Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
2025 INSC 379
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
(Arising out of SLP(C) NO.5505 of 2020)
YOGESH KUMAR …APPELLANT
VERSUS
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
AND OTHERS …RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
B.R. GAVAI, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The appeal is taken up for hearing.
3. This appeal challenges the judgment and order dated
th
16 May 2019 passed by the Division Bench of the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad (hereinafter, “High Court”)
in Special Appeal Defective No.456 of 2019, vide which the
appeal filed by the appellant herein challenging the order
passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court dated
rd
23 May 2018 came to be dismissed.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
NARENDRA PRASAD
Date: 2025.03.21
16:40:13 IST
Reason:
4. The facts, shorn of unnecessary details, giving rise to
the present appeal are as under:
1
4.1 The appellant, in response to the advertisement issued
by the District Court, Saharanpur, had applied for the post of
Stenographer. The appellant along with the other six
persons, who were found suitable in the selection process
were appointed to the post of Stenographer and assumed
th
their charge on 16 April 2002. However, subsequently it
was found that the number of posts advertised was only
three and four additional persons including the appellant
herein were appointed in excess. They were, therefore, issued
show cause notices, calling upon them to show cause as to
th
why their appointment should not be terminated. On 28
February 2005, the District Judge passed an order
terminating the services of the appellant herein and three
others.
4.2 Being aggrieved by the termination, the appellant herein
and three others approached the learned Single Judge of the
High Court, by way of Writ Petition No.43168 of 2005. Vide
th
order dated 17 May 2012, the said writ petition came to be
dismissed. An intra court appeal being Special Appeal
No.1180 of 2012 was also dismissed. Being aggrieved
thereby, the appellant herein approached this Court by way
2
of a Special Leave Petition(C) No.26959 of 2012.
st
4.3 This Court vide order dated 21 September 2012
dismissed the special leave petition filed by the appellant
herein and others, in the following terms:-
“Heard.
We do not see any reason to interfere with the
impugned order. The Special Leave Petition is
dismissed.
Learned counsel for the petitioners at this
stage submits that the petitioners were not paid
salary for a period of 8 years even though they had
worked as stenographers. He seeks liberty for the
petitioners to claim payment of salary for the period
they have worked. We make it clear that the
dismissal of this special leave petition shall not
prevent the petitioners from seeking any such relief
in an appropriate civil action. We express no
opinion as to the maintainability of any such action,
or the tenability of the proposed claim.”
4.4 It appears that thereafter the appellant and others made
representation before the District Judge, Saharanpur for
payment of their salary for the period during which they had
worked. The said representation came to be rejected. Being
aggrieved thereby, the appellant and others preferred Writ
Petition No.26698 of 2015 before the learned Single Judge.
rd
The said petition was dismissed vide order dated 23 May
2018. An intra court appeal being Special Appeal Defective
3
No.456 of 2019 was carried thereagainst, which was also
dismissed. Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeal by
th
way of special leave has been filed. Vide order dated 28
February 2020, notice was issued by this Court.
5. We have heard Dr. L.S. Chaudhary, learned counsel for
the appellant and Shri Vishal Meghwal for respondent
No.2/High Court of Judicature at Allahabad.
6. Dr. L.S. Chaudhary, learned counsel for the appellant,
submits that the learned Single Judge of the High Court as
well as the Division Bench have taken a totally erroneous
approach in rejecting the claim of the appellant. It is
submitted that it is not disputed that the appellant and
others had actually put in their services for eight years. It is
also submitted that even the learned Single Judge of the
High Court has accepted the position that the appellant and
others had actually worked for eight years. However, the
relief is denied to the appellant and others on the ground
that this Court had observed that insofar as the payment of
salary is concerned, the appellant and others were entitled to
take recourse to an appropriate civil action. It is submitted
that the approach of the learned Single Judge in non-suiting
4
the appellant, since the writ court was not a civil court, is
totally erroneous.
7. Shri Vishal Meghwal, learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the High Court, vehemently opposes this appeal.
