Full Judgment Text
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
th
Judgment delivered on : 12 December 2023
+ MAT. APP. (F.C) 135/2016 & CM APPL. 8195/2018
OMAR ABDULLAH .... Appellant
versus
PAYAL ABDULLAH .... Respondents
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Appellant: Ms. Malavika Rajkotia with Mr. Ramakant Sharma, Ms.
Trisha Gupta, Ms. Ekta Sharma, Ms. Purva Dua, Mr. Sajal
Arora, Mr. Prateek Avasthi and Mr. Mayank Grover,
Advocates.
For the Respondents: Mr. Prosenjeet Banerjee, Ms. Shreya Singhal, Mr. Sarthak
Bhardwaj, Ms. Anshika Sharma, Ms. Pranaya Sahai and
Ms. Akriti Anand, Advocates.
CORAM: -
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV SACHDEVA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIKAS MAHAJAN
JUDGMENT
SANJEEV SACHDEVA, J.
1. Appellant/Husband impugns judgment and decree dated
30.08.2016 passed by the Family Court, whereby the petition filed by
the appellant seeking divorce under Section 18 of the Foreign
Marriage Act 1969 read with Section 27(1)(B) and (D) of the Special
Marriage Act, 1954 on the grounds of desertion and cruelty has been
dismissed.
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2. Appellant husband, a Muslim got married to Respondent wife, a
Hindu on 01.09.1994 under Civil Law in England. It is an admitted
position that both parties are permanent residents of India and there is
no dispute that the family court at Delhi had the jurisdiction to
adjudicate the petition.
3. Appellant filed the petition alleging that their marriage has
irretrievably broken down and that parties have been living separately
since 2009, although they had not enjoyed conjugal relations since
2007. As per the Appellant, he has been residing in Srinagar since
2009 and was serving as the Chief Minister of the State of Jammu and
Kashmir and Respondent had chosen to reside in Delhi with their
children.
4. As per the Appellant Respondent refused to accompany him to
Kashmir in 2002, when he moved there in order to prepare himself for
the elections and this resulted in the Petitioner having to fly to Delhi
on the weekends to meet his children. It is alleged that the Respondent
has alienated the children from the Appellant which is evident from
the SMS exchange between them and the Appellant. He further
alleges that the Respondent had an uncomfortable relationship with
the Appellant’s family, due to which he was forced to distance himself
from his own family to keep the peace in his marriage. It is contended
that Respondent would never attend holidays with the Appellant’s
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family, nor would she allow the children to do so.
5. As per the Appellant the fact that Respondent has been
irrationally refusing any and all discussion for an amicable
separation/divorce, it also amounts to cruelty. It is alleged that
appellant had made sincere efforts to settle the disputes, however the
Respondent has refused any dialogue.
6. Per contra, Respondent contends that the petition does not
disclose any cruelty and as such the petition is liable to be dismissed
for want of cause of action. The allegation of parties not having any
conjugal relations since 2007 is denied, it is submitted that the parties
were residing together until the filing of the petition in January 2013.
It is contended that parties had not been living separately for over two
years prior to the filing of the petition.
7. As per the respondent, parties had agreed that Respondent and
the children would stay in Delhi, due to the security threats in
Srinagar. It is submitted that the Respondent and children frequently
travelled to Srinagar to visit the Appellant and his family and they
took trips together abroad and within India.
8. The Family Court after considering the evidence led by the
parties held that the allegations of cruelty were vague and
unacceptable. It was held that the Appellant did not provide one single
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circumstance to explain the alleged discomfort between the
Respondent and his family members. None of the family members
except the Appellant’s sister deposed, who also did not disclose any
instances of mental stress and cruelty caused by the Respondent to the
Appellant. It was also held that the parties were based in Delhi till
2002 and mutually decided that the children should be educated in
Delhi and the Respondent agreed to stay back with the children.
9. The court held that frequent travel of the petitioner between
Delhi and Srinagar could not be held to be on account of marital
discord, as it was a collective decision and hence could not be termed
as an act of cruelty towards the Appellant. Furthermore, it was an
admitted position that the parties took several vacations and also
attended various family functions together up until January 2011,
when the divorce petition was filed.
10. The Family Court held that Appellant had miserably failed to
prove any act which could be termed as an act of cruelty, whether
physical or mental, towards him.
11. On the issue of desertion, the Family Court has held that though
parties had been living separately since 2009, they had been visiting
each other, travelling together till 2011. Further, the parties were
living separately under a mutual arrangement for the convenience and
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safety of their children and no fault could be attributed to the
Respondent, hence no divorce on grounds of desertion could be
granted. Consequently, the family court dismissed the Divorce
Petition filed by the Appellant.
12. Learned counsel for the Appellant submits that the Family
Court has erred in holding that the allegations do not amount to
cruelty. She submits that the Family Court has not held that the
allegations are not proved but has erroneously held that they do not
constitute cruelty.
13. Learned Counsel for the Appellant further submits that the
threshold of proof required to prove grounds for divorce under the
Special Marriage is much lower than the Hindu Marriage Act. It is
submitted that the impugned judgement has not distinguished between
the two acts and instead imposed the sensibilities and philosophies of
the Hindu Marriage Act on the Special Marriage Act.
14. It is submitted that irretrievable breakdown of marriage has
been considered along with the “fault theory” to bring down the
threshold of proof required to establish fault to either party under the
Special Marriage act, by virtue of marriage being contractual in
nature. She relies upon the judgment in the case of Sandhya Kumari
v. Manish Kumar 234 (2016) DLT 381 to contend that irretrievable
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breakdown of marriage blended with cruelty would entitle a Petitioner
to a divorce
15. Learned Counsel for the Appellant further submits that Special
Marriage Act, 1954 has a lower threshold of proof given the fact that
marriage under the said Act is not a "sacrament" in the way it is under
Hindu and Christian personal law. This, it is submitted that can be
inferred from the fact that Special Marriage Act provided for divorce
from its inception in 1954 while the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 did not
provide for it till 1976.
16. It is submitted that as marriage under the Hindu Marriage Act is
a sacrament thus divorce is not an entitlement. In contrast marriage
under the Special Marriage Act is purely contractual in nature. The
Special Marriage Act as a statute does not envisage 'no exit' and it
would be unjust for the Appellant to be denied a divorce.
17. Per Contra, Learned Counsel for the Respondent submitted that
the plea that the threshold for cruelty is lower in Special Marriage Act
than in the Hindu Marriage Act is unacceptable. He submits that both
Acts refer to the “solemnization of marriage” and hence marriage
under both is sacrament and not contractual. Section 27(1)(d) of
Special Marriage Act and Section 13(1) (ia) of Hindu Marriage Act
are pari materia. It is submitted that both statutes are identical in
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language and hence the law laid down by the High Courts and
Supreme Court of India while interpreting the respective provisions
i.e. Section 27(1)(d) of the Special Marriage Act and Section 13(1)
(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act would equally apply to cases being
tried under both the enactments.
18. To ascertain as to whether a different or lower threshold should
be applied to a Petition seeking divorce on the ground of cruelty under
the Special Marriage Act vis a vis Hindu Marriage Act, a comparative
of the various provisions is required to be done.
19. A comparative of the relevant provision of the Hindu Marriage
Act vis a vis the Special Marriage Act is as under:
| HINDU MARRIAGE ACT | SPECIAL MARRIAGE ACT |
|---|---|
| 5. Conditions for a Hindu<br>marriage.—A marriage may be<br>solemnized between any two<br>Hindus, if the following<br>conditions are fulfilled,<br>namely:—<br>(i) neither party has a spouse<br>living at the time of the marriage;<br>(ii) at the time of the marriage,<br>neither party—<br>(a) is incapable of giving a | 4. Conditions relating to<br>solemnization of special<br>marriages. ― Notwithstanding<br>anything contained in any other<br>law for the time being in force<br>relating to the solemnization of<br>marriages, a marriage between<br>any two persons may be<br>solemnized under this Act, if at<br>the time of the marriage the<br>following conditions are fulfilled,<br>namely:― |
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| valid consent to it in<br>consequence of<br>unsoundness of mind; or<br>(b) though capable of giving a<br>valid consent, has been<br>suffering from mental<br>disorder of such a kind or<br>to such an extent as to be<br>unfit for marriage and the<br>procreation of children; or<br>(c) has been subject to<br>recurrent attacks of<br>insanity;<br>(iii) the bridegroom has<br>completed the age of twenty-one<br>years and the bride, the age of<br>eighteen years at the time of the<br>marriage;<br>(iv) the parties are not within the<br>degrees of prohibited relationship<br>unless the custom or usage<br>governing each of them permits<br>of a marriage between the two;<br>(v) the parties are not sapindas of<br>each other, unless the custom or<br>usage governing each of them<br>permits of a marriage between the<br>two; | (a) neither party has a spouse<br>living;<br>b) neither party―<br>(i) is incapable of giving a valid<br>consent to it in consequence<br>of unsoundness of mind; or<br>(ii) though capable of giving a<br>valid consent, has been<br>suffering from mental<br>disorder of such a kind or to<br>such an extent as to be unfit<br>for marriage and the<br>procreation of children; or<br>(iii) has been subject to recurrent<br>attacks of insanity;<br>(c) the male has completed the<br>age of twenty-one years and the<br>female the age of eighteen years;<br>(d) the parties are not within the<br>degrees of prohibited relationship:<br>Provided that where a custom<br>governing at least one of the<br>parties permits of a marriage<br>between them, such marriage may<br>be solemnized, notwithstanding<br>that they are within the degrees of<br>prohibited relationship; and |
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| (e) where the marriage is<br>solemnized in the State of Jammu<br>and Kashmir, both parties are<br>citizens of India domiciled in the<br>territories to which this Act<br>extends].<br>Explanation.―In this section,<br>“custom”, in relation to a person<br>belonging to any tribe,<br>community, group or family,<br>means any rule which the State<br>Government may, by notification<br>in the Official Gazette, specify in<br>this behalf as applicable to<br>members of that tribe,<br>community, group or family:<br>Provided that no such notification<br>shall be issued in relation to the<br>members of any tribe,<br>community, group or family,<br>unless the State Government is<br>satisfied—<br>(i) that such rule has been<br>continuously and uniformly<br>observed for a long time among<br>those members;<br>(ii) that such rule is certain and<br>not unreasonable or opposed to<br>public policy; and |
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| (iii) that such rule, if applicable<br>only to a family, has not been<br>discontinued by the family. | |
|---|---|
| 7. Ceremonies for a Hindu<br>marriage.—(1) A Hindu<br>marriage may be solemnized in<br>accordance with the customary<br>rites and ceremonies of either<br>party thereto.<br>(2) Where such rites and<br>ceremonies include the Saptapadi<br>(that is, the taking of seven steps<br>by the bridegroom and the bride<br>jointly before the sacred fire), the<br>marriage becomes complete and<br>binding when the seventh step is<br>taken. | 12. Place and form of<br>solemnization.―(1) The<br>marriage may be solemnized at<br>the office of the Marriage Officer,<br>or at such other place within a<br>reasonable distance therefrom as<br>the parties may desire, and upon<br>such conditions and the payment<br>of such additional fees as may be<br>prescribed.<br>(2) The marriage may be<br>solemnized in any form which the<br>parties may choose to adopt:<br>Provided that it shall not be<br>complete and binding on the<br>parties unless each party says to<br>the other in the presence of the<br>Marriage Officer and the three<br>witnesses and in any language<br>understood by the parties,―“I,<br>(A), take the (B), to be my lawful<br>wife (or husband)”. |
