NAMDEO SHANKAR GOVARDHANE(D)THR.LRS.&ORS vs. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA .

     REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL Nos.10217­10250 OF 2011 Namdeo Shankar Govardhane(D) Thr. L.Rs. & Ors. etc.etc.              ….Appellant(s) VERSUS State of Maharashtra & Ors.           …Respondent(s) WITH CIVIL APPEAL Nos.10305­10308 OF 2011 AND CIVIL APPEAL No.10309 OF 2011 J U D G M E N T Abhay Manohar Sapre, J. 1. These   appeals   are   directed   against   the   final judgment   and   orders   passed   by   the   High   Court   of Judicature   at   Bombay   dated   11.10.2007     in   First Appeal Nos.2673, 2678­2695, 2697­2708, 2710­2712 Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by ASHOK RAJ SINGH Date: 2019.07.17 17:23:22 IST Reason: 1 and 2674­2677 of 2006 and order dated 23.08.2007 in First Appeal No.1241 of 2007. 2. A   few   facts   need   mention   hereinbelow   for   the disposal   of   these   appeals,   which   involve   a   short question. 3. The   appellants   are   the   landowners   (claimants) whereas the respondents are the State of Maharashtra and its authorities in the proceedings before the Trial Court out of which these appeals arise.  4. In exercise of powers under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), the State of Maharashtra issued a notification on 03.03.1994   for   acquiring   land   measuring   26,554.39 hectares situated in village Sanjegaon, Taluka Igatpuri District Nasik (MH). The purpose of acquisition of the land in question was construction of Mukane Dam. This   was   followed   by   issuance   of   declaration   under Section 6 of the Act on 17.06.1994. The appellants’ 2 land in question was also acquired in the acquisition proceedings.  5. This led to initiation of proceedings by the Land Acquisition Officer (LAO) under Section 11 of the Act for   determination   of   compensation   payable   to   the appellants along with other landowners whose lands were also acquired in the acquisition proceedings.  6. By   award   dated   14.07.1995,   the   LAO   offered compensation   to   the   landowners   by   classifying   the land in three categories, namely, Jirayat land, Bagayat Land   and   Pot   Kharab   land   at   the   rates   mentioned below: 

7. The landowners  (appellants herein) felt aggrieved by the award made by the LAO and accordingly sought reference   under   Section   18   of   the   Act   to   the   Civil Court.   By   award   dated   24.03.2006,   the   Civil   Court 3 partly   enhanced   the   rate   of   compensation   in appellants’ favour as under:

8. The State felt aggrieved by the award of the Civil Court and filed appeals under Section 54 of the Act before   the   Bombay   High   Court.   So   far   as   the landowners are concerned, they did not file any cross objection to claim further enhancement in the rate of compensation   determined   by   the   Civil   Court   except complaining   of   wrongly   making   the   classification   of their land by the Civil Court.  9. So,   the   question   before   the   High   Court   was whether   the   Civil   Court   was   justified   in   partly enhancing the rate of compensation mentioned above. The case of the State in their appeals was that the Civil Court was not justified in enhancing the rate of compensation and whatever the Reference Court had 4 determined, the same should be upheld as being just and   reasonable   compensation   awarded   to   the landowners (appellants herein). 10. By  impugned  order,   the   Division  Bench  of  the High   Court   partly   allowed   the   State's   appeals   and accordingly reduced the rate of compensation . The rate of compensation awarded by all the Courts are as under:

11.   Some   landowners   (appellants   herein)   felt aggrieved by the order of the High Court and have filed these appeals by way of special leave in this Court. 12.   So, the question, which arises for consideration in   these   appeals,   is   whether   the   High   Court   was justified   in   partly   allowing   the   State’s   appeals   and thereby   was   justified   in   reducing   the   rate   of 5 compensation as against what was determined by the Civil Court.  13. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 14. Learned counsel for the appellants (landowners) has   essentially   confined   his   submission   to   the   rate determined by the High Court in relation to Jirayat land  and Bagayat land. In other words, the appellants are aggrieved only by  the rates of Jirayat and Bagayat lands.  15. According   to   the   learned   counsel,   the   rates determined   by   the   Civil   Court   (Reference   Court)   in relation to Jirayat and Bagayat lands were just and proper, therefore, it should not have been interfered with by the High Court. It was his submission that keeping   in   view   the   exemplars   relied   on   by   the landowners   and,   particularly   (Ex­P­42),   the   rate mentioned   therein   should   have   been   applied   for determining the market value of the acquired land.  6 16. It was urged that the principle that price of small piece of land cannot be applied for determining the price of large chunk of acquired land may be good in relation to those cases where the acquired land is non­ agricultural and is situated in urban areas but where the land is an agricultural land such as the one in the present case, the rate of small piece of land can be taken into consideration while determining the large chunk of land. 17.   It   was   pointed   out   that   since   the   land   in question was an agricultural land, the market value of the acquired land could be determined keeping in view the price of the land purchased under exemplar (Ex­P­ 42) even though it was for a small piece of land.   18. In   reply,   learned   counsel   for   the   respondent (State) supported the well reasoned order of the High Court and prayed for dismissal of these appeals. 7 19. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we find no merit in these appeals.  20. In our  view,  the  reasoning  and  the  conclusion arrived at by the High Court, which resulted in partly allowing the State’s appeals and thereby reducing the rate of compensation to some extent is just and proper and hence does not call for any interference. This we say for the following reasons. 21.  We find that the High Court rightly appreciated the evidence and especially the 3 sale deeds filed by the State and 3 sale deeds filed by the landowners for determining the market value of the acquired land. It is apposite to set out the details of the six sale deeds hereinbelow: Three sale deeds produced by the State

8

Three sale deeds produced by the landowners

22. Learned     counsel   for   the   appellants,   in   his submissions, placed heavy reliance on the sale deed (EX­   42)   dated   04.07.1989   and   contended   that   the market   value   of   the   suit   land   should   have   been determined   keeping   in   view   the   price   of   the   land mentioned in this sale deed.  23. On   the   other   hand,   learned   counsel   for   the respondent   (State)   placed   reliance   on   the   sale   deed 9 dated 14.02.1994 (EX­141) and contended that if the price mentioned in this sale deed is relied on then it is amply   clear   that   the   High   Court   has   awarded   the compensation   on   higher   side   and,   therefore,   it deserves to be rather reduced.   24.  In   our   opinion,   the   relevant   sale   deed   to determine the market value of the suit land is (EX­ 141), which is dated 14.02.1994. This we say for two reasons. First, it is very near to the date of acquisition (03.03.1994); and Second, it is for a larger chunk of land. As a matter of fact, if we only rely upon Ex­141 then   perhaps   the   determination   made   by   the   High Court   in   relation   to   two   kinds   of   land   can   still   be reduced.  25. Since the State has not filed any appeal against the order of the High Court and on the other hand has accepted the determination made by the High Court, we need not examine the question of reducing the rate 1 determined by the High Court in these appeals. It is not legally permissible.  26. Having   examined   the   issue,   we   cannot   place exclusive   reliance   on   Ex­P­42   as   was   urged   by   the learned counsel for the appellants neither for restoring the rates determined by the Civil Court and nor for making   any   further   enhancement   in   the   rates determined by the High Court.  27. As a matter of fact, we find that Ex­P­42 is of the year 1989 and that too of a very small piece of land. It would not, therefore, be safe to place exclusive reliance on this sale deed. It is more so when we find that Ex­ 141   relied   on   by   the   learned   counsel   for   the respondent (State) was executed just one month prior to the date of acquisition and is also of a large chunk of land situated in the same village.  28. We are also not impressed by the submission of learned   counsel   when   he   contended   that   since   the 1 land in question is an agricultural land and, therefore, price   of   small   piece   of   land   can   be   taken   into consideration for determining the large chunk of land. We cannot accept this submission in the light of what we have held above on facts. 29. In our opinion,  the High Court, therefore, rightly took into consideration all the six sale deeds and then on appreciation of entire evidence rightly came to a conclusion   that   the   rates   determined   by   the   Civil Court   in   relation   to   Jirayat   and   Bagayat   lands appeared to be on higher side and hence need to be reduced.   Accordingly,   the   rate   of   Jirayat   land   was reduced   from   Rs.1,69,231/­   per   hectare   to   Rs. 1,26,924/­ per hectare and the rate of Bagayat land was   reduced   from   Rs.2,11,539/­   per   hectare   to Rs.1,58,655/­   per   hectare   by   the   High   Court.   The marginal reduction of the rates in two types of land, 1 which is based on cogent reasoning of the High Court, cannot, therefore, be faulted with.     30. In view of the foregoing discussion, we find no merit in these appeals. The appeals are accordingly dismissed.           ………...................................J.         [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]                                       …...……..................................J.                 [INDU MALHOTRA] New Delhi; July 17, 2019 1