Full Judgment Text
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 6
PETITIONER:
1. GAURAV JAIN, 2. SUPREME COURT BAR ASSOCIATION
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 30/03/1998
BENCH:
SUJATA V.MANOHAR, S.P. KURDUKAR, D.P. WADHWA
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
Mrs. Sujata V. Manohar, J.
This is a somewhat unusual review petition filed by the
Supreme Court Bar Association and supported by Gaurav Jain,
the original petitioner, in respect of a decision of a Bench
of two judges of this court, Ramaswamy and Wadhwa, JJ. in
writ petition (c) No. 824 of 1988, Gaurav Jain v. Union of
India & Ors. and reported in 1997 (8) SCC 114. By an order
dated 5th of January, 1998 this review petition has been
directed to be heard by a Bench of there judges of this
Court. Hence the petition has been placed before us.
The original writ petition under Article 32 of the
constitution was filed as a public interest litigation by
Gaurav Jain, an advocate of this Court. In the writ
petition, the petitioner had asked for establishment of
separate educational institutions for t he children of
prostitutes and for various other reliefs concerning
children of prostitutes. The petition was heard and disposed
of by a Bench of two judges - Ramaswamy and Wadhwa, JJ. in
the judgment delivered by Ramaswamy, j., apart from a
discussion of the plight of prostitutes and their children,
various directions have ben given, including directions for
the constitution of a committee as set out in the judgment,
to examine the plight of children of the prostitutes as also
the problems of the prostitutes themselves and to devise
ways and means for amelioration of their condition and for
prevention and eradication of prostitution. On the other
hand, wadhwa, J. in his judgment, while agreeing with the
directions given by ramaswamy, J. pertaining to the children
of the prostitutes, has not agreed to the directions given
in respect of eradication of prostitution or succour and
sustenance to be provided to them. He has stated:
" The committee in its report which
runs into over 100 pages has only
referred in two paragraphs, while
examining target group, as to who
are the prostitutes. Apart from
this I do not find there is any
discussion in the report of the
Committee towards eradication of
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 6
prostitution. As to what should be
the scheme to be evolved to
eradicate prostitution, i.e. the
source itself; the basics ; and
what succour and sustenance can be
provided to the fallen victims of
flesh trade was not a question
agitated in the proceedings,
Certainly no one can dispute that
evil of prostitution must be
curbed. It is the mandate of the
Constitution which prohibits
traffic in human beings.....
I am not entering into the
scope and width of public interest
litigation but when the issue has
not been squarely raised, concerned
parties not informed, pleadings
being not there, it may not be
correct to embark upon that task
and to give interpretation of the
law applicable thereto and that too
without hearing the parties when
the issue is so profound certainly
involving the issue is so profound
certainly involving hearing of the
Union of India and State
Governments with respect to their
problems.
Thus considering the
substratum of the judgment prepared
by my learned brother relating to
children of the prostitutes and
establishment of the juvenile homes
I would concur with the directions
being issued by him in his order. I
would, however, record my
respectful dissent on the question
of prostitution and the directions
proposed to be issued on that
account and also, in the
circumstances of the case, what my
learned brother has to say on the
directions proposed to be issued
referring to the provisions of to
be issued referring to the
provisions of Article 142 and
145(5) of the Constitution"
[underlining ours]
Despite this clear dissent voiced by his brother judge,
Ramaswamy, J. has given directions relating to prostitution
and its eradication. He has held that under Article 32 of
the Constitution, when a public interest litigation is
launched, it cannot be considered as adversorial. it
involves cooperation between the State and the Court. Had it
been an adversorial dispute, in view of the dissent
expressed by his brother judge, he would have referred the
matter to a three judge Bench in respect of the directions
on which he and his brother judge had differed. However,
since the petition was public interest litigation and was
not adversorial in nature, and since the matter was pending
for nearly a decade, if a reference were to be made to a
three-judge Bench, it may be further delayed. Therefore,
under Article 142 he could issue directions to enforce his
order in its entirety even in respect of that portion of the
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 6
order from which his brother judge had dissented, in order
to do complete justice in the case. By availing of Article
142, a Single Judge sitting in a Division Bench of two
judges has issued directions singly although there is a
difference of opinion between him and his brother judge. It
is this part of his order which is sought to be reviewed on
the ground that it discloses and error apparent on the face
of the record.
