Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
YEDIDA CHAKRADHARARAO (DEAD) THROUGH HISL.RS. & ORS. ETC.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH & ORS. ETC.
DATE OF JUDGMENT29/03/1990
BENCH:
KANIA, M.H.
BENCH:
KANIA, M.H.
MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (CJ)
RAY, B.C. (J)
SAIKIA, K.N. (J)
AGRAWAL, S.C. (J)
CITATION:
1990 SCR (2) 220 1990 SCC (2) 523
JT 1990 (2) 1 1990 SCALE (1)628
ACT:
Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural
Holdings) Act. 1973: S. 3(i)--Land sold under agreement
performance of agreement by delivery of possession--Such
land whether could be included in the holdings of
owner/vendor as well as purchaser.
HEADNOTE:
Sub-section (i) of s. 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Land
Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 defines
the expression "holding" as meaning the entire land held by
a person as an owner, a limited owner, usufructuary mortga-
gee, a tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a
mortgage by conditional sale or through part performance of
a contract of sale. The Explanation thereto states that
where the same land is held by one person in one capacity
and by another person in any other capacity such land shall
be included in the holding of both such persons.
The appellants/petitioners had alienated agricultural
lands under agreements of sale and the possession of these
lands was delivered in part performance of the said agree-
ments but no conveyance of the said lands had been executed
till the relevant date. A question arose whether such land
could be excluded from the holding of the owner-vendor
within the meaning of the Act. The Land Reforms Appellate
Tribunal found that the vendees alone were in possession and
enjoyment of the respective lands and, therefore, the appel-
lants could not be said to be holding the said lands. The
High Court held that the lands covered by the agreements of
sale have to be included in the holdings of the appellants
as well.
In these appeals and special leave petitions filed by
them it was contended that use of the word ’held’ in the
definition in s. 3(i) indicates that the person who is
supposed to hold the land must necessarily be the person in
possession of the said land and hence where, in part per-
formance of an agreement of sale or under a lease, the
purchaser or lessee has been put in possession of any land,
the owner of the said land cannot any longer be regarded as
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holding the same, and that although the
221
Explanation to sub-s.(i) of s.3 was very widely worded, its
meaning could not be so extended as to cover a case where
the owner of the land had parted with the possession thereof
under an agreement creating a right, legal or equitable, in
the land concerned.
Dismissing the appeals and the special leave petitions, the
Court,
HELD: 1. The Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on
Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 is a piece of agrarian
legislation enacted with a view to achieve a more equitable
distribution of land for common good and with a view to
subserve the objectives enshrined in Article 39 of the
Constitution, being one of the Directive Principles embodied
in the Constitution. Provisions of such a legislation have
to be interpreted liberally and with a view to furthering
the object of the legislation. [226B-C]
2.1 The very language of sub-s.(i) of s.3 indicates that
a person can ’hold’ land for the purposes of the Act as an
owner, as a limited owner, as a usufructuary mortgagee, as a
tenant and as one who is in possession by virtue of a mort-
gage by conditional sale or through part performance of a
contract of sale. The Explanation thereto in plain language
states that the same land can be held by one person in one
capacity and by another person in a different capacity and
provides that such land shall be included in the holdings of
both such persons. The Explanation thus clearly contemplates
that the same land can be "held" as contemplated under sub-
s. (i) by one person as the owner and by another person as
his lessee or as a person to whom the owner has delivered
possession of the land in part performance of an agreement
to sell. It cannot, ,therefore, be said that only where the
land is in possession of a person can that land be regarded
as held by him. 1226G-227B]
2.2 The Explanation to s. 3(i) was incorporated in the
Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms Act because the legislature took
the view that, but for such a drastic provision, it would
not be possible to effectively implement the provisions of
the said Act regarding the acquisition and distribution of
the surplus land to the landless and other deserving per-
sons. If the legislature has used language in s. 3(i) and
the Explanation thereto which on a plain reading shows that
in case of land covered under an agreement for sale or an
agreement of lease, even though the purchaser or the lessee
might be in possession of the land, it would be included in
the holdings of both of the purchaser as well.as the owner
or the lessee and the owner, there is no reason to cut down
the plain meaning of the language employed in that provision
[230B, C-D]
222
State of Andhra Pradesh v. Mohd. Ashrafuddin, [1982] 3
SCR 482 applied; Begulla Bapi Raju etc. etc. v. State of
Andhra Pradesh etc. etc., [1983] 3 SCR 701 referred to.
