on
record, the issue that falls for consideration before
us is whether the evidence led justified the Trial
Court’s exercise of power under Section 319 CrPC to
summon respondent no. 2, and whether the High
Court was right in setting that order aside at the
threshold.
8. We shall first examine the scope of Section 319 (1)
of the CrPC which has been reproduced hereunder:
“319. Power to proceed against other persons
appearing to be guilty of offence.
(1) Where, in the course of any inquiry into, or
trial of, an offence, it appears from the
SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1891 OF 2024 Page 9 of 17
evidence that any person not being the
accused has committed any offence for which
such person could be tried together with the
accused, the Court may proceed against such
person for the offence which he appears to
have committed.”
The provision enables a criminal Court, once seized
of the matter, to bring before it any individual whose
complicity becomes apparent from the evidence that
emerges in Court. It is an exception to the general
rule that an accused stands trial only upon
charge-sheet and committal; its object is to ensure
that the trial does not proceed without a participant
who, on the material now available, appears to share
criminal liability. The power is extraordinary and
therefore to be exercised with circumspection, yet it
is neither illusory nor deferential to investigative
conclusions: once live evidence evinces a prima-facie
case stronger than mere suspicion, the Court must
act.
9. The Constitution Bench of this Court in
1
Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab , observed that
Section 319 CrPC is designed to ensure that every
1
(2014) 3 SCC 92
SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1891 OF 2024 Page 10 of 17
participant in a crime is brought before the Court
and its provisions are therefore to be interpreted
constructively and purposively, so that the true
offender does not slip through procedural gaps. The
relevant paras of the judgement are hereunder:
“8. The constitutional mandate under Articles
20 and 21 of the Constitution of India
provides a protective umbrella for the smooth
administration of justice making adequate
provisions to ensure a fair and efficacious
trial so that the accused does not get
prejudiced after the law has been put into
motion to try him for the offence but at the
same time also gives equal protection to
victims and to society at large to ensure that
the guilty does not get away from the
clutches of law. For the empowerment of the
Courts to ensure that the criminal
administration of justice works properly, the
law was appropriately codified and modified
by the legislature under CrPC indicating as to
how the Courts should proceed in order to
ultimately find out the truth so that an
innocent does not get punished but at the
same time, the guilty are brought to book
SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1891 OF 2024 Page 11 of 17
under the law. It is these ideals as enshrined
under the Constitution and our laws that
have led to several decisions, whereby
innovating methods and progressive tools
have been forged to find out the real truth
and to ensure that the guilty does not go
unpunished.
9. The presumption of innocence is the
general law of the land as every man is
presumed to be innocent unless proven to be
guilty. Alternatively, certain statutory
presumptions in relation to certain class of
offences have been raised against the
accused whereby the presumption of guilt
prevails till the accused discharges his
burden upon an onus being cast upon him
under the law to prove himself to be innocent.
These competing theories have been kept in
mind by the legislature. The entire effort,
therefore, is not to allow the real perpetrator
of an offence to get away unpunished. This is
also a part of fair trial and in our opinion, in
order to achieve this very end that the
legislature thought of incorporating
provisions of Section 319 CrPC. It is with the
said object in mind that a constructive and
SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1891 OF 2024 Page 12 of 17
purposive interpretation should be adopted
that advances the cause of justice and does
not dilute the intention of the statute
conferring powers on the Court to carry out
the abovementioned avowed object and
purpose to try the person to the satisfaction
of the Court as an accomplice in the
commission of the offence that is the subject-
matter of trial.”
10. Hence, in our considered opinion, the power under
Section 319 CrPC is triggered not by conjecture but
by “evidence” that surfaces in Court. In the present
case, narrated in detail how, on the morning
of 10 May 2016, respondent no. 2, together with
others, stopped a car, confronted the deceased and,
in the Punjabi vernacular, told him that he and his
family ought to drown themselves for failing to
retaliate. PW-1 further described the immediate
impact of those words: the deceased broke down,
secluded himself, and a few hours later left home
never to return alive.