| 9. Restitution of conjugal<br>right.— When either the husband<br>or the wife has, without<br>reasonable excuse, withdrawn<br>from the society of the other, the | 22. Restitution of conjugal<br>rights.―When either the husband<br>or the wife has, without<br>reasonable excuse, withdrawn<br>from the society of the other, the |
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| aggrieved party may apply, by<br>petition to the district court, for<br>restitution of conjugal rights and<br>the court, on being satisfied of the<br>truth of the statements made in<br>such petition and that there is no<br>legal ground why the application<br>should not be granted, may decree<br>restitution of conjugal rights<br>accordingly.<br>Explanation.—Where a question<br>arises whether there has been<br>reasonable excuse for withdrawal<br>from the society, the burden of<br>proving reasonable excuse shall<br>be on the person who has<br>withdrawn from the society. | aggrieved party may apply by<br>petition to the district court for<br>restitution of conjugal rights, and<br>the court, on being satisfied of the<br>truth of the statements made in<br>such petition, and that there is no<br>legal ground why the application<br>should not be granted, may decree<br>restitution of conjugal rights<br>accordingly.<br>Explanation.―Where a question<br>arises whether there has been<br>reasonable excuse for withdrawal<br>from the society, the burden of<br>providing reasonable excuse shall<br>be on the person who has<br>withdrawn from the society. |
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| 10. Judicial separation.— (1)<br>Either party to a marriage,<br>whether solemnised before or<br>after the commencement of this<br>Act, may present a petition<br>praying for a decree for judicial<br>separation on any of the grounds<br>specified in sub-section (1) of<br>section 13, and in the case of a<br>wife also on any of the grounds<br>specified in sub-section (2)<br>thereof, as grounds on which a<br>petition for divorce might have<br>been presented.<br>(2) Where a decree for judicial | 23. Judicial separation.―(1) A<br>petition for judicial separation<br>may be presented to the district<br>court either by the husband or the<br>wife,―<br>(a) on any of the grounds<br>specified in sub-section (1) and<br>sub-section (1A) of section 27 on<br>which a petition for divorce might<br>have been presented; or<br>(b) on the ground of failure to<br>comply with a decree for<br>restitution of conjugal rights; |
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| separation has been passed, it<br>shall no longer be obligatory for<br>the petitioner to cohabit with the<br>respondent, but the court may, on<br>the application by petition of<br>either party and on being satisfied<br>of the truth of the statements<br>made in such petition, rescind the<br>decree if it considers it just and<br>reasonable to do so. | and the court, on being satisfied<br>of the truth of the statements<br>made in such petition, and that<br>there is no legal ground why the<br>application should not be granted,<br>may decree judicial separation<br>accordingly.<br>(2) Where the court grants a<br>decree for judicial separation, it<br>shall be no longer obligatory for<br>the petitioner to cohabit with the<br>respondent, but the court may, on<br>the application by petition of<br>either party and on being satisfied<br>of the truth of the statements<br>made in such petition, rescind the<br>decree if it considers it just and<br>reasonable to do so. |
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| 11. Void marriages.—Any<br>marriage solemnised after the<br>commencement of this Act shall<br>be null and void and may, on a<br>petition presented by either party<br>thereto against the other party, be<br>so declared by a decree of nullity<br>if it contravenes any one of the<br>conditions specified in clauses (i),<br>(iv) and (v) of section 5. | 24. Void marriages.―(1) Any<br>marriage solemnized under this<br>Act shall be null and void and<br>may, on a petition presented by<br>either party thereto against the<br>other party, be so declared] by a<br>decree of nullity if―<br>(i) any of the conditions<br>specified in clauses (a), (b),<br>(c) and (d) of section 4 has<br>not been fulfilled; or<br>(ii) the respondent was impotent |
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| at the time of the marriage<br>and at the time of the<br>institution of the suit.<br>(2) Nothing contained in this<br>section shall apply to any<br>marriage deemed to be<br>solemnized under this Act within<br>the meaning of section 18, but the<br>registration of any such marriage<br>under Chapter III may be declared<br>to be of no effect if the<br>registration was in contravention<br>of any of the conditions specified<br>in clauses (a) to (e) of section 15:<br>Provided that no such declaration<br>shall be made in any case where<br>an appeal has been preferred<br>under section 17 and the decision<br>of the district court has become<br>final. | |
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| 12. Voidable marriages.—(1)<br>Any marriage solemnised,<br>whether before or after the<br>commencement of this Act, shall<br>be voidable and may be annulled<br>by a decree of nullity on any of<br>the following grounds, namely:—<br>(a) that the marriage has not been<br>consummated owing to the<br>impotence of the respondent; or | 25. Voidable marriages.―Any<br>marriage solemnized under this<br>Act shall be voidable and may be<br>annulled by a decree of nullity<br>if,―<br>(i) the marriage has not been<br>consummated owing to the wilful<br>refusal of the respondent to<br>consummate the marriage; or<br>(ii) the respondent was at the time |
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| (b) that the marriage is in<br>contravention of the condition<br>specified in clause (ii) of section<br>5; or<br>(c) that the consent of the<br>petitioner, or where the consent of<br>the guardian in marriage of the<br>petitioner was required under<br>section 5 as it stood immediately<br>before the commencement of the<br>Child Marriage Restraint<br>(Amendment) Act, 1978 (2 of<br>1978)], the consent of such<br>guardian was obtained by force or<br>by fraud as to the nature of the<br>ceremony or as to any material<br>fact or circumstances concerning<br>the respondent; or<br>(d) that the respondent was at the<br>time of the marriage pregnant by<br>some person other than the<br>petitioner.<br>(2) Notwithstanding anything<br>contained in sub-section (1), no<br>petition for annulling a<br>marriage—<br>(a) on the ground specified in<br>clause (c) of sub-section (1) shall<br>be entertained if— | of the marriage pregnant by some<br>person other than the petitioner;<br>or<br>(iii) the consent of either party to<br>the marriage was obtained by<br>coercion or fraud, as defined in<br>the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9<br>of 1872):<br>Provided that, in the case<br>specified in clause (ii), the court<br>shall not grant a decree unless it is<br>satisfied,―<br>(a) that the petitioner was at the<br>time of the marriage ignorant of<br>the facts alleged;<br>(b) that proceedings were<br>instituted within a year from the<br>date of the marriage; and<br>(c) that marital intercourse with<br>the consent of the petitioner has<br>not taken place since the<br>discovery by the petitioner of the<br>existence of the grounds for a<br>decree:<br>Provided further that in the case<br>specified in clause (iii), the court<br>shall not grant a decree if,―<br>(a) proceedings have not been<br>instituted within one year |
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| (i) the petition is presented<br>more than one year after<br>the force had ceased to<br>operate or, as the case may<br>be, the fraud had been<br>discovered; or<br>(ii) the petitioner has, with his<br>or her full consent, lived<br>with the other party to the<br>marriage as husband or<br>wife after the force had<br>ceased to operate or, as the<br>case may be, the fraud had<br>been discovered;<br>(b) on the ground specified in<br>clause (d) of sub-section (1) shall<br>be entertained unless the court is<br>satisfied—<br>(i) that the petitioner was at the<br>time of the marriage<br>ignorant of the facts<br>alleged;<br>(ii) that proceedings have been<br>instituted in the case of a<br>marriage solemnised before<br>the commencement of this<br>Act within one year of such<br>commencement and in the<br>case of marriages<br>solemnised after such | after the coercion had<br>ceased or, as the case may<br>be, the fraud had been<br>discovered; or<br>(b) the petitioner has with his<br>or her free consent lived<br>with the other party to the<br>marriage as husband and<br>wife after the coercion had<br>ceased or, as the case may<br>be, the fraud had been<br>discovered. |
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| commencement within one<br>year from the date of the<br>marriage; and<br>(iii) that marital intercourse<br>with the consent of the<br>petitioner has not taken<br>place since the discovery<br>by the petitioner of the<br>existence of the said<br>ground. | |
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| 13. Divorce.—(1) Any marriage<br>solemnized, whether before or<br>after the commencement of this<br>Act, may, on a petition presented<br>by either the husband or the wife,<br>be dissolved by a decree of<br>divorce on the ground that the<br>other party—<br>(i) has, after the solemnization of<br>the marriage, had voluntary<br>sexual intercourse with any<br>person other than his or her<br>spouse; or<br>(ia) has, after the solemnization<br>of the marriage, treated the<br>petitioner with cruelty; or<br>(ib) has deserted the petitioner<br>for a continuous period of<br>not less than two years<br>immediately preceding the | 27. Divorce.―(1) Subject to the<br>provisions of this Act and to the<br>rules made there under, a petition<br>for divorce may be presented to<br>the district court either by the<br>husband or the wife on the ground<br>that the respondent―<br>(a) has, after the solemnization of<br>the marriage, had voluntary<br>sexual intercourse with any<br>person other than his or her<br>spouse; or<br>(b) has deserted the petitioner for<br>a continuous period of not less<br>than two years immediately<br>preceding the presentation of the<br>petition; or<br>(c) is undergoing a sentence of<br>imprisonment for seven years or<br>more for an offence as defined in |
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| presentation of the petition;<br>or<br>(ii) has ceased to be a Hindu by<br>conversion to another religion; or<br>(iii) has been incurably of<br>unsound mind, or has been<br>suffering continuously or<br>intermittently from mental<br>disorder of such a kind and to<br>such an extent that the petitioner<br>cannot reasonably be expected to<br>live with the respondent.<br>Explanation.—In this clause,—<br>(a) the expression “mental<br>disorder” means mental<br>illness, arrested or<br>incomplete development of<br>mind, psychopathic<br>disorder or any other<br>disorder or disability of<br>mind and includes<br>schizophrenia;<br>(b) the expression “psychopathic<br>disorder” means a<br>persistent disorder or<br>disability of mind (whether<br>or not including sub—<br>normality of intelligence)<br>which results in abnormally<br>aggressive or seriously | the Indian Penal Code (45 of<br>1860);<br>(d) has since the solemnization of<br>the marriage treated the petitioner<br>with cruelty; or<br>(e) has been incurably of unsound<br>mind, or has been suffering<br>continuously or intermittently<br>from mental disorder of such a<br>kind and to such an extent that the<br>petitioner cannot reasonably be<br>expected to live with the<br>respondent.<br>Explanation.―In this clause,―<br>(a) the expression “mental<br>disorder” means mental<br>illness, arrested or<br>incomplete development of<br>mind, psychopathic<br>disorder or any other<br>disorder or disability of<br>mind and includes<br>schizophrenia;<br>(b) the expression “psychopathic<br>disorder” means a<br>persistent disorder or<br>disability of mind (whether<br>or not including sub-<br>normality of intelligence)<br>which results in abnormally |
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| irresponsible conduct on<br>the part of the other party,<br>and whether or not it<br>requires or is susceptible to<br>medical treatment; or]<br>(iv) * * * * *<br>(v) has been suffering from<br>venereal disease in a<br>communicable form; or<br>(vi) has renounced the world by<br>entering any religious order; or<br>(vii) has not been heard of as<br>being alive for a period of seven<br>years or more by those persons<br>who would naturally have heard<br>of it, had that party been alive;<br>Explanation.—In this sub-section,<br>the expression “desertion” means<br>the desertion of the petitioner by<br>the other party to the marriage<br>without reasonable cause and<br>without the consent or against the<br>wish of such party, and includes<br>the wilful neglect of the petitioner<br>by the other party to the marriage,<br>and its grammatical variations<br>and cognate expressions shall be<br>construed accordingly.<br>(1A) Either party to a marriage, | aggressive or seriously<br>irresponsible conduct on<br>the part of the respondent,<br>and whether or not it<br>requires or is susceptible to<br>medical treatment; or<br>(f) has been suffering from<br>venereal disease in a<br>communicable form; or<br>(g) has been suffering from<br>leprosy, the disease not having<br>been contacted from the<br>petitioner; or<br>(h) has not been heard of as being<br>alive for a period of seven years<br>or more by those persons who<br>would naturally have heard of the<br>respondent if the respondent had<br>been alive;<br>Explanation.―In this sub-section,<br>the expression “desertion” means<br>desertion of the petitioner by the<br>other party to the marriage<br>without reasonable cause and<br>without the consent or against the<br>wish of such party, and includes<br>the wilful neglect of the petitioner<br>by the other party to the marriage,<br>and its grammatical variations<br>and cognate expressions shall be<br>construed accordingly; |
