Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
DAVIS
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
SEBASTIAN
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 19/08/1999
BENCH:
V.N.Khare, Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri
JUDGMENT:
SYED SHAH MOHAMMED QUADRI, J
This appeal is from the judgment and order of the
Division Bench of the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in
C.R.P. No.1778 of 1991-C dated July 28, 1994. The polemic
centres round interpretation of the expression ’personal
use’ in sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala
Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (for short ’the
Kerala Act’).
A brief narration of the facts giving rise to this
appeal is necessary to appreciate the question involved in
this case. The question of bona fide requirement of
additional accommodation under Section 11(8) of the Act
alone is canvassed before us so we are confining the facts
relevant to that ground. The appellant is the landlord and
the respondent is the tenant of a shop room which is a
portion of the main building of Irinjalakkuda Village,
Mukundapuram Taluk, (hereinafter referred to as ’the
premises’). In the main building the appellant was running
the business of hotel-cum-bar. On the plea that he had made
all preparations for starting a jewellery shop and a textile
shop and bona fide requires additional accommodation for the
proposed business, he filed R.C.P.No.31 of 1983 seeking
eviction of the respondent from the premises. The ground of
bona fide requirement of the appellant for additional
accommodation was opposed by the respondent. He averred
that he was running a provision shop in the premises which
was his sole source of income for his livelihood and the
appellant was having other vacant accommodation which he let
out to others. The learned Rent Controller recorded the
finding that the appellant was not in need of additional
accommodation. It was also found that if the respondent was
evicted from the premises he would be put to more hardship
than the benefit that would be fetched to the appellant. In
that view of the matter, the Rent Controller dismissed the
eviction petition on 7th June, 1986. The landlord
unsuccessfully assailed the said order before the Appellate
Authority in R.C.A. No.39 of 1990. Both, on the question
of bona fide requirement of the landlord and on the question
of comparative hardship, the Appellate Authority held
against the appellant/landlord. Aggrieved thereby, the
appellant filed C.R.P. No.1778 of 1991-C before the High
Court of Kerala. The Division Bench of the High Court
dismissed the Revision on 28th July 1994. It is against
that order of the High Court, the appellant is in appeal by
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special leave.
Mr.K. Sukumaran, learned senior counsel appearing for
the appellant, invited our attention to sub-section (8) of
Section 11 of the Kerala Act and argued that it enabled a
landlord to claim additional accommodation for his bona fide
personal use and that the High Court committed grave error
of law in confining the personal use of the landlord to
expansion of the existing business only.
Mr. Ramesh Babu, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent, has contended that for purposes of starting any
business the provisions of Section 11(3) will have to be
invoked and that Section 11(8) applies only when the
landlord’s need for additional accommodation relates to
expansion of his existing business; if Section 11(8) is
interpreted as contended by the appellant, then rigour of
Section 11(3) will be diluted and it will be circumvented by
having recourse to sub-section (8).
To appreciate the contentions of the learned counsel,
it will be appropriate to refer to sub-section (8) of
Section 11 of the Kerala Act which reads as under :
"11(8). A landlord who is occupying only a part of a
building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order
directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of
the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in
possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation
for his personal use."
A plain reading of the provision, extracted above,
shows that the requirements of sub-section (8) under which
the claim is made by the landlord are : (i) a landlord is
occupying only a part of a building; (ii) the tenant is
occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of
the building; and (iii) the landlord requires additional
accommodation for his personal use. We may notice here that
sub-section (10) is in the nature of a proviso to
sub-sections (3), (4) and (8). It mandates that if the Rent
Controller is satisfied that the claim of the landlord under
sub-sections (3), (4), (7) and (8) is bona fide, he shall
make an order thereunder but if he is not so satisfied he
shall make an order rejecting the application. The first
proviso to sub-section (10) provides an additional ground
for rejection of the application under sub-section (8) and,
that is, if the Controller is satisfied that the hardship
which may be caused to the tenant by ordering his eviction,
will outweigh the advantage to the landlord. In the event
of granting the application the second proviso comes into
operation and empowers the Rent Controller to grant
reasonable time to the tenant for putting the landlord in
possession of the building which may be extended from time
to time up to three months. While providing a ground to a
landlord to claim additional accommodation for his personal
use, possible care has been taken to safeguard the interest
of a tenant.