11. The primary argument of Respondent no. 2 rests on
his alibi. An alibi, however, is a plea in the nature of
a defence; the burden to establish it rests squarely
on the accused. Here, the documents relied upon,
parking chit, chemist’s receipt, OPD card, CCTV
SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1891 OF 2024 Page 13 of 17
clip, have yet to be formally proved. Until that
exercise is undertaken, they remain untested pieces
of paper. To treat them as conclusive at the
threshold would invert the established order of
criminal proceedings, requiring the Court to
pronounce upon a defence before the prosecution is
allowed to lead its full evidence. Even assuming the
documents will eventually be proved, their face
value does not eclipse the prosecution version. The
parking slip is timed at 06:30 a.m.; the chemist’s
bill and CCTV images are from 12:09 p.m. The
confrontation is alleged at 08:30 a.m. A road
journey from Jagowal to Chandigarh of roughly
ninety kilometres in a private vehicle can
comfortably be accomplished within the intervening
window. More importantly, abetment to suicide is
not an offence committed at a single moment. It may
consist of a build-up of psychological pressure
culminating in self-destruction, and the law
punishes that build-up wherever and whenever it
occurs.
12. Learned counsel for the respondents urged that the
police, having once accepted the alibi, were the best
judges of its authenticity and that their conclusion
should not be lightly brushed aside. The submission
overlooks the scheme of the CrPC. Once cognizance
SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1891 OF 2024 Page 14 of 17
is taken and trial commences, the investigating
agency’s view yields to the Court’s independent
assessment. If, in the midst of that trial, evidence
implicating a new participant surfaces, the Court is
duty-bound to act on it. Section 319 CrPC would be
rendered otiose if an Investigating Officer’s earlier
opinion could freeze the array of accused for all time.
13. It was next argued that PW-1’s deposition merely
reproduces the FIR. We are unable to agree. A first
information report is only an initial version; a
statement under oath, recorded in Court, is
substantive evidence. Indeed, it is difficult to
conceive of what stronger material could be
demanded at the summoning stage short of a
confession. The threshold is not proof beyond
reasonable doubt; it is the appearance of
involvement which is apparent from evidence
adduced in the proceeding. That threshold was
satisfied here.
14. We believe that the High Court, in interfering under
Section 482 CrPC, placed decisive reliance on the
investigation dossier and characterised the
10 May 2016 episode as mere “teasing”. Such a
description underplays both the content and the
effect of the words spoken. If the allegations is true,
telling a physically challenged man that he and his
SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1891 OF 2024 Page 15 of 17
family should die, and doing so in the immediate
aftermath of a grievous acid attack, is not
banter. Sensitivity to the social context, where
honour and shame weigh heavily, was called for. The
offence, no doubt, will have to be established at the
trial. The Trial Court will also decide whether on
facts the offence is established, keeping in view the
law laid down by this Court in Mahendra Awase vs.
2
State of Madhya Pradesh and other judgments
interpreting Section 306 IPC.
15. Having regard to the purpose of Section 319 CrPC,
we see no infirmity in the order of the Trial Court. On
the contrary, non-summoning of respondent no. 2
would have risked a truncated trial and a possible
failure of justice. The High Court, by elevating
unproved defence documents above sworn
testimony, adopted an approach that was neither
consistent with the text of Section 319 CrPC nor
consonant with the realities of a case involving a
vulnerable victim. The Court’s intervention, in effect,
foreclosed the prosecution from testing the alibi and
deprived the Trial Court of jurisdiction expressly
conferred upon it.
2
2025 SCC OnLine SC 107
SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1891 OF 2024 Page 16 of 17
16. For the reasons recorded above, the appeal succeeds
and is allowed. The judgment and order
dated 21 November 2023 passed by the High Court
of Punjab and Haryana in CRM-M No. 31120 of
2022 is set aside.
17. The order of the Trial Court dated 04 July 2022
summoning respondent no. 2 to stand trial for the
offence punishable under Section 306 IPC shall
stand revived. Respondent no. 2 shall appear before
the Trial Court within four weeks from today and
thereafter abide by all further orders of the Trial
Court. It will be open to the Trial Court to regulate
the conditions of his release, if any application for
bail is moved, in accordance with law.
18. All observations made herein are confined to the
present adjudication under Section 319 CrPC and
shall not influence the final appreciation of evidence
by the Trial Court.
19. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed
of.
……………………………………J.
(VIKRAM NATH)
……………………………………J.