Burmah Shell oil Storage and Distributing Co. of India
Ltd. & Anr. v. The Commercial Tax Officer & Ors., [1961] 1
SCR 902, distinguished.
The Authorised Officer (LR), Vijayawada v. Kalyanam
China Venkata Narasayya, [1978] 1 A.P. Law Journal 98 over-
ruled.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3388 of
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1984. etc.
From the Judgment and Order dated 4.4.1989 of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court in C.R.P. No. 1450 of 1981.
A.K. Sen, C. Sitaramiah, P.A. Chaudhary, K. Jagannatha
Rao, P.R. Ramachandra Murthy, Mrs. Anjani, K. Ram Kumar,
Y.P. Rao, P.S.R. Murhty, B. Kanta Rao, N.D.B. Raju, R.N.
Keshwani, R.F. Nariman, Raj Kumar Gupta, P.C. Kapur, Rajen-
dra Chaudhary, A. Subba Rao, K.R. Nagaraja, P.K. Rao, A.T.M.
Sampath, P.N. Ramalingam, R. Venkatramani, G. Narasimhulu,
G.N. Rao and S.K. Sucharita for the Appellants.
K. Parasaran, T.V.S.N. Chari, Mrs. B. Sunita Rao, Ms.
Manjula Gupta and V. Sekhar for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KANIA, J. This is a group of matters comprising Civil
Appeal No. 3388 of 1984 in this Court and other cases which
have been placed before us for hearing along with this
appeal. We propose to deal first with Civil Appeal No. 3388
of 1984.
This appeal by special leave is directed against a
judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Civil Revision
Petition No. 1450 of 1981. The question involved in the
appeal before the High Court from which this appeal arises
was whether land which has been agreed to be sold by the
owner under an agreement of sale and possession of which was
delivered in part performance of the agreement .for sale but
pursuant to which no conveyance had been executed till the
relevant date, could be included both in the holding of the
owner-vendor as
223
well as the purchaser or whether it was liable to be includ-
ed only in the holding of the purchaser for the purposes of
the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural
Holdings) Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as ’the said
Act’).
There are a number of connected matters where the same
question is involved and which have been placed for hearing
before us. In some of these cases, a part of the considera-
tion has been paid and in a few others, the entire consider-
ation has been paid. It has also been alleged that the
possession of the land was transferred to the purchaser
pursuant to the agreements of sale referred to. In some of
these cases, lands belonging to the owners have been given
on lease to tenants who are in possession thereof as les-
sees.
In order to appreciate the controversy arising before
us, it is necessary to bear in mind the relevant provisions
of the said Act. Before the said Act was enacted, there was
in force in Andhra Pradesh an Act entitled Andhra Pradesh
(Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1961 which provided
for the imposition of a ceiling on holdings of agricultural
land. After that Act had been in force for some time, the
Central Committee on Land Reforms made certain recommenda-
tions regarding the fixation of ceiling on agricultural
holdings and in line with this proposed policy, the said Act
was enacted in 1973 to bring about comprehensive legislation
for the imposition of ceiling on agricultural holdings in
the State of Andhra Pradesh and with a view to replace the
aforesaid Act of 1961 as well as Andhra Pradesh Agricultural
Lands (Prohibition of Alienation Act, 1972). The object of
the legislation was to take over the lands in excess of the
ceiling prescribed and to distribute the same among landless
and other deserving persons to subserve the common good. The
said Act was included in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitu-
tion at Item 67 by the Constitution 34th (Amendment) Act and
was protected under Article 31-A. The object of the said Act
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was agrarian reform. Under sub-section (c) of section 3 of
the said Act ’ceiling area’ is defined as under:
"3(c): ’ceiling area’ means the extent of land specified in
section 4 or section 4-A to be ceiling area."