He submits that the appellant and others have lost up to this
Court in the first round of litigation. It is submitted that the
liberty that was granted by this Court was to take recourse to
an appropriate civil action. Since the appellant and others
rather than filing an appropriate action before a Civil Court
had made a representation to the learned District Judge. The
learned District Judge had rightly rejected the said claim. For
the very same reasons, it is submitted that the High Court
was justified in rejecting the petition as well as the appeal of
the appellant herein and others.
8. The facts in the present case are not in dispute. The
appellant and others had applied in pursuance to the
advertisement issued by the District Court, Saharanpur.
However, it appears that though at the relevant time, there
were only three regular vacancies, since the Fast Track
Courts were functioning, the appellant and others were
appointed to work in the Fast Track Courts. Subsequently,
5
after the Fast Track Courts seized to function, the services of
the appellant and others appeared to have been terminated.
9. No doubt that the termination of the appellant has been
upheld by the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench
of the High Court as well as by this Court in the first round.
However, this Court has specifically clarified that the
dismissal of the special leave petition shall not prevent the
appellant and others from seeking any such relief in an
appropriate civil action.
10. The High Court has non-suited the appellant and others
on the ground that an appropriate civil action would mean
the proceedings only before a Civil Court. The learned Single
Judge has elaborated on as to what would amount to a ‘civil
action’ by referring to the Advanced Law Lexicon.
11. No doubt that the learned Single Judge has correctly
considered the definition of a ‘civil action’; but, in our view,
while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, the Court is not expected to be hyper-
technical.
12. The position that the appellant and others had, in fact,
put in eight years of service is not disputed by anyone at all.
6
Much before the judgment of the learned Single Judge was
rd
delivered on 23 May 2018, this Court in the case of ABL
International Ltd. and Another v. Export Credit
1
Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd. and Others
has
held that even in case of disputed questions of fact, the High
Court would be justified in entertaining a petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It has been held that
even in cases where there are disputed questions of fact,
where such disputes can be decided on the basis of an
affidavit evidence and no elaborate evidence is required to be
led, the High Court would be justified in granting a relief
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
13. In any case, the State as well as the High Courts are
expected to be model litigants. The High Court is not
expected to take a hyper-technical view, when dealing with
the case of payment of salary of the employees of the District
Judiciary, who have actually put in eight years of service.
The law laid down by this Court in the case of ABL
International (supra) has been subsequently followed by
this Court in the cases of Zonal Manager, Central Bank of
1
(2004) 3 SCC 553
7
2
India v. Devi Ispat Limited and Others , Real Estate
3
Agencies v. State of Goa and Others , Popatrao
4
Vyankatrao Patil v. State of Maharashtra and Others ,
Unitech Limited and Others v. Telangana State
Industrial Infrastructure Corporation (TSIIC) and
5
Others , National Company represented by its Managing
Partner v. Territory Manager, Bharat Petroleum
6
Corporation Limited and Another and State of Uttar
7
Pradesh v. Sudhir Kumar Singh and Others .
14. In that view of the matter, we find that the judgment
passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned
judgment and order passed by the learned Division Bench
are not at all sustainable in law.
15. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. The impugned
th
judgment and order dated 16 May 2019 passed by the
Division Bench of the High Court and the judgment and
rd
order dated 23 May 2018 passed by the learned Single
Judge of the High Court are set aside.
2
(2010) 11 SCC 186 : 2010 INSC 462
3
(2012) 12 SCC 170 : 2012 INSC 387
4
(2020) 19 SCC 241 : 2020 INSC 183
5
(2021) 16 SCC 35 : 2021 INSC 96
6
(2021) 13 SCC 121 : 2021 INSC 714
7
(2021) 19 SCC 706 2020 INSC 603
8
16. The respondents are directed to pay the salary of the
appellant herein and other similarly circumstances persons
for the period during which they have actually worked in the
District Court. The same shall be paid within a period of
three months from today, along with interest at the rate of
6% per annum from the date on which the salaries ought to
have been paid to them.
17. We further find that since the appellant herein and
others who were made to run from one Court to another,
specifically after 2012 i.e. the date on which the order was
passed by this Court, the appellant would also be entitled to
costs quantified at Rs.1 lakh, to be paid within three months
from today.
18. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
..............................J.
(B.R. GAVAI)
............................................J.
(AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH)
NEW DELHI;
MARCH 18, 2025.