(K .V. VISWANATHAN)
NEW DELHI
MAY 06, 2025
SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1891 OF 2024 Page 17 of 17
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). ……………….. OF 2025
(@ SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1891 OF 2024)
HARJINDER SINGH …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. …RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
VIKRAM NATH, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The present appeal, preferred by the
complainant-father (“the appellant”) of the deceased
Dharminder Singh, assails the judgment
dated 21 November 2023 of the High Court of
Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh (“the
High Court”) allowing Criminal Miscellaneous
Petition No. 31120 of 2022 under Section 482 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”). By the
impugned judgment the High Court set aside an
order dated 04 July 2022 passed by the Additional
Signature Not Verified
Sessions Judge, Sangrur (“the Trial Court”)
Digitally signed by
NEETU KHAJURIA
Date: 2025.05.06
17:33:39 IST
Reason:
SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1891 OF 2024 Page 1 of 17
summoning Varinder Singh (hereinafter
“respondent no. 2”) to face trial under Section 306
read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
(“IPC”) in First Information Report No. 51 of 2016
registered at Police Station Amargarh,
District Sangrur, Punjab.
3. The facts giving rise to the present appeal are as
follows:
3.1 On 13 March 2016 an acid attack was allegedly
committed upon Dharminder Singh by ten
persons. That occurrence was recorded as
FIR No. 30 of 2016 under Sections 323, 324, 341,
506, 148, 149 and 326-A IPC; respondent no.2
was not named therein.
3.2 On 10 May 2016 at around 8.30 am in the
morning, Dharminder Singh and his paternal
uncle Jagdev Singh were standing near their
abadi land on Jagowal Road when
Gurmail Singh, respondent no. 2, Santokh Singh
and Iqbal Singh, accompanied by an unidentified
person, allegedly stopped their white car and
taunted the deceased, stating that he and his
family “should die of shame” for not having taken
action against the acid-attack assailants.
3.3 The deceased returned home in distress, locked
himself in a room, and left the house alone at
SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1891 OF 2024 Page 2 of 17
about 04:00 p.m. When he did not return by
evening, a search party found his bicycle, clothing
and footwear near the Hussainpur canal.
On 13 May 2016 his body was recovered from the
canal head at village Salar. The appellant lodged
a complaint the same day; FIR No. 51 of 2016
(“the FIR in question”) was registered under
Sections 306/34 IPC, naming, inter alia,
respondent no. 2.
3.4 During investigation the police accepted the plea
of alibi advanced by respondent no. 2, who
produced, among other things, a parking-lot slip,
outpatient records, a medicine bill and CCTV
footage from PGI Chandigarh timed 06:30 a.m.
onward on 10 May 2016. Endorsing these
materials, the investigating officer filed a report
under Section 173 (2) CrPC on 02 August 2016
classifying respondent no. 2 as “innocent”.
Consequently, only the remaining accused were
committed to the Court of Session.
3.5 On an application by the Public Prosecutor the
Trial Court, by order dated 20 January 2017,
summoned respondent no. 2 under Section 193
of CrPC. Therefore, Respondent no. 2
successfully challenged that order before the
High Court. By the impugned order
SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1891 OF 2024 Page 3 of 17
dated 24 November 2021 the High Court
quashed the summoning on the ground that
there had been no committal order qua
respondent no. 2, while granting liberty to invoke
Section 319 CrPC if credible evidence emerged
during trial.
3.6 During the trial, on 08 March 2022 the appellant
testified as PW-1, narrating the confrontation
th
of 10 May 2016 and hence attributing direct
participation to respondent no. 2. The Public
Prosecutor relying on the statement of PW-1 as
well as on the statement of Jagdev Singh recorded
under Section 161 CrPC moved an application
under Section 319 CrPC to summon
respondent no. 2.
3.7 By order dated 04 July 2022 the Trial Court
allowed the application, observing that PW-1’s
sworn testimony, corroborated by Jagdev Singh’s
statement, disclosed a prima-facie case and that
the plea of alibi was a matter for trial.
Respondent no. 2 was directed to appear
on 02 August 2022 to stand trial alongside the
existing accused for the offence under
Section 306 IPC.
3.8 Respondent no. 2 approached the High Court
under Section 482 CrPC, asserting that the Trial
SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1891 OF 2024 Page 4 of 17
Court had disregarded what he described as
“scientific and documentary proof” of his
whereabouts in Chandigarh at the relevant time
and insisting that only substantially stronger
evidence could justify his addition to the array of
accused. The High Court, persuaded with the
submission, was of the view that the Trial Court
ought to have weighed the investigation record,
including the parking slip, CCTV footage and
associated inquiries, set aside the summoning
order on 21 November 2023, concluding that the
material adduced fell short of the rigor demanded
for invoking Section 319 CrPC.