It may be mentioned here that the agricultural land was
classified into wet land, dry land and so on and appropriate
areas were fixed as ceiling in respect of such lands taking
into account the nature and yield capacity of the lands in
question. Section 3(i) runs as follows:
224
"3(i): ’holding’ means the entire land held by a person--
(i) as an owner;
(ii) as a limited owner;
(iii) as an usufructuary mortgagee;
(iv) as a tenant;
(v) who is in possession by virtue of a mortgage by condi-
tional sale or through part performance of a contract for
the sale of land or otherwise; or in one or more of such
capacities; and the expression ’to hold land’ shall be
construed accordingly;
Explanation: Where the same land is held by one person in
one capacity and by another person in any other capacity,
such land shall be included in the holding of both such
persons."
Section 3(m) provides that "notified date" means the date
notified under sub-section (3) of section 1 on which the
said Act came into force. It may be mentioned that the
notified date in respect of the said Act is 1.1.1975. Very
briefly stated, under section 4, the ceiling area in the
case of a family unit consisting of not more than five
members was prescribed as one standard holding. Where the
family consisted of more than five members, there was,
broadly speaking, a proportionate increase in the ceiling
area. Under section 5, the standard holding is fixed taking
into account the classification of the land according to the
nature of the land. Sub-section (1) of section 7 runs as
follows:
"7(1). Special provision in respect of certain transfers,
etc. already made:
Where on or after the 24th January, 1971 but before the
notified date, any person has transferred whether by way of
sale, gift, usufructuary mortgage, exchange, settlement,
surrender or in any other manner whatsoever, any land held
by him or created a trust of any land held by him, then the
burden of proving that such transfer or creation of trust
has not been effected in anticipation of, and with a view to
avoiding or defeating the objects of any law relating to a
reduction in the ceiling on agricultural holdings, shall be
on
225
such person, and where he has not so proved, such transfer
or creation of trust, shall be disregarded for the purpose
of the computation of the ceiling area of such person."
Very briefly stated, sub-section (2) of section 7 pro-
vides inter alia that any alienation made. by way of sale,
lease for a period exceeding six years, gift, exchange,
usufructuary mortgage or otherwise as set out in the said
sub-section on or after 2nd May, 1972 and before the noti-
fied date in contravention of the Andhra Pradesh Agricultur-
al Land (Prohibition of Alienation) Act, 1972 shall be null
and void. The other sub-sections also provide that in the
various other circumstances set out therein alienations made
will be disregarded for purposes of fixation of ceiling.
Section 8 provides, in brief, that every person whose
holding on the notified date together with any land trans-
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ferred by him on or after 24th January, 1971 exceeds the
specified limits, shall within 30 days from the notified
date, namely 1.1. 1975 or such extended period as the Gov-
ernment may notify in that behalf furnish a declaration in
respect of his holding to the competent Tribunal.
Section 9 deals with determination of the ceiling area
by the Tribunal constituted under Section 6. Section 10
deals with the surrender of lands in certain cases. Sub-
section (5) of the said section provides that it shall be
open to the Tribunal to refuse to accept the surrender of
any land as contemplated under sub-section (1) or deemed
surrender of land as contemplated under sub-section (4) of
the said section in the circumstances set out in sub-section
(5). Section 11 deals with the vesting of surrendered lands.
Section 12 deals with revision and vesting of lands
surrendered. The opening part of that section provides that
where any land is surrendered or deemed to have been surren-
dered under the said Act by any usufructuary mortgagee or a
tenant, the possession of such land shall, subject to such
rules, as may be prescribed, revert to the owner. Sub-sec-
tion (4) of section 12 provides that where any land is
surrendered or is deemed to have been surrendered under the
said Act by any person in possession by virtue of a mortgage
by conditional sale or through a part performance of con-
tract for sale or otherwise the possession of such land
shall subject to such rules as may be prescribed, revert to
the owner. Sub-section (5-A) make an analogous provision in
connection with lands surrendered by limited owners and
provides that such surrendered lands shall revert to the
person having a vested interest in the remainder.
226
Section 13 makes special provision for the exclusion
from the holding of the owner of land belonging to him held
by a protected tenant where such land or part thereof stands
transferred to the protected tenant under Section 38A of the
Andhra Pradesh (Telengana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural
Land Act, 1950.