9
2025 INSC 379
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
(Arising out of SLP(C) NO.5505 of 2020)
YOGESH KUMAR …APPELLANT
VERSUS
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
AND OTHERS …RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
B.R. GAVAI, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The appeal is taken up for hearing.
3. This appeal challenges the judgment and order dated
th
16 May 2019 passed by the Division Bench of the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad (hereinafter, “High Court”)
in Special Appeal Defective No.456 of 2019, vide which the
appeal filed by the appellant herein challenging the order
passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court dated
rd
23 May 2018 came to be dismissed.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
NARENDRA PRASAD
Date: 2025.03.21
16:40:13 IST
Reason:
4. The facts, shorn of unnecessary details, giving rise to
the present appeal are as under:
1
4.1 The appellant, in response to the advertisement issued
by the District Court, Saharanpur, had applied for the post of
Stenographer. The appellant along with the other six
persons, who were found suitable in the selection process
were appointed to the post of Stenographer and assumed
th
their charge on 16 April 2002. However, subsequently it
was found that the number of posts advertised was only
three and four additional persons including the appellant
herein were appointed in excess. They were, therefore, issued
show cause notices, calling upon them to show cause as to
th
why their appointment should not be terminated. On 28
February 2005, the District Judge passed an order
terminating the services of the appellant herein and three
others.
4.2 Being aggrieved by the termination, the appellant herein
and three others approached the learned Single Judge of the
High Court, by way of Writ Petition No.43168 of 2005. Vide
th
order dated 17 May 2012, the said writ petition came to be
dismissed. An intra court appeal being Special Appeal
No.1180 of 2012 was also dismissed. Being aggrieved
thereby, the appellant herein approached this Court by way
2
of a Special Leave Petition(C) No.26959 of 2012.
st
4.3 This Court vide order dated 21 September 2012
dismissed the special leave petition filed by the appellant
herein and others, in the following terms:-
“Heard.
We do not see any reason to interfere with the
impugned order. The Special Leave Petition is
dismissed.
Learned counsel for the petitioners at this
stage submits that the petitioners were not paid
salary for a period of 8 years even though they had
worked as stenographers. He seeks liberty for the
petitioners to claim payment of salary for the period
they have worked. We make it clear that the
dismissal of this special leave petition shall not
prevent the petitioners from seeking any such relief
in an appropriate civil action. We express no
opinion as to the maintainability of any such action,
or the tenability of the proposed claim.”
4.4 It appears that thereafter the appellant and others made
representation before the District Judge, Saharanpur for
payment of their salary for the period during which they had
worked. The said representation came to be rejected. Being
aggrieved thereby, the appellant and others preferred Writ
Petition No.26698 of 2015 before the learned Single Judge.
rd
The said petition was dismissed vide order dated 23 May
2018. An intra court appeal being Special Appeal Defective
3
No.456 of 2019 was carried thereagainst, which was also
dismissed. Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeal by
th
way of special leave has been filed. Vide order dated 28
February 2020, notice was issued by this Court.
5. We have heard Dr. L.S. Chaudhary, learned counsel for
the appellant and Shri Vishal Meghwal for respondent
No.2/High Court of Judicature at Allahabad.
6. Dr. L.S. Chaudhary, learned counsel for the appellant,
submits that the learned Single Judge of the High Court as
well as the Division Bench have taken a totally erroneous
approach in rejecting the claim of the appellant. It is
submitted that it is not disputed that the appellant and
others had actually put in their services for eight years. It is
also submitted that even the learned Single Judge of the
High Court has accepted the position that the appellant and
others had actually worked for eight years. However, the
relief is denied to the appellant and others on the ground
that this Court had observed that insofar as the payment of
salary is concerned, the appellant and others were entitled to
take recourse to an appropriate civil action. It is submitted
that the approach of the learned Single Judge in non-suiting
4
the appellant, since the writ court was not a civil court, is
totally erroneous.
7. Shri Vishal Meghwal, learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the High Court, vehemently opposes this appeal.