4. The appellant has approached this Court
contending, inter alia, that the High Court
misapplied the threshold for exercise of power under
Section 319 CrPC, prematurely evaluated an
untested alibi and disregarded direct eyewitness
evidence. It is in these circumstances that the
matter now engages our consideration.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant has advanced the
following submissions:
5.1 The police, while filing the final report under
Section 173 (2) CrPC, conflated two distinct
occurrences: the acid ‑ attack of 13 March 2016
(FIR 30/2016), in which respondent no. 2 was
SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1891 OF 2024 Page 5 of 17
not named, and the incident of 10 May 2016 that
forms the gravamen of the present FIR.
Respondent no. 2’s alibi materials relate only to
10 March 2016 and were erroneously treated as
exonerating him for the later incident.
5.2 Respondent no. 2 has furnished no cogent alibi
for 10 May 2016. The documents he now relies
on, parking ticket, OPD card, CCTV clip and
supporting statements, were never exhibited
before the Trial Court nor tested in
cross ‑ examination; their veracity can be
adjudicated only at trial.
5.3 The eye ‑ witness Jagdev Singh, whose
Section 161 statement specifically attributes the
fatal taunts to respondent no. 2, corroborates the
sworn testimony of PW ‑ 1. Taken together, this
constitutes prima ‑ facie “evidence” arising in the
course of trial, satisfying the threshold for
exercise of power under Section 319 CrPC.
5.4 The High Court characterised the confrontation
of 10 May 2016 as mere “teasing” and
concentrated on the previous acid ‑ attack, thereby
undervaluing an independent offence of abetment
to suicide that was proximate in time and
casually linked to the deceased’s death.
SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1891 OF 2024 Page 6 of 17
5.5 By resting its decision on investigation ‑ stage
material concerning 10 March 2016, the High
Court prematurely evaluated an unproven alibi
and overlooked the settled principle that the
burden of establishing such a defence lies
squarely on the accused and must be discharged
through evidence at trial.
5.6 Section 319 CrPC is intended to prevent the real
perpetrator from escaping trial; once ocular
testimony discloses a direct role, the Court is
obliged to summon the person concerned. The
Trial Court’s order of 04 July 2022 correctly
applied this standard, whereas the High Court’s
interference under Section 482 CrPC amounts to
a pre ‑ trial acquittal on disputed facts.
6. Learned counsel for the respondents, respondent
no.1 (State of Punjab) and respondent no.2, have
submitted the following arguments:
6.1 The police investigation, supported by a
parking-slip timed 06.30 a.m., OPD
documentation, medical-store bill, CCTV footage
and mobile-tower records, indicate that
respondent no. 2 was at PGI Chandigarh
on 10 May 2016. Moreover statements of the
parking-attendant and chemist, as well as a
village-level inquiry, corroborate this. These
SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1891 OF 2024 Page 7 of 17
materials were scrutinised up the chain of
command and the final report under
Section 173(2) CrPC recorded respondent no. 2’s
innocence, which the prosecution never
challenged.
6.2 Section 319 CrPC demands evidence stronger
than that required even for framing a charge. The
testimony of PW-1 merely reiterates the FIR
narrative, while Jagdev Singh’s version remains a
Section 161 statement, inadmissible until he
enters the witness box. No fresh or compelling
material emerged after the High Court had earlier
(24 November 2021) quashed the Section 193
summons; the prosecution is essentially seeking
a second bite on the same record.
6.3 The time-distance matrix reinforces the alibi:
village Jagowal is about 90 km from Chandigarh,
and the CCTV still shows respondent no. 2 at PGI
at 12:09 p.m., making his presence at the village
confrontation improbable.
6.4 The Trial Court, in summoning respondent no. 2,
ignored the “scientific and documentary”
evidence and treated the untested alibi as a
matter for trial, thereby reversing the
investigative conclusion without any stronger
contra-proof. The High Court correctly intervened
SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1891 OF 2024 Page 8 of 17
under Section 482 CrPC, holding that the Trial
Court was required to weigh the entire record,
including the investigation dossier, before
exercising an extraordinary power meant to be
sparingly used.