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| whether solemnized before or<br>after the commencement of this<br>Act, may also present a petition<br>for the dissolution of the marriage<br>by a decree of divorce on the<br>ground—<br>(i) that there has been no<br>resumption of cohabitation<br>as between the parties to<br>the marriage for a period of<br>9[one year] or upwards<br>after the passing of a<br>decree for judicial<br>separation in a proceeding<br>to which they were parties;<br>or<br>(ii) that there has been no<br>restitution of conjugal<br>rights as between the<br>parties to the marriage for a<br>period of 9[one year] or<br>upwards after the passing<br>of a decree for restitution<br>of conjugal rights in a<br>proceeding to which they<br>were parties.]<br>(2) A wife may also present a<br>petition for the dissolution of her<br>marriage by a decree of divorce<br>on the ground,—<br>(i) in the case of any marriage | (1A) A wife may also present a<br>petition for divorce to the district<br>court on the ground,―<br>(i) that her husband has, since<br>the solemnization of the<br>marriage, been guilty of<br>rape, sodomy or bestiality;<br>(ii) that in a suit under section<br>18 of the Hindu Adoptions<br>and Maintenance Act, 1956<br>(78 of 1956), or in a<br>proceeding under section<br>125 of the Code of<br>Criminal Procedure, 1973<br>(2 of 1974) (or under the<br>corresponding section 488<br>of the Code of Criminal<br>Procedure, 1898) (5 of<br>1898), a decree or order, as<br>the case may be, has been<br>passed against the husband<br>awarding maintenance to<br>the wife notwithstanding<br>that she was living apart<br>and that since the passing<br>of such decree or order,<br>cohabitation between the<br>parties has not been<br>resumed for one year or<br>upwards.<br>(2) Subject to the provisions of |
|---|
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| solemnized before the<br>commencement of this Act, that<br>the husband had married again<br>before such commencement or<br>that any other wife of the husband<br>married before such<br>commencement was alive at the<br>time of the solemnization of the<br>marriage of the petitioner:<br>Provided that in either case the<br>other wife is alive at the time of<br>the presentation of the petition; or<br>(ii) that the husband has, since the<br>solemnization of the marriage,<br>been guilty of rape, sodomy or<br>bestiality; or<br>(iii) that in a suit under section<br>18 of the Hindu Adoptions and<br>Maintenance Act, 1956 (78 of<br>1956), or in a proceeding under<br>section 125 of the Code of<br>Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of<br>1974) (or under the corresponding<br>section 488 of the Code of<br>Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of<br>1898), a decree or order, as the<br>case may be, has been passed<br>against the husband awarding<br>maintenance to the wife<br>notwithstanding that she was<br>living apart and that since the<br>passing of such decree or order, | this Act and to the rules made<br>there under, either party to a<br>marriage, whether solemnized<br>before or after the<br>commencement of the Special<br>Marriage (Amendment) Act, 1970<br>(29 of 1970), may present a<br>petition for divorce to the district<br>court on the ground―<br>(i) that there has been no<br>resumption of cohabitation<br>as between the parties to<br>the marriage for a period of<br>one year or upwards after<br>the passing of a decree for<br>judicial separation in a<br>proceeding to which they<br>were parties; or<br>(ii) that there has been no<br>restitution of conjugal<br>rights as between the<br>parties to the marriage for a<br>period of one year or<br>upwards after the passing<br>of a decree for restitution<br>of conjugal rights in a<br>proceeding to which they<br>were parties. |
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| cohabitation between the parties<br>has not been resumed for one year<br>or upwards;<br>(iv) that her marriage (whether<br>consummated or not) was<br>solemnized before she attained<br>the age of fifteen years and she<br>has repudiated the marriage after<br>attaining that age but before<br>attaining the age of eighteen<br>years.<br>Explanation.—This clause applies<br>whether the marriage was<br>solemnized before or after the<br>commencement of the Marriage<br>Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976<br>(68 of 1976).] | |
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| 13A. Alternate relief in divorce<br>proceedings.—In any proceeding<br>under this Act, on a petition for<br>dissolution of marriage by a<br>decree of divorce, except in so far<br>as the petition is founded on the<br>grounds mentioned in clauses (ii),<br>(vi) and (vii) of sub-section (1) of<br>section 13, the court may, if it<br>considers it just so to do having<br>regard to the circumstances of the<br>case, pass instead a decree for<br>judicial separation. | 27A. Alternative relief in<br>divorce proceedings.―In any<br>proceeding under this Act, on a<br>petition for dissolution of<br>marriage by a decree of divorce,<br>except insofar as the petition is<br>founded on the ground mentioned<br>in clause (h) of sub-section (1) of<br>section 27, the court may, if it<br>considers it just so to do having<br>regard to the circumstances of the<br>case, pass instead a decree for<br>judicial separation. |
| 13B. Divorce by mutual | 28. Divorce by mutual |
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| consent.—(1) Subject to the<br>provisions of this Act a petition<br>for dissolution of marriage by a<br>decree of divorce may be<br>presented to the district court by<br>both the parties to a marriage<br>together, whether such marriage<br>was solemnized before or after<br>the commencement of the<br>Marriage Laws (Amendment)<br>Act, 1976 (68 of 1976), on the<br>ground that they have been living<br>separately for a period of one year<br>or more, that they have not been<br>able to live together and that they<br>have mutually agreed that the<br>marriage should be dissolved.<br>(2) On the motion of both the<br>parties made not earlier than six<br>months after the date of the<br>presentation of the petition<br>referred to in sub-section (1) and<br>not later than eighteen months<br>after the said date, if the petition<br>is not withdrawn in the meantime,<br>the court shall, on being satisfied,<br>after hearing the parties and after<br>making such inquiry as it thinks<br>fit, that a marriage has been<br>solemnized and that the<br>averments in the petition are true,<br>pass a decree of divorce declaring<br>the marriage to be dissolved with | consent.―(1) Subject to the<br>provisions of this Act and to the<br>rules made thereunder, a petition<br>for divorce may be presented to<br>the district court by both the<br>parties together on the ground that<br>they have been living separately<br>for a period of one year or more,<br>that they have not been able to<br>live together and that they have<br>mutually agreed that the marriage<br>should be dissolved.<br>(2) On the motion of both the<br>parties made not earlier than six<br>months after the date of the<br>presentation of the petition<br>referred to in sub-section (1) and<br>not later than eighteen months<br>after the said date, if the petition<br>is not withdrawn in the meantime,<br>the district court shall, on being<br>satisfied, after hearing the parties<br>and after making such inquiry as<br>it thinks fit, that a marriage has<br>been solemnized under this Act,<br>and that the averments in the<br>petition are true, pass a decree<br>declaring the marriage to be<br>dissolved with effect from the<br>date of the decree. |
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| effect from the date of the decree. | |
|---|---|
| 14. No petition for divorce to be<br>presented within one year of<br>marriage.—(1) Notwithstanding<br>anything contained in this Act, it<br>shall not be competent for any<br>court to entertain any petition for<br>dissolution of a marriage by a<br>decree of divorce, unless at the<br>date of the presentation of the<br>petition one year has elapsed<br>since the date of the marriage:<br>Provided that the court may, upon<br>application made to it in<br>accordance with such rules as<br>may be made by the High Court<br>in that behalf, allow a petition to<br>be presented before one year has<br>elapsed since the date of the<br>marriage on the ground that the<br>case is one of exceptional<br>hardship to the petitioner or of<br>exceptional depravity on the part<br>of the respondent, but if it appears<br>to the court at the hearing of the<br>petition that the petitioner<br>obtained leave to present the<br>petition by any misrepresentation<br>or concealment of the nature of<br>the case, the court may, if it<br>pronounces a decree, do so<br>subject to the condition that the | 29. Restriction on petitions for<br>divorce during first one year<br>after marriage.―(1) No petition<br>for divorce shall be presented to<br>the district court unless at the date<br>of the presentation of the petition<br>one year has passed since the date<br>of entering the certificate of<br>marriage in the Marriage<br>Certificate Book:<br>Provided that the district court<br>may, upon application being<br>made to it, allow a petition to be<br>presented before one year has<br>passed on the ground that the case<br>is one of exceptional hardship<br>suffered by the petitioner or of<br>exceptional depravity on the part<br>of the respondent, but if it appears<br>to the district court at the hearing<br>of the petition that the petitioner<br>obtained leave to present the<br>petition by any misrepresentation<br>or concealment of the nature of<br>the case, the district court may, if<br>it pronounces a decree, do so<br>subject to the condition that the<br>decree shall not have effect until<br>after the expiry of one year from<br>the date of the marriage or may<br>dismiss the petition, without |
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| decree shall not have effect until<br>after the expiry of one year] from<br>the date of the marriage or may<br>dismiss the petition without<br>prejudice to any petition which<br>may be brought after expiration of<br>the said one year upon the same<br>or substantially the same facts as<br>those alleged in support of the<br>petition so dismissed.<br>(2) In disposing of any<br>application under this section for<br>leave to present a petition for<br>divorce before the expiration of<br>one year] from the date of the<br>marriage, the court shall have<br>regard to the interests of any<br>children of the marriage and to<br>the question whether there is a<br>reasonable probability of a<br>reconciliation between the parties<br>before the expiration of the said<br>one year. | prejudice to any petition, which<br>may be brought after the<br>expiration of the said one year<br>upon the same, or substantially<br>the same, facts as those proved in<br>support of the petition so<br>dismissed.<br>(2) In disposing of any<br>application under this section for<br>leave to present a petition for<br>divorce before the expiration of<br>one year from the date of the<br>marriage, the district court shall<br>have regard to the interests of any<br>children of the marriage, and to<br>the question whether there is a<br>reasonable probability of a<br>reconciliation between the parties<br>before the expiration of the said<br>one year. |
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| 15. Divorced persons when may<br>marry again.—When a marriage<br>has been dissolved by a decree of<br>divorce and either there is no<br>right of appeal against the decree<br>or, if there is such a right of<br>appeal, the time for appealing has<br>expired without an appeal having<br>been presented, or an appeal has | 30. Remarriage of divorced<br>persons.―Where a marriage has<br>been dissolved by a decree of<br>divorce, and either there is no<br>right of appeal against the decree<br>or if there is such a right of<br>appeal, the time for appealing has<br>expired without an appeal having<br>been presented, or an appeal has |
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| been presented but has been<br>dismissed, it shall be lawful for<br>either party to the marriage to<br>marry again. | been presented but has been<br>dismissed either party to the<br>marriage may marry again. |
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20. It may be noticed that nearly all the provision relating to the
conditions relating to solemnizing of marriage; ceremonies/form of
solemnization of a marriage; restitution of conjugal rights; judicial
separation; void marriages; voidable marriages; divorce, grounds for
divorce; alternative relief in divorce proceedings; divorce by mutual
consent; restriction in respect of filing of a petition for divorce within
one year of marriage and remarriage of divorced person are identical.