There is no controversy in regard to compliance of
requirements of (i) and (ii) of sub-section (8) noted above.
In hoc requirement (iii), the landlord has to show that he
bona fide requires additional accommodation for his personal
use. The High Court held that the requirement of the
landlord should relate to the same purpose, namely, for
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expansion of his existing business of hotel-cum-bar and that
as the appellant intended to start a different business,
namely, the jewellery and textile business, in the
additional accommodation, the case did not fall under
Section 11(8) of the Kerala Act.
Now, what is the meaning of the expression ’personal
use’ in sub- section (8)? It is a well-settled principle of
interpretation that words in a statute shall be given their
natural, ordinary meaning; nothing should be added to them
nor should any word be treated as otiose. Two comprehensive
expressions ’additional accommodation’ and ’personal use’
are employed in sub-section (8). The expression ’additional
accommodation’ takes in both residential as well as non-
residential buildings. ’Personal use’ is also an expression
of wide amplitude. There is nothing in the sub-section
which restricts the import of that expression. The said
requirement of sub-section (8) will be complied with on the
satisfaction of the Controller about bona fide need of the
additional accommodation for personal use of the landlord.
To what use the additional accommodation should be put, is
the choice of the landlord. In the case of a
non-residential building whether a new business should be
set up in the additional accommodation or whether it should
be used for expansion of the existing business, is left
entirely to the option of the landlord. This, being the
intendment of the legislature, the Court cannot impose any
restriction with regard to the use of the additional
accommodation from which the eviction of the tenant is
sought.
In Joseph vs. Francis [1965 KLT 1113], a learned
Single Judge of the Kerala High Court correctly construed
Section 11(8) of the Kerala Act when he held that it was the
landlord’s choice to decide what business he would carry on
and that a Court would not be justified in saying that he
required the building bona fide for his own use only if he
required it for expanding his existing trade.
Thus, it follows that the phrase ’additional
accommodation for personal use of the landlord’ may relate
to residential purpose as well as for non-residential
purpose. Where it relates to non-residential purpose there
is no reason to restrict personal use of the landlord for
the purpose of only expansion of the existing business. He
can put the additional accommodation, so long as he bona
fide need it, to any business or purpose of his choice.
Here, it may be useful to refer to in pari materia
enactments of other States. In Andhra Pradesh Buildings
(Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1960, Section 10(3)(c)
deals with granting order of eviction on the plea of
additional accommodation. It provides that in the case of
non-residential building the landlord has to show that he
requires the additional accommodation for the purpose of a
business which he is carrying on; thus under Andhra Act
additional accommodation can be sought for purposes of the
business which the landlord is carrying on. So also under
Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease & Rent
Control) Act 1960, the additional accommodation for non-
residential purposes can be claimed for purposes of the
business which the landlord is carrying on.
In Shri Balaganesan Metals vs. Shri M.N.Shanmugham
Chetty & Ors. [1987 (1) RCR 586], while construing Section
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(10)(3)(c) of Tamil Nadu Act, this Court held that once a
landlord has satisfied the Controller that he was bona fide
in need of additional accommodation for residential or
non-residential purposes and that the advantage derived by
him by an order of eviction will outweigh the hardship
caused to the tenant, then the landlord is entitled to an
order of eviction irrespective of any other consideration.
It may be pointed out here in contra distinction to
the other enactments that under Section 11(8) of the Kerala
Act claim for additional accommodation is not confined to
expansion of the business which the landlord is carrying on.