Before going into the merits of the contentions urged
and considering the proper interpretation to be given to the
relevant sections of the said Act, we cannot lose sight of
the fact that the said Act is a piece of agrarian legisla-
tion enacted with a view to achieve a more equitable distri-
bution of lands for common good and with a view to subserve
the objectives enshrined in Article 39 of the Constitution,
being one of the Directive Principles embodied in the Con-
stitution. Provisions of such a legislation have to be
interpreted liberally and with a view to furthering the
object of the legislation and not with a view to defeat the
same in a strict and constricted manner in which a taxing
law, for instance, might be interpreted.
The main submission of learned counsel for the appel-
lants is that the expression ’holding’ has been defined in
sub-section (i) of Section 3 of the said Act, the definition
section set out earlier, as meaning the entire land held by
a person (emphasis supplied) and that the use of the said
word "held" in the definition indicates that the person who
is supposed to hold the land, must necessarily be the person
in possession of the said land; and hence where, in part
performance of an agreement for sale or under a lease, the
purchaser or lessee has been put in possession of any land,
the owner of the said land cannot any longer be regarded as
holding the said land and it cannot be said that the said
land is held by him. It was submitted by learned counsel
that in view of this context although the Explanation to
sub-section (i) of section 3 is very widely worded, its
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meaning cannot be so extended as to cover a case where the
owner of the land is no longer in possession of the land and
has parted with the possession thereof under an agreement
creating a right, legal or equitable, in the land concerned.
We find it difficult to accept this contention. Clauses (i)
to (v) of subsection (i) of section 3 set out the various
capacities in which a person can be said to "hold" land for
the purposes of the said Act and among these capacities are
"as a usufructuary mortgagee, as a tenant and as one who is
in possession by virtue of a mortgage by conditional sale or
through part performance of a contract of sale". The very
language of sub-section (i) of section 3 indicates that land
can be held as contemplated in the said sub-section by
persons in a number of capacities. The Explanation in plain
language states that the same land can be held by
227
one person in one capacity and by another person in a dif-
ferent capacity and provides that such land shall be includ-
ed in the holdings of both such persons. The Explanation
thus clearly contemplates that the same land can be held as
contemplated under-sub-section (i) by one person as the
owner and by another person as his lessee or as a person to
whom the owner has delivered possession of the land in part
performance of an agreement to sell. On a plain reading of
the language used in the Explanation, we find it that it is
not possible to accept the submission that only where the
land is in possession of a person can that land be regarded
as held by him.
Apart from what we have pointed out earlier we find that
the question which arises before us in this appeal is al-
ready covered by the decision of this Court in State of
Andhra Pradesh v. Mohd. Ashrafuddin, [1982] 3 SCR 482. The
facts of the case were that out of the total holding of his
land the respondent transferred some land to another person
under two unregistered sale deeds pursuant to an agreement
for sale and gifted.away some land to his son. In the return
submitted by him under the said Act the respondent did not
include in his holding the area transferred under the unreg-
istered sale deeds or the land gifted by him which was in
the possession of the purchaser and donee respectively. The
Land Reforms Tribunal ignoring the two transfers computed
his holding at 1.7692 standard holding and called upon him
to surrender land equivalent to 0.7692 standard holding. In
revision, the High Court held that the land transferred
under the two sale deeds could not be included in the hold-
ing of the respondent for ascertaining the ceiling area. In
coming to this conclusion, the High Court gave the benefit
of section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act to the person
in possession of the plot pursuant to the contract for sale
and treated the land as a part of his holding. On appeal to
this court, a Division Bench comprising three learned Judges
of this Court reversed the decision of the High Court and
held that the High Court was in error in holding that the
land in the possession of the transferee cannot be taken to
be a part of the holding of the respondent. It was held by
this Court that the expression "held" connotes both owner-
ship as well as possession. In the context of the definition
it is not possible to interpret the term "holding" only in
the sense of possession. The Explanation to the definition
of the term "holding" clearly contemplates that the same
land can be the holding of two different persons holding the
land in different capacities, (See page 486). The Court went
on to state that:
"It is by now well settled that a person in possession
pursuant to a contract for sale does not get title to the
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land
228
unless there is a valid document of title in his favour. In
the instant case it has already been pointed out that the
transferee came into possession in pursuance of an agreement
for sale but no valid deed of title was executed in his
favour. Therefore, the ownership remained with the respond-
ent-transferor. But even in the absence of a valid deed of
title the possession pursuant to an agreement of transfer
cannot be said to be illegal and the transferee is entitled
to remain in possession"
The Court went on to observe that:
"There may conceivably be cases where the same land is
included in holding of two persons in different capacities
and serious prejudice might be caused to one or both of them
if they were asked to surrender the excess area. To safe-
guard the interest of the owners in such a case the legisla-
ture has made a provision in section 12(4) and (5) of the
Act. Even so there might be cases where some prejudice might
be caused to some tenure holders."