21. Further the expression used in respect of marriage is
“solemnisation”. The expression solemnization implies a solemn act
i.e. a formal act performed with an oath or pledge.
22. A comparative of the various provisions of the Special
Marriage Act with the Hindu Marriage Act two act shows that the
legislature has prescribed that even though the Hindu Marriage Act
applies only to a class of persons and Special Marriage Act is not
restricted to any particular class, the conditions relating to
solemnizing of marriage; ceremonies/form of solemnization of a
marriage; restitution of conjugal rights; judicial separation; void
marriages; voidable marriages; divorce, grounds for divorce;
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alternative relief in divorce proceedings; divorce by mutual consent;
restriction in respect of filing of a petition for divorce within one year
of marriage and remarriage of divorced person apply equally in an
identical sphere.
23. In respect of grant of divorce on the ground of cruelty, the
Hindu Marriage Act prescribes “ has, after the solemnization of the
marriage, treated the petitioner with cruelty” and the Special
Marriage Act prescribes “ has since the solemnization of the marriage
treated the petitioner with cruelty”. Both the acts use identical
expression while providing for a ground for divorce on the ground of
cruelty. Since both the Acts have similar provision in respect of nearly
all the incidences of marriage and divorce and identical provision in
respect of ground for divorce on the ground of cruelty, there is no
basis to hold that lower threshold should apply while considering a
petition for divorce on the ground of cruelty under the Special
Marriage Act.
24. Reliance placed by learned counsel for the Appellant on the
decision of Sandhya Kumari v. Manish Kumar (supra) to contend that
irretrievable breakdown of marriage blended with cruelty would
entitle a petitioner to divorce is misplaced.
25. In Sandhya Kumari v. Manish Kumar (supra) the bench held
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that “ Though irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not a ground for
divorce but in the judgments reported as 2006 (2) Mh.L.J. 307 Madhvi
Ramesh Dudani v. Ramesh K. Dudani, 2007 (4) KHC 807 Shrikumar
V. Unnithan v. Manju K. Nair, (1994) 1 SCC 337 V. Bhagat v. D.
Bhagat and (2006) 4 SCC 558 Navin Kohli v. Neelu Kohli the concept of
cruelty has been blended by the Courts with irretrievable breakdown
of marriage. The ratio of law which emerged from said decisions is
that where there is evidence that the husband and wife indulged in
mutual bickering leading to remonstration and therefrom to the stage
where they target each other mentally, insistence by one to retain the
matrimonial bond would be a relevant factor to decide on the issue of
cruelty, for the reason the obvious intention of said spouse would be
to continue with the marriage not to enjoy the bliss thereof but to
torment and traumatized each other.”
26. It may be noted that irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not
a ground for grant of divorce under either the Hindu Marriage Act or
the Special marriage Act. All the cases referred to are where the
Supreme Court of India has exercised powers under Article 142 of
the Constitution of India.
27. With regard to the powers of the Supreme Court under
Article 142 of the Constitution of India, the Constitution Bench of the
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Supreme Court in Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan , 2023 SCC
OnLine SC 544 has held as under:
“24. Exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142(1) of
the Constitution of India by this Court in such cases is
clearly permissible to do ‘complete justice’ to a ‘cause or
matter’. We should accept that this Court can pass an
order or decree which a family court, trial court or High
Court can pass. As per Article 142(1) of the Constitution
of India, a decree passed or an order made by this Court
is executable throughout the territory of India. Power of
this Court under Articles 136 and 142(1) of
the Constitution of India will certainly embrace and
enswathe this power to do ‘complete justice’, even when
the main case/proceeding is pending before the family
court, the trial court or another judicial forum. A
question or issue of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
does not arise. Settlements in matrimonial matters
invariably end multiple legal proceedings, including
criminal proceedings in different courts and at diverse
locations. Necessarily, in such cases, the parties have to
move separate applications in multiple courts, including
the jurisdictional High Court, for appropriate relief and
closure, and disposal and/or dismissal of cases. This puts
burden on the courts in the form of listing, paper work,
compliance with formalities, verification etc. Parallelly,
parties have to bear the cost, appear before several
forums/courts and the final orders get delayed causing
anxiety and apprehension. In this sense, when this Court
exercises the power under Article 142(1) of
the Constitution of India, it assists and aids the cause of
justice.
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25. However, there is a difference between existence of a
power, and exercise of that power in a given case.
Existence of power is generally a matter of law, whereas
exercise of power is a mixed question of law and facts.
Even when the power to pass a decree of divorce by
mutual consent exists and can be exercised by this Court
under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India, when
and in which of the cases the power should be exercised
to do ‘complete justice’ in a ‘cause or matter’ is an issue
that has to be determined independent of existence of the
power. This discretion has to be exercised on the basis of
the factual matrix in the particular case, evaluated on
objective criteria and factors, without ignoring the
objective of the statutory provisions. In Amit
Kumar v. Suman Beniwal (2021 SCC OnLine SC 1270),
this Court has held that reading of sub-sections (1) and
(2) to Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act envisages
a total waiting period/gap of one and a half years from
the date of separation for the grant of decree of divorce
by mutual consent. Once the condition for waiting
period/gap of one and a half year from the date of
separation is fulfilled, it can be safely said that the
parties had time to ponder, reflect and take a conscious
decision on whether they should really put the marriage
to end for all times to come. This period of separation
prevents impulsive and heedless dissolution of marriage,
allows tempers to cool down, anger to dissipate, and
gives the spouses time to forgive and forget. At the same
time, when there is complete separation over a long
period and the parties have moved apart and have
mutually agreed to separate, it would be incoherent to
perpetuate the litigation by asking the parties to move the
trial court. This Court in Amit Kumar (supra) has
observed that, in addition to referring to the six
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factors/questions in Amardeep Singh v. Harveen
Kaur (2017) 8 SCC 746, this Court should ascertain
whether the parties have freely, on their own accord, and
without any coercion or pressure arrived at a genuine
settlement which took care of the alimony, if any,
maintenance and custody of children, etc.
*
41. Having said so, we wish to clearly state that grant of
divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of
marriage by this Court is not a matter of right, but a
discretion which is to be exercised with great care and
caution, keeping in mind several factors ensuring that
‘complete justice’ is done to both parties. It is obvious
that this Court should be fully convinced and satisfied
that the marriage is totally unworkable, emotionally dead
and beyond salvation and, therefore, dissolution of
marriage is the right solution and the only way forward.
That the marriage has irretrievably broken down is to be
factually determined and firmly established. For this,
several factors are to be considered such as the period of
time the parties had cohabited after marriage; when the
parties had last cohabited; the nature of allegations
made by the parties against each other and their family
members; the orders passed in the legal proceedings
from time to time, cumulative impact on the personal
relationship; whether, and how many attempts were
made to settle the disputes by intervention of the court or
through mediation, and when the last attempt was made,
etc. The period of separation should be sufficiently long,
and anything above six years or more will be a relevant
factor. But these facts have to be evaluated keeping in
view the economic and social status of the parties,
including their educational qualifications, whether the
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parties have any children, their age, educational
qualification, and whether the other spouse and children
are dependent, in which event how and in what manner
the party seeking divorce intends to take care and
provide for the spouse or the children. Question of
custody and welfare of minor children, provision for fair
and adequate alimony for the wife, and economic rights
of the children and other pending matters, if any, are
relevant considerations. We would not like to codify the
factors so as to curtail exercise of jurisdiction under
Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India, which is
situation specific. Some of the factors mentioned can be
taken as illustrative, and worthy of consideration.”
28. In terms of the Judgment of the Constitution Bench of the
Supreme Court in Shilpa Sailesh (supra), the power to grant divorce
on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage is exercised by
the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to do
complete justice to both the parties. Such a power is not vested in the
High Courts leave alone the Family Courts.
29. Further, the contention on behalf of the Appellant that Special
Marriage Act has a lower threshold of proof, given the fact that
marriage under the said Act is not a "sacrament" in the way it is under
Hindu and Christian personal laws and this could be inferred from the
fact that Special Marriage Act provided for divorce from its inception
in 1954 while the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 did not provide for
divorce till 1976 also does not have any merit. Divorce was
contemplated by the Hindu Marriage Act from 1955 itself, however
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the ground of cruelty was added by the 1976 amendment. The fact
that cruelty was added as a ground for divorce by the 1976
amendment, does not take away the concept of marriage being a
sacrament.
30. Furthermore, post the 1976 amendment in the Hindu Marriage
Act, both the Special Marriage Act and Hindu Marriage Act have
identical provisions as noticed hereinabove. Consequently the
expression “treated the petitioner with cruelty” used in both the Acts
has to be given the same meaning.
31. The question that is now left for determination is as to whether
the Appellant has been able to prove that he has been treated with
cruelty by the respondent as is sufficient to constitute a ground for
divorce.