He submits that the appellant and others have lost up to this
Court in the first round of litigation. It is submitted that the
liberty that was granted by this Court was to take recourse to
an appropriate civil action. Since the appellant and others
rather than filing an appropriate action before a Civil Court
had made a representation to the learned District Judge. The
learned District Judge had rightly rejected the said claim. For
the very same reasons, it is submitted that the High Court
was justified in rejecting the petition as well as the appeal of
the appellant herein and others.
8. The facts in the present case are not in dispute. The
appellant and others had applied in pursuance to the
advertisement issued by the District Court, Saharanpur.
However, it appears that though at the relevant time, there
were only three regular vacancies, since the Fast Track
Courts were functioning, the appellant and others were
appointed to work in the Fast Track Courts. Subsequently,
5
after the Fast Track Courts seized to function, the services of
the appellant and others appeared to have been terminated.
9. No doubt that the termination of the appellant has been
upheld by the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench
of the High Court as well as by this Court in the first round.
However, this Court has specifically clarified that the
dismissal of the special leave petition shall not prevent the
appellant and others from seeking any such relief in an
appropriate civil action.
10. The High Court has non-suited the appellant and others
on the ground that an appropriate civil action would mean
the proceedings only before a Civil Court. The learned Single
Judge has elaborated on as to what would amount to a ‘civil
action’ by referring to the Advanced Law Lexicon.
11. No doubt that the learned Single Judge has correctly
considered the definition of a ‘civil action’; but, in our view,
while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, the Court is not expected to be hyper-
technical.
12. The position that the appellant and others had, in fact,
put in eight years of service is not disputed by anyone at all.
6
Much before the judgment of the learned Single Judge was
rd
delivered on 23 May 2018, this Court in the case of ABL
International Ltd. and Another v. Export Credit
1
Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd. and Others
has
held that even in case of disputed questions of fact, the High
Court would be justified in entertaining a petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It has been held that
even in cases where there are disputed questions of fact,
where such disputes can be decided on the basis of an
affidavit evidence and no elaborate evidence is required to be
led, the High Court would be justified in granting a relief
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
13. In any case, the State as well as the High Courts are
expected to be model litigants. The High Court is not
expected to take a hyper-technical view, when dealing with
the case of payment of salary of the employees of the District
Judiciary, who have actually put in eight years of service.
The law laid down by this Court in the case of ABL
International (supra) has been subsequently followed by
this Court in the cases of Zonal Manager, Central Bank of
1
(2004) 3 SCC 553
7
2
India v. Devi Ispat Limited and Others , Real Estate
3
Agencies v. State of Goa and Others , Popatrao
4
Vyankatrao Patil v. State of Maharashtra and Others ,
Unitech Limited and Others v. Telangana State
Industrial Infrastructure Corporation (TSIIC) and
5
Others , National Company represented by its Managing
Partner v. Territory Manager, Bharat Petroleum
6
Corporation Limited and Another and State of Uttar
7
Pradesh v. Sudhir Kumar Singh and Others .
14. In that view of the matter, we find that the judgment
passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the impugned
judgment and order passed by the learned Division Bench
are not at all sustainable in law.
15. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. The impugned
th
judgment and order dated 16 May 2019 passed by the
Division Bench of the High Court and the judgment and
rd
order dated 23 May 2018 passed by the learned Single
Judge of the High Court are set aside.
2
(2010) 11 SCC 186 : 2010 INSC 462
3
(2012) 12 SCC 170 : 2012 INSC 387
4
(2020) 19 SCC 241 : 2020 INSC 183
5
(2021) 16 SCC 35 : 2021 INSC 96
6
(2021) 13 SCC 121 : 2021 INSC 714
7
(2021) 19 SCC 706 2020 INSC 603
8
16. The respondents are directed to pay the salary of the
appellant herein and other similarly circumstances persons
for the period during which they have actually worked in the
District Court. The same shall be paid within a period of
three months from today, along with interest at the rate of
6% per annum from the date on which the salaries ought to
have been paid to them.
17. We further find that since the appellant herein and
others who were made to run from one Court to another,
specifically after 2012 i.e. the date on which the order was
passed by this Court, the appellant would also be entitled to
costs quantified at Rs.1 lakh, to be paid within three months
from today.
18. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
..............................J.
(B.R. GAVAI)
............................................J.
(AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH)
NEW DELHI;
MARCH 18, 2025.
9