6.5 Finally, respondents contend that conflating the
acid-attack FIR of 13 March 2016 (in which
respondent no. 2 was never named) with the
present FIR has led to misplaced suspicion;
repeated attempts to summon him, despite a
consistent exoneration, amount to harassment
rather than pursuit of justice.
7. Having considered the arguments and submissions
of the parties and having examined the material on
record, the issue that falls for consideration before
us is whether the evidence led justified the Trial
Court’s exercise of power under Section 319 CrPC to
summon respondent no. 2, and whether the High
Court was right in setting that order aside at the
threshold.
8. We shall first examine the scope of Section 319 (1)
of the CrPC which has been reproduced hereunder:
“319. Power to proceed against other persons
appearing to be guilty of offence.
(1) Where, in the course of any inquiry into, or
trial of, an offence, it appears from the
SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1891 OF 2024 Page 9 of 17
evidence that any person not being the
accused has committed any offence for which
such person could be tried together with the
accused, the Court may proceed against such
person for the offence which he appears to
have committed.”
The provision enables a criminal Court, once seized
of the matter, to bring before it any individual whose
complicity becomes apparent from the evidence that
emerges in Court. It is an exception to the general
rule that an accused stands trial only upon
charge-sheet and committal; its object is to ensure
that the trial does not proceed without a participant
who, on the material now available, appears to share
criminal liability. The power is extraordinary and
therefore to be exercised with circumspection, yet it
is neither illusory nor deferential to investigative
conclusions: once live evidence evinces a prima-facie
case stronger than mere suspicion, the Court must
act.
9. The Constitution Bench of this Court in
1
Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab , observed that
Section 319 CrPC is designed to ensure that every
1
(2014) 3 SCC 92
SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1891 OF 2024 Page 10 of 17
participant in a crime is brought before the Court
and its provisions are therefore to be interpreted
constructively and purposively, so that the true
offender does not slip through procedural gaps. The
relevant paras of the judgement are hereunder:
“8. The constitutional mandate under Articles
20 and 21 of the Constitution of India
provides a protective umbrella for the smooth
administration of justice making adequate
provisions to ensure a fair and efficacious
trial so that the accused does not get
prejudiced after the law has been put into
motion to try him for the offence but at the
same time also gives equal protection to
victims and to society at large to ensure that
the guilty does not get away from the
clutches of law. For the empowerment of the
Courts to ensure that the criminal
administration of justice works properly, the
law was appropriately codified and modified
by the legislature under CrPC indicating as to
how the Courts should proceed in order to
ultimately find out the truth so that an
innocent does not get punished but at the
same time, the guilty are brought to book
SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1891 OF 2024 Page 11 of 17
under the law. It is these ideals as enshrined
under the Constitution and our laws that
have led to several decisions, whereby
innovating methods and progressive tools
have been forged to find out the real truth
and to ensure that the guilty does not go
unpunished.
9. The presumption of innocence is the
general law of the land as every man is
presumed to be innocent unless proven to be
guilty. Alternatively, certain statutory
presumptions in relation to certain class of
offences have been raised against the
accused whereby the presumption of guilt
prevails till the accused discharges his
burden upon an onus being cast upon him
under the law to prove himself to be innocent.
These competing theories have been kept in
mind by the legislature. The entire effort,
therefore, is not to allow the real perpetrator
of an offence to get away unpunished. This is
also a part of fair trial and in our opinion, in
order to achieve this very end that the
legislature thought of incorporating
provisions of Section 319 CrPC. It is with the
said object in mind that a constructive and
SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1891 OF 2024 Page 12 of 17
purposive interpretation should be adopted
that advances the cause of justice and does
not dilute the intention of the statute
conferring powers on the Court to carry out
the abovementioned avowed object and
purpose to try the person to the satisfaction
of the Court as an accomplice in the
commission of the offence that is the subject-
matter of trial.”
10. Hence, in our considered opinion, the power under
Section 319 CrPC is triggered not by conjecture but
by “evidence” that surfaces in Court. In the present
case, narrated in detail how, on the morning
of 10 May 2016, respondent no. 2, together with
others, stopped a car, confronted the deceased and,
in the Punjabi vernacular, told him that he and his
family ought to drown themselves for failing to
retaliate. PW-1 further described the immediate
impact of those words: the deceased broke down,
secluded himself, and a few hours later left home
never to return alive.