32. The case set up by the Appellant before the Family Court was
that parties had not enjoyed conjugal relations since 2007 and though
from 2007 to 2009, they stayed under the same roof but only
communicated through text messages. In his evidence Appellant has
deposed that the marriage has broken down irretrievably between the
parties and that they have not had a regular conjugal relationship for a
number of years. Since 2009, Appellant has been living in Srinagar
and serving as the Chief Minister of the State. Respondent has chosen
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to live in Delhi with the children, in the government accommodation
allotted to the Appellant.
33. Respondent on the other hand has deposed that parties stayed
together till 2011 and even right before the filing of the petition, the
Appellant came to Delhi and stayed at 7, Akbar Road with the
Respondent and their children. She deposed that the parties had a
good and healthy relationship right up until the Appellant approached
the Mediation Centre of the Delhi High Court, in 2013. She also
deposed that the Appellant abandoned her and the children in mid
2011. Respondent was cross examined on this aspect and she deposed
that abandonment alleged in mid 2011 was more mental than physical.
She further deposed that she spent considerable time in Jammu and
Kashmir campaigning for her father-in-law and she also spent 6
consecutive months from May to October 2010 in Jammu and
Kashmir for renovation of the Appellant’s official residence in
Jammu.
34. On the issue of Absence of Intimacy, the family Court has held
as under:
“ 108 Absence of Intimacy
The petitioner has deposed that absence of intimacy of
standard period of time was another hallmark of
breakdown of their marriage. At one point of time, it was
so bad that it extended to five years. During a nasty fight
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he narrated this to the parents of the respondent.
Thereafter, it never stretched to five years but gaps of six
months to a year was common. This testimony of the
petitioner is vague in so much as it does not specify the
alleged period of absence of intimacy. Moreover, the
respondent has categorically denied there being any
absence of intimacy between her and the petitioner.
Whether the parties shared their lives as husband and
wife is a fact within their private domain, but the conduct
towards each other is significant to father if they had no
marital relationship.
110. The petitioner having become the Chief Minister of
J & K was necessarily required to shift to J & K. The
children were studying in Delhi on account of which the
respondent and the children remained in Delhi. Though
the petitioner has asserted that he wanted the children
and the respondent to shift with him to government
accommodation in J& K, but significantly there is no
denial that the official accommodation in Delhi at 7,
Akbar Road continued to be in the name of the petitioner.
At no point of time did he surrender the said
accommodation nor is there any evidence that he
intended to withdraw his children from Sanskriti School
or to admit them in Srinagar.
112. Though, petitioner has asserted that he would have
been able to provide better security to children in J & K,
but the explanation of respondent that continuity of
studies and better prevailing law and order situation
were the reasons for their continuing to stay in Delhi,
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seems more plausible.
114. The respondent and the children did continue to
live in Delhi even after 2009 when the petitioner shifted
to Srinagar on account of his official exigencies. The
question is not of physical distance but whether there was
complete forsaking of matrimonial relationship between
the parties or that the respondent withdrew herself from
her matrimonial obligations thereby causing cruelty to
the petitioner.
115. The petitioner has deposed that though they
resided together under the same roof from 2007 to 2009,
but they were communicating only through text
messages. In the matrimonial matters, the best witness to
what transpires between husband and wife, are they both.
It is the word of one against the other. In order to
ascertain whether there was no interaction and
relationship of husband and wife between them, their
conduct during this period is most significant.
116. The petitioner in his cross-examination has
admitted that between 2007-2009 he along with his wife
and children had visited Maldives, Kullu & Manali. They
even went for a European Cruise in the year 2008.
117. The petitioner qualified these trips by claiming
that in the trip to Kullu and Manali, the parents of the
respondent had also accompanied them. In the European
Cruise, they were accompanied by six other family
friends.
118. The family friends or the parents of the respondent
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may have accompanied the petitioner for these trips, but
it cannot be overlooked that his wife and children had
been with him for these various vacations. A person does
not go for family vacations with his wife if he is not on
talking terms with his wife.
119. The petitioner has admitted that in December,
2008, his wife and children were with him in Jammu &.
Kashmir. He explained that this was the easiest way for
him to get his children to come to Kashmir by making
their mother accompany them. In order to make these
visits more pleasant and easier all around more often
than not. the parents of respondent were also included in
these trips or else the children on their own, would not be
able to visit Jammu & Kashmir.
120. The family went for a vacation in U.K in March,
2009. It was sought to be explained that after a difficult
election campaign, he wanted to spend some relaxing
moments with his children and thereby, allowed the
respondent to accompany them or else the sons would not
have been permitted to spend vacation with him. One
does not take a wife with whom a person has severed the
relationship for relaxation. The only inference that can
be drawn is that the relationship between petitioner and
respondent were not strained as claimed by him.
121. Similarly, it is admitted by him that in April, 2009
he visited Dubai with his wife and mother-in-law. Here
again a similar explanation as earlier, was given. He
admittedly visited Samod in Rajasthan for holidays in
May 2009.
122. The petitioner admittedly went to Italy for vacation
with his wife alone in November, 2009. He sought to
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explain the trip by claiming that it was a last holiday with
his wife in the hope of attempting to sort out the problems
in their marriage. He had looked forward to this vacation
but was subjected to worst mental torture, scorn, and
th
anger by his wife and 3/4 of his nine-day trip went with
respondent not talking fighting and refusing to
participate in any of the activities of the trip. She
disagreed with him about how much money she would
spend in the trip. He did not cut short the trip as he did
not want the problems of their marriage to become
apparent to their families. He was accused of not being a
good provider and being stingy with money. She
constantly taunted how she could have a much better life
if she had chosen to marry earlier suiters, whom she had
turned down. She repeatedly claimed that the trip was a
big mistake, and she would never accompany him on any
holiday again.
123. It is the testimony of petitioner himself that the trip
was intended to sort out the existing problems. The
petitioner has failed to explain the "problems" that
allegedly existed between him and the respondent.
Merely claiming that there were problems, cannot be of
any assistance to the petitioner to prove cruelty by
respondent.
124. This trip to Italy was followed by another similar
trip of the petitioner with respondent to Singapore in
December, 2009. The petitioner in his cross-examination
again asserted that this trip was also because he wanted
to spend some time with his sons and had to necessarily
take the respondent along. He was not sure if parents of
respondent had accompanied them. Again, there is no
instance of there being any discord or unpleasant
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incident during this trip. No such suggestion has been
given to PW-2, Major General Ram Nath, father of
respondent, in his cross-examination.
125. The New Year Eve of 2009-10 was admittedly
spent by petitioner and respondent along with their
children in Gulmarg, Kashmir. Again, the petitioner
claimed that since their relationship was prone
arguments, fights, and tension, he had invited the family
friends as well. However, there is no elaboration of these
"arguments, fights and tension". Except empty assertions,
there is no corroboration of the petitioner's claim.
126. This clearly establishes the cordiality of
relationship between the parties.
127. The petitioner turned 40 years in March,2010. He
admittedly went to Udaipur along with the respondent
from 07.03.2010 to 11.03.2010. He admitted that he went
there to celebrate his 40'" birthday. He asserted that
rather than being a memorable occasion, he had a fight
with the respondent on the day of his birthday on the
special dinner that was organized by him at Taj Lake
Palace Hotel. The fight persisted throughout the evening.
Because he had already paid at Oberoi Udai Vilas for
the vacation, he did not cut short the trip, but requested
friends whom he was aware of to spend rest of the time
with them. He thus, admitted that he and the respondent
were in Udaipur for 40th Birthday celebration of the
petitioner, to make it a memorable occasion. Good
memories are created with people whom you love and not
with a wife with whom one is not on talking terms. The
going together of petitioner with respondent to create
memorable memories itself show that there existed no
differences between them, which could be termed as
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cruelty.
128. In October, 2010 the petitioner along with the
family went to Shimla and stayed at Wildflower Hall. The
petitioner has again explained, the respondent w that
children be taken to Wild Flower Hall along with her
parents, petitioner was also keen that the children should
come and spend time with him in Kashmir especially
because his elder son's birthday was on 12 October, A
compromise was worked out and it was decided that they
would spend four days in Shimla to celebrate son's
birthday and then stay in Kashmir for a week and
thereafter, go back to Delhi. They went to Shimla and
th
returned to Srinagar on 14 October. Immediately on
reaching Srinagar, they had an argument and she
immediately wanted to leave for Delhi. On his asking,
parents of respondent intervened, and she stayed back for
a day or two.
129, The testimony of petitioner about having spent
time together on a vacation in October, 2010 after a
difficult summer again defeats his claim of not being on
talking terms with respondent. One does not take
vacation for relaxation and destressing with estranged
wife. Also, they were having arguments according to the
petitioner which definitely shows that they were
interacting and not on "no-talking terms", as is asserted
by him.
th
130, In December, 2010 till 4 January, 2011 he along
with his family and other close relatives was in London,
the petitioner again gave a long explanation that he
again went through anguish and abuse, the starting point
of which was that he did not stand in the long line outside
the counter of designer shopping outlet in one of
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London's shopping malls. The respondent felt that he was
lazy, useless, and worthless because he stepped out of
line to give her place to see what bags were available in
the shop. He was told in no uncertain terms that he was a
bad husband, a bad father and a poor provider and had
continually failed in the responsibility, whether personal
or professional Also, he was unable to find any
restaurant for respondent as they were closed due to
holiday season, which was attributed as one of his major
failings. It is difficult to accept that all the restaurants
would be closed in London during the holiday season.
Thus, his consequent explanation of respondent being
upset on this account, does not appeal to common sense.
131. Again, neither there are any details of fights nor
any corroborative evidence of friends who had
accompanied them. Significantly, if such fights and
humiliations were frequent as claimed and caused mental
anguish, they should have found mentioned in the petition
and the affidavit of evidence of petitioner which is
conspicuously silent on these aspects and are stated to be
the first time by the petitioner in cross-examination.
Moreover, none of these incidents have been put to
respondent in her cross-examination.
132. PW-3 Sh. N.C Garware had also deposed about
having accompanied the petitioner's family to London in
December, 2010 for a vacation. He has deposed that
while he was staying in an apartment with his family,
petitioner was forced to stay in a hotel even though his
parents had a house located just outside Central London
at a distance of about one hour. The petitioner was
visibly saddened as he was unable to spend time with his
own family. He has deposed that the animosity between
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the couple was evident, and the respondent was sarcastic
with the petitioner in front of the children and treated
him with contemptuous disregard. He advised the
petitioner not to use abusive language in front of children
which was detrimental to their interest. This testimony of
PW3 in isolation cannot be termed as an act of especially
when there is no mention of the specific incident
testimony of the petitioner or the respondent.
133. The various trips with respondent and family and
then vacation alone with respondent would not happen if
petitioner was not on talking terms with the respondent,
as was asserted by him. His claim that she termed him
stingy and had differences with him about money to be
spent, clearly defy that he was not in any kind of
communication with his wife. Also, he himself has
deposed that trip alone with respondent was an attempt
to save his failing marriage, which again reflects that
they were having matrimonial relationship. Moreover,
one does not go for vacations with a person with whom
the relationship has already become dead. The very fact
that petitioner and respondent went alone to Udaipur to
th
celebrate 40 birthday of petitioner further reinforces
that they were having cordial relationship. No person
th
would go to celebrate a special event of his life like a 40
birthday with his wife with whom his relationship has
come to an end.