Article 145(1) of the Constitution provides that
subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament, the
supreme Court may, from time to time, with the approval of
the President, make rules for regulating generally the
practice and procedure of the court. The Supreme Court Rules
have been framed under this provision. Under clause (2) of
Article 145, subject to the provisions of clause (3), rules
made this Article may fix the minimum number of judges who
are to sit for any purpose, and may provide for the powers
of single judges and Division Courts. Clause (5) of Article
145 provides as follows:
" 145(5): NO judgment and no such
opinion shall b delivered by the
Supreme Court save with the
concurrence of a majority of the
judges present at the hearing of
the case, but nothing in this
clause shall be deemed to prevent a
judge who does not concur from
delivering a dissenting judgment or
opinion."
In view of Article 145(5) the concurrence of a majority
of judges present at the hearing of a case is necessary for
any judgment or order. When a Bench consists of two judges
and they differ, the correct procedure is to refer the
matter to the Chief justice for constituting a larger bench.
Under Order VII Rule 1 of the Supreme Court rules, 1966,
subject to the other provisions of these rules, every cause,
appeal or matter shall be heard by a Bench consisting of not
less than two judges nominated by the Chief Justice subject
to certain provisos. Rule 2 of Order VII provides that
where, in the course of the hearing of any cause, appeal or
other proceeding, the Bench considers that the matter should
be dealt with by a larger Bench, it shall refer the matter
to the chief Justice, who shall thereupon constitute such a
Bench for the hearing of it. Order XXXV deals with
applications for enforcement of fundamental rights under
Article 32 of the Constitution. Rule 1 of Order XXXV
provides as follows:
"1. (1): Every petition under
Article 35 of theConstitution shall
be in writing and shall be heard by
a Division Court of not less than
five judges provided that a
petition which does not raise a
substantial question of law as to
the interpretation of the
constitution may be heard and
decided by a Division court of less
than five judges, and, during
vacation, by the Vacation Judge
sitting singly."
Rules 10 (1) and (2) of Order XXXV are as follows:
" 10(1) : Unless the court
otherwise orders, the rule nisi
together with a copy of the
petition and of the affidavit in
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 6
support thereof shall be served on
the respondent not less than
twenty-one days before the
returnable persons directly
affected and on such other persons
as the Court may direct.
(2) Affidavits in opposition shall
be filed in the Registry not later
than four days before the
returnable date and affidavits in
reply shall be filed within two
days of the service of the
affidavit in opposition."
Therefore, counter affidavits can be filed by the
respondents in a public interest litigation, and further
affidavits in rejoinder etc. can also be filed.
There is no provision under Order XXXV for any special
procedure in respect of a public interest petition under
Article 32. The petition will have to be served on the
respondents who have a right to file a counter affidavit.
Although the proceedings in a public interest litigation may
not be adversorial in a given case, there can clearly be
different perceptions of the same problem or its solution
and the respondents are entitled to put forth their own view
before the Court which may or may not coincide with the view
of the petitioner. The court may come to a view different
from that of any of the parties. Therefore, even in a public
interest litigation, if the members of the Bench hold
different views, the provisions of Article 145(5) will apply
and the matter will have to be decided by a majority. When a
Bench consists of two judges and they differ, the matter
must necessarily be referred to the Chief justice for
constituting a larger Bench. In fact this legal position is
expressly noted by Ramaswamy, J. However, he has taken the
view that despite the provisions of Article 145(5), he can
take the assistance of Article 142 for the purpose of
issuing directions even though his brother judge has
differed from these directions.
