Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
STATE TRADING CORPORATIONOF INDIA LTD.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF MYSORE
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
28/08/1962
BENCH:
SARKAR, A.K.
BENCH:
SARKAR, A.K.
DAS, S.K.
KAPUR, J.L.
HIDAYATULLAH, M.
DAYAL, RAGHUBAR
CITATION:
1967 AIR 585
CITATOR INFO :
R 1971 SC 870 (13,14)
ACT:
Sales Tax-Supply made to purchasers within the State from
factories outside the State-If inter-State sale-Central
Sales Tax Act, 1956(74 of 1956), s.3-Constitution of India,
as amended by the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act, 1956
Arts . 286(2), 269(1)(g), Entry 92A of List I, 19(1)(f) 31.
HEADNOTE:
Clause (1) of Art. 269 of the Constitution as amended by the
Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act, 1956, which came into
force on September 11, 1956, provided that "The
following... ..taxes shall be levied and collected by the
Government of India (g) taxes on the sale of goods other
than newspapers, where such sale . ..takes place in the
course of Inter-State trade. . . . . . " Clause (3) of that
article provided that "Parliament may by law formulate
principles for determining when a sale takes place in the
course of inter-State trade.. .." By s. 3 of the Central
Sales Tax Act, passed by Parliament on December 21, 1956, it
was provided that "A sale shall be deemed to take place in
the course of inter-State trade if the sale (a) occasions
the movement of goods from one State to another. "
In 1957-58 the C. Company made various sales of cement which
were supplied from factories outside the State of Mysore to
purchasers within that State The State of Mysore levied tax
on these sales under two Sales Tax Acts passed by the Mysore
legislature. The C. Company applied under Art.32 of the
Constitution to quash the assessment orders on the ground
that Mysore State had no power to tax the sales as they had
taken place in the course of inter-State trade.
Held, that a sale occasions the movement of goods from one
State to another within s.3(a) of the Central Sales Tax Act
when the movement is the result of a covenant or incident of
the contract of sale.
Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. S. R. Sarkar, [1961], 1
S.C.R. 379, followed.
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As the sales were made under permits issued by the
Government and on the terms contained in them, and as the
permits provided that the supply had to be made from
factories outside State of Mysore the contracts of sale must
be deemed to have contained a covenant that the goods would
be supplied in Mysore from a place situate outside its
borders. The Sales were, therefore, inter-State sales
within s.3(a) of the Central Sales Tax Act which a State
could not tax in view of Art. 269 of the Constitution.
The taxing officer had no jurisdiction to tax inter-State
sales in view of the Constitutional Prohibition and he could
not give himself jurisdiction to do so by deciding a
collateral fact wrongly. ’the petitions are, therefore, not
incompetent under the principle laid down In Ujjain Bai’s
case.
Ujjam Bai v. The State of Uttar Pradesh [1963] I S.C.R.778
held inapplicable.
JUDGMENT:
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Petitions Nos. 65 and 66 of 1960.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for
enforcement of Fundamental Rights.)
R. J. Kolah, J. B. Dadachanji, O. C. Mathur and Ravinder
Narain for the Petitioners.
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor General of India,
R. Gopalakrishnan and P. D. Memon for the respondents.
1962. August 28. The Judgement of the court was delivered
by
SARKAR, J.-These are two Petitions under Art. 32 of the
Constitution asking for writs to quash certain assessment
orders impossing sales tax and for consequential reliefs
preventing the levy and collection of that tax. The
petitioners allege that the assessment orders are wholly
void and therefore affect their fundamental rights under
Art. 19 (1) (f) and Art. 31.
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There are two petitioners in each case, the first being the
State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. and the second, the
Cement Marketing Company of India Ltd. There are also two
respondents in each petition, the first of whom is the State
of Mysore which through one of its officers, the second
respondent, passed the assessment orders imposing the tax.
The impugned assessment orders were made on the Marketing
Company in respect of certain sales of cement made by it in
the year 1957,58. The petitioners say that the Marketing
Company made those sales as agent of the Trading
Corporation. Whether this is correct or not is not strictly
relevant in this case for the Marketing Company does not
deny its liability to be taxed as the agent of the
Corporation. The only dispute is whether the sales in which
the goods were moved from outside the State of Mysore into
it were liable to be taxed. The petitioners contend that
they were not so liable as they were sales made in the
course of inter-State trade, which no law of a State
legislature could tax.
Though the assessment year was one, namely, 1957-58, there
were two assessment orders. That was because in that year
there were in force in Mysore two Sales Tax Acts, namely,
the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1948, and the Mysore Sales Tax
Act, 1957, the latter of which repealed the earlier with
effect from October 1, 1957. The disputed sales which took
place between April 1, 1957, and September 30, 1957, were
taxed under the 1948 Act and those that took place between
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October 1, 1957, and March 31, 1958, under the 1957 Act.
Both the assessment orders are challenged by the
petitioners.
The tax was levied under State laws. Now Art. 286(2) of the
Constitution as originally framed laid down that except in
so far as Parliament by law
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otherwise provided, a State could not pass a law taxing an
inter-State sale or purchase. This provision was deleted by
the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act, 1956, which came
into force on September 11, 1956. The Constitution (Sixth
Amendmant) Act also amended Art. 269, the relevant portion
of which after such amendment reads as follows :
Art. 269 (1) "The following duties and
taxes shall be levied and collected by the
Government of India...............
(2) taxes on the sale or purchase of goods
other than Newspapers, where such sale or
purchase takes place in the course of inter-
State trade or commerce.........
(3) Parliament may by law formulate princi-
ples for determining when a sale or purchase
of goods takes place in the course of inter-
State trade or commerce.