136. Again, his own admissions show that the
respondent had been accompanying him not only for
vacations but also for family occasions. Also, his giving
into the respondent's wish of not staying with mother in
order to avoid her hostility, again reflects that he shared
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the concerns of respondent, his wife. It is also revealed
from his own admissions that even in-laws were not
aware of their being any discord between the petitioner
and the respondent. His assertions that the parents in law
were being taken on various occasions earlier only to
defuse the hostility between them gets demolished from
the very fact that as per himself, the in-laws were not
even aware of this imaginary hostility between the
petitioner and the respondent.
138. Other incidents which are admitted by the
petitioner are that he became a spouse member of
Gymkhana Club in 2010 as the respondent who was a
green card holder on account of her father being a
member, was offered full membership. It is also admitted
by him thai the respondent had done the renovation work
of his two residences in Jammu and Srinagar. Though he
claimed thai she was a paid contractor and had not done
the work as a loving wife, but this again shows that
respondent had full involvement in the life of the
petitioner or else she would not have made an effort to be
a part of renovation of their official residences in Jammu
and Srinagar.
140, The entire gamut of evidence, as discussed above,
does not reflect that there was total non-communication
between the petitioner and the respondent. In fact, all
their visits, trips, and participation of the respondent in
the life of petitioner clearly shows that she was
throughout a part of the life of the petitioner. No act of
respondent has been brought forth which could reflect
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any withdrawal from her matrimonial obligation or being
non-supportive of the husband's political career. The
petitioner has miserably failed to prove any act which
could be termed as an act of cruelty, whether physical or
mental, towards the petitioner
141. It was argued that Respondent herself had
admitted differences between them since 2011, but it is
significant to note that the differences may have started
to creep in but per se, they do not amount to cruelty. It
was for the petitioner to show that it was such conduct of
respondent that made it impossible for him to continue to
live in harmony with her.
145. The petitioner has not been able to prove any
conduct of respondent which could be termed as cruelty.
146. To conclude, the petitioner has admitted that till
about March April 2011 he had been going with his wife
and children to various places as has already been
discussed. A person who was allegedly talking to his wife
on text since 2007 and not talking at all since 2009 would
not be going on such frequent trips. Rather his own
admissions in the cross-examination defeat his assertions
that he was not on talking terms. The frequent vacations
with the respondent and the children and many a times
with the friends and parents of respondent, clearly reflect
that there was complete cordiality and matrimonial
relationship between the parties. Had there been the kind
of hostility and discord as is asserted by the petitioner,
there would necessarily have been moments of
differences during all these vacations to which either the
parents or the friends would have been a witness. There
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is not a single incident of there being any unpleasantness
on any of these vacations that has been deposed by the
petitioner.
(underlining supplied)
35. The Family Court after appreciating the evidence led on behalf
of the parties has come to the conclusion that Appellant/petitioner had
not been able to prove any conduct of the Respondent which could be
termed as cruelty.
36. Though the entire focus of the submission of learned counsel
for the Appellant was on lowering the threshold than on the factual
matrix of the case, we have examined the evidence led by the parties
in the light of the allegations made by the Appellant and are of the
view that the family court has rightly appreciated the evidence led by
the parties and come to the conclusion that the Appellant has not been
able to prove that respondent has treated the Appellant with cruelty so
as to constitute a ground for divorce under the Special Marriage Act.
37. Another ground raised by the Appellant in the Divorce Petition
was that Respondent refused to move to Kashmir in 2002, when he
moved there in order to prepare himself for the then ensuing elections.
This resulted in Appellant having to fly to Delhi on the weekends to
meet his children. In response to the said allegation Respondent had
deposed that it was the decision of the Appellant and not the
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Respondent, due to security reasons and more importantly because the
Jammu and Kashmir government operated from Srinagar for six
months and from Jammu for six months, which would continuously
displace the children .
38. The family Court in the impugned judgment has held as under:
“ 100. The respondent in her cross-examination has
explained that the children were admitted In Sanskriti
School at the age of 5 years and 4 years respectively.
This shows that their education since beginning was in
Sanskriti School. In this context, it is significant to note
that his grandmother, then his father and thereafter he
had been allotted government accommodation in Delhi
and they had been residing in Delhi since much before
the marriage of petitioner. Furthermore, after marriage
in the year 1994, petitioner and the respondent had
stayed in the accommodation allotted to grandmother at
Safdarjung Lane till 1999. Thereafter, the petitioner and
respondent shifted to separate accommodation at
Pandara Road, New Delhi, as he became a Minister in
NDA Government in October 1999 till about December,
2002. The petitioner and the respondent were in Delhi till
2002 on account of the exigencies of his own work and
not on account of the insistence or preference of
respondent to be In Delhi. It is natural for the children to
have been admitted in a school In Delhi, as petitioner
and respondent were residing in Delhi. The claim of
petitioner that it was respondent's adamancy in getting
children admitted in Delhi school is thus, not tenable.
101. The petitioner has claimed that after having lost
election in 2002 he wanted to shift to Srinagar along with
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the respondent and the children, but the respondent did
not agree as she preferred to stay in Delhi which
impacted his work as he had to travel between Delhi and
Srinagar. The respondent on the other hand, has
explained in her cross-examination that in the year 2003
petitioner as well as she understood the gravity of the
situation prevailing in J & K. Her husband had been
attacked twice while he was there along with the
respondent and the children was there in Srinagar.
Moreover, the State of J & K is unique in as much as
there are two capitals: one at Jammu and other at
Srinagar. The State Government stays in each capital for
six months. But this does not happen with the schools. So,
they would have had to stay separately for six months.
Therefore, they both took a conscious decision of putting
the children in a school in Delhi and thus, selected
Sanskriti School at Chanakyapuri.
103. From the testimony of the petitioner and
respondent, it has been clearly established that the
petitioner because of his political career (being a
Minister in Central Government till 2002) was based in
Delhi. Thereafter, he lost the election, but because of the
prevail situation in J & K and also because of the two
capitals creating difficulty in providing a stable place to
children, they concertedly decided to get the children
educated in Delhi and the respondent agreed to stay back
in Delhi along with the children.
104. The petitioner may have had to frequently travel to
Srinagar on account of his political compulsions, but
such travel cannot by any stretch of interpretation, be
termed to be on account of the matrimonial discord
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between the parties. This was a collective decision taken
by both the parties in their own interest as well as in the
interest of the children. The parties continued to have
interactions as a family and frequently travelled together
for vacations and the petitioner as per his own testimony
regularly visited the respondent and the children in
Delhi. This arrangement of respondent and children
residing in Delhi while petitioner commuting to Srinagar
on account of his work, cannot be termed as an act of
mental cruelty towards the petitioner.”
(underling supplied)
39. The Family Court has held and rightly so that Appellant and
respondent were in Delhi till 2002 on account of the exigencies of
Appellant’s own work and not on account of the insistence or
preference of respondent to be In Delhi. Further that it was natural for
the children to have been admitted in a school In Delhi, as Appellant
and respondent were residing in Delhi. The claim of Appellant that it
was respondent's adamancy in getting children admitted in Delhi
school was thus held to be not tenable. Respondent in her testimony
had deposed that Appellant had been attacked twice while he was in
Jammu and Kashmir along with the respondent and the children.
Further keeping the children’s education in mind they both took a
conscious decision of putting the children in a school in Delhi. The
Family Court has held that Appellant may have had to frequently
travel to Srinagar on account of his political compulsions, but such
travel could not be termed to be on account of the matrimonial discord
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between the parties. Parties continued to have interactions as a family
and frequently travelled together for vacations and the Appellant as
per his own testimony regularly visited the respondent and the
children in Delhi. This arrangement of respondent and children
residing in Delhi while Appellant commuting to Srinagar on account
of his work, cannot be termed as an act of mental cruelty towards the
Appellant.
40. Another allegation raised by the Appellant was that Respondent
was never comfortable with the family of the Appellant and he was
forced to distance himself from his family in order to keep peace in
his marriage. He was forced to have no contact with his sisters
because of the Respondent. The Respondent on the other hand
contended that Appellant never had good relations with his sister and
hence they never gave any respect to the Respondent. She stated that
she never stopped Appellant from meeting anyone he wanted. She
also denied all allegations of discord with the family of the Appellant.
41. The Family Court has held as under:
“70. From the testimony of the respondent coupled with
the admissions of PW2 Sara Pilot in her cross-
examination, it is abundantly clear that the respondent
after marriage resided together with the petitioner in the
Safdarjung Lane house, which was allotted to the
grandmother of the petitioner, as a joint family. It is only
when the petitioner was allotted his own independent
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accommodation in 1999 that he shifted out. The reason
for shifting out of joint family is the allotment of separate
accommodation to petitioner in 1999 when he became a
Minister with NDA Government. The reason for
separation is not shown to be the strain between the
family members of the petitioner and the respondent. The
assertions of the petitioner in regard to alleged strain is
rather vague and non-explanatory.
71. The petitioner has deposed in his affidavit that
respondent did not have a comfortable relationship with
his family because of which he was forced to distance
himself from his family to keep marriage. He has tried to
substantiate this assertion, which is otherwise bereft of
any detail, by asserting that they had stopped visiting
England till they could afford to stay in a hotel. The
respondent refused to stay in the deponent's mother's
house in England. Though the petitioner is claiming
distance between his mother and the respondent, but
PW2 Sara Pilot his sister has given incidents when the
petitioner's mother and sister Minna had visited the
respondent at their residence at 7, Akbar Road. There is
no specific incident given by the petitioner to explain how
and when he was prevented from meeting or interacting
with his own family members. There are various
incidents (which would be discussed later) to show that
the respondent had been a part of the family and they had
been interacting with them on various occasions. The
testimony of the petitioner is completely vague and un-
acceptable.
72. The petitioner has not given a single circumstance
to explain the alleged difference between the respondent
and the family members. However, this has been
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explained by his sister Sara Pilot who appeared as PW-2.
It is deposed by her that after concluding her college in
U.K, she moved to India in 2001. She was 22 years old,
but respondent refused to allow her to stay in the house
of her brother at 7, Akbar Road by making her feel
unwelcome by her cold, aloof and uncaring behavior.
She never asked or offered her to stay with them. She was
thus, compelled to stay in Kashmir House. Her father Dr.
Abdullah was not happy with this arrangement as she
was a single young girl who was compelled to stay in a
room in State Guest House. Her father requested her
brother to allow her to stay with him, but he was
apprehensive of incurring the respondent's displeasure.
She, therefore, stayed in a State Guest House in Kotia
Lane and thereafter, moved to Kashmir House till
January, 2004.