We do not find any thing in Article 142 which enables
the court to do so. Article 142 provides as follows:
" 142. Enforcement of decrees and
orders of Supreme court and orders
as to discovery, etc.-
(1) The Supreme Court in the
exercise of its jurisdiction may
pass such decree or make such order
as is necessary for doing complete
justice in any cause or matter
pending before it, and any decree
so passed or order so made shall b
enforceable throughout the
territory of India in such manner
as may be prescribed by or under
any law made by parliament and,
until provision in that behalf is
so made, in such manner as the
president may by order prescribe.
(2) .................... "
It does not and cannot override Article 145(5). The
decrees or orders issued under Article 142 must be issued
with the concurrence of the majority of judges hearing the
matter. In the case of Prem Chand Garg and Anr. v. Excise
Commissioner, U.P. and Ors. ( AIR 1963 SC 996) , a Bench of
five judges of this Court considered a Rule made by this
Court providing for imposition of terms as to costs and as
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 6
to giving of security in a petition under Article 32. The
Rule was sought to be justified, inter alia, on the ground
that the powers conferred on this Court under Article 142
were very wide and could not be controlled by Article 32.
Negativing this contention, this Court said, "The powers of
this Court under Article 142(1) are no doubt very wide and
they are intended and would be exercised in the interest of
justice. But that is not to say that an order can be made by
this Court which is inconsistent with the fundamental rights
guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. An order which
this Court can make in order to do complete justice between
the parties must not only be consistent with the fundamental
rights guaranteed by the Constitution but it cannot even be
inconsistent with the substantive provisions of the relevant
statutory laws. Therefore, we do not think it would be
possible to hold that Article 142(1) confers upon this Court
powers which can contravene the provisions of Article 32".
Similarly, powers conferred by Article 14291) also cannot
contravene the provisions of Article 145(5). Article 142
would not entitle a judge sitting on a Bench of two judges,
who differs from his colleague to issue directions for the
enforcement of his order although it may not be the agreed
order of the Bench of two judges. If this were to be
permitted, it would lead to conflicting directions being
issued by each judge under Article 142, directions which may
quite possibly nullify the directions given by another judge
on the same Bench. This would put the court in an untenable
position. Because if in a Bench of two judges, one judge can
resort to Article 142 for enforcement of his directions, the
second judge can do likewise for the enforcement of his
directions. And even in a larger Bench, a judge holding a
minority view can issue his order under Article 142 although
it may conflict with the order issued by the majority. This
would put this Court in an indefensible situation and lead
to total confusion. Article 142 is not meant for such a
purpose and cannot be resorted to in this fashion.
The learned judge is in error in resorting to Article
142 for the purpose of enforcement of his directions
although his brother judge has dissented from those
directions. The justification which is put forward for
resorting to Article 142 is that reference to a larger Bench
would cause delay. This cannot be a ground for not following
the provisions of the Constitution under Article 145.
Whenever a matter has to be referred to a larger Bench,
there is bound to be some delay. But such a reference is
necessary in the interest of justice. It is necessary that
the Court speaks with one voice and that voice is the voice
of the majority as propounded in Article 145(5). Only then
can its orders be enforced. When two judges differ, the
matter will have to be decided by a larger Bench.
We, therefore, allow this review petition. The
directions given by the learned judge relating to
prostitution and/or its amelioration or eradication or set
aside. This, however, should not be understood as preventing
the Union or State Governments from formulating their own
policies in this area or taking measures to implement them.
His observations relating to the use of Article 142 in this
connection are also set aside and the question of giving any
directions in relation to prostitution, its eradication or
amelioration will have to be placed before a larger bench if
any directions are required to be given in that connection
by this Court. The matter should be placed before the
Hon’ble the Chief Justice for considering whether a larger
Bench should be constituted for this purpose.
In view of this order, the application filed by the
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 6
Union of India - I.A. No. 1 is not pressed. It is
accordingly disposed of.