The Court further observed that:
"But if the definition of the term ’holding’ is couched in
clear and unambiguous language the court has to accept it as
it stands. So construed the same land can be a part of the
holding of various persons holding it in different capaci-
ties. When the terms of the definition are clear and unam-
biguous there is no question of taking extraneous aid for
construing it."
The correctness of this decision has been upheld by this
court in Begulla Bapi Raju etc. etc. v. State of Andhra
Pradesh etc. etc., [1983] 3 SCR 70 1 at p. 7 17. In that
case one of the contentions urged on behalf of the petition-
ers was that land transferred by the petitioners under
various transfer deeds to the outsiders and who came in
possession also could not be included in the holding of the
petitioners. This argument was negatived by a Bench compris-
ing three learned Judges of this Court, which followed the
decision of this Court in Mohd. Ashrafuddin’s case (supra),
and did not accept the plea that the decision in that case
required reconsideration.
The question raised for our determination in this appeal is
229
directly covered against the appellant by the decisions of
this Court in two cases just referred to by us. In these
circumstances, even assuming that there is another equally
plausible view regarding the construction and the legal
effect of section 3(i) of the said Act read with Explana-
tion, that would not necessarily justify our reconsidering
the question which has already been decided by this Court,
although the decision was rendered by a Bench comprising
only three learned Judges of this Court. In our opinion,
unless we find that the decisions in the aforesaid cases are
erroneous, it would not be proper on our part to reconsider
the same. Apart from this, as we have pointed out earlier,
in our view, considering the clear language of section 3(i)
of the said Act read with Explanation to that section, the
view taken in Mohd. Ashrafuddin’s case (supra) is, with
respect, the correct view, and we are inclined to take the
same view on the construction and legal effect of that
provision.
Learned counsel for the appellant sought to place reli-
ance on the decision of a Division Bench of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court in The Authorised Officer (LR), Vijayawa-
da v. Kalyanam China Venkata Narasayya, [1978] 1 A.P. Law
Journal 98. In that case a Division Bench of the Andhra
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Pradesh High Court took the view that, if the owner of the
land has put the transferee in possession of the land in
part performance of a contract for sale, such land can be
included only in the holding of the transferee and cannot
simultaneously be computed in the holding of the transferor
as well, for that land is not "held" by him as an "owner".
It could be included in the holding of the transferor only
as and when the transferee surrenders that land and that
land reverts to the transferor as provided under section 12
of the said Act. The Division Bench also took the view that
the expression "holding" and the expression "held by a
person" occurring in section 3(i) of the said Act must be
construed as taking in the idea of actual possession and not
merely any right, title or interest in the land devoid of
actual possession. In our view, this decision cannot be
regarded as laying d,own good law and must be treated as
overruled by the decisions of this Court in Mohd. Ashrafud-
din’s case (supra) and Begulla Bapi Raju’s case (supra). We
cannot lose sight of the fact that the said Act is a piece
of agrarian reform legislation passed with a view to effec-
tively fix a ceiling on agricultural holdings and to achieve
equitable distribution of surplus land among the landless
and the other deserving persons. The plain language of
section 3(i) read with Explanation supports the view taken
by this Court in Mohd. Ashrafuddin’s case (supra). 1t is
true that the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High
Court in the aforesaid judgment has given certain examples
230
where the interpretation which has been given in Mohd.
Ashrafuddin’s case (supra), might lead to some hardship.