73. In this regard, it is significant to refer to her cross-
examination. It is her own testimony that she completed
her Master's programme in U.K in 2003. It has been
explained by her that during the period 2001. 2004. she
was visiting India periodically as she interned with
United Nations in Delhi and at the same time was doing
her Master's programme in U.K. It has been further
admitted by her that the J&K House was at 20, Canning
Lane. It is further deposed by her that 11,3 Murti Lane,
address of which was given by her in list of witnesses,
had been allotted to her father i.e., Dr. Farooq Abdulla.
74. The respondent in her cross-examination when
specifically asked, admitted that Sara Pilot after return
from U.K, did not stay with her at 7, Akbar Road, but she
stayed with her father though she did not remember the
address of the said house. A suggestion was given to her
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that Sara Pilot stayed in Kashmir House in a room in
State Guest House, it was explained by the respondent
that 5, Prithvi Raj Road is called Kashmir House, where
only the Chief Minister and Governor can stay and Sara
stayed there as a member of the family of her father, who
was the Chief Minister. She explained when asked about
KotIa Lane House, that it is not a State Guest House but
a government accommodation that was allotted to Dr.
Farooq Abdullah or his mother. She further explained
that Sara Pilot did not stay there throughout till she got
married (in 2004) as her father (Dr. Farooq Abdulla)
became the Chief Minister and was given an
accommodation at 5, Prithvi Raj Road, where she shifted.
It is admitted by her that she did not ask Sara Pilot to
stay with her at 7, Akbar Road.
75. From the admissions of PW2 Sara Pilot it is
evident that she was intermittently staying in Delhi while
interning with United between 2001 to 2004 as she was
pursuing her Master’s programme in U.K simultaneously
which she completed in 2003. It is also evident from her
testimony that there was alternative accommodation
available in Delhi in the name of her father. Therefore, it
is well understandable for her to have stayed in the
accommodation in the name of her father, which cannot
be considered to be any less safe than the house of the
petitioner. It was suggested to respondent in cross-
examination that Dr. Farooq Abdullah, her father-in-law
wanted Sara to reside in her house. The respondent
stated that she was not aware of any such inclination of
her father-in-law. The best person to depose about this
aspect was Dr. Farooq Abdullah, but he has not been
examined as a witness.
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76. It is significant to note that the time period about
which PW2 Sara Pilot is talking is 2001 to January, 2004
when the petitioner was also with the respondent. He has
not been explicit in his testimony that it was the
respondent who prevented his sister from staying with
them during this period. Even though the respondent
admittedly did not offer Sara to stay with them at their
residence, but then no evidence has been led by the
petitioner to show that he wanted his sister Sara to stay
with them or that he was keen to have his sister stay with
him or that respondent resisted it which led to any stress
and strain in their matrimonial relationship. The
petitioner's testimony in this regard is absolutely silent.
77. PW-2 Sara Pilot has further deposed that in 2002,
her mother and elder sister Hinna were in India. They
were upset that she was living on her own and had no
contact with anyone in brother's houses and even food
was not being sent by them. A close friend of her Uncle
Bali was regularly sending food to her. PW2 Sara has
deposed that her sister Hinna had told the respondent
that the family was upset as Sara was living on her own
and no concern had been shown by her. On this,
respondent had exhorted that she was not her
responsibility and if the parents are so bothered, they
should take care of her. Her sister Hinna had also
expressed the concern to respondent about sending the
tiffin to Sara in the Guest House, on which she said that
it was not her responsibility and that her father may keep
a cook for her. Again, it may be noted that the testimony
of the petitioner is silent in this regard and even
respondent has not been confronted with this evidence.
78. PW-2 Sara Pilot has further deposed that in 2002
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when her brother along with the sons, was in Kashmir,
she had visited them and had tried to play with and hold
Zahir who was one year old at that time. However, the
maid refused to hand over the child and stated that the
respondent had instructed her not to give child to her.
This caused her extreme humiliation. She raised the issue
with her brother, who told her to let the matter slide and
assured that she could play with Zahir.
79. PW-2 Sara Pilot had claimed that Zahir was one
year old in 2002 but has admitted in her cross-
examination that Zahir was born in 1999 and therefore,
was not one year old in 2002 when she claimed to have
visited Kashmir. It was thus, suggested to her that no
such incident happened as Zahir was not one year old in
2002. Such isolated non-proven trifle incident wherein
the sister of the petitioner was not handed over the child
to play with, cannot be taken as an act of cruelty of the
respondent towards the petitioner.
*
81. It is significant to note that as per PW2 Sara Pilot,
the petitioner was also present in the said lunch.
However, this incident has not been cited by the
petitioner in his testimony. At best, it can be inferred
from the testimony of PW2 that she and respondent did
not share a very cordial relationship, but this
indifference cannot amount to an act of cruelty of
respondent towards petitioner as the testimony of the
petitioner is completely silent in this regard. Though, the
petitioner had claimed that strained relationship between
the respondent and his family members became a cause
of mental stress and cruelty to him, but except a bald
assertion, none of the incidents as narrated by PW2 have
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been stated by the petitioner.
82. PW-2 Sara Pilot has further deposed that her
mother and sisters were due to return to U.K in 2002.
The respondent and the petitioner camo to Kashmir
House to say goodbye to them. Unfortunately, she and
her sister were not present as they had to collect last
minute things for taking back to England. This seemed to
u respondent who was very cold towards them. Her sister
Hinna tried to overcome the awkwardness with some
small talk. They said goodbye and went out to their car.
She remarked to her mother "See, there was not even a
goodbye to her". Her mother shouted to her brother
"Omar, you forgot to say bye to Sara". On this,
respondent followed the petitioner shouting at her mother
that she always took her own daughters’ side and that
she always found fault with her. She shocked them all as
they all always treated the respondent well. Petitioner
took the mother inside and later, the mother told that
petitioner had begged her not to say anything to the
respondent as things were at breaking point between
them.
83. This incident itself as narrated by PW-2 shows that
it is the petitioner who had not said goodbye to her which
had upset the mother. The role of the respondent is
nowhere to be seen except the assertion that she
subsequently confronted the mother for always blaming
her. Rather, from her own narration, it seems that the
petitioner was the one who had strained relationship with
Sara.
84. As already noted above, this incident has also not
been deposed by the petitioner in his testimony.
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85. PW2 Sara has further deposed that her mother and
sister Safia and Minna have told her that on numerous
occasions when they visited the respondent at her
residence at Akbar Road, they were told by the staff to go
and see the respondent in her bedroom as she always
remained on the telephone and waived them inside. She
never stood up when her mother came in or give her
respect of a senior. They were made to feel like
unwelcome intruders in the house. Eventually, they
decreased their visits to their house over a period of time.
86. This attitude of the respondent is reported to be
towards Safia, Hinna and their mother, but none of these
persons have stepped into the witness box. The testimony
of PW2 in this regard is only a hearsay. Moreover, from
her testimony it can be inferred that mother and sisters
had been frequently visiting the house of the respondent
at 7, Akbar Road and they were always invited inside.
This in fact, shows that respondent did not have any
inimical attitude towards the family members of the
petitioner and that they were free to visit their house at 7,
Akbar Road.
87. PW-2 Sara Pilot had narrated an incident of
August, 2011 when on the occasion of Eid-ul-Fitr, her
father and sister Hinna had visited Akbar Roadhouse to
wish the sons of the petitioner, but respondent did not
come out to see them. The father and the sister met the
boys in the sitting room and left, thereafter. It is further
deposed by her that recently her parents had brought
some gifts from England for the two sons of the
petitioner, but they were not allowed inside the main
door They entered through kitchen door and handed over
the gifts to the servant.
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88. These are the incidents to which the father and the
sisters of the petitioner were an eyewitness, but none of
them have stepped into the witness box. Also, there is no
corroboration to these incidents in the testimony of the
petitioner.
89. Gala Dinner in 2010
PW2 Sara Pilot has further deposed that in and around
April 2010 her brother i.e., the petitioner had helped to
organize a Gala Dinner for the NGO Rahat Charitable
Foundation, which is run by the respondent. Various
famous personalities were invited but the respondent
refused to invite her and other sisters. She was told by
her friend Natasha, who was helping to organize the
dinner, that the respondent did not want her to be there.
Her father and brother were upset. The respondent never
cared for their feeling. Eventually, the function was
attended by her parents and brother. She received an
invitation on the last day but even her name and address
were written erroneously. The invitation was extended
only on the insistence of her brother and father. Her
sister in Kashmir, did not receive the invitation.
90. The respondent was also confronted about this
Gala Charity Dinner in April 2010 organized on behalf
of NGO Rahat Charitable Foundation. She explained
that she and the petitioner along with other members of
the foundation, had organized the dinner. Tables were
sold for charity, and she was not aware of the complete
guest list. She and the petitioner had invited the members
of the petitioner's family, who attended the dinner as
well. She was evasive when asked if Sara Pilot (PW2)
received the invitation a night before, by stating that she
did not remember. She stated that she was not aware if
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the delayed invitation was on account of Dr. Farooq
Abdullah insistence that she be invited. She stated that
Dr. Abdulla may have spoken to the petitioner. She
admitted that the petitioner was the Chief Minister at that
time and was not sure if the petitioner had come from
Srinagar to attend the dinner. She, however, denied that
it was she who had the event or that petitioner could not
be involved because duties.
91. The petitioner has not deposed about this dinner in
his examination in chief. However, this hosting of dinner
on 24.04.2010 on behalf of Rahat Charitable Foundation
was put to the petitioner in his cross-examination,
wherein he explained that he as well as his parents were
very keen that his sister should also be invited to this
dinner, but because of the unreasonable and violent
hatred that the respondent had for his sisters, they were
singled out and not invited to this event. His request was
categorically refused, thereby causing him and his
parents’ great avoidable mental anguish. He personally
made lot of efforts to make the dinner a success but
received no gratitude. Denial of invitation to his sisters
made this otherwise pleasant evening, an extremely
unpleasant one because of the guilt of not being able to
invite his sisters.
92. This explanation of the petitioner is totally
contrary to that of PW2 Sara Pilot. She has admitted that
invitation had been given though it was received
belatedly only on previous night. Moreover, the
respondent has explained, and it also emerges from the
testimony of the petitioner that he was actively involved
in organizing this dinner and there was nothing which
prevented him to invite any person or his sisters in this
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function. Significantly, he has not deposed in this regard
in his affidavit of evidence (examination in chief) and has
claimed this to be a mental anguish only in his cross-
examination.
93. From the cross-examination of the petitioner/
respondent along with the testimony of PW-2. Sara Pilot
it is shown that indeed a gala dinner on behalf of NGO
Rabat Charitable Foundation organized by the petitioner
and the respondent. It also emerges the petitioner was
also involved in the organization of said dinner. What is
significant to note is that if the petitioner had any concern
in the matter, he should have been the first person to
ensure that timely invitation was given to his entire
family. The petitioner himself has not deposed in his
testimony nor is there any explanation forthcoming as to
why the petitioner did not extend the invite or insist on
the presence of Sara Pilot in this function.