The Constitution Amendment Act had also amended the Seventh
Schedule by adding item 92A to List I and thereby giving the
Union the power to tax sales or purchases of goods other
than newspapers made in the course of inter-State trade or
commerce and by substituting for old item 54 in List II anew
item which gave the State the power to tax all sales or
purchases of goods other than newspapers subject to entry
92A of List I. Since this amendment of the Constitution
therefore the States can not tax an inter-State sale or
purchase.
On December 21, 1962. Parliament passed the Central Sales
Tax Act, s.3 of which defined an inter-State sale. This
section came into force on January 5, 1957. The taxing
provisions of this Act however came into force much later
but with them we are not concerned in these , oases.
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The whole of the assessment year 1957-58 was after a. 3 of
the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 had come into force. During
that year, therefore, the State could not tax a sale which
was an interState sale as defined in s. 3 of the Central
Sales Tax Act. That section defined an inter-State sale in
two ways one of which is in these terms: " A sale or
purchase of goods shall be deemed to take place in the
course of inter State trade or commerce if the sale or
purchase-(a) occasions the movement of goods from one state
to another." The petitioners contend that the disputed sales
were of this variety and the respondent, therefore, could
not tax them.
The question then is, did the sales occasion the movement of
cement from another State into Mysore within the meaning of
the definition ? In Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. S.R.
Sarkar(1) it was held that a sale occasions the movement of
goods from one State to another within s. 3 (a) of the
Central Sales Tax Act, when the movement is the result of a
covenant or incident of the contract of sale". That the
cement concerned in the disputed sales was actually moved
from another State into Mysore in not denied. The
respondents only contend that the movement was not the
result of a covenant in or an incident of the contract of
sale.
The result of this appeal will therefore turn on whether the
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movement of cement from another State into Mysore was the
result of a covenant in the contract of sale or an incident
of such contract. This question will depend on the contract
and in order properly ’to appreciate the contract the
procedure of the sales, as to which there is no dispute, has
to be referred to. Now, at the relevant time cement could
be purchased only under a
(1) [1961] 1 S.C.R. 379,391.
797
permit issued by the Government and on the terms contained
in it. This, it seems, was the result of certain statutory
provisions. All the sales with which we are concerned were
under such permits. Unfortunately the petitioners did not
disclose in their petitions any specimen copy of a permit.
As however the existence of the permits was not in dispute
and had been mentioned in the petitions, the petitioners
were allowed at the hearing to produce a specimen copy of a
permit which was accepted by the respondents as a correct
specimen. It appears from the specimen produced that a
cement factory which was required to supply the cement
covered by the permit was named in it. We are concerned
with sales in which the permits required supplies to be made
from factories outside Mysore. These permits were issued to
the purchasers and the supplier named in them was the
Marketing Company. On receipt of the permit the purchaser
placed an order with the Marketing Company and later a firm
contract with it was made.
In making the orders of assessment, the Taxing Officer
observed that the firm contracts did not provide for any
supplies being made from any particular factory and the
supplies had actually been made from factories outside the
State of Mysore only to suit the convenience of the
supplier, the Marketing Company, and not because of any
covenant in the contracts. It is true that the written
contracts did not themselves contain any covenant that the
supply had to be made from any particular factory but it
seems to us that the agreement between the parties was not
fully set out ill them. In any case each contract was
subject to the terms of the permit to which it expressly
referred. As it is not in dispute that the sale could only
be under a permit and on the terms contained in it, a
contract has to be read as subject to it. Since
798
the permits with which we are concerned provided that the
supply had to be made from one or other factory situate
outside Mysore. the contracts must be deemed to have
contained a covenant that the goods would be supplied in
Mysore from a place situate outside it borders. A sale
under such a contract would clearly be an inter-State sale
as defined in s. 3(a) of the Central Sales Tax Act. In view
of the provisions of the Constitution and the Central Sales
Tax Act earlier referred to a State could not impose a tax
on such a sale. Therefore it seems to us that the petition
should succeed.
It was however said that the petitions were incompetent in
view of our decision in Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar
Pradesh (1) in as much as the Taxing Officers under the
Mysore Acts had jurisdiction to decide whether a particular
sale was an Inter-State sale or not and any error committed
by them as quasi-judicial tribunals in exercise of such
jurisdiction did not offend any fundamental right. But we
think that that case its clearly distinguishable. Das, J.,
there stated that "if a quasi-judicial authority acts
without jurisdiction or wrongly assumes jurisdiction by
committing an error as to a collateral fact and the
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resultant action threatens or violates a fundamental right,
the question of enforcement of that right arises and a
petition under Art. 32 will lie."’ He also said that where a
statute is intra-vires but the action taken is with. out
jurisdiction, then a petition under Art. 32 would be
competent. That is the case here. There is no dispute that
the Taxing Officer had no jurisdiction to tax inter-State
sales, there being a constitutional prohibition against a
State taxing them. He could not give himself jurisdiction
to do so by deciding a collateral fact wrongly. That is
what he seems to have done here. Therefore we think
(1) (1963) 1 S.C.R. 778.
799
the decision in Ujjam Bai’s case (1), is not applicable to
the present case and the petitions are fully competent.
The result is that the petitions are allowed and we direct
that appropriate writs be issued quashing the orders of
assesment mentioned in the petitions and restraining the
respondents from levying or collecting the tax in respect of
sales mentioned in the petitions in which the goods moved
from outside into Mysore. There will be Do order for costs
as the petitioners had omited to disclose to permits and had
not in the petitions stated their case as clearly as it
could have been done. As they had been granted some
indulgence we think it right to deprive them of the costs of
these petition,
Petitions allowed.
(1) (1963) 1 S.C.R. 778.
800