That, however, in our opinion, cannot justify restricting
the effect of the plain language of the relevant provisions
in the manner done by the Division Bench of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court. The Explanation to section 3(i) was
incorporated in the said Act because the legislature took
the view that, but for such a drastic provision, it would
not be possible to effectively implement the provisions of
the said Act regarding the acquisition of surplus land and
distribution of the surplus land to the landless and the
other deserving persons. It is a notorious fact that there
were a large number of cases where agreements for sale or
documents for lease in respect of excess lands were executed
by owners of lands in excess Of the ceiling area with a view
to defeat the provisions of the said Act. In fact, a perusal
of the facts in the cases before us generally lends support
to the existence of such a situation. In these circum-
stances, if the legislature has used language in section
3(i) and the Explanation thereto which, on a plain reading,
shows that in case of land covered under an agreement for
sale or an agreement of lease, even though the purchaser or
the lessee might be in possession of the land, it would be
included in the holdings of both of the purchaser as well as
the owner or the lessee and the owner, we see no reason to
cut down the plain meaning of the language employed in that
provision, merely because that it might possibly result in
hardship in few cases. Moreover we find that, to some ex-
tent, the legislature has tried to mitigate this hardship by
providing that, if the purchaser under the agreement of sale
or the lessee has in his holding land in excess of the
ceiling area, such excess would revert to the owner of the
land. If the interpretation sought to be put by learned
counsel for the appellants, which finds support from the
aforementioned decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court,
were correct, we fail to see why such a provision as afore-
stated for reversion of excess land to the owner should have
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been made.
It was contended by learned counsel for the appellants
that if the construction placed on the said provisions by
the judgment of the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court in the aforesaid judgment was accepted, it is not
as if the object of the said legislation would be defeated
because where an agreement for sale or agreement of lease
cannot be shown to be bona fide, the land would be included
in the holding of the owner. This circumstance. however. is
of a little avail. Where such agreements for sale or of
lease are executed in writing and possession is handed over
to the purchaser or the lessee, it would be very difficult
to show that the transaction was not bona fide although the
agreement might well have been executed really with a
231
view to defeat the provisions of the said Act. We cannot
lose sight of the fact that section 3(i) and the Explanation
only deals with cases where the transfer of ownership is not
complete and the owner does not part completely with his
legal interest in the land, so that on the termination of
the agreement for sale or agreement of lease without any
document being registered, the land would fully revert to
the owner. Moreover, in many cases, it was found that the
owner of the land himself continued to cultivate the land
claiming that he was doing so on behalf of his son who was
the lessee or the purchaser under an agreement. In these
circumstances, we fail to see any reason to cut down the
plain meaning of the provisions of section 3(i) and the
Explanation thereto.
It was submitted by learned counsel for the appellants
that the definition of the word ’holding’ contained in sub-
section (i) of section 3 was an exhaustive definition and
that definition contained in the main section could not be
interpreted in the light of the Explanation thereto. It was
submitted by him that the meaning of the term ’holding’ and
’held’ in sub-section (i) of section 3 could not be governed
by the Explanation. In support of the contention, reliance
was placed on a decision of this Court in Burmah Shell Oil
Storage and Distributing Co. of India Ltd. & Anr. v. The
Commercial Tax Officer and Others, [1961] 1 SCR 902 at pp.
914-917. In our opinion, this decision is hardly of any
assistance in the matter before us. It is well settled that
the provisions in an Act have to be read harmoniously and in
the light of the context in which they occur. In our opin-
ion, there can be no quarrel with the reliance being placed
on the Explanation in order to understand the meaning of the
term "holding" and "held" used in sub-section (i) of section
3 of the said Act. Although some other decisions have been
referred to us, we do not think any useful purpose would be
served by discussing the same in view of what we have ob-
served earlier, nor would it serve any purpose to refer to
the various examples of ownership set out in the American
Jurisprudence to which our attention was drawn.
In the result, in our opinion, there is no merit in the
appeal and the same must fail and is dismissed. Looking to
the facts and circumstances of the case, we, however, direct
that there will be no order as to costs of the appeal.
The other connected Civil Appeals and Special Leave
Petitions have all been directed to be tagged with the
aforesaid Civil Appeal disposed of by us as they involve the
same points as raised in the said
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Civil Appeal. Following our decision, the said Civil Appeals
and the Special Leave Petitions are dismissed but with no
order as to costs.
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In view of the dismissal of all the Appeals and Special
Leave Petitions, the Civil Miscellaneous Petitions therein
do not survive and all are dismissed with no order as to
costs. Interim orders, if any, are vacated.
Appeals and
P.S. S Petitions dismissed.
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