94. In this regard, it is also significant to refer to the
cross examination of respondent who had stated that
Sara Pilot had got married to Sachin Pilot and that none
of the family members had attended her marriage. This
fact cannot be overlooked considering that petitioner
himself has not deposed in his testimony that Sara pilot
was intentionally invited at last minute by the respondent
or that he wanted to invite his sister but was prevented by
the respondent. The petitioner has nowhere asserted that
he was obstructed and prevented by the respondent in
interacting with his family in this dinner in April, 2010.
Even if it is accepted that PW2 Sara Pilot was invited
only on the insistence of her father and she did not attend
the dinner as she felt that the respondent did not want her
to attend the dinner, but it is not an incident which
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became a bone of contention between the petitioner or
respondent or that it caused any stress. The petitioner
has also not claimed that this was an incident which
caused him mental cruelty.
95. PW-2 Sara Pilot has further deposed that in April,
2012 she along with her friends had gone to Restaurant
Diva in Greater Kailash for dinner. The respondent was
present there along with her mother and the sons. On
noticing them, she sent and offered to wish them,
respondent was extremely cold and abused her in front of
the children and said, "Gel lost you bitch, they don't want
to see you". She left the table and was completely
devastated. Thereafter, she started avoiding any public
or social interaction with the respondent and this greatly
upset her brother when she narrated him about this
incident.
96. This incident was put to respondent in her cross-
examination, but she stated that she did not remember if
she had met Sara Pilot in the Restaurant and denied that
she had abused PW2 when she approached her to extend
pleasantries.
97. Significantly, again the testimony of the petitioner
is completely silent about this incident. He has nowhere
deposed that the conduct of the respondent in publicly
humiliating his sister, has caused him agony nor has he
deposed that the relationship of the respondent with his
family became a bone of contention between them.
Another aspect which emerges is that this is an incident
of 2012, while according to the petitioner, he was not on
talking terms with respondent sinch 2007 have
completely separated since 2009. The contradictions are
inherent in the testimony of PW2 Sara and the assertions
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of the petitioner which caste a doubt on the claims of the
petitioner.”
(underlining supplied)
42. The family Court has held that the allegation that Appellant
was forced by the Respondent to distance himself from his family has
not been substantiated. The Family Court has held that no specific
incident was narrated by the Appellant to explain how and when he
was prevented from meeting or interacting with his own family
members on the other hand the Family Court has found that there
were various incidents to show that the respondent had been a part of
the family and had been interacting with them on various occasions.
The testimony of the Appellant was found to be completely vague and
un-acceptable.
43. Further material witnesses to depose about certain averments
were not examined by the Appellant. Appellant was found to be silent
about certain incidents about which his sister had deposed, though he
also should have specific knowledge about them. The Family Court
further held that from the testimony, it could be inferred that mother
and sisters of the Appellant had been frequently visiting the house of
the respondent and they were always invited inside, which showed
that respondent did not have any inimical attitude towards the family
members of the Appellant and that they were free to visit their house.
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44. Further, With regard to the allegation of the Appellant that his
sister had not been invited to the Gala Charity Dinner in April 2010
organized on behalf of NGO Rahat Charitable Foundation, the Family
Court has referred to the testimony of the Appellant and noted that he
had not deposed about this dinner in his examination in chief
however, in his cross examination, he explained that he as well as his
parents were very keen that his sister should also be invited to this
dinner, but because of the unreasonable and violent hatred that the
respondent had for his sisters, they were singled out and not invited to
this event. His request was categorically refused, thereby causing him
and his parents’ great avoidable mental anguish. He personally made
lot of efforts to make the dinner a success but received no gratitude.
Denial of invitation to his sisters made this otherwise pleasant
evening, an extremely unpleasant one because of the guilt of not being
able to invite his sisters. The Family Court has held that the
explanation of the Appellant was totally contrary to that of PW2 Sara
Pilot. She has admitted that invitation had been given though it was
received belatedly only on previous night. The Family Court has held
that from the testimony of the Appellant it emerged that he was
actively involved in organizing this dinner and there was nothing
which prevented him to invite any person or his sisters to the said
function. Further, the Family Court has held that Appellant has also
not claimed that this was an incident which caused him mental
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cruelty.
45. The Appellant’s allegation that Respondent did not support the
Appellant in his Political career has also not been found to be
substantiated. The Family Court has held that Appellant in his cross-
examination had admitted that respondent had joined him various
occasions from 2009 till 2011. Appellant had tried to explain that as
wife of a Chief Minister she would have necessarily been expected to
perform numerous political duties including hosting of dinners for
visiting dignatories, Prime Minister, President and other VVIPs
hosting visitors on festivals participating in public events. The Family
Court relied upon various admission made by the Appellant in his
cross examination to hold that respondent had nowhere failed in her
responsibilities as wife of the petitioner.
46. The Family Court has further held that Appellant had admitted
to taking vacations with the Respondent and their sons. He admitted to
taking holidays to Dubai in April 2009, along with the Respondent,
their children, and Respondent’s parents. He also admits that they
went on holiday to Samod, Rajasthan on 30.05.2009, to Italy in
November, 2009, to Singapore in December 2009, to Udaipur in
March 2010, to Shimla in October 2010 and to London in December
2010. Respondent on the other had deposed that in 2011 they went to
Italy and in March 2012, they went to London.
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47. With regard to the allegation of the Appellant that the
Respondent was using the children as pawns to accomplish her own
ulterior means, appellant has relied upon alleged text messages.
48. The Family Court has held as under:
“ 154. Tutoring of sons
The petitioner has asserted cruelty by claiming that her
sons were being tutored against him and he was not able
to interact freely with his children. As already discussed
above, the petitioner and respondent had been frequently
going for trips in India as well as abroad and except
barely on one or two occasions, the children had always
accompanied them. Not only this they have been frequent
visiting the petitioner in J & K from time to time and also
during the vacations. There is nothing to show that either
respondent prevented the petitioner from visiting them in
Delhi or they were visiting the petitioner J&K or tutored
the sons in any manner against the petitioner.
155. The petitioner has referred to the SMS
communication exchange between his son and himself
during the pendency of the petition to assert that the said
communication was a clear indicator of the tutoring of
the son done by the respondent. Even though an
objection about the admissibility of such communication
has been taken by the respondent as the same has not
been proved either by producing the original mobile
phone or a certificate under Section 65B of Evidence Act,
but aside from this technical objection, the conversation
per se does not reflect any tutoring. The gist of the
conversation is that the son sought information from the
petitioner about selling his Apple TV in order to raise
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money to fight the court case. He Questioned his father
(petitioner) as to why he had filed a divorce case against
the mother, if he had love and care for them. The son had
further written that he had read the paper sent through
the lawyer and thai the petitioner has nothing to give her
(the respondent) but wanted half of her hard-earned
money and property. He questioned his father as to why
he did not speak to them before he walked out and
approached the Court. He also questioned him for
harassing the mother by filing the court case.
156. The entire conversation merely reflects the trauma
faced by a child who in his teenage, was confronted with
the situation where the father has filed a divorce petition
against the mother. The reason for doing so by the father
was not comprehendible to the young mind of his son. He
sought answers to various question as to why he walked
out of them; this by no stretch of interpretation can be
termed as tutoring of a child against the father.
157. It was asserted by the petitioner that respondent
had brought the children to the Court despite there being
no court order, only to tutor the children against him. It
has been explained by the respondent that it is she who
has been wronged and her sons who were teenagers, had
come with her for her support. Merely because the
children came to the Court at the time when the
respondent was to depose in the Court, cannot be termed
as an act of tutoring.
158. There is no act of tutoring of the children by the
respondent that has been proved by the petitioner. In
fact, the petitioner has not been able to show any act of
respondent in relation to the children which could have
caused trauma, mental harassment, and cruelty to the
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petitioner. There is no evidence of the petitioner having
ever been denied the access to his own sons. No act of
cruelty in this respect has been established on the part of
the respondent.”
(underlining supplied)
49. The Family Court has thus held that the allegation of tutoring of
children has not been established. Appellant had access to his children
and had been meeting them and spending time with them. Even this
allegation has not been established by the Appellant.
50. Learned counsel for the Appellant referred to a letter dated
27.06.2016 allegedly written by the Respondent to the Prime Minister
of India as also an interview allegedly given to ABP News to contend
that the same also amount to cruelty.
51. It may be noticed that alleged letter is dated 27.06.2016 and the
argument were concluded before the Family Court on 22.08.2016.
Said letter does not appear to have been produced before the family
court. The interview appears to have been given after the judgment
was pronounced by the Family Court dismissing the Petition for grant
of divorce.
52. Copy of the letter and the video clip have been filed in these
proceedings merely with an index. Neither of the two were placed
before the Family Court at the time of the pendency of the Divorce
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Petition. No application has been filed under Order 41 rule 27 of the
Code of Civil Procedure
53. Order 41 rule 27 reads as under:
“27. Production of additional evidence in Appellate
Court.— (1) The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled
to produce additional evidence, whether oral or
documentary, in the Appellate Court. But if —
(a) the Court from whose decree the appeal is
preferred has refused to admit evidence which
ought to have been admitted, or
(aa) the party seeking to produce additional evidence,
establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of
due diligence, such evidence was not within his
knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due
diligence, be produced by him at the time when the
decree appealed against was passed, or
(b) the Appellate Court requires any document to be
produced or any witness to be examined to enable
it to pronounce judgment, or for any other
substantial cause,
the Appellate Court may allow such evidence or
document to be produced, or witness to be examined.
(2) Wherever additional evidence is allowed to be
produced by an Appellate Court, the Court shall record
the reason for its admission.”
54. Order 41 rule 27 CPC disentitles a party to produce additional
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evidence whether oral or documentary that was not produced before
the concerned trial court except in certain circumstances.
55. In the present case, Appellant has merely filed the said
documents on record without seeking any leave to produce additional
evidence. Respondent has not been given any opportunity to explain
the documents or the circumstances under which the alleged letter was
written and the interview given to the news channel. Consequently,
appellant is not entitled to rely upon the said documents in support of
his appeal.
56. In the letter dated 27.06.2016, the Respondent is alleged to be
complaining to the Prime Minister about him deserting her, filing for
divorce and her being harassed in a number of ways including arrest
warrants being issued from his constituency. In the interview the
Respondent is alleged to be complaining about the Appellant not
paying any maintenance; having been evicted from her house;
education of children and her filing a claim before a court of law.
57. Even if one were to examine the documents and accept them at
their face value, in our view the same still do not meet the threshold of
cruelty as required for grant of divorce under the Special Marriage
Act.
58. In view of the above, we find no infirmity in the view taken by
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the Family Court that the allegations of cruelty were vague and
unacceptable and that Appellant failed to prove any act which could
be termed as an act of cruelty, whether physical or mental, towards
him.
59. Consequently, we find no merit in the appeal. The appeal is
accordingly dismissed.
SANJEEV SACHDEVA, J
VIKAS MAHAJAN, J
DECEMBER 12, 2023
HJ
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