As pointed above, the landlord has a wider choice under
Section 11(8) of the Act. He can use it at his option in
case of non-residential accommodation, either for expansion
of existing business or for a new business.
The contention that if the expression ’personal use’
under sub- section (8) is interpreted to include ’use for
any business’, it will dilute the rigour of Section 11(3),
which is devoid of merit. We shall notice sub-section (3)
of Section 11 of the Act here to examine the contention of
the learned counsel :
"Section 11(3). A landlord may apply to the Rent
Control Court for an order directing the tenant to put the
landlord in possession of the building if he bona fide needs
the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by
any member of his family dependent on him :
Provided that the Rent Control Court shall not give
any such direction if the landlord has another building of
his own in his possession in the same city, town or village
except where the Rent Control Court is satisfied that for
special reasons, in any particular case it will be just and
proper to do so:
Provided further that the Rent Control Court shall not
give any direction to a tenant to put the landlord in
possession, if such tenant is depending for his livelihood
mainly on the income derived from any trade or business
carried on in such building and there is no other suitable
building available in the locality for such person to carry
on such trade or business."
(Provisos 3 and 4 are not relevant for our purposes).
To secure the eviction of a tenant under sub-section
(3), a landlord has to show that : (i) he bona fide needs
the building for his own occupation or for the occupation of
any member of his family dependent on him; (ii) the
building of which eviction is sought, is in the occupation
of a tenant; and (iii) he does not have another building of
his own in his possession in the same city town or village
or if he has such a building in his possession, the Rent
Controller will have to be satisfied for special reasons
that it will be just and proper to order eviction of tenant
from the building in occupation of the tenant. The
legislative mandate to the Rent Controller is not to pass an
order directing the tenant to put the landlord in
possession, if such tenant is depending for his livelihood
mainly on the income derived from any trade or business
carried on in such building and if there is no other
suitable building available in the locality for such person
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to carry on such trade or business. Thus, it is seen that
whereas before passing an order under sub-section (8), the
requirement of comparative hardship is to be considered by
the Rent Controller and it is only when the hardship that
may be caused to the tenant by granting an order in favour
of the landlord will outweigh the advantage to the landlord
that the Rent Controller has to reject the application. But
under sub-section (3) no order of eviction against the
tenant can be passed if he is dependent for his livelihood
mainly on the income derived from any trade or business
carried on in such building and there is no other suitable
building available in the locality for such person to carry
on such trade or business. There is yet another feature
which distinguishes sub- section (3) from sub-section (8).
Whereas possession of another building in the same city,
town or village except when the Rent Controller is satisfied
for special reasons, is a bar for passing an order of
eviction under sub-section (3) but the basis of claiming
such an order under sub-section (8) is that the landlord is
in occupation of a part of the building and he needs the
remaining part of the building or a portion thereof in
occupation of the tenant as additional accommodation for his
personal use. Thus it is seen that the requirements of
sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) are different. There is
no scope for a case falling under sub-section (3) to have
recourse to sub-section (8) and thus diluting sub-section
(3).
Now, the germane aspect which remains to be adverted
to is the requirement of the first proviso to sub-section
(10) of Section 11, namely, comparative hardship to the
tenant. The learned Rent Controller as well as the
Appellate Authority held against the appellant on this
aspect. The High Court did not consider this aspect in the
view it had taken of Section 11(8) of the Act. For all the
above reasons, we are of the opinion that even after holding
that bona fide requirement of the landlord for additional
accommodation for personal use is established, the relief
under sub- section (8) of Section 11, cannot be granted to
him without recording a finding under the first proviso to
sub-section (10) of Section 11 of the Act in favour of the
landlord. Since, the High Court did not consider this
aspect, we are of the opinion that the matter has to go back
to the High Court for fresh consideration in the light of
this judgment. The judgment and order of the Division Bench
under appeal is, therefore, set aside and the case is
remitted to the High Court for fresh disposal in accordance
with law. The appeal is allowed as indicated above. No
costs.