11. The primary argument of Respondent no. 2 rests on
his alibi. An alibi, however, is a plea in the nature of
a defence; the burden to establish it rests squarely
on the accused. Here, the documents relied upon,
parking chit, chemist’s receipt, OPD card, CCTV
SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1891 OF 2024 Page 13 of 17
clip, have yet to be formally proved. Until that
exercise is undertaken, they remain untested pieces
of paper. To treat them as conclusive at the
threshold would invert the established order of
criminal proceedings, requiring the Court to
pronounce upon a defence before the prosecution is
allowed to lead its full evidence. Even assuming the
documents will eventually be proved, their face
value does not eclipse the prosecution version. The
parking slip is timed at 06:30 a.m.; the chemist’s
bill and CCTV images are from 12:09 p.m. The
confrontation is alleged at 08:30 a.m. A road
journey from Jagowal to Chandigarh of roughly
ninety kilometres in a private vehicle can
comfortably be accomplished within the intervening
window. More importantly, abetment to suicide is
not an offence committed at a single moment. It may
consist of a build-up of psychological pressure
culminating in self-destruction, and the law
punishes that build-up wherever and whenever it
occurs.
12. Learned counsel for the respondents urged that the
police, having once accepted the alibi, were the best
judges of its authenticity and that their conclusion
should not be lightly brushed aside. The submission
overlooks the scheme of the CrPC. Once cognizance
SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1891 OF 2024 Page 14 of 17
is taken and trial commences, the investigating
agency’s view yields to the Court’s independent
assessment. If, in the midst of that trial, evidence
implicating a new participant surfaces, the Court is
duty-bound to act on it. Section 319 CrPC would be
rendered otiose if an Investigating Officer’s earlier
opinion could freeze the array of accused for all time.
13. It was next argued that PW-1’s deposition merely
reproduces the FIR. We are unable to agree. A first
information report is only an initial version; a
statement under oath, recorded in Court, is
substantive evidence. Indeed, it is difficult to
conceive of what stronger material could be
demanded at the summoning stage short of a
confession. The threshold is not proof beyond
reasonable doubt; it is the appearance of
involvement which is apparent from evidence
adduced in the proceeding. That threshold was
satisfied here.
14. We believe that the High Court, in interfering under
Section 482 CrPC, placed decisive reliance on the
investigation dossier and characterised the
10 May 2016 episode as mere “teasing”. Such a
description underplays both the content and the
effect of the words spoken. If the allegations is true,
telling a physically challenged man that he and his
SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1891 OF 2024 Page 15 of 17
family should die, and doing so in the immediate
aftermath of a grievous acid attack, is not
banter. Sensitivity to the social context, where
honour and shame weigh heavily, was called for. The
offence, no doubt, will have to be established at the
trial. The Trial Court will also decide whether on
facts the offence is established, keeping in view the
law laid down by this Court in Mahendra Awase vs.
2
State of Madhya Pradesh and other judgments
interpreting Section 306 IPC.
15. Having regard to the purpose of Section 319 CrPC,
we see no infirmity in the order of the Trial Court. On
the contrary, non-summoning of respondent no. 2
would have risked a truncated trial and a possible
failure of justice. The High Court, by elevating
unproved defence documents above sworn
testimony, adopted an approach that was neither
consistent with the text of Section 319 CrPC nor
consonant with the realities of a case involving a
vulnerable victim. The Court’s intervention, in effect,
foreclosed the prosecution from testing the alibi and
deprived the Trial Court of jurisdiction expressly
conferred upon it.
2
2025 SCC OnLine SC 107
SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1891 OF 2024 Page 16 of 17
16. For the reasons recorded above, the appeal succeeds
and is allowed. The judgment and order
dated 21 November 2023 passed by the High Court
of Punjab and Haryana in CRM-M No. 31120 of
2022 is set aside.
17. The order of the Trial Court dated 04 July 2022
summoning respondent no. 2 to stand trial for the
offence punishable under Section 306 IPC shall
stand revived. Respondent no. 2 shall appear before
the Trial Court within four weeks from today and
thereafter abide by all further orders of the Trial
Court. It will be open to the Trial Court to regulate
the conditions of his release, if any application for
bail is moved, in accordance with law.
18. All observations made herein are confined to the
present adjudication under Section 319 CrPC and
shall not influence the final appreciation of evidence
by the Trial Court.
19. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed
of.
……………………………………J.
(VIKRAM NATH)
……………………………………J.
(K .V. VISWANATHAN)
NEW DELHI
MAY 06, 2025
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